Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-shim6-applicability

draft-ietf-shim6-applicability






shim6 Working Group                                             J. Abley
Internet-Draft                                                     ICANN
Intended status: Informational                                M. Bagnulo
Expires: April 28, 2011                               A. Garcia-Martinez
                                                                    UC3M
                                                        October 25, 2010


   Applicability Statement for the Level 3 Multihoming Shim Protocol
                                (Shim6)
                   draft-ietf-shim6-applicability-08

Abstract

   This document discusses the applicability of the Shim6 IPv6 protocol
   and associated support protocols and mechanisms to provide site
   multihoming capabilities in IPv6.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 28, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Address Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Protocol Version (IPv4 vs. IPv6) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.2.  Prefix Lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Address Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  Use of CGA vs. HBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Shim6 and Ingress Filtering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Shim6 Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.1.  Fault Tolerance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1.1.  Establishing Communications After an Outage  . . . . .  9
       5.1.2.  Short-Lived Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.1.3.  Long-Lived Communications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.2.  Load Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     5.3.  Traffic Engineering  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Application Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Interaction with Other Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     7.1.  Shim6 and Mobile IPv6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       7.1.1.  Multihomed Home Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       7.1.2.  Shim6 Between the HA and the MN  . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.2.  Shim6 and SEND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.3.  Shim6 and SCTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.4.  Shim6 and NEMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     7.5.  Shim6 and HIP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     8.1.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22













Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


1.  Introduction

   Site multihoming is an arrangement by which a site may use multiple
   paths to the rest of the Internet to provide better reliability for
   traffic passing in and out of the site than would be possible with a
   single path.  Some of the motivations for operators to multi-home
   their network are described in [RFC3582].

   In IPv4, site multihoming is achieved by injecting into the global
   Internet routing system (sometimes referred to as the Default-Free
   Zone, or DFZ) the additional state required to allow session
   resilience over re-homing events [RFC4116].  There is concern that
   this approach will not scale [RFC3221], [RFC4984].

   In IPv6, site multihoming in the style of IPv4 is not generally
   available to end sites due to a strict policy of route aggregation in
   the DFZ.  Site multihoming for sites without provider-independent
   (PI) addresses is achieved by assigning multiple addresses to each
   host, one or more from each provider.  This multihoming approach
   provides no transport-layer stability across re-homing events.

   Shim6 provides layer-3 support for making re-homing events
   transparent to the transport layer by means of a shim approach.
   State information relating to the multihoming of two endpoints
   exchanging unicast traffic is retained on the endpoints themselves,
   rather than in the network.  Communications between Shim6-capable
   hosts and Shim6-incapable hosts proceed as normal, but without the
   benefit of transport-layer stability.  The Shim6 approach is thought
   to have better scaling properties with respect to the state held in
   the DFZ than the IPv4 approach.

   This note describes the applicability of the Level 3 multihoming
   (hereafter Shim6) protocol defined in [RFC5533] and the failure
   detection mechanisms defined in [RFC5534].

   The terminology used in this document, including terms like locator,
   and ULID, is defined in [RFC5533].


2.  Deployment Scenarios

   The goal of the Shim6 protocol is to support locator agility in
   established communications: different layer-3 endpoint addresses may
   be used to exchange packets belonging to the same transport-layer
   session, all the time presenting a consistent identifier pair to
   upper-layer protocols.

   In order to be useful, the Shim6 protocol requires that at least one



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   of the peers has more than one address which could be used on the
   wire (as locators).  In the event of communications failure between
   an active pair of addresses, the Shim6 protocol will attempt to
   reestablish communication by trying different combinations of
   locators.

   While other multi-addressing scenarios are not precluded, the
   scenario in which the Shim6 protocol is expected to operate is that
   of a multihomed site which is connected to multiple transit
   providers, and which receives an IPv6 prefix from each of them.  This
   configuration is intended to provide protection for the end-site in
   the event of a failure in some subset of the available transit
   providers, without requiring the end-site to acquire PI address space
   or requiring any particular cooperation between the transit
   providers.

      ,------------------------------------.       ,----------------.
      |        Rest of the Internet        +-------+ Remote Host R  |
      `--+-----------+------------------+--'       `----------------'
         |           |                  |            LR[1] ... LR[m]
     ,---+----.  ,---+----.        ,----+---.
     | ISP[1] |  | ISP[2] | ...... | ISP[n] |
     `---+----'  `---+----'        `----+---'
         |           |                  |
     ,---+-----------+------------------+---.
     |   Multi-Homed Site S assigned        |
     |   prefixes P[1], P[2], ..., P[n]     |
     |                                      |
     |  ,--------. L[1] = P[1]:iid[1],      |
     |  | Host H | L[2] = P[2]:iid[2], ...  |
     |  `--------' L[n] = P[n]:iid[n]       |
     `--------------------------------------'

                                 Figure 1

   In the scenario illustrated in Figure 1 host H communicates with some
   remote host R. Each of the addresses L[i] configured on host H in the
   multihomed site S can be reached through provider ISP[i] only, since
   ISP[i] is solely responsible for advertising a covering prefix for
   P[i] to the rest of the Internet.

