AX Enterprize, LLC

4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville NY 13495 USA adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com

AX Enterprize, LLC

4947 Commercial Drive Yorkville NY 13495 USA stu.card@axenterprize.com

HTT Consulting

Oak Park MI 48237 USA rgm@labs.htt-consult.com

Internet DRIP Working Group Internet-Draft The Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP), plus trust policies and periodic access to registries, augments Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification (UAS RID), enabling local real time assessment of trustworthiness of received RID messages and observed UAS, even by Observers then lacking Internet access. This document defines DRIP message types and formats to be sent in Broadcast RID Authentication Messages to verify that attached and recent detached messages were signed by the registered owner of the DRIP Entity Tag (DET) claimed.

Introduction The initial regulations (e.g., ) and standards (e.g., ) for Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Systems (UAS) Remote Identification and tracking (RID) do not address trust. However, this is a requirement that needs to be addressed for various different parties that have a stake in the safe operation of National Airspace Systems (NAS). DRIP's goal as stated in the WG charter is:

• to specify how RID can be made trustworthy and available in both Internet and local-only connected scenarios, especially in emergency situations.

UAS often operate in a volatile environment. Small UA offer little capacity for computation and communication. UAS RID must also be accessible with ubiquitous and inexpensive devices without modification. This limits options. Generally two communication schemes for UAS RID are considered: Broadcast and Network. This document focuses on adding trust to Broadcast RID (Section 3.2 of ). Senders can make any claims the RID message formats allow. Observers have no standardized means to assess how much to trust message content, nor verify whether the messages were sent by the UA identified therein, nor confirm that the UA identified therein is the one they are visually observing. Indeed, Observers have no way to detect whether the messages were sent by any UA at all, or spoofed by some other transmitter (e.g. a laptop or smartphone) anywhere in direct wireless broadcast range.

DET Authentication Goals for Broadcast RID ASTM Authentication Messages (Message Type 0x2), when used with formats using DETs, enable a high level of trust that the content of other ASTM Messages was generated by their claimed registered source. These messages are designed to provide the Observers with immediately actionable information. This authentication approach also provides some error correction () as mandated by the United States (US) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) , which is missing from over Legacy Transports (Bluetooth 4.x). These DRIP enhancements to further support the important use case of Observers who are sometimes offline at the time of observation. A summary of DRIP requirements addressed herein is provided in .

• Note: The Endorsement (used in ) that proves that a DET is registered MUST come from its immediate parent in the registration hierarchy, e.g. a DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME) . In the definitive hierarchy the parent of the UA is its HDA, the parent of an HDA is its RAA, etc. It is also assumed that DRIP aware entities all use a DET as their identifier during interactions with other DRIP aware entities.

Terminology

Required Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Definitions This document makes use of the terms (Observer, USS, UTM, etc.) defined in . Other terms (such as DIME) are from , while others (DET, RAA, HDA, etc.) are from . In addition, the following terms are defined for this document: ASTM Message (25-bytes):

• Full ASTM Message as defined in ; specifically Message Types 0x0, 0x1, 0x3, 0x4, and 0x5

ASTM Message Hash (8-bytes):

• Hash of a single full ASTM Message using hash operations described in (). ASTM Message includes Message Type and Protocol Version and does not include the Message Counter.

Broadcast Endorsement (136-bytes):

• A class of Endorsement under DRIP which is carried by the Link Message . They are generated by a DIME during the registration of a subordinate DET-based entity.

Current Manifest Hash (8-bytes):

• Hash of the current Manifest Message (). See .

Evidence (0 to 112 bytes):

• Opaque evidence data that the UA is endorsing during its flight in .

Extended Transports:

• use of extended advertisements (Bluetooth 5.x), service info (Wi-Fi NAN) or vendor specific element information (IEEE 802.11 Beacon) in broadcast frames as specified in . Must use ASTM Message Pack (Message Type 0xF).

Frame Type (1-byte):

• Sub-type for future different DRIP Frame formats. See .

Legacy Transports:

• use of broadcast frames (Bluetooth 4.x) as specified in .

Previous Manifest Hash (8-bytes):

• Hash of the previously sent Manifest Message (). See .

UA DRIP Entity Tag (DET) (16-bytes):

• The UA DET in byte form (network byte order) and is part of .

UA Signature (64-bytes):

• Signature over all 4 preceding fields of using the Host Identity (HI) of the UA.

Valid Not After (VNA) Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):

• Timestamp denoting recommended time to stop trusting data in . MUST follow the format defined in . That is a Unix-style timestamp (with an epoch of 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC) with an additional offset to push a short time into the future (relative to Not Before Timestamp) to avoid replay attacks. The offset used against the Unix-style timestamp is not defined in this document. Best practice identifying an acceptable offset should be used taking into consideration the UA environment, and propagation characteristics of the messages being sent and clock differences between the UA and Observers. A reasonable time would be to set Not After Timestamp 2 minutes after Not Before Timestamp.

Valid Not Before (VNB) Timestamp by UA (4-bytes):

• Timestamp denoting recommended time to start trusting data in . MUST follow the format defined in . That is a Unix-style timestamp with an epoch of 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC. MUST be set no earlier than the time the signature is generated.

