HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2002 22:47:33 GMT Server: Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) Last-Modified: Fri, 09 Feb 1996 23:00:00 GMT ETag: "2e7dbc-5f88-311bd1f0" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 24456 Connection: close Content-Type: text/plain Internet Draft L. Berger Expiration: August 9, 1996 BBN File: draft-berger-rsvp-ext-01.txt T. O'Malley BBN R. Atkinson Cisco Proposed RSVP Extensions for IPSEC IPv4 Data Flows February 8, 1996 Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet- Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Abstract This document presents extensions to Version 1 of RSVP. These extensions permit support of individual data flows using RFC 1826 IP Authentication Header (AH) or RFC 1827 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). RSVP Version 1 as currently specified can support the IPv4 IPSEC protocols, but only on a per address, per protocol basis not on a per flow basis. Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 1] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 Table of Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Overview of Extensions 4 3 Mechanisms 5 4 Processing Rules 6 4.1 Required Changes 6 4.2 Merging Flowspecs 7 4.2.1 FF and SE Styles 7 4.2.2 WF Styles 8 5 Object Definition 8 5.1 SESSION Class 8 5.2 FILTER_SPEC Class 8 5.3 SENDER_TEMPLATE Class 9 6 Security Considerations 9 7 References 10 8 Acknowledgments and Authors' Information 10 8.1 Acknowledgments 10 8.2 Authors' Information 11 Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 2] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 Changes From Previous Version The most significant changes from the previous version are: o Introduction of new SESSION object. New session object is used to unambiguously distinguish use of generalized destination port rather than use of UDP/TCP-like port. Format of new SESSION object is identical to IPv4/UDP SESSION object. o Removal of section on other possible solutions. 1 Introduction Recently published Standards Track RFCs specify protocol mechanisms to provide IP level security. These IP Security, or IPSEC, protocols support packet level authentication, [RFC1826], and integrity and confidentiality [RFC1827]. A number of interoperable implementations already exist and several vendors have announced commercial products that will use these mechanisms. The IPSEC protocols provide service by adding a new header between a packet's IP header and the transport (e.g. UDP) protocol header. The two security headers are the Authentication Header (AH), for authentication, and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), for integrity and confidentiality. RSVP is being developed as a resource reservation (dynamic QoS setup) protocol. For IPv4, RSVP as currently specified [RSVP95] is really tailored towards IP packets carrying TCP or UDP data. This means that flows of IP packets containing the IPSEC protocols are not very well supported. The RSVP specification does detail support for other protocols such as the IPSEC protocols, but only with limitations. Specifically, since the IPSEC protocols do not have UDP/TCP like ports, flow definition can only be done on an IP address, per protocol basis. This memo proposes extensions to RSVP so that data flows containing IPSEC protocols can be controlled at a granularity similar to what is already specified for UDP and TCP. Section 2 of this memo will provide an overview of extensions. Section 3 contains a description of extended protocol mechanisms. Section 4 presents extended protocol processing rules. Section 5 defines the additional RSVP data objects. Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 3] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 2 Overview of Extensions The basic notion is to extend RSVP to use the IPSEC Security Parameter Index, or SPI, in place of UDP/TCP-like ports. This will require a new FILTER_SPEC object, which will contain the IPSEC SPI, and a new SESSION object. The extension will require modifying RESV processing. While SPIs are allocated based on destination address, they will typically be associated with a particular sender. (Two senders to the same unicast destination will usually have different SPIs, but the receiver may want to share reservations for both senders.) For this reason the SPI will be included as part of the FILTER_SPEC. This approach will support the control of multiple independent flows between source and destination IP addresses using FF and SE filter styles. With WF, all flows to the same IP destination address using the same protocol will share the same reservation. This limitation results because the IPSEC protocols do not contain UDP/TCP-like destination ports. The RESV message itself will not need modification. It will still contain a FILTER_SPEC as usual. On the other hand, RESV processing will need to change. When the FILTER_SPEC is used with IPSEC protocols, processing will need to be dependent on the use of the new SESSION object and on the next protocol field contained in the session definition. When the new SESSION object is used, the complete four bytes of the SPI will need to be extracted from the