   The use of locator L[i] on H hence causes inbound traffic towards H
   to be routed through ISP[i].  Changing the locator from L[i] to L[j]
   will have the effect of re-routing inbound traffic to H from ISP[i]
   to ISP[j].  This is the central mechanism by which the Shim6 protocol
   aims to provide multihoming functionality: by changing locators, host
   H can change the upstream ISP used to route inbound packets towards
   itself.  Regarding the outbound traffic to H, the path taken in this



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   case depends on both the actual locator LR[j] chosen by R, and the
   administrative exit selection policy of site S.

   The Shim6 protocol has other potential applications beyond site
   multihoming.  For example, since Shim6 is a host-based protocol, it
   can also be used to support host multihoming.  In this case, a
   failure in communication between a multihomed host and some other
   remote host might be repaired by selecting a locator associated with
   a different interface.


3.  Address Configuration

3.1.  Protocol Version (IPv4 vs. IPv6)

   The Shim6 protocol is defined only for IPv6.  However, there is no
   fundamental reason why a Shim6-like approach could not support IPv4
   addresses as locators, either to provide multihoming support to IPv4-
   numbered sites, or as part of an IPv4/IPv6 transition strategy.  Some
   extensions to the Shim6 protocol for supporting IPv4 locators have
   been proposed in [I-D.nordmark-shim6-esd].

   The Shim6 protocol, as specified for IPv6, incorporates cryptographic
   elements in the construction of locators (see [RFC3972], [RFC5535]).
   Since IPv4 addresses are insufficiently large to contain addresses
   constructed in this fashion, direct implementation of Shim6 as
   specified for IPv6 for use with IPv4 addresses might require protocol
   modifications.

   In addition, there are other factors to take into account when
   considering the support of IPv4 addresses, in particular IPv4
   locators.  Using multiple IPv4 addresses in a single host in order to
   support Shim6 style of multihoming would result in an increased IPv4
   address consumption, which with the current rate of IPv4 addresses
   would be problematic.  Besides, Shim6 may suffer additional problems
   if locators become translated on the wire.  Address translation is
   more likely to involve IPv4 addresses.  IPv4 addresses can be
   translated to other IPv4 addresses (for example, private IPv4 address
   into public IPv4 address and vice versa) or to/from IPv6 addresses
   (for example, as defined by NAT64
   [I-D.ietf-behave-v6v4-xlate-stateful]).  When address translation
   occurs, a locator exchanged by Shim6 could be different to the
   address needed to reach the corresponding host, either because the
   translated version of the locator exchanged by Shim6 is not known or
   because the translation state does not exist any more in the
   translator device.  Supporting these scenarios would require NAT
   traversal mechanisms which are not defined yet and which would imply
   additional complexity (as any other NAT traversal mechanism).



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


3.2.  Prefix Lengths

   The Shim6 protocol does not assume that all the prefixes assigned to
   the multihomed site have the same prefix length.

   However, the use of CGA [RFC3972] and HBA [RFC5535] involve encoding
   information in the lower 64 bits of the locators.  This imposes the
   requirement on address assignment to Shim6-capable hosts that all
   interface addresses should be able to accommodate 64-bit interface
   identifiers.  It should be noted that this is imposed by RFC4291
   [RFC4291].

3.3.  Address Generation

   The security of the Shim6 protocol is based on the use of CGA and HBA
   addresses.

   CGA and HBA generation process can use the information provided by
   the stateless auto-configuration mechanism defined in [RFC4862] with
   the additional considerations presented in [RFC3972] and [RFC5535].

   Stateful address auto-configuration using DHCP [RFC3315] is not
   currently supported, because there is no defined mechanism to convey
   the CGA Parameter Data Structure and other relevant information from
   the DHCP server to the host.  The definition of such mechanism seems
   to be quite straightforward in the case of the HBA, since only the
   CGA Parameter Data Structure needs to be delivered from the DHCP
   server to the Shim6 host, and this data structure does not contain
   any secret information.  In the case of CGAs, the difficulty is
   increased, since private key information should be exchanged as well
   as the CGA Parameter Data Structure.  However, with appropriate
   extensions a DHCP server could inform to a host about the SEC value
   to use when generating an address, or DHCP could even be used by the
   host to delegate to the server the CPU-intensive task of computing a
   Modifier for a given <prefix, public key, SEC> combination
   [I-D.ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps].