Background

Reasoning for IETF DRIP Authentication defines Authentication Message framing only. It does not define authentication formats or methods. It explicitly anticipates several signature options, but does not fully define those. Annex A1 of defines a Broadcast Authentication Verifier Service, which has a heavy reliance on Observer real-time connectivity to the Internet. Fortunately, also allows third party standard Authentication Types using Type 5 Specific Authentication Method (SAM), several of which DRIP defines herein. The standardization of specific formats to support the DRIP requirements in UAS RID for trustworthy communications over Broadcast RID is an important part of the chain of trust for a UAS ID. Per Section 5 of , there is a need to have Authentication formats to relay information for Observers to determine trust. No existing formats (defined in or other organizations leveraging this feature) provide the functionality to satisfy this goal resulting in the work reflected in this document.

UA Signed Evidence When an Observer receives a DRIP-based Authentication Message (, , or ) containing UA-signed Evidence (in an Endorsement structure ) it SHOULD validate the signature using the HI corresponding to the UA's DRIP Entity Tag (DET). The UA's HI SHOULD be retrieved from DNS. If not available it may have been revoked. Note that accurate revocation status is a DIME inquiry; DNS non-response is a hint to the DET being expired or revoked. It MAY be retrieved from a local cache, if present. The local cache is typically populated by DNS lookups and/or by received Broadcast Endorsements (). Once the Observer has the registered UA's DET and HI, all further (or cached previous) DRIP-based Authentication Messages using the UA DET can be validated. Signed content, tied to the DET, can now be trusted to have been signed by the holder of the private key corresponding to the DET. Whether the content is true is a separate question which DRIP cannot address but sanity checks () are possible.

DIME Endorsements of Subordinate DET When an Observer receives a DRIP Link Authentication Message () containing an Endorsement by the DIME of the a child DET registration, it SHOULD validate the signature using the HI corresponding to the DIME's DET. The DIME's HI, SHOULD be retrieved from from DNS (Section 5, ), when available. It MAY be cached from a prior DNS lookup or it may be stored in a distinct local store.

DIME Hierarchy Endorsements An Observer can receive a series of DRIP Link Authentication Messages (), each one pertaining to a DIME's registration in the DIME above it in the hierarchy. Similar to , each link in this chain SHOULD be validated.

UAS RID Trust , , and complete the trust chain but the chain cannot yet be trusted as having any relevance to the observed UA because replay attacks are trivial. At this point the key nominally possessed by the UA is trusted but the UA has not yet been proven to possess that private key. It is necessary for the UA to prove possession by dynamically signing data that is unique and unpredictable but easily verified by the Observer. This can be in the form of a DRIP Wrapper or Manifest (, ) containing an ASTM Message that fulfills the requirements. Verification of this signed data MUST be performed by the Observer as part of the received UAS RID information trust assessment ().

ASTM Authentication Message The Authentication Message (Message Type 0x2) is a unique message in the Broadcast standard as it is the only one that is larger than the Legacy Transport size. To address this, it is defined as a set of "pages", each of which fits into a single Legacy Transport frame. For Extended Transports these pages are still used but are all in a single frame.

Authentication Page

Standard ASTM Authentication Message Page

This document leverages Authentication Type 0x5, Specific Authentication Method (SAM), as the principal authentication container, defining a set of SAM Types in . This is denoted in every Authentication Page in the Page Header. The SAM Type is denoted as a field in the Authentication Payload (see ). The Authentication Message is structured as a set of pages . There is a technical maximum of 16 pages (indexed 0 to 15 in the Page Header) that can be sent for a single Authentication Message, with each page carrying a maximum 23-byte Authentication Payload. See for more details. Over Legacy Transports, these messages are "fragmented", with each page sent in a separate Legacy Transport frame. Either as a single Authentication Message or a set of fragmented Authentication Message Pages the structure is further wrapped by outer ASTM framing and the specific link framing.

Authentication Payload Field is the source data view of the data fields found in the Authentication Message as defined by . This data is placed into 's Authentication Payload, spanning multiple pages.

ASTM Authentication Message Fields

When Additional Data is being sent, a single unsigned byte (Additional Data Length) directly follows the Authentication Data / Signature and has the length, in bytes, of the following Additional Data. For DRIP, this field is used to carry Forward Error Correction as defined in .

Specific Authentication Method

SAM Data Format is the general format to hold authentication data when using SAM and is placed inside the Authentication Data/Signature field in .

SAM Data Format

SAM Type For DRIP the following SAM Types are allocated:

SAM Type	Description
0x01	DRIP Link ()
0x02	DRIP Wrapper ()
0x03	DRIP Manifest ()
0x04	DRIP Frame ()

• Note: ASTM International is the owner of these code points as they are defined in . In accordance with Annex 5, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has been selected by ASTM as the registrar to manage allocations of these code points.

SAM Authentication Data This field has a maximum size of 200-bytes, as defined by .

ASTM Broadcast RID Constraints

Wireless Frame Constraints A UA has the option of broadcasting using Bluetooth (4.x and 5.x), Wi-Fi NAN, or IEEE 802.11 Beacon, see . With Bluetooth, FAA and other Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) mandate transmitting simultaneously over both 4.x and 5.x. The same application layer information defined in MUST be transmitted over all the physical layer interfaces performing the function of RID. Bluetooth 4.x presents a payload size challenge in that it can only transmit 25-bytes of payload per frame where the others all can support larger payloads per frame. However, the messaging framing dictated by Bluetooth 4.x constraints is inherited by over other media.

