Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc. February 12, 2002 Expires: August 12, 2002 Extensible Provisioning Protocol DNS Security Extensions Mapping Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress". The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. Abstract This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) extension mapping for the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions for domain names stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required for the provisioning of DNS security extensions. Conventions Used In This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client and "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element relationships and is not a REQUIRED feature of this protocol. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 1] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................. 3 2. Object Attributes ............................................ 4 2.1 Public Key Information ...................................... 4 2.2 Signature Information ....................................... 4 2.3 Delegation Signer Information ............................... 5 3. EPP Command Mapping .......................................... 6 3.1 EPP Query Commands .......................................... 6 3.1.1 EPP Command ....................................... 6 3.1.2 EPP Command ........................................ 6 3.1.3 EPP Command .................................... 11 3.2 EPP Transform Commands ...................................... 11 3.2.1 EPP Command ...................................... 11 3.2.2 EPP Command ...................................... 15 3.2.3 EPP Command ....................................... 16 3.2.4 EPP Command .................................... 16 3.2.5 EPP Command ...................................... 16 4. Formal Syntax ................................................ 22 5. Internationalization Considerations .......................... 26 6. IANA Considerations .......................................... 26 7. Security Considerations ...................................... 27 8. Acknowledgements ............................................. 27 9. References ................................................... 28 10. Author's Address ............................................ 29 A. Revisions From Previous Version .............................. 29 B. Full Copyright Statement ..................................... 30 Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 2] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 1. Introduction This document describes a DNS security extension mapping for version 1.0 of the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP). This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping described in [EPP-D], is specified using the Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 as described in [XML] and XML Schema notation as described in [XMLS-1] and [XMLS- 2]. [EPP] provides a complete description of EPP command and response structures. A thorough understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to understand the mapping described in this document. Familiarity with the Domain Name System (DNS) described in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035] and DNS security extensions described in [RFC2535], [RFC3008], and [RFC3090] is required to understand the concepts described in this document. The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a shared central repository. Information exchanged via this mapping can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNS resource records as described in [RFC2535], [IETF-DS], and [IETF-OPTIN]. XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the character case presented to develop a conforming implementation. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 3] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 2. Object Attributes This extension adds additional elements to the domain name mapping described in [EPP-D]. Only new element descriptions are described here. This document describes update scenarios in which a client can create an initial key set, add new keys to a set, remove keys from a set, and replace an existing key set. Key set replacement vs. adding and removing individual keys might be a matter of server policy or the subject of another document. Insights into operational requirements are welcome. 2.1 Public Key Information Public key information is sent to the server so that the server can sign RRs published in a zone managed by the server operator using a zone-level key. A server operator SHOULD NOT sign any key provided by a client without cryptographically confirming that the client possesses the private key associated with the public key. Clients can send information describing multiple keys to a server. Each key element MUST be accompanied by a corresponding signature element when adding keys to a set. Public key information provided by a client maps to the KEY RR fields described in [RFC2535]. A KEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol octet, an algorithm number octet, and a public key. See [RFC2535] for specific field formats. 2.2 Signature Information Signature information is sent to the server to prove that the client (or an entity for whom the client is acting as agent) has the private key corresponding to the public key and that the key has not been modified while in transit. It allows the server to do basic error checking as part of the provisioning process. Clients can send information describing multiple signatures to a server. Each signature element MUST correspond to a key element when adding keys to a set. The signature value in each signature element MUST cover all of the keys in the given set. Signature information provided by a client maps to the SIG RR fields described in [RFC2535]. A SIG RR contains nine fields: a "type covered" field, an algorithm number octet, a labels octet, an original TTL field, a signature expiration field, a signature inception field, a key tag field, a signer's name field, and a signature field. See Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 4] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 [RFC2535] for specific field formats. 2.3 Delegation Signer Information Delegation signer (DS) information is generated by the server to indicate that a delegated zone is digitally signed and that the delegation zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the delegated zone. A DS RR contains four fields: a key tag field, a KEY algorithm number octet, an octet identifying the digest algorithm used, and a digest field. See [IETF-DS] for specific field formats. This document does not describe an explicit DS provisioning mechanism. Instead, the information needed to publish DS RRs is derived by the server from key and signature information provided by the client. This provisioning mechanism minimizes client complexity and ensures that there is no DS version conflict between the client and server, minimizing or eliminating client-server DS errors. A REQUIRED flag is used by clients to notify servers that DS provisioning is requested. It is worth noting, though, that there are other DS provisioning options. One option is for client to generate and send only DS information to the server. This option is the simplest for the server to implement, though the server has no means of detecting errors in the data provided by the client. Another option is for the client to send DS information, KEY information, and SIG(DS) information to the server. This option is verbose and does nothing to reduce the client-server error rate, but it provides the server with enough information to detect DS errors easily. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 5] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3. EPP Command Mapping A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found in [EPP]. The command mappings described here are specifically for use in provisioning and managing DNS security extensions via EPP. 3.1 EPP Query Commands EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: to determine if an object can be provisioned, to retrieve detailed information associated with an object, and to retrieve object transfer status information. 3.1.1 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in [EPP-D]. 