3.4.  Use of CGA vs. HBA

   The choice between CGA and HBA is a trade-off between flexibility and
   performance.

   The use of HBA is more efficient in the sense that addresses require
   less computation than CGA, involving only hash operations for both
   the generation and the verification of locator sets.  However, the
   locators of an HBA set are determined during the generation process,
   and cannot be subsequently changed; the addition of new locators to
   that initial set is not supported, except by re-generation of the



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 6]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   entire set which will in turn cause all addresses to change.

   The use of CGA is more computationally expensive, involving public
   key cryptography in the verification of locator sets.  However, CGAs
   are more flexible in the sense that they support the dynamic
   modification of locator sets.

   Therefore, CGAs are well suited to support dynamic environments such
   as mobile hosts, where the locator set must be changed frequently.
   HBAs are better suited for sites where the prefix set remains
   relatively stable.

   It should be noted that, since HBAs are defined as a CGA extension,
   it is possible to generate hybrid HBA/CGA structures that incorporate
   the strengths of both: i.e. that a single address can be used as an
   HBA, enabling computationally-cheap validation amongst a fixed set of
   addresses, and also as a CGA, enabling dynamic manipulation of the
   locator set.  For additional details, see [RFC5535].


4.  Shim6 and Ingress Filtering

   Ingress filtering [RFC2827] prevents address spoofing by dropping
   packets which come from customer networks with source addresses not
   belonging to the prefix assigned to them.  The problem of deploying
   ingress filters with multihomed customers is discussed in [RFC3704],
   in particular considering the case in which non-PI addresses are used
   by customer networks.  This is the case for IPv6 hosts in multihomed
   networks with PA, and also for a Shim6 host in a multihomed network.
   Note that this is also the case for other solutions supporting
   multihoming, such as SCTP [RFC4960], HIP [RFC4423], etc.

   One solution to this problem is to make the providers aware of the
   alternative prefixes that can be used by a multihomed site, so that
   ingress filtering would not be applied to packets with source
   addresses belonging to these prefixes.  This may be possible in some
   cases, but it cannot be assumed as the general case.

   [RFC3704] requires that sites using non-PI addresses should ensure
   that each packet is delivered to the provider whose prefix matches
   its source address.  To deliver packets to the appropriate outgoing
   ISP, some routers of the site must consider source addresses in their
   forwarding decisions, in addition to the usual destination-based
   forwarding.  These routers maintain as many parallel routing tables
   as there are valid source prefixes, and choose a route that is a
   function of both the source and the destination address.  The way
   these routing tables are populated is out of the scope of this
   document.



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 7]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   Site exit routers are required (at least) to be part of a single
   connected source based routing domain:


                    Multiple site exits
                    |     |     |     |
               -----+-----+-----+-----+-----
              (                             )
              ( Source based routing domain )
              (                             )
               ----+----+----+----+----+----
              (                             )
              (   Generic routing domain    )
              (                             )
               -----------------------------

                                 Figure 2

   In this way, packets arriving to this connected source based routing
   domain would be delivered to the appropriate exit router.

   Some particular cases of this generic deployment scenario are:

   - a single exit router, in which the router chooses the exit provider
   according to the source address of the packet to be forwarded

   - a site in which all routers perform source address based forwarding

   - a site in which only site-exit routers perform source address based
   forwarding, and these site-exit routers are connected through point-
   to-point tunnels, so that packets can be tunneled to the appropriate
   exit router according to its source address

   For hosts attached directly to networks of different providers, a
   host solution to ensure that packets are forwarded to the appropriate
   interface according to its source address must be provided.  This
   problem is discussed in the Multiple Interfaces (MIF) IETF Working
   Group.

   Shim6 has no means to enforce neither host nor network forwarding for
   a given locator to be used as source address.  If any notification is
   received from the router dropping the packets with legitimate source
   addresses as a result of ingress filtering, the affected locator
   could be associated to a low preference (or not being used at all).
   But even if such notification is not received, or not processed by
   the Shim6 layer, defective ingress filtering configuration will be
   treated as a communication failure, and Shim6 re-homing would finally
   select a working path in which packets are not filtered, if this path



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 8]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   exists.  Note that this behavior results from the powerful end-to-end
   resilience properties exhibited by REAP.


