Network Working Group S. Hollenbeck Internet-Draft VeriSign, Inc. Expires: December 6, 2004 June 7, 2004 Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) draft-hollenbeck-epp-secdns-03.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2004. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name System (DNS) security extensions for domain names stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, this mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required for the provisioning of DNS security extensions. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 1] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1 Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Public Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2 Signature Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3 Delegation Signer Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1 EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.1 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2 EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.1 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.2 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.3 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.4 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.5 EPP Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 27 Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 2] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 1. Introduction This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 3730 [1]. This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping described in RFC 3731 [2], is specified using the Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 [3] and XML Schema notation ([4], [5]). The EPP core protocol specification [1] provides a complete description of EPP command and response structures. A thorough understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to understand the mapping described in this document. Familiarity with the DNS described in RFC 1034 [10] and RFC 1035 [11], and DNS security extensions described in RFC 2535 [6], RFC 3008 [12], and RFC 3090 [13] is required to understand the DNS security concepts described in this document. The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a shared central repository. Information exchanged via this mapping can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNS resource records as described in RFC 2535 [6] and RFC 3658 [7]. 1.1 Conventions Used In This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [8]. In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client and "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page boundaries. Indentation and white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element relationships and is not a REQUIRED feature of this protocol. XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the character case presented to develop a conforming implementation. 2. Object Attributes This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name mapping [2]. Only new element descriptions are described here. This document describes update scenarios in which a client can create an initial key set, add new keys to a set, remove keys from a set, and replace an existing key set. Key set replacement vs. adding and Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 3] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 removing individual keys might be a matter of server operator policy or the subject of another document. 2.1 Public Key Information Public key information is sent to the server so that the server can sign RRs published in a zone managed by the server operator using a zone-level key. A server operator SHOULD NOT sign any key provided by a client without cryptographically confirming that the client possesses the private key associated with the public key. Clients can send information describing multiple keys to a server. Each key element MUST be accompanied by a corresponding signature element when adding keys to a set. Public key information provided by a client maps to the KEY RR fields described in RFC 2535 [6]. A KEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol octet, an algorithm number octet, and a public key. See RFC 2535 for specific field formats. 2.2 Signature Information Signature information is sent to the server to prove that the client (or an entity for whom the client is acting as agent) has the private key corresponding to the public key and that the key has not been modified while in transit. It allows the server to do basic error checking as part of the provisioning process. Clients can send information describing multiple signatures to a server. Each signature element MUST correspond to a key element when adding keys to a set. The signature value in each signature element MUST cover all of the keys in the given set. Signature information provided by a client maps to the SIG RR fields described in RFC 2535 [6]. A SIG RR contains nine fields: a "type covered" field, an algorithm number octet, a labels octet, an original TTL field, a signature expiration field, a signature inception field, a key tag field, a signer's name field, and a signature field. See RFC 2535 for specific field formats. 2.3 Delegation Signer Information Delegation signer (DS) information is published by the server to indicate that a delegated zone is digitally signed and that the delegation zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the delegated zone. A DS RR contains four fields: a key tag field, a KEY algorithm number octet, an octet identifying the digest algorithm used, and a digest field. See RFC 3658 [7] for specific field Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 4] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 formats. This document describes multiple DS provisioning mechanisms. The RECOMMENDED mechanism is one in which the information needed to publish DS RRs is derived by the server from key and signature information provided by the client. This provisioning mechanism minimizes client complexity and ensures that there is no DS version conflict between the client and server, minimizing or eliminating client-server DS errors. It is worth noting, though, that there are other DS provisioning options. One option that is supported in this specification is for the client to generate and send only DS information to the server. This option is the simplest for the server to implement, though more complex for the client because the client is responsible for generating the DS information. The server has no means of detecting errors in the data provided by the client prior to publishing the DS information. Another option that is not supported in this specification is for the client to send DS information, KEY information, and SIG(DS) information to the server. This option is verbose and does nothing to reduce the client-server error rate, but it does provide the server with enough information to detect DS errors before they appear in a zone. 3. EPP Command Mapping A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found in the EPP core protocol specification [1]. The command mappings described here are specifically for use in provisioning and managing DNS security extensions via EPP. 3.1 EPP Query Commands EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: to determine if an object is known to the server, to retrieve detailed information associated with an object, and to retrieve object transfer status information. 3.1.1 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 3.1.2 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. Additional elements are defined for the response. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 5] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 When an command has been processed successfully, the EPP element MUST contain child elements as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. In addition, the EPP element MUST contain a child element that identifies the extension namespace and the location of the extension schema. The element contains the following child elements: A element that describes extension status for the domain. This element contains an attribute named "s" whose value is either "secure" or "insecure". Domains that have been provisioned with security extensions are represented with "secure" status. Domains that have not been provisioned with security extensions are represented with "insecure" status. The element is followed by either a element, a element, or a element depending on the status of the delegation. A element or a element MUST be present if the status of the delegation is "secure". A element MUST be present if the status of the delegation is "insecure". The element contains no child elements. It does contain a REQUIRED "nxt" attribute that notes if the delegation is included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. A value of "1" or "true" indicates that the delegation is insecure, but is included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. A value of "0" or "false" indicates that the delegation is insecure and is not included in the parent zone's chain of NXT records. The element contains a subset of the public key information originally provided by the client for a secured delegation. Each element contains a element, an OPTIONAL element, and an OPTIONAL element. The and elements indicate a client's preferences for the start and end date of DNS security extension resource record publication in the zone administered by the server operator. The element contains the following child elements: A element that contains a flags field value as described in sections 3.1 and 3.1.2 of RFC 2535 [6]. A element that contains a protocol field value as described in sections 3.1 and 3.1.3 of RFC 2535 [6]. A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of RFC 2535 [6]. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 6] An OPTIONAL element that contains an encoded public key field value as described in section 3.1 of RFC 2535 [6]. The format of the public key is algorithm dependent. This value will be provided only if server policy supports retention of client-provided keys. The element contains delegation signer information originally provided by the client for a secured delegation. If present, the element contains the following child elements: A element that contains a key tag value as described in section 2.4 of RFC 3658 [7]. A element that contains an algorithm value as described in section 2.4 of RFC 3658 [7]. A element that contains a digest type value as described in section 2.4 of RFC 3658 [7]. A element that contains a digest value as described in section 2.4 of RFC 3658 [7]. An OPTIONAL element and an OPTIONAL element. The and elements indicate a client's preferences for the start and end date of DNS security extension resource record publication in the zone administered by the server operator. Example Response for a Secure Delegation with Key Data: S: S: S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.tld S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 7] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: 256 S: 3 S: 1 S: AQPJ////4Q== S: S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: Example Response for a Secure Delegation with DS Data: S: S: S: S: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 8] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.tld S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: 12345 S: 3 S: 1 S: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ S: S: S: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 9] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Example Response for an Insecure Delegation: S: S: S: S: S: Command completed successfully S: S: S: S: example.tld S: EXAMPLE1-REP S: S: jd1234 S: sh8013 S: sh8013 S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ns1.example.tld S: ns2.example.tld S: ClientX S: ClientY S: 1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: ClientX S: 1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z S: 2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z S: 2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z S: 2fooBAR S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: S: ABC-12345 S: 54322-XYZ Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 10] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 S: S: S: An EPP error response MUST be returned if an command can not be processed for any reason. 3.1.3 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 3.2 EPP Transform Commands EPP provides five commands to transform objects: to create an instance of an object, to delete an instance of an object, to extend the validity period of an object, to manage object sponsorship changes, and to change information associated with an object. 3.2.1 EPP Command This extension defines additional elements for the EPP command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. No additional elements are defined for the EPP response. When a command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 3.2.2 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 3.2.3 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 3.2.4 EPP Command This extension does not add any elements to the EPP command or response described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 11] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 3.2.5 EPP Command This extension defines additional elements for the EPP command described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. No additional elements are defined for the EPP response. The EPP command provides a transform operation that allows a client to modify the attributes of a domain object. In addition to the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the command MUST contain an element. The element MUST contain a child element that identifies the extension namespace and the location of the extension schema. The element contains a element to add security information to a delegation, a element to remove security information from a delegation, or a element to replace (possibly empty) security information with new security information. The element is used to add keys to an existing set. The element contains a element whose child elements are the same as those listed in the description of the EPP command. The element MAY only be used to add keys to an existing set; it MUST NOT be used to replace DS data with key data, for example. The element contains either a element that is used to remove keys from an existing set, or a element that is used to remove DS data from a delegation. Removing all keys or DS data MUST change the status of the delegation to "notSecured". The element contains the following child elements used to identify the key to be removed: A element that contains an algorithm number field value as described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of RFC 2535 [6]. A element that contains a key tag field value as described in sections 4.1 and 4.1.6 of RFC 2535 [6]. The element MAY contain a element whose child elements are the same as those listed in the description of the EPP command. The element is used to replace an existing key set with a new key set and to remove a key set completely. The element contains child elements that are the same as those presented in the description of the element as part of the EPP command. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 12] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Example Command, Adding a Key: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: KEY C: 1 C: 2 C: 172800 C: 2001-11-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 2001-10-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 14845 C: example.tld C: AzHp////hp4= C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 13] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Example Command, Replacing a Key Set: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 256 C: 3 C: 1 C: AQPJ////4Q== C: C: C: KEY C: 1 C: 2 C: 172800 C: 2001-11-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 2001-10-05T22:00:00.0Z C: 14845 C: example.tld C: AzHp////hp4= C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 14] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Example Command, Removing a Key Set: C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Example Command, Removing a Key: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 15] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 1 C: 14845 C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Example Command, Changing DS Data: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 16] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 3 C: 1 C: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: Example Command, Removing DS Data: Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 17] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 C: C: C: C: C: C: example.tld C: C: C: C: C: C: C: 12345 C: 3 C: 1 C: 49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC C: C: C: C: C: ABC-12345 C: C: When an extended command has been processed successfully, the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2]. 4. Formal Syntax An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation. The formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML instances. The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI registration purposes. BEGIN Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 18] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 domain name extension schema for provisioning DNS security extensions. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 20] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 21] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 END 5. Internationalization Considerations EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding information using the Unicode character set and its more compact representations including UTF-8 [14]. Conformant XML processors recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [15]. Though XML includes provisions to identify and use other character encodings through use of an "encoding" attribute in an declaration, use of UTF-8 is RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support incompatibility exists. As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [2], the elements, element content, attributes, and attribute values described in this document MUST inherit the internationalization conventions used to represent higher-layer domain and core protocol structures present in an XML instance that includes this extension. 6. IANA Considerations This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [9]. Two URI assignments are requested. Registration request for the extension namespace: URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0 Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document. XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification. Registration request for the extension XML schema: URI: uurn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0 Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document. XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 23] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 7. Security Considerations The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any security services beyond those described by EPP [1], the EPP domain name mapping [2], and protocol layers used by EPP. The security considerations described in these other specifications apply to this specification as well. As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in sections 2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 3730 [1]. Any attempt to perform a transform operation on a domain object by any client other than the sponsoring client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP authorization error. The provisioning service described in this document involves the exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the DNS. A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a strong authentication mechanism. An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator who wants to send key information to be signed and published by the server operator. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data manipulation. The signature information provided by a client allows a server to confirm that the corresponding key is usable and has not been modified while in transit, but the server generally does not have enough information to confirm that the key was generated and provided by the child zone administrator. Authentication and integrity services MUST be provided on a hop-by-hop basis to ensure that data is not modified while in transit between entities. Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce significant operational consequences. The child and parent zones MUST be consistent to properly secure the delegation. In the absence of consistent signatures the delegation will not appear in the secure name space, yielding untrustworthy query responses. Signature checking at the server requires computational resources. A purposeful or inadvertent denial of service attack is possible if a client requests some number of update operations that exceed a server's processing capabilities. Server operators SHOULD take steps to manage command load and command processing requirements to minimize the risk of a denial of service attack. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 24] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 8. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the following people who have provided significant contributions to the development of this document: David Blacka, Olafur Gudmundsson, Mark Kosters, and Dan Massey. 9. References 9.1 Normative References [1] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 3730, March 2004. [2] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping", RFC 3731, March 2004. [3] Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C. and E. Maler, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (2nd ed)", W3C REC-xml, October 2000, . [4] Thompson, H., Beech, D., Maloney, M. and N. Mendelsohn, "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C REC-xmlschema-1, May 2001, . [5] Biron, P. and A. Malhotra, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes", W3C REC-xmlschema-2, May 2001, . [6] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC 2535, March 1999. [7] Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR)", RFC 3658, December 2003. [8] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [9] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, January 2004. 9.2 Informative References [10] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. [11] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 25] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 [12] Wellington, B., "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Signing Authority", RFC 3008, November 2000. [13] Lewis, E., "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone Status", RFC 3090, March 2001. [14] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. [15] Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646", RFC 2781, February 2000. Author's Address Scott Hollenbeck VeriSign, Inc. 21345 Ridgetop Circle Dulles, VA 20166-6503 US EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 26] Internet-Draft EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping June 2004 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Disclaimer of Validity This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Hollenbeck Expires December 6, 2004 [Page 27]