3.1.2 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command described in [EPP-D]. Additional elements are defined for the response. When an command has been processed successfully, the EPP element MUST contain child elements as described in [EPP-D]. In addition, the EPP element MUST contain a child element that identifies the secDNS namespace and the location of the secDNS schema. The element contains the following child elements: - A element that describes extension status for the domain. This element contains an attribute named "s" whose value is either "secure" or "insecure". Domains that have been provisioned with security extensions are represented with "secure" status. Domains that have not been provisioned with security extensions are represented with "insecure" status. The element is followed by either a element or a element depending on the status of the delegation. A element MUST be present if the status of the delegation is "secure". A element MUST be present if the status of the delegation is "insecure". The element contains no child elements. It does contain a REQUIRED "nxt" attribute that notes if the delegation is included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. A value of "1" or "true" indicates that the delegation is insecure, but is included in Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 6] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 the parent zone's chain of NXT records. A value of "0" or "false" indicates that the delegation is insecure and is not included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. Server policy and further discussion around [IETF-OPTIN] might have an impact on the necessity of this element. The element contains a subset of the public key information originally provided by the client for a secured delegation. Each element contains a element, an OPTIONAL element, and an OPTIONAL element. The and elements indicate a client's preferences for the start and end date of DNS security extension resource record publication in the zone administered by the server operator. The element contains the following child elements: - A element that contains a flags field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.1.2. - A element that contains a protocol field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.1.3. - A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.2. - An OPTIONAL element that contains an encoded public key field value as described in [RFC2535] section 3.1. The format of the public key is algorithm dependent. This value will be provided only if server policy supports retention of client-provided keys. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 7] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.1.2.1 Example Response for a Secure Delegation S: S: S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.tld S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: 256 S: 3 S: 1 Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 8] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 S: AQPJ////4Q== S: S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 9] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.1.2.2 Example Response for an Insecure Delegation S: S: S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.tld S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 10] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: An EPP error response MUST be returned if an command can not be processed for any reason. 3.1.3 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in [EPP-D]. 3.2 EPP Transform Commands EPP provides five commands to transform objects: to create an instance of an object, to delete an instance of an object, to extend the validity period of an object, to manage object sponsorship changes, and to change information associated with an object. 3.2.1 EPP Command This extension defines additional elements for the EPP command described in [EPP-D]. No additional elements are defined for the EPP response. The EPP command provides a transform operation that allows a client to create a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements described in [EPP-D], the command MUST contain an element. The element MUST contain a child element that identifies the secDNS namespace and the location of the secDNS schema. The element MUST contain one of the following child elements: - A element that contains no child elements, but does contain a REQUIRED "nxt" attribute that notes if the delegation is to be included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. A value of "1" or "true" indicates that the delegation is insecure, but is to be included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. A value of "0" or "false" indicates that the delegation is insecure and is not to be included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. Server policy and further discussion around [IETF-OPTIN] might have an impact on the necessity of this element. - A element that contains key and signature data. Each element contains one or more elements, one or more corresponding elements, an OPTIONAL Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 11] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 element, and an OPTIONAL element. The and elements MAY be used to indicate a client's preferences for the start and end date of DNS security extension resource record publication in the zone administered by the server operator. If not provided, the server operator's standard resource record publication policies apply. The element contains the following child elements: - A element that contains a flags field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.1.2. - A element that contains a protocol field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.1.3. - A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.2. - A element that contains an encoded public key field value as described in [RFC2535] section 3.1. The format of the public key is algorithm dependent. The element contains the following child elements: - A element that contains a "type covered" field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.1. - A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.2. - A element that contains a labels field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.3. - A element that contains an original TTL field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.4. - A element that contains a date-time value describing the end of the signature's validity period as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.5. - A element that contains a date-time value describing the start of the signature's validity period as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.5. - A element that contains a key tag field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.6. - A element that contains a signer name field Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 12] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.7. - A element that contains a signature field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.8. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 13] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.2.1.1 Example Command for a Secure Delegation C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: 2 C: ns1.example.tld C: ns2.example.tld C: jd1234 C: sh8013 C: sh8013 C: 2fooBAR C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: KEY C: 1 C: 2 C: 172800 C: 2001-11-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 2001-10-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 14845 C: example.tld C: AzHp////hp4= C: C: Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 14] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: 3.2.1.2 Example Command for a Insecure Delegation C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: 2 C: ns1.example.tld C: ns2.example.tld C: jd1234 C: sh8013 C: sh8013 C: 2fooBAR C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: When a command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in [EPP-D]. 3.2.2 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 15] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 or response described in [EPP-D]. 3.2.3 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in [EPP-D]. 3.2.4 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in [EPP-D]. 