FILTER_SPEC for use by the packet classifier. The location of the SPI in the transport header of the IPSEC packets is dependent on the next protocol field. The SPI is located at transport header offset +4 for AH (50), and at +0 for ESP (51). The extension will also require a change to PATH processing. Specifically in usage of the port field in session definition. An RSVP session is defined by the triple: (DestAddress, ProtocolId, DstPort). The DstPort field of the SESSION object is currently defined as "a 16-bit quantity carried at the octet offset +2 in the transport header" or zero for protocols that lack such a field. The IPSEC protocols do not contain such a field, but there remains a requirement for demultiplexing sessions beyond the IP destination address. RSVP defines such a demultiplexing point as a "generalized destination port." For IPSEC protocols, DstPort will be used as the generalized port, but DstPort value will not be carried in the IPSEC transport header. This change will allow control of multiple IPSEC flows to a single destination. Traffic will be mapped (classified) to reservations based on SPIs in FILTER_SPECs. This, of course, means that when WF is used all flows to the same IP destination address and protocol ID will share the same reservation. Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 4] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 For IPSEC protocols, AH (50) and ESP (51), PATH messages will not be changed. PATH messages will still contain SENDER_TEMPLATE and SESSION objects. The SENDER_TEMPLATE for IPSEC flows will match the modified FILTER_SPEC. (The SENDER_TEMPLATE will contain a "generalized source port" rather than a "generalized destination port.") But, a new SESSION object will be used to unambiguously distinguish the use of generalized destination ports from the use of UDP/TCP-like ports. Session definition and PATH processing will need to be modified to support the new message class types. To make use of this extension, communicating hosts will need to match RSVP sessions and reservations to appropriate SPIs. To make best use of reservations, the WF reservation style should be avoided and multiple SPIs used when supporting multiple data flows between hosts. The use of multiple SPIs is supported by the IPSEC protocols, so this should not be an issue. Avoiding WF and only using SE and FF style reservations should also not be a major issue since the IPSEC protocols require receivers to identify all valid senders and their associated SPIs. End-stations will also need to track when the SPI value associated with an RSVP flow changes. Changes will happen whenever that flow changes its Security Association. Such changes will occur when a flow is rekeyed (i.e. to use a new key). Rekeying intervals are typically set based on traffic levels, key size, threat environment, and crypto algorithm in use. This issue is also likely to be a tolerable, since rekeying intervals are under the control of local administrators. The advantages to the described approach are that no changes to RFC1826 and 1827 are required and that there is no additional per data packet overhead. The disadvantages to this approach are that we have to modify RSVP and, to a lesser degree, that the use of SPI is overloaded. 3 Mechanisms This extension does not alter the mechanisms described in [RSVP95] with the exception of Port Usage. For IPSEC data flows, UDP/TCP-like ports are primarily replaced by IPSEC SPIs. Implementations of RSVP that support IPSEC flows must recognize the new SESSION object and the IPSEC ProtocolIds. When the new SESSION object is used, such systems must permit non-zero destination port values even though the IPSEC protocols don't support UDP/TCP-like ports. The SESSION object used with IPSEC protocols will have the same format of the IPv4/UDP SESSION object, only the C-Type will Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 5] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 differ. Session definition for IPSEC flows will continue to use the triple: (DestAddress, ProtocolId, DstPort), where the DstPort field will represent a generalized destination port rather than a specific value in the transport header. The ProtocolId field must be set to either AH (50) or ESP (51). Implementations of RSVP must require non-zero values of DstPort when either IPSEC protocol is used. A zero value of DstPort is not valid and end-stations should give an error to an application that specifies a zero value. The FILTER_SPEC used with IPSEC protocols will be very similar to the current IPv4 FILTER_SPEC. (The 2 reserved bytes and 2 UDP/TCP port bytes of the IPv4 FILTER_SPEC will be replaced by a four byte field that will contain an SPI.) The SENDER_TEMPLATE used with IPSEC protocols will match the FILTER_SPEC. Both the IPSEC filter spec and IPSEC sender template will be defined by the pair: (SrcAddress, SPI). When the new objects are used, SPIs in SENDER_TEMPLATEs and FILTER_SPECs must match. The FILTER_SPEC and SENDER_TEMPLATE used with IPSEC protocols will contain a four byte field that will be used to carry the SPI. Rather than label the modified field with an IPSEC specific label, SPI, the label "Generalized Port Identifier", or GPI, will be so that these object may be reused for non-IPSEC uses in the future. The name of the objects will be IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC and IPv4/GPI SENDER_TEMPLATE. Similarly, the name of the new SESSION object will be IPv4/GPI SESSION. 