YANG Groupings for
TLS Clients and TLS ServersWatsen Networkskent+ietf@watsen.netCisco Systemsgarywu@cisco.comHuaweifrank.xialiang@huawei.com
Operations
NETCONF Working GroupThis document defines three YANG modules: the first defines groupings
for a generic TLS client, the second defines groupings for a generic TLS
server, and the third defines common identities and groupings used by
both the client and the server. It is intended that these groupings will
be used by applications using the TLS protocol.This draft contains many placeholder values that need to be replaced
with finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.This document contains references to other drafts in progress, both
in the Normative References section, as well as in body text throughout.
Please update the following references to reflect their final RFC
assignments: I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchorsI-D.ietf-netconf-keystoreArtwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: XXXX --> the assigned RFC value
for this draftYYYY --> the assigned RFC value
for I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchorsZZZZ --> the assigned RFC value
for I-D.ietf-netconf-keystoreArtwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: 2019-03-09 --> the publication
date of this draftThe following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
Appendix A. Change LogThis document defines three YANG 1.1
modules: the first defines a grouping for a generic TLS client, the
second defines a grouping for a generic TLS server, and the third
defines identities and groupings common to both the client and the
server (TLS is defined in ). It is intended that
these groupings will be used by applications using the TLS protocol. For
instance, these groupings could be used to help define the data model
for an HTTPS server or a NETCONF over TLS based server.The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one
grouping, which is focused on just TLS-specific configuration, and
specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what
ports to listen-on or connect-to. This affords applications the
opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP
connection is established. For instance, applications supporting NETCONF
Call Home could use the "ssh-server-grouping"
grouping for the TLS parts it provides, while adding data nodes for the
TCP-level call-home configuration.The modules defined in this document use groupings defined in enabling keys
to be either locally defined or
a reference to globally configured values.The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.This section provides a tree diagram for
the "ietf-tls-client" module that does not have groupings
expanded.This section presents two examples showing the tls-client-grouping
populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same
except the first configures the client identity using a local key
while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples
are consistent with the examples presented in Section 3 of and Section 3.2 of .The following example configures the client identity using a local
key: ct:rsa2048base64encodedvalue==base64encodedvalue==base64encodedvalue==explicitly-trusted-server-ca-certs
explicitly-trusted-server-certs
303
]]>The following example configures the client identity using a key
from the keystore: ex-rsa-certexplicitly-trusted-server-ca-certs
explicitly-trusted-server-certs
303
]]>This YANG module has normative references to and . file "ietf-tls-client@2019-03-09.yang"
module ietf-tls-client {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client";
prefix "tlsc";
import ietf-tls-common {
prefix tlscmn;
revision-date 2019-03-09; // stable grouping definitions
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
import ietf-trust-anchors {
prefix ta;
reference
"RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
}
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC ZZZZ: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web:
WG List:
Author: Kent Watsen
Author: Gary Wu ";
description
"This module defines reusable groupings for TLS clients that
can be used as a basis for specific TLS client instances.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2019-03-09" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-client-hello-params-config {
description
"TLS hello message parameters are configurable on a TLS
client.";
}
feature tls-client-keepalives {
description
"Per socket TLS keepalive parameters are configurable for
TLS clients on the server implementing this feature.";
}
// Groupings
grouping tls-client-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS client without
any consideration for how an underlying TCP session is
established.";
uses client-identity-grouping;
uses server-auth-grouping;
uses hello-params-grouping;
uses keepalives-grouping;
}
grouping client-identity-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS client identity.";
container tls-client-identity {
description
"The credentials used by the client to authenticate to
the TLS server.";
choice auth-type {
description
"The authentication type.";
container certificate {
uses
ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
description
"A locally-defined or referenced certificate
to be used for client authentication.";
reference
"RFC ZZZZ: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
}
}
}
grouping server-auth-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring TLS server
authentication.";
container tls-server-auth {
must 'pinned-ca-certs or pinned-server-certs';
description
"Trusted server identities.";
leaf pinned-ca-certs {
if-feature "ta:x509-certificates";
type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
description
"A reference to a list of certificate authority (CA)
certificates used by the TLS client to authenticate
TLS server certificates. A server certificate is
authenticated if it has a valid chain of trust to
a configured pinned CA certificate.";
}
leaf pinned-server-certs {
if-feature "ta:x509-certificates";
type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
description
"A reference to a list of server certificates used by
the TLS client to authenticate TLS server certificates.