5.  Shim6 Capabilities

5.1.  Fault Tolerance

5.1.1.  Establishing Communications After an Outage

   If a host within a multihomed site attempts to establish a
   communication with a remote host and selects a locator which
   corresponds to a failed transit path, bidirectional communication
   between the two hosts will not succeed.  In order to establish a new
   communication, the initiating host must try different combinations of
   (source, destination) locator pairs until it finds a pair that works.
   The mechanism for this default address selection is described in
   [RFC3484].  As a result of the use of this mechanism, some failures
   may not be recovered even if a valid alternative path exists between
   two communicating hosts.  For example, assuming a failure in ISP[1]
   (see figure 1), and host H initiating a communication with host R,
   the source address selection algorithm described in [RFC3484] may
   result in the selection of the source address corresponding to ISP[1]
   for every destination address being tried by the application.
   However, note that if R is the node initiating the communication, it
   will find a valid path provided that the application at R tries every
   available address for H.

   Since a Shim6 context is normally established between two hosts only
   after initial communication has been set up, there is no opportunity
   for Shim6 to participate in the discovery of a suitable, initial
   (source, destination) locator pair.  The same consideration holds for
   referrals, as it is described in Section 6.

5.1.2.  Short-Lived Communications

   The Shim6 context establishment operation requires a 4-way packet
   exchange, and involves some overhead on the participating hosts in
   memory and CPU.

   For short-lived communications between two hosts, the benefit of
   establishing a Shim6 context might not exceed the cost, perhaps
   because the protocols concerned are fault tolerant and can arrange
   their own recovery (e.g.  DNS) or because the frequency of re-homing
   events is sufficiently low that the probability of such a failure
   occurring during a short-lived exchange is not considered
   significant.




Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                 [Page 9]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   It is anticipated that the exchange of Shim6 context will provide
   most benefit for exchanges between hosts which are long-lived.  For
   this reason the default behaviour of Shim6-capable hosts is expected
   to employ deferred context-establishment.  This default behaviour
   will be able to be overridden by applications which prefer immediate
   context establishment regardless of transaction longevity.

   It must be noted that all the above considerations refer to the
   lifetime of the interaction between the peers and not about the
   lifetime of a particular connection (e.g.  TCP connection).  In other
   words, the Shim6 context is established between ULID pairs and it
   affects all the communication between these ULIDs.  So, two nodes
   with multiple short-lived communications using the same ULID pair
   would benefit as much from the Shim6 features as two nodes having a
   single long-lived communication.  One example of such scenario would
   be a web client software downloading web contents from a server over
   multiple TCP connections.  Each TCP connection is short-lived, but
   the communication/contact between the two ULID could be long-lived.

5.1.3.  Long-Lived Communications

   As discussed in Section 5.1.2, hosts engaged in long-lived
   communications will suffer lower proportional overhead, and greater
   probability of benefit than those performing brief transactions.

   Deferred context setup ensures that session establishment time will
   not be increased by the use of Shim6.

5.2.  Load Balancing

   The Shim6 protocol does not support load balancing within a single
   context: all packets associated with a particular context are
   exchanged using a single locator pair per direction, with the
   exception of forked contexts, which are created upon explicit
   requests from the upper-layer protocol.

   It may be possible to extend the Shim6 protocol to use multiple
   locator pairs in a single context, but the impact of such an
   extension on upper-layer protocols (e.g. on TCP congestion control)
   should be considered carefully.

   When many contexts are considered together in aggregation, e.g. on a
   single host which participates in many simultaneous contexts or in a
   site full of hosts, some degree of load sharing should occur
   naturally due to the selection of different locator pairs in each
   context.  However, there is no mechanism defined to ensure that this
   natural load sharing is arranged to provide a statistical balance
   between transit providers.



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 10]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


5.3.  Traffic Engineering

   The Shim6 protocol provides some lightweight traffic engineering
   capabilities in the form of the Locator Preferences option, which
   allows a host to inform a remote host of local preferences for
   locator selection.

   This mechanism is only available after a Shim6 context has been
   established, and it is a host-based capability rather than a site-
   based capability.  There is no defined mechanism which would allow
   use of the Locator Preferences option amongst a site full of hosts to
   be managed centrally.


6.  Application Considerations

   Shim6 provides multihoming support without forcing changes in the
   applications running on the host.  The fact that an address has been
   generated according to the CGA or HBA specification does not require
   any specific action from the application, e.g. it can obtain remote
   CGA or HBA addresses as a result of a getaddrinfo() call to trigger a
   DNS Request.  The storage of CGA or HBA addresses in DNS does not
   require also any modification of this protocol, since they are
   recorded using AAAA records.  Moreover, neither the ULID/locator
   management [RFC5533] nor the failure detection and recovery [RFC5534]
   functions require application awareness.