4 Processing Rules This section presents additions to the Processing Rules section of the [RSVP95]. These additions are required in order to properly process the new IPv4/GPI SESSION object and IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC. 4.1 Required Changes Both RESV and PATH processing will need to be changed to support the new IPv4/GPI objects. The changes ensure consistency and extend port processing. The following PATH message processing changes are required: o When a session is defined using the IPv4/GPI SESSION object, only the IPv4/GPI SENDER_TEMPLATE may be used. Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 6] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 o For PATH messages that contain the IPv4/GPI SESSION object, the value of the ProtocolId must correspond to a protocol known to use the IPv4/GPI SESSION object. Values 50(AH) or 51(ESP) must be supported by implementations supporting the described IPSEC extensions. o For such messages, the DstPort value should be recorded and no special action should be taken. (Non-zero values of DstPort are required even though the IPSEC protocols do not have UDP/TCP-like ports.) The changes to RESV message processing are: o When a RESV message contains an IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC, the session must be defined using the IPv4/GPI SESSION object. o When a RESV message contains an IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC, the SENDER_TEMPLATE of the associated Path state must be an IPv4/GPI SENDER_TEMPLATE object. o The GPI contained in the FILTER_SPEC must match the GPI contained in the SENDER_TEMPLATE. o When the IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC is used, each network element must create a data classifier for the flow described by the quadruple: (DestAddress, ProtocolId, SrcAddress, GPI). Specifically, the data classifier must NOT include any UDP/TCP-like source or destination ports! The data classifier will need to look for the four byte GPI at transport header offset +4 for AH, and at transport header offset +0 for ESP. 4.2 Merging Flowspecs When using this extension for IPSEC data flows, RSVP sessions are defined by the triple: (DestAddress, ProtocolId, DstPort), where the DstPort field will be a two byte representation of a generalized destination port. Similarly, a sender is defined by the tuple: (SrcAddress, GPI). Where the GPI field will be a four byte representation of a generalized source port. Effectively, these extensions have added generalized port to both definitions, which has some ramifications on merging of filter style. 4.2.1 FF and SE Styles In the FF and SE Styles, the FILTER_SPEC object contains the (SrcAddress, GPI) pair. This allows the receiver to uniquely identify senders based on both elements of the pair. When merging explicit sender descriptors, the senders may only be considered Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 7] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 identical when both elements are identical. 4.2.2 WF Styles These extensions provide very limited service when used with WF style reservations. As described, the SENDER_TEMPLATE and FILTER_SPEC each contain the GPI. In a WF style reservation, the RESV message does NOT contain a FILTER_SPEC (after all, it is a wildcard filter), and the SENDER_TEMPLATE is ignored (again, because any sender is allowed). As a result, classifiers are likely to match all packets that contain both the session's destination IP address and next protocol ID to such WF reservations. For this reason, it is recommended that WF style reservations not be used with IPSEC protocols. A solution for this limitation is not proposed. This issue is not seen as significant since IPSEC applications are unlikely to use WF style reservations. Although, it would be nice to have a filter style which specifies a wildcard sender but specific GPI. The mechanism to support such a filter, however, seems non-trivial. 5 Object Definition As previously mentioned, rather than label the modified FILTER_SPEC and SENDER_TEMPLATE with IPSEC the specific fields, SPI, we use the label "Generalized Port Identifier", or GPI, so that these object may be reused for non-IPSEC uses in the future. 5.1 SESSION Class SESSION Class = 1. o IPv4/GPI SESSION object: Class = 1, C-Type = 3 Definition same as IPv4/UDP SESSION object. 5.2 FILTER_SPEC Class FILTER_SPEC class = 10. o IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC object: Class = 10, C-Type = 4 +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | IPv4 SrcAddress (4 bytes) | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ | Generalized Port Identifier (GPI) | +-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+ Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 8] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 5.3 SENDER_TEMPLATE Class SENDER_TEMPLATE class = 11. o IPv4/GPI SENDER_TEMPLATE object: Class = 11, C-Type = 3 Definition same as IPv4/GPI FILTER_SPEC object. 