A server certificate is authenticated if it is an
exact match to a configured pinned server certificate.";
}
}
}
grouping hello-params-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS transport
parameters.";
container tls-hello-params {
if-feature tls-client-hello-params-config;
uses tlscmn:hello-params-grouping;
description
"Configurable parameters for the TLS hello message.";
}
}
grouping keepalives-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring TLS client keepalive
parameters.";
container tls-keepalives {
if-feature "tls-client-keepalives";
description
"Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test
the aliveness of the TLS server. An unresponsive
TLS server is dropped after approximately max-wait
* max-attempts seconds.";
leaf max-wait {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units seconds;
default 30;
description
"Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if no data
has been received from the TLS server, a TLS-level message
will be sent to test the aliveness of the TLS server.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8;
default 3;
description
"Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive messages
that can fail to obtain a response from the TLS server
before assuming the TLS server is no longer alive.";
}
}
}
}
]]>This section provides a tree diagram for
the "ietf-tls-server" module that does not have groupings
expanded.This section presents two examples showing the tls-server-grouping
populated with some data. These examples are effectively the same
except the first configures the server identity using a local key
while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both examples
are consistent with the examples presented in Section 3 of and Section 3.2 of .The following example configures the server identity using a local
key: ct:rsa2048base64encodedvalue==base64encodedvalue==base64encodedvalue==explicitly-trusted-client-ca-certs
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
]]>The following example configures the server identity using a key
from the keystore: ex-rsa-certexplicitly-trusted-client-ca-certs
explicitly-trusted-client-certs
]]>This YANG module has a normative references to ,
and . file "ietf-tls-server@2019-03-09.yang"
module ietf-tls-server {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server";
prefix "tlss";
import ietf-tls-common {
prefix tlscmn;
revision-date 2019-03-09; // stable grouping definitions
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
import ietf-trust-anchors {
prefix ta;
reference
"RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
}
import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks;
reference
"RFC ZZZZ: YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
}
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web:
WG List:
Author: Kent Watsen
Author: Gary Wu ";
description
"This module defines reusable groupings for TLS servers that
can be used as a basis for specific TLS server instances.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2019-03-09" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-server-hello-params-config {
description
"TLS hello message parameters are configurable on a TLS
server.";
}
feature tls-server-keepalives {
description
"Per socket TLS keepalive parameters are configurable for
TLS servers on the server implementing this feature.";
}
// Groupings
grouping tls-server-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS server without
any consideration for how underlying TCP sessions are
established.";
uses server-identity-grouping;
uses client-auth-grouping;
uses hello-params-grouping;
uses keepalives-grouping;
}
grouping server-identity-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS server identity.";
container tls-server-identity {
description
"A locally-defined or referenced end-entity certificate,
including any configured intermediate certificates, the
TLS server will present when establishing a TLS connection
in its Certificate message, as defined in Section 7.4.2
in RFC 5246.";
reference
"RFC 5246:
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
RFC ZZZZ:
YANG Data Model for a 'Keystore' Mechanism";
uses ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping;
}
}
grouping client-auth-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS client
authentication.";
container tls-client-auth {
description
"A reference to a list of pinned certificate authority (CA)
certificates and a reference to a list of pinned client
certificates.";
leaf pinned-ca-certs {
if-feature "ta:x509-certificates";
type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
description
"A reference to a list of certificate authority (CA)
certificates used by the TLS server to authenticate
TLS client certificates. A client certificate is
authenticated if it has a valid chain of trust to
a configured pinned CA certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
}
leaf pinned-client-certs {
if-feature "ta:x509-certificates";
type ta:pinned-certificates-ref;
description
"A reference to a list of client certificates used by
the TLS server to authenticate TLS client certificates.