Paged Authentication Message Constraints To keep consistent formatting across the different transports (Legacy and Extended) and their independent restrictions, the authentication data being sent is REQUIRED to fit within the page limit that the most constrained existing transport can support. Under Broadcast RID the Extended Transport that can hold the least amount of authentication data is Bluetooth 5.x at 9 pages. As such DRIP transmitters are REQUIRED to adhere to the following when using the Authentication Message:

1. Authentication Data / Signature data MUST fit in the first 9 pages (Page Numbers 0 through 8).
2. The Length field in the Authentication Headers (which denotes the length in bytes of Authentication Data / Signature only) MUST NOT exceed the value of 201. This includes the SAM Type but excludes Additional Data such as FEC.

DRIP Authentication Formats All formats defined in this section are the content for the Authentication Data/Signature field in and use the Specific Authentication Method (SAM, Authentication Type 0x5). The first byte of the Authentication Data / Signature of , is used to multiplex between these various formats. When sending data over a medium that does not have underlying Forward Error Correction (FEC), for example Legacy Transports, then MUST be used. gives a high-level overview of the various states machine for determining a trustworthiness state and examples of each.

Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence The Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence () is used by the UA during flight to sign over information elements using the private key associated with the current UA DET. It is encapsulated by the SAM Authentication Data field of . This structure is used by the DRIP Wrapper (), Manifest , and Frame (). DRIP Link () MUST NOT use it as it will not fit in the ASTM Authentication Message with its intended content (i.e. a Broadcast Endorsement).

Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence

UA DRIP Entity Tag:

• This is the current DET being used by the UA.

Evidence:

• The evidence section MUST be filled in with data in the form of an opaque object specified in the DRIP Wrapper, Manifest, or Frame sections.

UA Signature:

• The UA private key MUST be used over all preceding fields to generate the signature.

When using this structure, the UA is minimally self-endorsing its DET. The HI of the UA DET can be looked up by mechanisms described in or by extracting it from a Broadcast Endorsement (see and ).

DRIP Link This SAM Type is used to transmit Broadcast Endorsements. For example, the Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA is sent (see ) as a DRIP Link message. DRIP Link is important as its contents are used to provide trust in the DET/HI pair that the UA is currently broadcasting. This message does not require Internet connectivity to perform signature validations of the contents when the DIME DET/HI is in the receiver's cache. It also provides the UA HI, when it is a Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA, so that connectivity is not required when performing validation of other DRIP Authentication Messages.

Broadcast Endorsement / DRIP Link

This DRIP Authentication Message is used in conjunction with other DRIP SAM Types (such as the Manifest or the Wrapper) that contain data (e.g., the ASTM Location/Vector Message, Message Type 0x2) that is guaranteed to be unique, unpredictable and easily cross checked by the receiving device. The hash of such a message SHOULD merely be included in a DRIP Manifest, but an entire such message MAY be encapsulated in a DRIP Wrapper periodically for stronger security.

DRIP Wrapper This SAM Type is used to wrap and sign over a list of other Broadcast RID messages. The evidence section of the Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence () is populated with full (25-byte) Broadcast RID messages. The ASTM Messages can be concatenated together to form a contiguous byte sequence as shown in . The maximum number of messages supported is 4. The messages MUST be in Message Type order as defined by . All message types except Authentication (Message Type 0x2) and Message Pack (Message Type 0xF) are allowed.

DRIP Wrapper Evidence

Wrapped Count & Sanity Check When decoding a DRIP Wrapper on a receiver, a calculation of the number of messages wrapped and a sanity check can be performed by using the number of bytes (defined as wrapperLength) between the UA DET and the VNB Timestamp by UA such as in .

Pseudo-code for Wrapper sanity check and number of messages calculation

Wrapper over Extended Transports To send the DRIP Wrapper over Extended Transports the messages being wrapped are co-located with the Authentication Message in a ASTM Message Pack (Message Type 0xF). The evidence section of the Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence is cleared after signing leaving the following binary structure that is placed into the SAM Authentication Data of and sent in the same Message Pack.

DRIP Wrapper over Extended Transports

To verify the signature the receiver must concatenate all the messages in the Message Pack (excluding Authentication Message found in the same Message Pack) in Message Type order and set the evidence section of the Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence before performing signature verification. The functionality of a Wrapper in this form is identical to Message Set Signature (Authentication Type 0x3) when running over Extended Transports. What the Wrapper provides is the same format but over both Extended and Legacy Transports allowing the transports to be similar. Message Set Signature also implies using the ASTM validator system architecture which relies on Internet connectivity for verification which the receiver may not have at the time of receipt of an Authentication Message. This is something the Wrapper, and all DRIP Authentication Formats, avoid when the UA key is obtained via a DRIP Link Authentication Message.

Wrapper Limitations The primary limitation of the Wrapper is the bounding of up to 4 ASTM Messages that can be sent within it. Another limitation is that the format can not be used as a surrogate for messages it is wrapping. This is due to high potential a receiver on the ground does not support DRIP. Thus, when a Wrapper is being used the wrapped data must effectively be sent twice, once as a single framed message (as specified in ) and then again within the Wrapper.