   However, a specific API [I-D.ietf-shim6-multihome-shim-api] is
   developed for those applications which might require additional
   capabilities in ULID/locator management, such as the locator pair in
   use for a given context, or the set of local or remote locators
   available for it.  This API can also be used to disable Shim6
   operation when required.

   It is worth noting that callbacks can benefit naturally from Shim6
   support.  In a callback, an application in B retrieves IP_A, the IP
   address of a peer A, and B uses IP_A to establish a new communication
   with A. As long as the address exchanged, IP_A is the ULID for the
   initial communication between A and B, and B uses the same address as
   in the initial communication, and this initial communication is alive
   (or the context has not been deleted), the new communication could
   use the locators exchanged by Shim6 for the first communication.  In
   this case, communication could proceed even if the ULID of A is not
   reachable.

   However, Shim6 does not provide specific protection to current
   applications when they use referrals.  A referral is the exchange of
   the IP address IP_A of a party A by party B to party C, so that party



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 11]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   C could use IP_A to communicate with party A. In a normal case, the
   ULID IP_A would be the only information sent by B to C as referral.
   But if IP_A is no longer valid as locator in A, C could have trouble
   in establishing a communication with A. Increased failure protection
   for referrals could be obtained if B exchanged the whole list of
   alternative locators of A, although in this case the application
   protocol should be modified.  Note that B could send to C the current
   locator of A, instead of the ULID of A, as a way of using the most
   recent reachability information about A. While in this case no
   modification of the application protocol is required, some concerns
   arise: host A may not accept one of its locator as ULID for
   initiating a communication, and if CGA are used, the locator may not
   be a CGA so a Shim6 context among A and C could not be created.


7.  Interaction with Other Protocols

7.1.  Shim6 and Mobile IPv6

   We next consider some scenarios in which the Shim6 protocol and the
   MIPv6 protocol [RFC3775] might be used simultaneously.

7.1.1.  Multihomed Home Network

   In this case, the Home Network of the Mobile Node (MN) is multihomed.
   This implies the availability of multiple Home Network prefixes,
   resulting on multiple HoAs for each MN.  Since the MN is a node
   within a multihomed site, it seems reasonable to expect that the MN
   should be able to benefit from the multihoming capabilities provided
   by the Shim6 protocol.  Moreover, the MN needs to be able to obtain
   the multihoming benefits even when it is roaming away from the Home
   Network: if the MN is away from the Home Network while the Home
   Network suffers a failure in a transit path, the MN should be able to
   continue communicating using alternate paths to reach the Home
   Network.
















Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 12]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   The resulting scenario is the following:


          +------------------------------------+
          |               Internet             |
          +------------------------------------+
             |                   |
           +----+              +----+
           |ISP1|              |ISP2|
           +----+              +----+
             |                   |
          +------------------------------------+
          |   Multihomed Home Network          |
          |   Prefixes: P1 and P2              |
          |                                    |
          |                   Home Agent       |
          |                   //               |
          +------------------//----------------+
                            //
                           //
                         +-----+
                         | MN  | HoA1, HoA2
                         +-----+

                                 Figure 3

   So, in this configuration, the Shim6 protocol is used to provide
   multiple communication paths to all the nodes within the multihomed
   sites (including the mobile nodes) and the MIPv6 protocol is used to
   support mobility of the mobile nodes of the multihomed site.





















Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 13]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   The proposed protocol architecture would be the following:


                           +--------------+
                           |  Application |
                           +--------------+
                           |  Transport   |
                           +--------------+
                           |      IP      |
                           | +----------+ |
                           | |  IPSec   | |
                           | +----------+<--ULIDs
                           | | Shim6    | |
                           | +----------+<--HoAs
                           | | MIPv6    | |
                           | +----------+<--CoAs
                           |              |
                           +--------------+


                                 Figure 4

   In this architecture, the upper layer protocols and IPSec would use
   ULIDs of the Shim6 protocol.  Only the HoAs will be presented by the
   upper layers to the Shim6 layer as potential ULIDs.  Two Shim6
   entities will exchange their own available HoAs as locators.
   Therefore, Shim6 provides failover between different HoAs and allows
   preserving established communications when an outage affects the path
   through the ISP that has delegated the HoA used for initiating the
   communication (similarly to the case of a host within a multihomed
   site).  The CoAs are not presented to the Shim6 layer and are not
   included in the local locator set in this case.  The CoAs are managed
   by the MIPv6 layer, which binds each HoA to a CoA.

   So, in this case, the upper layer protocols select a ULID pair for
   the communication.  The Shim6 protocol translates the ULID pair to an
   alternative locator in case that is needed.  Both the ULIDs and the
   alternative locators are HoAs.  Next, the MIPv6 layer maps the
   selected HoA to the corresponding CoA, which is the actual address
   included in the wire.