3.2.5 EPP Command This extension defines additional elements for the EPP command described in [EPP-D]. No additional elements are defined for the EPP response. The EPP command provides a transform operation that allows a client to modify the attributes of a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements descried in [EPP-D], the command MUST contain an element. The element MUST contain a child element that identifies the secDNS namespace and the location of the secDNS schema. The element contains a element to add keys to a set, a element to remove keys from a set, or a element to replace a (possibly empty) key set with a new key set. The element is used to add keys to an existing set. The element contains a element whose child elements are the same as those presented in the description of the EPP command. The element contains a element that is used to remove keys from an existing set. Removing all keys returns the status of the delegation to "notSecured". The element contains the following child elements used to identify the security extension information to be removed: - A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 3.1 and 3.2. - A element that contains a key tag field value as described in [RFC2535] sections 4.1 and 4.1.6. The element is used to replace an existing key set with a new key set and to remove a key set completely. The element contains child elements that are the same as those presented Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 16] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 in the description of the element as part of the EPP command. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 17] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.2.5.1 Example Command, Adding a Key C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: KEY C: 1 C: 2 C: 172800 C: 2001-11-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 2001-10-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 14845 C: example.tld C: AzHp////hp4= C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 18] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.2.5.2 Example Command, Replacing a Key Set C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: KEY C: 1 C: 2 C: 172800 C: 2001-11-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 2001-10-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 14845 C: example.tld C: AzHp////hp4= C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 19] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.2.5.3 Example Command, Removing a Key C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 1 C: 14845 C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 20] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 3.2.5.4 Example Command, Removing a Key Set C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: When an command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in [EPP-D]. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 21] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 4. Formal Syntax An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML instances. The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI registration purposes. BEGIN Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 domain name extension schema for provisioning DNS security extensions. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 23] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 24] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 END Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 25] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 5. Internationalization Considerations EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding information using the Unicode character set and its more compact representations including UTF-8. Compliant XML processors are REQUIRED to understand both UTF-8 and UTF-16. Though XML includes provisions to identify other character set encodings through use of an "encoding" attribute in an declaration, EPP use with character sets other than UTF-8 is NOT RECOMMENDED. 6. IANA Considerations This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in [IETF-XML]. Two URI assignments are requested. Registration request for the secDNS namespace: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document. XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification. Registration request for the secDNS XML schema: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0 Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document. XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 26] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 7. Security Considerations The provisioning service described in this document involves the exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the DNS. A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a strong authentication mechanism. An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator who wants to send key information to be signed and published by the server operator. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data manipulation. The signature information provided by a client allows a server to confirm that the corresponding key is usable and has not been modified while in transit, but the server generally does not have enough information to confirm that the key was generated and provided by the child zone administrator. Authentication and integrity services MUST be provided on a hop-by-hop basis to ensure that data is not modified while in transit between entities. Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce significant operational consequences. The child and parent zones MUST be consistent to properly secure the delegation. In the absence of consistent signatures the delegation will not appear in the secure name space, yielding untrustworthy query responses. Signature checking at the server requires computational resources. A purposeful or inadvertent denial of service attack is possible if a client requests some number of update operations that exceed a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD take steps to manage command load and command processing requirements to minimize the risk of a denial of service attack. 8. Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this document provided by David Blacka, Olafur Gudmundsson, and Mark Kosters. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 27] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 9. References Normative References: [EPP] S. Hollenbeck: "Extensible Provisioning Protocol", work in progress. [EPP-D] S. Hollenbeck: "Extensible Provisioning Protocol Domain Name Mapping", work in progress. [IETF-DS] O. Gudmundsson: "Delegation Signer Resource Record", work in progress. [IETF-OPTIN] R. Arends et al.: "DNSSEC Opt-In", work in progress. [IETF-XML] M. Mealling: "The IETF XML Registry", work in progress. [RFC1034] P. Mockapetris: "DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS AND FACILITIES", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. [RFC1035] P. Mockapetris: "DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. [RFC2119] S. Bradner: "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2535] D. Eastlake: "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC 2535, March 1999. [RFC3008] B. Wellington: "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Signing Authority", RFC 3008, November 2000. [RFC3090] E. Lewis: "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone Status", RFC 3090, March 2001. Informative References: [XML] Editors T. Bray et al.: "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)", W3C Recommendation 6 October 2000. [XMLS-1] Editors H. Thompson et al.: "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C Recommendation 2 May 2001. [XMLS-2] Editors P. Biron, A. Malhotra: "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes", W3C Recommendation 2 May 2001. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 28] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 10. Author's Address Scott Hollenbeck VeriSign Global Registry Services 21345 Ridgetop Circle Dulles, VA 20166-6503 USA shollenbeck@verisign.com A. Revisions From Previous Version (Note to RFC editor: please remove this section completely before publication as an RFC.) None, this is the initial version. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 29] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Mapping February 12, 2002 B. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society 2002. All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Acknowledgement Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Hollenbeck Expires August 12, 2002 [Page 30]