DRIP Manifest This SAM Type is used to create message manifests that contain hashes of previously sent ASTM Messages. By hashing previously sent messages and signing them we gain trust in a UA's previous reports without retransmitting them. An Observer who has been listening for any length of time SHOULD hash received messages and cross-check them against the Manifest hashes. This is a way to evade the limitation of a maximum of 4 messages in the Wrapper () and greatly reduce overhead. Judicious use of a Manifest enables an entire Broadcast RID message stream to be strongly authenticated with less than 100% overhead relative to a completely unauthenticated message stream (see ). The evidence section of the Endorsement Structure for UA Signed Evidence () is populated with 8-byte hashes of Broadcast RID messages (from 2 to 11) and two special hashes (). All these hashes MUST be concatenated to form a contiguous byte sequence in the evidence section. The Previous Manifest Hash and Current Manifest Hash MUST always come before the ASTM Message Hashes as seen in . A receiver SHOULD use the Manifest to verify each ASTM Message hashed therein that it has previously received. It can do this without having received them all. A Manifest SHOULD typically encompass a single transmission cycle of messages being sent, see and .

DRIP Manifest Evidence Structure

Hash Count & Sanity Check When decoding a DRIP Manifest on a receiver, a calculation of the number of hashes and a sanity check can be performed by using the number of bytes (defined as manifestLength) between the UA DET and the VNB Timestamp by UA such as in .

Pseudo-code for Manifest sanity check and number of hashes calculation

Manifest Ledger Hashes Two special hashes are included in all Manifests: the Previous Manifest Hash, which links to the previous Manifest; and the Current Manifest Hash. These hashes act as a ledger to provenance to the Manifest that could be traced back if the Observer was present for extended periods of time.

Hash Algorithms and Operation The hash algorithm used for the Manifest is the same hash algorithm used in creation of the DET that is signing the Manifest. DET's using cSHAKE128 compute the hash as follows:

• Informative Note: specifies cSHAKE128 but is open for the expansion of other OGAs.

When building the list of hashes the Previous Manifest Hash is known from the previous Manifest. For the first built Manifest this value is filled with a random nonce. The Current Manifest Hash is null filled while ASTM Messages are hashed and fill the ASTM Messages Hashes section. When all messages are hashed the Current Manifest Hash is computed over the Previous Manifest Hash, Current Manifest Hash (null filled) and ASTM Messages Hashes. This hash value replaces the null filled Current Manifest Hash and becomes the Previous Manifest Hash for the next Manifest.

Legacy Transport Hashing Under this transport DRIP hashes the full ASTM Message being sent over the Bluetooth Advertising frame. For paged ASTM Messages (currently only Authentication Messages) all the pages are concatenated together and hashed as one object. For all other Message Types each individual 25-byte message is hashed.

Extended Transport Hashing Under this transport DRIP hashes the full ASTM Message Pack (Message Type 0xF) - regardless of its content.

DRIP Frame This SAM Type is for when the authentication data does not fit in other defined formats under DRIP and is reserved for future expansion under DRIP if required. The contents of Frame Evidence Data is not defined in this document. Other specifications MUST define the contents and register for a Frame Type.

DRIP Frame

Frame Type Byte to sub-type for future different DRIP Frame formats. It takes the first byte in leaving 111-bytes available for Frame Evidence Data.

Frame Type	Name	Description
0x00	Reserved	Reserved
0xC0-0xFF	Experimental	Experimental Use

Forward Error Correction For Broadcast RID, Forward Error Correction (FEC) is provided by the lower layers in Extended Transports. The Bluetooth 4.x Legacy Transport does not have supporting FEC so with DRIP Authentication the following application level FEC scheme is used to add FEC. When sending data over a medium that does not have underlying FEC, for example Bluetooth 4.x, then this section MUST be used. The Bluetooth 4.x lower layers have error detection but not correction. Any frame in which Bluetooth detects an error is dropped and not delivered to higher layers (in our case, DRIP). Thus it can be treated as an erasure. DRIP standardizes a single page FEC scheme using XOR parity across all page data of an Authentication Message. This allows the correction of single erased page in an Authentication Message. Other FEC schemes, to protect more than a single page of an Authentication Message or multiple Messages, is left for future standardization if operational experience proves it necessary and/or practical. The data added during FEC is not included in the Authentication Data / Signature but instead in the Additional Data field of . This may cause the Authentication Message to exceed 9-pages, up to a maximum of 16-pages.

Encoding When encoding two things are REQUIRED:

1. The FEC data MUST start on a new Authentication Page. To do this the results of parity encoding MUST be placed in the Additional Data field of with null padding before it to line up with the next page. The Additional Data Length field MUST be set to number of padding bytes + number of parity bytes.
2. The Last Page Index field (in Page 0) MUST be incremented from what it would have been without FEC by the number of pages required for the Additional Data Length field, null padding and FEC.

To generate the parity a simple XOR operation using the previous parity page and current page is used. Only the 23-byte Authentication Payload field of is used in the XOR operations. For Page 0, a 23-byte null pad is used for the previous parity page. shows an example of the last two pages (out of N) of an Authentication Message using DRIP Single Page FEC. The Additional Data Length is set to 33 as there are always 23-bytes of FEC data and in this example 10-bytes of padding to line it up into Page N.