   The Shim6 context is established between the MN and the CN, and it
   would allow the communication to use all the available HoAs to
   provide fault tolerance.  The MIPv6 protocol is used between the MN
   and the HA in the case of the bidirectional tunnel mode, and between
   the MN and the CN in case of the RO (Route Optimization) mode.





Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 14]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


7.1.2.  Shim6 Between the HA and the MN

   Another scenario where a Shim6-MIPv6 interaction may be useful is the
   case where a Shim6 context is established between the MN and the HA
   in order to provide fault tolerance capabilities to the bidirectional
   tunnel between them.

   Consider the case where the HA has multiple addresses (whether
   because the Home Network is multihomed or because the HA has multiple
   interfaces) and/or the MN has multiple addresses (whether because the
   visited network is multihomed or because the MN has multiple
   interfaces).  In this case, if a failure affects the address pair
   that is being used to run the tunnel between the MN and HA,
   additional mechanisms need to be used to preserve the communication.

   One possibility would be to use MIPv6 capabilities, by simply
   changing the CoA used as the tunnel endpoint.  However, MIPv6 lacks
   of failure detection mechanisms that would allow the MN and/or the HA
   to detect the failure and trigger the usage of an alternative
   address.  Shim6 provides such failure detection protocol, so one
   possibility would be re-using the failure detection function from the
   Shim6 failure detection protocol in MIPv6.  In this case, the Shim6
   protocol wouldn't be used to create Shim6 context and provide fault
   tolerance, but just its failure detection functionality would be re-
   used.

   The other possibility would be to use the Shim6 protocol to create a
   Shim6 context between the HA and the MN so that the Shim6 detects any
   failure and re-homes the communication in a transparent fashion to
   MIPv6.  In this case, the Shim6 protocol would be associated to the
   tunnel interface.

7.2.  Shim6 and SEND

   Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] uses CGAs to prove address
   ownership for Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861].  The Shim6 protocol can
   use either CGAs or HBAs to protect locator sets included in Shim6
   contexts.  It is expected that some hosts will need to participate in
   both SEND and Shim6 simultaneously.

   In the case that both the SEND and Shim6 protocols are using the CGA
   technique to generate addresses, then there is no conflict: the host
   will generate addresses for both purposes as CGAs, and since it will
   be in control of the associated private key, the same CGA can be used
   for the different protocols.

   In the case that a Shim6-capable host is using HBAs to protect its
   locator sets, the host will need to generate hybrid HBA/CGA addresses



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 15]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   as defined in [RFC5535] and discussed briefly in Section 3.4.  In
   this case, the CGA Parameter Data Structure containing a valid public
   key and the Multi-Prefix extension are included as inputs to the hash
   function.

7.3.  Shim6 and SCTP

   The SCTP [RFC4960] protocol provides a reliable, stream-based
   communications channel between two hosts which provides a superset of
   the capabilities of TCP.  One of the notable features of SCTP is that
   it allows the exchange of endpoint addresses between hosts, and is
   able to recover from the failure of a particular endpoint pair in a
   manner which is conceptually similar to locator selection in Shim6.

   SCTP is a transport-layer protocol, higher in the protocol stack than
   Shim6, and hence there is no fundamental incompatibility which would
   prevent a Shim6-capable host from communicating using SCTP.

   However, since SCTP and Shim6 both aim to exchange addressing
   information between hosts in order to meet the same generic goal, it
   is possible that their simultaneous use might result in unexpected
   behaviour, e.g. lead to race conditions.

   The capabilities of SCTP with respect to path maintenance of a
   reliable, connection-oriented stream protocol are more extensive than
   the more general layer-3 locator agility provided by Shim6.
   Therefore, It is recommended that Shim6 is not used for SCTP
   sessions, and that path maintenance is provided solely by SCTP.
   There are at least two ways to enforce this behaviour.  One option
   would be to make the stack, and in particular the Shim6 sublayer,
   aware of SCTP sockets and in this case refrain from creating a Shim6
   context.  The other option is that the upper layer, SCTP in this
   case, informs using a Shim6-capable API like the one proposed in
   [I-D.ietf-shim6-multihome-shim-api] that no Shim6 context must be
   created for this particular communication.

   Note that the issues described here for SCTP may also arise for a
   multipath TCP solution.

7.4.  Shim6 and NEMO

   The NEMO [RFC3963] protocol extensions to MIPv6 allow a Mobile
   Network to communicate through a bidirectional tunnel via a Mobile
   Router (MR) to a NEMO-compliant Home Agent (HA) located in a Home
   Network.