A clients certificate is authenticated if it is an
exact match to a configured pinned client certificate.";
reference
"RFC YYYY: YANG Data Model for Global Trust Anchors";
}
}
}
grouping hello-params-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring a TLS transport
parameters.";
container tls-hello-params {
if-feature tls-server-hello-params-config;
uses tlscmn:hello-params-grouping;
description
"Configurable parameters for the TLS hello message.";
}
}
grouping keepalives-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for configuring TLS server keepalive
parameters.";
container tls-keepalives {
if-feature "tls-server-keepalives";
description
"Configures the keep-alive policy, to proactively test
the aliveness of the TLS client. An unresponsive
TLS client is dropped after approximately max-wait
* max-attempts seconds.";
leaf max-wait {
type uint16 {
range "1..max";
}
units seconds;
default 30;
description
"Sets the amount of time in seconds after which if no data
has been received from the TLS client, a TLS-level message
will be sent to test the aliveness of the TLS client.";
}
leaf max-attempts {
type uint8;
default 3;
description
"Sets the maximum number of sequential keep-alive messages
that can fail to obtain a response from the TLS client
before assuming the TLS client is no longer alive.";
}
}
}
}
]]>The TLS common model presented in this section contains identities
and groupings common to both TLS clients and TLS servers. The
hello-params-grouping can be used to configure the list of TLS
algorithms permitted by the TLS client or TLS server. The lists of
algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple algorithms are permitted
by the client, the algorithm that appears first in its list that is also
permitted by the server is used for the TLS transport layer connection.
The ability to restrict the algorithms allowed is provided in this
grouping for TLS clients and TLS servers that are capable of doing so
and may serve to make TLS clients and TLS servers compliant with local
security policies. This model supports both TLS1.2 and TLS 1.3 .TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 have different ways defining their own supported
cryptographic algorithms, see TLS and DTLS IANA registries page
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml):TLS 1.2 defines four categories of registries for cryptographic
algorithms: TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureAlgorithm, TLS
HashAlgorithm, TLS Supported Groups. TLS Cipher Suites plays the
role of combining all of them into one set, as each value of the set
represents a unique and feasible combination of all the
cryptographic algorithms, and thus the other three registry
categories do not need to be considered here. In this document, the
TLS common model only chooses those TLS1.2 algorithms in TLS Cipher
Suites which are marked as recommended:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, and so on. All chosen
algorithms are enumerated in Table 1-1 below;TLS 1.3 defines its supported algorithms differently. Firstly, it
defines three categories of registries for cryptographic algorithms:
TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported Groups.
Secondly, all three of these categories are useful, since they
represent different parts of all the supported algorithms
respectively. Thus, all of these registries categories are
considered here. In this draft, the TLS common model chooses only
those TLS1.3 algorithms specified in B.4, 4.2.3, 4.2.7 of .Thus, in order to support both TLS1.2 and TLS1.3, the cipher-suites
part of the hello-params-grouping should include three parameters for
configuring its permitted TLS algorithms, which are: TLS Cipher Suites,
TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported Groups. Note that TLS1.2 only uses
TLS Cipher Suites. defines six categories
of cryptographic algorithms (hash-algorithm,
symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm, mac-algorithm,
asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm, signature-algorithm,
key-negotiation-algorithm) and lists several widely accepted algorithms
for each of them. The TLS client and server models use one or more of
these algorithms. The following tables are provided, in part to define
the subset of algorithms defined in the crypto-types model used by TLS,
and in part to ensure compatibility of configured TLS cryptographic
parameters for configuring its permitted TLS algorithms:+-----------------------------------------------+---------+
| ciper-suites in hello-params-grouping | HASH |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | sha-384 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | sha-384 |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | sha-384 |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | sha-384 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | sha-384 |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
+-----------------------------------------------+---------++--------------------------------------------- +---------------------+