Example Single Page FEC Encoding

Decoding To determine if FEC has been used a simple check of the Last Page Index can be used. In general if the Last Page Index field is one greater than that necessary to hold Length bytes of Authentication Data then FEC has been used. Note however that if Length bytes was exhausted exactly at the end of an Authentication Page then the Additional Data Length field will occupy the first byte of the following page the remainder of which under DRIP will be null padded. In this case the Last Page Index will have been once for initializing the Additional Data Length field and once for FEC page, for a total of two additional pages. To decode FEC in DRIP a rolling XOR is used on each Authentication Page received in the current Authentication Message. A Message Counter, outside of the ASTM Message but specified in is used to signal a different Authentication Message and to correlate pages to messages. This Message Counter is only 1-byte in length, so it will roll over (to 0x00) after reaching its maximum value (0xFF). If only 1-page is missing in the Authentication Message the resulting parity bytes should be the data of the erased page. Authentication Page 0 contains various important fields, only located on that page, that help decode the full ASTM Authentication Message. If Page 0 has been reconstructed the Last Page Index and Length fields are REQUIRED to be sanity checked by DRIP. The pseudo-code in can be used for both checks.

Pseudo-code for Decode Checks = 16) { return DECODE_FAILURE } // check that decoded length does not exceed DRIP maximum if (decoded_length > 201) { return DECODE_FAILURE } // grab the page at index where length ends and extract its data auth_data = auth_pages[(decoded_length - 17) / 23].data // find the index of last auth byte last_auth_byte = (17 + (23 * last_auth_page)) - decoded_length // look for non-nulls after the last auth byte if (auth_data[(last_auth_byte + 2):] has non-nulls) { return DECODE_FAILURE } // check that byte directly after last auth byte is null if (auth_data[last_auth_byte + 1] equals null) { return DECODE_FAILURE } // we set our presumed Additional Data Length (ADL) presumed_adl = auth_data[last_auth_byte + 1] // use the presumed ADL to calculate a presumed LPI presumed_lpi = (presumed_adl + decoded_length - 17) / 23 // check that presumed LPI and decoded LPI match if (presumed_lpi not equal decoded_lpi) { return DECODE_FAILURE } return DECODE_SUCCESS } ]]>

FEC Limitations The worst case scenario is when the Authentication Data / Signature ends perfectly on a page (Page N-1). This means the Additional Data Length would start the next page (Page N) and have 22-bytes worth of null padding to align the FEC to begin at the start of the next page (Page N+1). In this scenario an entire page (Page N) is being wasted just to carry the Additional Data Length. This should be avoided where possible in an effort to maintain efficiency.

Requirements & Recommendations

Legacy Transports With Legacy Advertisements the goal is to attempt to bring reliable receipt of the paged Authentication Message. FEC () MUST be used, per mandated RID rules (for example the US FAA RID Rule ), when using Legacy Advertising methods (such as Bluetooth 4.x). Under , transmission of Authentication Messages are sent at the static rate (at least every 3 seconds). Any DRIP Authentication Messages containing dynamic data (such as the DRIP Wrapper) MAY be sent at the dynamic rate (at least every 1 second).

Extended Transports Under the ASTM specification, Extended Transports of RID must use the Message Pack (Message Type 0xF) format for all transmissions. Under Message Pack messages are sent together (in Message Type order) in a single frame (up to 9 single frame equivalent messages under Legacy Transports). Message Packs are required by to be sent at a rate of 1 per second (like dynamic messages). Without any fragmentation or loss of pages with transmission FEC () MUST NOT be used as it is impractical.

Authentication It is REQUIRED that a UA send the following DRIP Authentication Formats to fulfill the requirements in :

1. SHOULD: send DRIP Link () using the Broadcast Endorsement: Apex, RAA (satisfying GEN-3); at least once per 5 minutes
2. MUST: send DRIP Link () using the Broadcast Endorsement: RAA, HDA (satisfying GEN-3); at least once per 5 minutes
3. MUST: send DRIP Link () using the Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA (satisfying ID-5, GEN-1 and GEN-3); at least once per minute
4. MUST: send any other DRIP Authentication Format (RECOMMENDED: DRIP Manifest () or DRIP Wrapper ()) where the UA is dynamically signing data that is guaranteed to be unique, unpredictable and easily cross checked by the receiving device (satisfying ID-5, GEN-1 and GEN-2); at least once per 5 seconds

Operational UAS operation may impact the frequency of sending DRIP Authentication messages. Where a UA is dwelling in one location, and the channel is heavily used by other devices, "occasional" message authentication may be sufficient for an Observer. Contrast this with a UA traversing an area, and then every message should be authenticated as soon as possible for greatest success as viewed by the receiver. Thus how/when these DRIP Authentication Messages are sent is up to each implementation. Further complication comes in contrasting Legacy and Extended Transports. In Legacy, each message is a separate hash within the Manifest. So, again in dwelling, may lean toward occasional message authentication. In Extended Transports, the hash is over the Message Pack so only few hashes need to be in a Manifest. A single Manifest can handle a potential two Message Packs (for a full set of messages) and a DRIP Link Authentication Message for the Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA. A separate issue is the frequency of transmitting the DRIP Link Authentication Message for the Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA when using the Manifest. This message content is static; its hash never changes radically. The only change is the 4-byte timestamp in the Authentication Message headers. Thus, potentially, in a dwelling operation it can be sent once per minute, where its hash is in every Manifest. A receiver can cache all DRIP Link Authentication Message for the Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA to mitigate potential packet loss. The following operational configuration is RECOMMENDED (in alignment with ):