   If either or both of the MR or HA are multihomed, then a Shim6
   context established preserves the integrity of the bidirectional



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 16]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   tunnel between them in the event that a transit failure occurs in the
   connecting path.

   Once the tunnel between MR and HA is established, hosts within the
   Mobile Network which are Shim6-capable can establish contexts with
   remote hosts in order to receive the same multihoming benefits as any
   host located within the Home Network.

7.5.  Shim6 and HIP

   Shim6 and the Host Identity Protocol (HIP [RFC4423]) are
   architecturally similar in the sense that both solutions allow two
   hosts to use different locators to support communications between
   stable ULIDs.  The signaling exchange to establish the demultiplexing
   context on the hosts is very similar for both protocols.  However,
   there are a few key differences.  First, Shim6 avoids defining a new
   namespace for ULIDs, preferring instead to use a routable locator as
   a ULID, while HIP uses public keys and hashes thereof as ULIDs.  The
   use of a routable locator as ULID better supports deferred context
   establishment, application callbacks, and application referrals, and
   avoids management and resolution costs of a new namespace, but
   requires additional security mechanisms to securely bind the ULID
   with the locators.  Second, Shim6 uses an explicit context header on
   data packets for which the ULIDs differ from the locators in use
   (this header is only needed after a failure/rehoming event occurs),
   while HIP may compress this context-tag function into the ESP SPI
   field [RFC5201].  Third, HIP as presently defined requires the use of
   public-key operations in its signaling exchange and ESP encryption in
   the data plane, while the use of Shim6 requires neither (if only HBA
   addresses are used).  HIP by default provides data protection, while
   this is a non-goal for Shim6.

   The Shim6 working group was chartered to provide a solution to a
   specific problem, multihoming, which minimizes deployment disruption,
   while HIP is considered more of an experimental approach intended to
   solve several more general problems (mobility, multihoming and loss
   of end-to-end addressing transparency) through an explicit
   identifier/locator split.  Communicating hosts that are willing and
   interested to run HIP (perhaps extended with Shim6's failure
   detection protocol) likely have no reason to also run Shim6.  In this
   sense, HIP may be viewed as a possible long-term evolution or
   extension of the Shim6 architecture, or one possible implementation
   of the extended Shim6 design ESD [I-D.nordmark-shim6-esd].


8.  Security Considerations

   This section considers the applicability of the Shim6 protocol from a



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 17]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   security perspective, i.e. which security features can expect
   applications and users of the Shim6 protocol.

   First of all, it should be noted that the Shim6 protocol is not a
   security protocol, like for instance HIP.  This means that as opposed
   to HIP, it is an explicit non-goal of the Shim6 protocol to provide
   enhanced security for the communications that use the Shim6 protocol.
   The goal of the Shim6 protocol design in terms of security is not to
   introduce new vulnerabilities that were not present in the current
   non-Shim6 enabled communications.  In particular, it is an explicit
   non-goal of the Shim6 protocol security to provide protection from
   on-path attackers.  On-path attackers are able to sniff and spoof
   packets in the current Internet, and they are able to do the same in
   Shim6 communications (as long as the communication flows through the
   path they are located on).  So, summarizing, the Shim6 protocol does
   not provide data packet protection from on-path attackers.

   However, the Shim6 protocol does use several security techniques.
   The goal of these security measures is to protect the Shim6 signaling
   protocol from new attacks resulting from the adoption of the Shim6
   protocol.  In particular, the use of HBA/CGA prevents on-path and
   off-path attackers injecting new locators into the locator set of a
   Shim6 context, thus preventing redirection attacks [RFC4218].
   Moreover, the usage of probes before re-homing to a different locator
   as a destination address prevents flooding attacks from off-path
   attackers.

   In addition, the usage of a 4-way handshake for establishing the
   Shim6 context protects against DoS attacks, so hosts implementing the
   Shim6 protocol should not be more vulnerable to DoS attacks than
   regular IPv6 hosts.

   Finally, many Shim6 signaling messages contain a Context Tag, meaning
   that only attackers that know the Context Tag can forge them.  As a
   consequence, only on-path attackers can generate false Shim6
   signaling packets for an established context.  The impact of these
   attacks would be limited since they would not be able to add
   additional locators to the locator set (because of the HBA/CGA
   protection).  In general the possible attacks have similar effects to
   the ones that an on-path attacker can launch on any regular IPv6
   communication.  The residual threats are described in the Security
   Considerations of the Shim6 protocol specification [RFC5533].