6 Security Considerations The same considerations stated in [RSVP95], [RFC1826], and [RFC1827] apply to the extensions described in this note. There are three additional issues related to these extensions. The first issue is that the use of SPIs to identify reservations may introduce greater opportunity for traffic analysis. The significance of the added traffic analysis threat will, of course, vary on a case-by-case basis. Applications or users may choose to reduce the threat by aggregating reservations and flows, or even aggregating all traffic into a single flow and reservation. The second issue is that there may be an added burden placed on key setup protocols. Specifically, since SPIs are used to identify reservations, the end-station IPSEC implementation will need to provide SPIs on a per flow basis. For flows with multiple senders, the same SPI must be used or each source must be individually identified in an appropriate (FF or SE) filter entry. This requirement may place new restrictions on IPSEC implementations, key negotiation, or possibly even future uses of the IPSEC protocols. The third issue is that changes in SPI values for a given flow will affect RSVP flows and reservations. As mentioned earlier, changes will happen whenever that flow changes its Security Association. Such changes will occur when a flow is rekeyed (i.e. to use a new key). The frequency of key changes will depend on duration and size of the flow, key size, threat environment, and crypto algorithm in use. When an SPI change occurs it will, in most cases, be necessary to update (send) the corresponding SENDER_TEMPLATEs and FILTER_SPECs. IPSEC implementations, RSVP applications, and RSVP end-station implementations will need to take the possibility of changes of SPI into account to ensure proper reservation behavior. Many, if not most, RSVP sessions will not need to deal with this last issue. For those applications that do need to deal with changes of SPIs during a session, the impact of sending new PATH and RESV messages will vary based on the reservation style being used. Builders of such applications may want to select reservation style based on interaction with SPI changes. Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 9] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 The least impact of an SPI change will be to WF style reservations. For such reservations, a new SENDER_TEMPLATE will need to be sent, but no new RESV is required. For SE style reservations, both a new SENDER_TEMPLATE and a new RESV will need to be sent. This will result in changes to state, but should not affect data packet delivery or actual resource allocation in any way. The FF style will be impacted the most. Like with SE, both PATH and RESV messages will need to be sent. But, since FF style reservations result in sender receiving its own resource allocation, resources will be allocated twice for a period of time. Or, even worse, there won't be enough resources to support the new flow without first freeing the old flow. A way around this FF/SPI-change problem does exist, but it is not elegant: Applications that want FF style reservations can use multiple SE reservations. Each real sender would have a separate SESSION (DstPort) definition. When it came time to switch SPIs, a shared reservation could be made for the new SPI while the old SPI was still active. Once the new SPI was in use, the old reservation could be torn down. This is inelegant, but will provide uninterrupted service for a set of applications. 7 References [RSVP95] Braden, R., Ed., Zhang, L., Estrin, D., Herzog, S., and S. Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1 Functional Specification. Internet Draft draft-ietf-rsvp-spec-08.ps, November 1995. [RFC1825] Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 1825, NRL, August 1995. [RFC1826] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826, NRL, August 1995. [RFC1827] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", RFC 1827, NRL, August 1995. 8 Acknowledgments and Authors' Information 8.1 Acknowledgments This note includes ideas originated and reviewed by a number of individuals who did not participate in this note's writing. The authors would like to acknowledge their contribution. We thank Fred Baker for proposing a SPI FILTER_SPEC, Greg Troxel for proposing a solution that we didn't use, and John Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 10] Internet Draft RSVP Extensions for IPv4 IPSEC Flows February 9, 1996 Krawczyk for his detailed feedback. We also thank Buz Owen, Claudio Topolcic, Andy Veitch, and Luis Sanchez for their help in coming up with the proposed approach. If any brain-damage exists in this note, it originated solely from the authors. 8.2 Authors' Information Lou Berger BBN 1300 North 17th Street, Suite 1200 Arlington, VA 22209 Phone: 703-284-4651 EMail: lberger@bbn.com Tim O'Malley BBN 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 617-873-3076 EMail: timo@bbn.com Randall Atkinson cisco Systems 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 Phone: 408-526-6566 EMail: rja@cisco.com Berger, O'Malley, Atkinson Expires August 9, 1996 [Page 11]