1. Per CAA requirements, generate and transmit a set of ASTM Messages (example; Basic ID, Location and System).
2. Under Extended Transports, generate and include in the same Message Pack as the CAA required ASTM Messages a DRIP Wrapper as specified in (implicitly wrapping and signing messages in the pack).
3. Under Legacy Transports, generate and transmit every 5 seconds a DRIP Manifest () hashing as many sets as desired of recent CAA required ASTM Messages. The system MAY periodically replace the DRIP Manifest with a DRIP Wrapper () containing at least a Location Message (Message Type 0x2).
4. Under both Legacy or Extended Transports, generate and transmit a DRIP Link's () containing; Broadcast Endorsement: HDA, UA every minute, Broadcast Endorsement: RAA, HDA every 5 minutes, Broadcast Endorsement: Apex, RAA every 5 minutes.

The reasoning and math behind this recommendation can be found in .

DRIP Wrapper The DRIP Wrapper MUST NOT be used in place of sending the ASTM messages as is. All receivers MUST be able to process all the messages specified in . Sending them within the DRIP Wrapper makes them opaque to receivers lacking support for DRIP Authentication Messages. Thus, messages within a Wrapper are sent twice: in the clear and authenticated within the Wrapper. The DRIP Manifest would seem to be a more efficient use of the transport channel. The DRIP Wrapper has a specific use case for DRIP aware receivers. For receiver plotting Location Messages (Message Type 0x2) on a map display an embedded Location Message in a DRIP Wrapper can be marked differently (e.g. via color) to signify trust in the Location data.

UAS RID Trust Assessment As described in , the receiver MUST perform verification of the data being received in Broadcast RID. This is because trust in a key is different from trust that an observed UA possesses that key. A chain of DRIP Links provides trust in a key. A message containing rapidly changing, unpredictable but sanity-checkable data, signed by that key, provides trust that some agent with access to that data also possesses that key. If the sanity check involves correlating physical world observations of the UA with claims in that data, then the probability is high that the observed UA is (or is collaborating with or observed in real time by) the agent with the key. After signature validation of any DRIP Authentication Message containing UAS RID information elements (e.g. DRIP Wrapper ) the Observer MUST use other sources of information to correlate against and perform verification. An example of another source of information is a visual confirmation of the UA position. When correlation of these different data streams do not match in acceptable thresholds the data SHOULD be rejected as if the signature failed to validate. Acceptable thresholds limits and what happens after such a rejection are out of scope for this document.

Summary of Addressed DRIP Requirements The following requirements are addressed in this document: ID-5: Non-spoofability

• Addressed using the DRIP Wrapper (), DRIP Manifest () or DRIP Frame ().

GEN-1: Provable Ownership

• Addressed using the DRIP Link () and DRIP Wrapper (), DRIP Manifest () or DRIP Frame ().

GEN-2: Provable Binding

• Addressed using the DRIP Wrapper (), DRIP Manifest () or DRIP Frame ().

GEN-3: Provable Registration

• Addressed using the DRIP Link ().

IANA Considerations

IANA DRIP Registry This document requests two new registries, for DRIP SAM Type and DRIP Frame Type, under the DRIP registry group.

DRIP SAM Type:

This registry is a mirror for SAM Types containing the subset of allocations used by DRIP Authentication Messages. Future additions MUST be done through ICAO using their process. The following values have been allocated by ICAO to the IETF and are defined here:

DRIP Frame Type:

This 8-bit valued registry is for Frame Types in DRIP Frame Authentication Messages. Future additions to this registry are to be made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of ). The following values are defined:

Security Considerations

Replay Attacks The astute reader may note that the DRIP Link messages, which are recommended to be sent, are static in nature and contain various timestamps. These DRIP Link messages can easily be replayed by an attacker who has copied them from previous broadcasts. If an attacker (who is smart and spoofs more than just the UAS ID/data payloads) willingly replays an DRIP Link message they have in principle actually helped by ensuring the DRIP Link is sent more frequently and be received by potential Observers. The primary mitigation is the UA is REQUIRED to send more than DRIP Link messages, specifically the Manifest and/or Wrapper messages that sign over changing data ASTM Messages (e.g. Location/Vector Messages) using the DET private key. An UA sending these messages then actually signing these and other messages using the DET key provides the Observer with data that proves realtime signing. An UA who does not either run DRIP themselves or does not have possession of the same private key, would be clearly exposed upon signature verification.

VNA Timestamp Offsets for DRIP Authentication Formats Note the discussion of VNA Timestamp offsets here is in context of the DRIP Wrapper (), DRIP Manifest () and DRIP Frame (). For DRIP Link () these offsets are set by the DIME and have their own set of considerations in . The offset of the VNA Timestamp by UA is one that needs careful consideration for any implementation. The offset should be shorter than any given flight duration (typically less than an hour) but be long enough to be received and processed by Observers (larger than a few seconds). It recommended that 3-5 minutes should be sufficient to serve this purpose in any scenario, but is not limited by design.

