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sec The document provides a specification of the application-level trust model. Being provided at the application level, the limitations of trust can be distributed separately using cryptographically protected format instead of hardcoding the checks into the application itself.

Binary trust model standardized as a set of trusted anchors and CRLs/OCSP services does not cover all corner cases in the modern crypto world. There is a need in more differentiated limitations. Some of them are suggested by Google when it limits the usage of Symantec’s certificates. The CRL profile does not fit the purpose of such limitations. The CRLs are issued by the same CAs that are subject to be limited. Currently the set of CAs trusted by OS can be used for the validation purposes. In case when a large enough CA becomes untrusted, it cannot be deleted from the storage of trusted CAs because it may cause error of validation of many certificates. The measures usually taken in such cases usually include application-level limitation of certificates lifetimes, refusing to accept EV-certificates in other way than DV, requirements to use Certificate Transparency, etc. This document suggests a cryptographically signed format dubbed Certificate Limitation Profile (CLP) designed for description of such limitations. This format can be used by applications that use system-wide set of trust anchors for validating purposes or by applications with own wide enough set of trusted anchors in case when the trust anchor for the entity found misbehaving cannot be revoked. Currently the only way to provide such limitations is hard coding them in application itself. Using of CLPs does not allow to completely avoid hard coding but allows to hard code only the minimal set of rarely changing data: the fact that application uses CLP the certificate to verify the signature under the CLP file minimal date of the CLP to be used for the current version of application. It will be possible to move the checks for the limitations to the external cryptographical libraries, such as OpenSSL, instead of checking them at the application level.

A proposed syntax and overall structure of CLP is very similar to the one defined for CRLs. CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE { tbsCertList TBSCertList, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureValue BIT STRING } TBSCertList ::= SEQUENCE { version Version OPTIONAL, -- if present, MUST be v1 signature AlgorithmIdentifier, issuer Name, thisUpdate Time, limitedCertificates SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { userCertificate CertificateSerialNumber, sertificateIssuer Name, limitationDate Time, limitationPropagation Enum, fingerprint SEQUENCE { fingerprintAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, fingerprintValue OCTET STRING } OPTIONAL, limitations SEQUENCE, } OPTIONAL, };

TBD

The key used for signing the CLP files should have a special Key Usage value and/or an Extended Key Usage value.

Each entry in list contains the following fields: The issuer of the certificate with limited trust. The serial of the certificate with limited trust. The fingerprint of the certificate with limited trust (optional). limitationPropagation. This field indicates whether limitations are applied to the certificate itself, to all of its descendants in the chain of trust, or both. and a subset of the following limitations: maxIssued - do not trust the certs issued after the specified date maxValidity - do not trust the certs after the specified date validityPeriod, days - take minimal value from "native" validity period and specified in the limitation file ignoredX509Extensions - list of X.509 extensions of limited certificate that MUST be ignored for the specified certificate (e.g. EV-indicating extensions) requiredX509extensions - list of X.509 extensions that MUST be present in the certificate to be trusted. The limitations are identified by OIDs

When this limitation is present, any certificate matching the entry and issued after the specified date MUST NOT be trusted

When this limitation is present, any certificate matching the entry MUST NOT be trusted after the specified date.

When this limitation is present, no certificate matching the entry should be treated as valid after specified period from its validFrom.

When this limitation is present, the extensions listed in this element should be ignored for the matching certificate.

When this limitation is present, the extensions listed in this element should be present for the matching certificate.

The verification of CLP SHOULD be performed by the application. The application should check whether the provided CLP matches the internal requirements and is correclty signed by the specified key.

In case of using CLP the checks enforced by CLP should be applied after the other checks. The limitation provided by CLP MUST NOT extend the trustworthy of the checked certificate. The limitations are applied after cryptographic validation of the certificate and building its chain of trust. If the certificate or any of its ascendants in the chain of trust matches any record in the CLP, the limitations are applied from the ascendant to descendants. The maxIssued and maxValidity limitations are applied to find out the actual validity periods for the any certificate in the chain of trust. If the CLP prescribes to have a particular extension(s) and the certificate does not have it, the certificate MUST NOT be trusted.

TBD

In case when an application uses CLP, it is recommended to specify the minimal date of issuing of the CLP document somewhere in code. It allows to avoid an attack of CLP rollback when the stale version of CLP is used. It is recommended to distribute CLPs using the channels that are used for distribution of the applications themselves to avoid possible DoS consequences.

Special thaks to Rich Salz, Igor Ustinov, Vasily Dolmatov, Stanislav Smyishlyaev, Patrik Fältström.

The current version of the document is available on GitHub https://github.com/beldmit/clp