8.1.  Privacy Considerations

   The Shim6 protocol is designed to provide some basic privacy
   features.  In particular, HBAs are generated in such a way, that the
   different addresses assigned to a host cannot be trivially linked



Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 18]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   together as belonging to the same host, since there is nothing in
   common in the addresses themselves.  Similar features are provided
   when the CGA protection is used.  This means that it is not trivial
   to determine that a set of addresses is assigned to a single Shim6
   host.

   However, the Shim6 protocol does exchange the locator set in clear
   text and it also uses a fixed Context Tag when using different
   locators in a given context.  This implies that an attacker observing
   the Shim6 context establishment exchange or seeing different payload
   packets exchanged through different locators, but with the same
   Context Tag, can determine the set of addresses assigned to a host.
   However, this requires that the attacker is located along the path
   and that it can capture the Shim6 signaling packets.


9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.


10.  Contributors

   The analysis on the interaction between the Shim6 protocol and the
   other protocols presented in this note benefited from the advice of
   various people including Tom Henderson, Erik Nordmark, Hesham
   Soliman, Vijay Devarpalli, John Loughney and Dave Thaler.


11.  Acknowledgements

   Joe Abley's work was supported in part by the US National Science
   Foundation (research grant SCI-0427144) and DNS-OARC.

   Marcelo Bagnulo worked on this document while visiting Ericsson
   Research Laboratory Nomadiclab.

   Shinta Sugimoto reviewed this document and provided comments and
   text.

   Iljitsch van Beijnum, Brian Carpenter, Sam Xia reviewed this document
   and provided comments.


12.  References






Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 19]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


12.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-behave-v6v4-xlate-stateful]
              Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers",
              draft-ietf-behave-v6v4-xlate-stateful-12 (work in
              progress), July 2010.

   [I-D.ietf-shim6-multihome-shim-api]
              Komu, M., Bagnulo, M., Slavov, K., and S. Sugimoto,
              "Socket Application Program Interface (API) for
              Multihoming Shim", draft-ietf-shim6-multihome-shim-api-14
              (work in progress), August 2010.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
              and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
              IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [RFC3484]  Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
              Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.

   [RFC3775]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
              in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [RFC3963]  Devarapalli, V., Wakikawa, R., Petrescu, A., and P.
              Thubert, "Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support Protocol",
              RFC 3963, January 2005.

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
              Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [RFC4423]  Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Host Identity Protocol
              (HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006.




Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 20]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [RFC4960]  Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
              RFC 4960, September 2007.

   [RFC5201]  Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
              "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.

   [RFC5533]  Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming
              Shim Protocol for IPv6", RFC 5533, June 2009.

   [RFC5534]  Arkko, J. and I. van Beijnum, "Failure Detection and
              Locator Pair Exploration Protocol for IPv6 Multihoming",
              RFC 5534, June 2009.

   [RFC5535]  Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535,
              June 2009.

12.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps]
              Jiang, S., "DHCPv6 and CGA Interaction: Problem
              Statement", draft-ietf-csi-dhcpv6-cga-ps-06 (work in
              progress), October 2010.

   [I-D.nordmark-shim6-esd]
              Nordmark, E., "Extended Shim6 Design for ID/loc split and
              Traffic Engineering", draft-nordmark-shim6-esd-01 (work in
              progress), February 2008.

   [RFC3221]  Huston, G., "Commentary on Inter-Domain Routing in the
              Internet", RFC 3221, December 2001.

   [RFC3582]  Abley, J., Black, B., and V. Gill, "Goals for IPv6 Site-
              Multihoming Architectures", RFC 3582, August 2003.

   [RFC4116]  Abley, J., Lindqvist, K., Davies, E., Black, B., and V.
              Gill, "IPv4 Multihoming Practices and Limitations",
              RFC 4116, July 2005.

   [RFC4218]  Nordmark, E. and T. Li, "Threats Relating to IPv6
              Multihoming Solutions", RFC 4218, October 2005.




Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 21]

Internet-Draft        Shim6 Applicability Statement         October 2010


   [RFC4984]  Meyer, D., Zhang, L., and K. Fall, "Report from the IAB
              Workshop on Routing and Addressing", RFC 4984,
              September 2007.


Authors' Addresses

   Joe Abley
   ICANN
   4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
   Marina del Rey, CA  90292
   USA

   Phone: +1 519 670 9327
   Email: joe.abley@icann.org


   Marcelo Bagnulo
   U. Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911
   Spain

   Phone: +34 91 6248814
   Email: marcelo@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es/


   Alberto Garcia Martinez
   U. Carlos III de Madrid
   Av. Universidad 30
   Leganes, Madrid  28911
   Spain

   Phone: +34 91 6248782
   Email: alberto@it.uc3m.es
   URI:   http://www.it.uc3m.es/














Abley, et al.            Expires April 28, 2011                [Page 22]