| ciper-suites in hello-params-grouping | symmetric |
| | |
+--------------------------------------------- +---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | enc-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | enc-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | enc-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | enc-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | enc-aes-128-ccm |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | enc-aes-256-ccm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | enc-aes-128-ccm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | enc-aes-256-ccm |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |enc-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256|enc-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |enc-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |enc-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |enc-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | enc-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-ccm |
+--------------------------------------------- +---------------------++--------------------------------------------- +---------------------+
| ciper-suites in hello-params-grouping | MAC |
| | |
+--------------------------------------------- +---------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | mac-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | mac-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | mac-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | mac-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | mac-aes-128-ccm |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | mac-aes-256-ccm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | mac-aes-128-ccm |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | mac-aes-256-ccm |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |mac-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256|mac-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |mac-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |mac-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |mac-chacha20-poly1305|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | mac-aes-256-gcm |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-ccm |
+--------------------------------------------- +---------------------++----------------------------------------------+----------------------+
|ciper-suites in hello-params-grouping | signature |
+--------------------------------------------- +----------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | rsa-pkcs1-sha384 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | N/A |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | N/A |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256|
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384|
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | rsa-pkcs1-sha384 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | N/A |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | N/A |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256|ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256|
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | N/A |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | N/A |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | N/A |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | N/A |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | N/A |
+----------------------------------------------+----------------------++----------------------------------------------+-----------------------+
|ciper-suites in hello-params-grouping | key-negotiation |
+----------------------------------------------+-----------------------+
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | dhe-ffdhe2048, ... |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | dhe-ffdhe2048, ... |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | psk-dhe-ffdhe2048, ...|
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | psk-dhe-ffdhe2048, ...|
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ecdhe-secp256r1, ... |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ecdhe-secp256r1, ... |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | ecdhe-secp256r1, ... |
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | ecdhe-secp256r1, ... |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM | dhe-ffdhe2048, ... |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM | dhe-ffdhe2048, ... |
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM | psk-dhe-ffdhe2048, ...|
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM | psk-dhe-ffdhe2048, ...|
| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | ecdhe-secp256r1, ... |
| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256| ecdhe-secp256r1, ... |
| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | dhe-ffdhe2048, ... |
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 |psk-ecdhe-secp256r1,...|
| TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | psk-dhe-ffdhe2048, ...|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |psk-ecdhe-secp256r1,...|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |psk-ecdhe-secp256r1,...|
| TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 |psk-ecdhe-secp256r1,...|
+----------------------------------------------+-----------------------++------------------------------+---------+
| ciper-suites in hello | HASH |
| -params-grouping | |
+------------------------------+---------+
| TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | sha-384 |
| TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | sha-256 |
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | sha-256 |
+------------------------------+---------++------------------------------+-----------------------+
| ciper-suites in hello | symmetric |
| -params-grouping | |
+------------------------------+-----------------------+
| TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | enc-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | enc-chacha20-poly1305 |
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | enc-aes-128-ccm |
+------------------------------+-----------------------++------------------------------+-----------------------+
| ciper-suites in hello | symmetric |
| -params-grouping | |
+------------------------------+-----------------------+
| TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 | mac-aes-128-gcm |
| TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 | mac-chacha20-poly1305 |
| TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 | mac-aes-128-ccm |
+------------------------------+-----------------------++----------------------------+-------------------------+
|signatureScheme in hello | signature |
| -params-grouping | |
+----------------------------+-------------------------+
| rsa-pkcs1-sha256 | rsa-pkcs1-sha256 |
| rsa-pkcs1-sha384 | rsa-pkcs1-sha384 |
| rsa-pkcs1-sha512 | rsa-pkcs1-sha512 |
| rsa-pss-rsae-sha256 | rsa-pss-rsae-sha256 |
| rsa-pss-rsae-sha384 | rsa-pss-rsae-sha384 |
| rsa-pss-rsae-sha512 | rsa-pss-rsae-sha512 |
| rsa-pss-pss-sha256 | rsa-pss-pss-sha256 |
| rsa-pss-pss-sha384 | rsa-pss-pss-sha384 |
| rsa-pss-pss-sha512 | rsa-pss-pss-sha512 |
| ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256 | ecdsa-secp256r1-sha256 |
| ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384 | ecdsa-secp384r1-sha384 |
| ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512 | ecdsa-secp521r1-sha512 |
| ed25519 | ed25519 |
| ed448 | ed448 |
+----------------------------+-------------------------++----------------------------+-------------------------+
|supported Groups in hello | key-negotiation |
| -params-grouping | |
+----------------------------+-------------------------+
| dhe-ffdhe2048 | dhe-ffdhe2048 |
| dhe-ffdhe3072 | dhe-ffdhe3072 |
| dhe-ffdhe4096 | dhe-ffdhe4096 |
| dhe-ffdhe6144 | dhe-ffdhe6144 |
| dhe-ffdhe8192 | dhe-ffdhe8192 |
| psk-dhe-ffdhe2048 | psk-dhe-ffdhe2048 |
| psk-dhe-ffdhe3072 | psk-dhe-ffdhe3072 |
| psk-dhe-ffdhe4096 | psk-dhe-ffdhe4096 |
| psk-dhe-ffdhe6144 | psk-dhe-ffdhe6144 |
| psk-dhe-ffdhe8192 | psk-dhe-ffdhe8192 |
| ecdhe-secp256r1 | ecdhe-secp256r1 |
| ecdhe-secp384r1 | ecdhe-secp384r1 |
| ecdhe-secp521r1 | ecdhe-secp521r1 |
| ecdhe-x25519 | ecdhe-x25519 |
| ecdhe-x448 | ecdhe-x448 |
| psk-ecdhe-secp256r1 | psk-ecdhe-secp256r1 |
| psk-ecdhe-secp384r1 | psk-ecdhe-secp384r1 |
| psk-ecdhe-secp521r1 | psk-ecdhe-secp521r1 |
| psk-ecdhe-x25519 | psk-ecdhe-x25519 |
| psk-ecdhe-x448 | psk-ecdhe-x448 |
+----------------------------+-------------------------+
Note that in Table 1-5:dhe-ffdhe2048, ... is the abbreviation of dhe-ffdhe2048,
dhe-ffdhe3072, dhe-ffdhe4096, dhe-ffdhe6144, dhe-ffdhe8192;psk-dhe-ffdhe2048, ... is the abbreviation of psk-dhe-ffdhe2048,
psk-dhe-ffdhe3072, psk-dhe-ffdhe4096, psk-dhe-ffdhe6144,
psk-dhe-ffdhe8192;ecdhe-secp256r1, ... is the abbreviation of ecdhe-secp256r1,
ecdhe-secp384r1, ecdhe-secp521r1, ecdhe-x25519, ecdhe-x448;psk-ecdhe-secp256r1, ... is the abbreviation of
psk-ecdhe-secp256r1, psk-ecdhe-secp384r1, psk-ecdhe-secp521r1,
psk-ecdhe-x25519, psk-ecdhe-x448.Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not
widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of
algorithms is not exhaustive.The following tree diagram provides an
overview of the data model for the "ietf-tls-common" module.This section shows how it would appear if the
transport-params-grouping were populated with some data.tlscmn:tls-1.1tlscmn:tls-1.2tlscmn:dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-shatlscmn:rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-shatlscmn:rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha
]]>This YANG module has a normative references to , , , , and .This YANG module has a informative references to , , , and . file "ietf-tls-common@2019-03-09.yang"
module ietf-tls-common {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common";
prefix "tlscmn";
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web:
WG List:
Author: Kent Watsen
Author: Gary Wu ";
description
"This module defines a common features, identities, and
groupings for Transport Layer Security (TLS).