Brute Force Attacks The authentication methods presented in this document work well for usages where "shadowing" is determined a high threat that needs to be mitigated. This specification does not perform well in scenarios where a UA is spoofing either in a different area or time. A mitigation of this is that the UA public key SHOULD NOT be exposed any sooner than necessary by

Acknowledgments

• Ryan Quigley and James Mussi of AX Enterprize, LLC for early prototyping to find holes in the draft specifications.
• Soren Friis for pointing out that Wi-Fi implementations would not always give access to the MAC Address, originally used in calculation of the hashes for DRIP Manifest. Also, for confirming that Message Packs (0xF) can only carry up to 9 ASTM frames worth of data (9 Authentication pages).
• Thanks to the following reviewers:
  • Rick Salz (secdir)
  • Matt Joras (genart)

References Normative References This document defines terminology and requirements for solutions produced by the Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group. These solutions will support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) for security, safety, and other purposes (e.g., initiation of identity-based network sessions supporting UAS applications). DRIP will facilitate use of existing Internet resources to support RID and to enable enhanced related services, and it will enable online and offline verification that RID information is trustworthy. This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses, which makes them trustable identifiers for use in Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification (UAS RID) and tracking. Within the context of RID, HHITs will be called DRIP Entity Tags (DETs). HHITs provide claims to the included explicit hierarchy that provides registry (via, for example, DNS, RDAP) discovery for third-party identifier endorsement. This document updates RFCs 7401 and 7343. This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID), plus UAS-RID-related communications. This architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements document (RFC 9153). In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology

US Gaithersburg

Informative References Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. AX Enterprize, LLC RTFM llp This document describes the high level architecture for the registration and discovery of DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) using DNS. Discovery of DETs and their artifacts are through DRIP specific DNS structures and standard DNS methods. A general overview of the interfaces required between involved components is described in this document with future supporting documents giving technical specifications.

Authentication States ASTM Authentication has only three states: None, Invalid, and Valid. This is because, under ASTM, the authentication is done by an external service hosted somewhere on the Internet so it is assumed you will always get some sort of answer back. This classification becomes more complex in DRIP with the support of "offline" scenarios where a receiver does not have Internet connectivity. With the use of asymmetric keys this means that the public key (PK) must somehow be obtained. gets more into detail how these keys are stored on DNS and one reason for DRIP Authentication is to send PK's over Broadcast RID. There are two keys of interest: the PK of the UA and the PK of the DIME. This document describes how to send the PK of the UA over the Broadcast RID messages. The key of the DIME can be sent over Broadcast RID using the same mechanisms (see and ) but is not required due to potential operational constraints of sending multiple DRIP Link messages. As such, there are scenarios where part of the key-chain is available, but not all of it. The intent of this appendix is to give some kind of recommended way to classify these various states and convey it to the user through colors and state names/text. These states can apply to either a single authentication message, a DET (and its associated public key), and/or a transmitter. The table below lays out the RECOMMENDED colors to associate with state and a brief description of each.

State	Color	Details
None	Black	No Authentication being received (as yet)
Partial	Gray	Authentication being received but missing pages
Unsupported	Brown	Authentication Type/SAM Type of received message not supported
Unverifiable	Yellow	Data needed for verification of full authentication message missing
Verified	Green	Valid verification results
Trusted	Blue	Valid verification results and DIME is marked as only registering trusted clients
Questionable	Orange	Inconsistent verification results
Unverified	Red	Invalid verification results
Conflicting	Purple	Inconsistent verification results and DIME is marked as only registering trusted clients

None: Black The default state where no authentication information has yet to be received or trust is unknown.

Partial: Gray A pending state where authentication pages are being received but a full authentication message has yet to be compiled. This state is scoped to handling frames, not full messages.

Unsupported: Brown A state representing The only authentication data being received, at this point, is not supported. This can be either due to not supporting the decoding of Authentication Type or SAM Type. This state is scoped to handling frames, not full messages.

Unverifiable: Yellow A pending state where a full authentication message has been received but other information, such as public keys to verify signatures, is missing. This state is scoped to handling an authentication message or list of them.

Verified: Green A state where all authentication messages that have been received, up to that point, pass signature verification. This state is scoped to handling a full authentication message or list of them that have been validated.

Trusted: Blue A state where all authentication messages that has been received, up to that point, pass signature verification and the public key of the aircraft is marked as trusted. In DRIP the trust of the aircraft key typically is done when a DIME, via its policy, only registers "verified" users and that the receiver, also via policy (either independently or their organization), marks that DIME as trusted. Any key under that DIME transitively becomes trusted as well. This state is scoped to handling a list of authentication messages that have been validated.

Questionable: Orange A state where there is a mix of authentication messages received that are verified and unverified. This state is scoped to handling a list of authentication messages that have been validated.

Unverified: Red A state where all authentication messages that have been received, up to that point, failed signature verification. This state is scoped to handling a full authentication message or list of them.

Conflicting: Purple A state where there is a mix of authentication messages received that are verified and unverified and the public key of the aircraft is marked as trusted. This state is scoped to handling a list of authentication messages that have been validated.

Operational Recommendation Analysis The recommendations found in () may seem heavy handed and specific. This appendix lays out the math and assumptions made to come to the recommendations listed there. This section is solely based on operations using Legacy Transports; as such, all calculations of frame counts for DRIP included FEC using .

Methodology In the US, the required ASTM Messages to be transmitted every second are: Basic ID (0x1), Location (0x2), and System (0x4). Typical implementations will most likely send at a higher rate (2x sets per cycle) resulting in 6 frames sent per cycle. Transmitting this set of message more than once a second is not discouraged but awareness is needed to avoid congesting the RF spectrum, causing further issues.

• Informational Note: In Europe, the Operator ID Message (0x5) is also included; pushing the frame count to 8 per cycle. In Japan, two Basic ID (0x0), Location (0x1), and Authentication (0x2) are required, likely pushing the frame count beyond 8.

To calculate the frame count of a given DRIP Authentication Message the following formula is used:

• 1 + ceiling((((16 + 8 + 64) + (Item Size * Item Count) + 2) - 16) / 23) + 1

The leading 1 is counting for the Page 0 which is always present. The DET (16-bytes), timestamps (8-bytes) and signature (64-bytes) all make up the required fields for DRIP. Item Size (in bytes) is size of each item in a given format; for a Wrapper it is 25 (a full ASTM Message), while for a Manifest it is 8 (a single hash). 2 more is added to account for the SAM Type and the ADL byte. The value 16 is the number of bytes not counted (as they are part of Page 0 which is already counted for). 23 is the number of bytes per Authentication Page (pages 1 - 15). After dividing by 23 the value is raised to the nearest whole value as we can only send full frames, not partial. The final 1 is counting for a single page of FEC applied in DRIP under Bluetooth 4.x.

• Informational Note: for DRIP Link the Item Size is 48 and Item Count is 1; resulting in a frame count of 8

Comparing DRIP Wrapper and Manifest Authentication Message frame counts we have the following: Frame Counts

Authenticated Frames	Wrapper Frames	Manifest Frames	Total Wrapper Frames	Total Manifest Frames
1	7	7	8	8
2	8	7	10	9
3	9	7	12	10
4	10	8	14	12
5	N/A	8	N/A	13
6	N/A	8	N/A	14
7	N/A	9	N/A	16
8	N/A	9	N/A	17
9	N/A	10	N/A	19
10	N/A	10	N/A	20
11	N/A	10	N/A	21
12	N/A	12	N/A	24

Note that for Manifest Frames the calculations use an Item Count that is 2 + Authentication Frames. This is to account for the two special hashes. The values in Total Frames is calculated by adding in the Item Count (to either the Wrapper Frames or Manifest Frames column) to account for the ASTM Messages being sent outside the Authentication Message.

ASTM Maximum Schedule Example For this example we will assume the following ASTM Messages are in play:

• 1x Basic ID (0x0) set as ID Type for Serial Number (0x1)
• 1x Basic ID (0x0) set as ID Type for CAA Assigned ID (0x2)
• 1x Basic ID (0x0) set as ID Type for UTM Assigned ID (0x3)
• 1x Basic ID (0x0) set as ID Type for Specific Session ID (0x4)
• 2x Location (0x1)
• 1x Self ID (0x3)
• 2x System (0x4)
• 2x Operator ID (0x5)

This message set uses all single frame ASTM Messages, sending a set of them (Location, System and Operator ID) at a rate of 2 per second. Two Basic IDs are sent in a single second and rotate between the 4 defined (1x per type). A single Self ID is sent every second. All messages in a given second, if appear more than once, are exact duplicates. This example, as exactly presented here, would never make sense in practice, as a Single Use Session ID is pointless in conjunction with any other Basic ID. This is just to show that you could send everything, that doing so would have an overhead not much over 100%, and that you could create a reasonable practical schedule by simply "puncturing" this one (omitting those messages you don't need or want).

Example Legacy Transport Transmit Schedule

Manifest messages in the schedule are filled with unique messages from previously transmitted messages before the new Manifest is sent. In , this is denoted by the * symbol as being part of the Manifest. In , messages are eligible for the Manifest in the very first cycle of transmission. In future iterations, 56 messages are eligible across the 7 seconds it takes to send the previous Manifest and the next Link/Wrapper. Care should be given into the selection of messages for a Manifest as there is a limit of 11 hashes.

• Informational Note: the term "unique message" above is used as in the example schedule the 2nd Location and System messages MAY be exact copies of the previous Location and System messages sent in the same second. Duplicates of this kind SHOULD NOT be included in a Manifest.

In the schedule the Wrapper and the Link messages switch back and forth the contents of them are changing in the following order: Any messages not required for a local jurisdiction can be removed from the schedule. It is RECOMMENDED this empty frame slot is left empty to help with timing due to RF constraints/concerns. For example, in the US the Self ID (0x3) and Operator ID (0x5) are not required and can be ignored in the above figures. Only one Basic ID (0x0) is selected in the US at any given time, opening up three (3) more slots.

US Example

US Example Legacy Transport Transmit Schedule

EU Example

EU Example Legacy Transport Transmit Schedule

JP Example

JP Example Legacy Transport Transmit Schedule