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD
License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2019-03-09" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-1_0 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
feature tls-1_1 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
feature tls-1_2 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-1_3 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3";
}
feature tls-ecc {
description
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature tls-dhe {
description
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-3des {
description
"The Triple-DES block cipher is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-gcm {
description
"The Galois/Counter Mode authenticated encryption mode is
supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5288: AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for
TLS";
}
feature tls-sha2 {
description
"The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is supported
for TLS.";
reference
"FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}
// Identities
identity tls-version-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS protocol versions.";
}
identity tls-1.0 {
base tls-version-base;
if-feature tls-1_0;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
identity tls-1.1 {
base tls-version-base;
if-feature tls-1_1;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
identity tls-1.2 {
base tls-version-base;
if-feature tls-1_2;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity cipher-suite-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS cipher suites.";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature tls-sha2;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature tls-sha2;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature tls-dhe;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature tls-dhe;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature tls-3des;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-3des";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
if-feature "tls-ecc";
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
// Groupings
grouping hello-params-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for TLS hello message parameters.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
container tls-versions {
description
"Parameters regarding TLS versions.";
leaf-list tls-version {
type identityref {
base tls-version-base;
}
description
"Acceptable TLS protocol versions.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
the acceptable TLS protocol versions are implementation-
defined.";
}
}
container cipher-suites {
description
"Parameters regarding cipher suites.";
leaf-list cipher-suite {
type identityref {
base cipher-suite-base;
}
ordered-by user;
description
"Acceptable cipher suites in order of descending
preference. The configured host key algorithms should
be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured
private key. Please see Section 5 of RFC XXXX for
valid combinations.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
the acceptable cipher suites are implementation-
defined.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
}
}
}
]]>The YANG modules defined in this document are designed to be accessed
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF and RESTCONF . Both of these
protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g.,
SSH, TLS) with mutual authentication.The NETCONF access control model (NACM)
provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a
pre-configured subset of all available protocol operations and
content.Since the modules defined in this document only define groupings,
these considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules
that use these groupings.There are a number of data nodes defined in the YANG modules that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default).
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some
network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data
nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network
operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes and their
sensitivity/vulnerability: The entire data tree of all the groupings
defined in this draft is sensitive to write operations. For
instance, the addition or removal of references to keys,
certificates, trusted anchors, etc., can dramatically alter the
implemented security policy. However, no NACM annotations are
applied as the data SHOULD be editable by users other than a
designated 'recovery session'.Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG modules may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability: Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability: This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the
IETF XML Registry . Following the format in
, the following registrations are
requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names
registry . Following the format in , the following registrations are requested:
name: ietf-tls-client
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client
prefix: tlsc
reference: RFC XXXX
name: ietf-tls-server
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server
prefix: tlss
reference: RFC XXXX
name: ietf-tls-common
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common
prefix: tlscmn
reference: RFC XXXX
Noted that '0.0.0.0' and '::' might have special meanings.Renamed "keychain" to "keystore".Removed the groupings containing transport-level configuration.
Now modules contain only the transport-independent groupings.Filled in previously incomplete 'ietf-tls-client' module.Added cipher suites for various algorithms into new
'ietf-tls-common' module.Added a 'must' statement to container 'server-auth' asserting
that at least one of the various auth mechanisms must be
specified.Fixed description statement for leaf 'trusted-ca-certs'.Updated title to "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS
Servers"Updated leafref paths to point to new keystore pathChanged the YANG prefix for ietf-tls-common from 'tlscom' to
'tlscmn'.Added TLS protocol verions 1.0 and 1.1.Made author lists consistentNow tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagramsUpdated YANG to use typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore
pathsNow inlines key and certificates (no longer a leafref to
keystore)Merged changes from co-author.Updated to use trust anchors from trust-anchors draft (was
keystore draft)Now Uses new keystore grouping enabling asymmetric key to be
either locally defined or a reference to the keystore.factored the tls-[client|server]-groupings into more reusable
groupings.added if-feature statements for the new "x509-certificates"
feature defined in draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors.Added a number of compatibility matrices to Section 5 (thanks Frank!)Clarified that any configured "cipher-suite" values need to be
compatible with the configured private key.Updated examples to reflect update to groupings defined in the keystore draft.Add TLS keepalives features and groupings.Prefixed top-level TLS grouping nodes with 'tls-' and support mashups.Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and folding algorithm.The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balázs Kovács, David Lamparter,
Alan Luchuk, Ladislav Lhotka, Radek Krejci, Tom Petch, Juergen
Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, and Bert Wijnen.