PKIX Working Group J. Schaad (Soaring Hawk Consulting)
Internet Draft B. Kaliski (RSA Laboratories)
R. Housley (Vigil Security)
expires July 2005 January 2004
Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography
for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC 2026. Internet-Drafts are
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Abstract
This document supplements RFC 3279. It describes the conventions
for using the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm, the RSAES-OAEP key
transport algorithm and additional one-way hash functions with the
PKCS #1 version 1.5 signature algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI). Encoding formats, algorithm identifiers,
and parameter formats are specified.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction.......................................................2
1.1 Terminology....................................................2
1.2 RSA Public Keys................................................2
2 Common Functions...................................................5
2.1 One-way Hash Functions.........................................5
2.2 Mask Generation Functions......................................6
3 RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm.....................................7
3.1 RSASSA-PSS Public Keys.........................................7
3.2 RSASSA-PSS Signature Values....................................9
3.3 RSASSA-PSS Signature Parameter Validation......................9
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 1
4 RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm................................10
4.1 RSAES-OAEP Public Keys........................................10
5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5 Signature Algorithm...........................12
6 ASN.1 Module......................................................13
7 References........................................................19
7.1 Normative References..........................................19
7.2 Informative References........................................19
8 Security Considerations...........................................20
10 Author Addresses.................................................22
11 Full Copyright Statement.........................................22
1 Introduction
This document supplements RFC 3279 [PKALGS]. This document
describes the conventions for using the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm and the RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm in the Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [PROFILE]. Both of these RSA-
based algorithms are specified in [P1v2.1]. The algorithm
identifiers and associated parameters for subject public keys that
employ either of these algorithms are specified, and the encoding
format for RSASSA-PSS signatures is specified. Also, the algorithm
identifiers for using the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
one-way hash functions with the PKCS #1 version 1.5 signature
algorithm [P1v1.5] are specified.
This specification supplements RFC 3280 [PROFILE], which profiles
the X.509 Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for
use in the Internet. This specification extends the list of
algorithms discussed in RFC 3279 [PKALGS]. The X.509 Certificate
and CRL definitions use ASN.1 [X.208-88], the Basic Encoding Rules
(BER) [X.209-88], and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.509-
88].
This specification defines the contents of the signatureAlgorithm,
signatureValue, signature, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields within
Internet X.509 certificates and CRLs. For each algorithm, the
appropriate alternatives for the keyUsage extension are provided.
1.1 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS].
1.2 RSA Public Keys
RFC 3280 [PROFILE] specifies the profile for using X.509
Certificates in Internet applications. When a RSA public key will
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 2
be used for RSASSA-PSS digital signatures or RSAES-OAEP key
transport, the conventions specified in this section augment RFC
3280.
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. However, to implement all of the
recommendations described in the Security Considerations section of
this document (see section 8), the certificate user needs to be able
to determine the form of digital signature or key transport that the
RSA private key owner associates with the public key.
The rsaEncryption object identifier continues to identify the
subject public key when the RSA private key owner does not wish to
limit the use of the public key exclusively to either RSASSA-PSS or
RSAES-OAEP. In this case, the rsaEncryption object identifier MUST
be used in the algorithm field within the subject public key
information, and the parameters field MUST contain NULL.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
Further discussion of the conventions associated with use of the
rsaEncryption object identifier can be found in RFC 3279 (see
[PKALGS], section 2.3.1).
When the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use of the public
key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, then the id-RSASSA-PSS object
identifier MUST be used in the algorithm field within the subject
public key information, and, if present, the parameters field MUST
contain RSASSA-PSS-params. The id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier
value and the RSASSA-PSS-params syntax are fully described in
section 3 of this document.
When the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use of the public
key exclusively to RSAES-OAEP, then the id-RSAES-OAEP object
identifier MUST be used in the algorithm field within the subject
public key information, and, if present, the parameters field MUST
contain RSAES-OAEP-params. The id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier
value and the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax are fully described in
section 4 of this document.
Note: It is not possible to restrict the use of a key to only just
two of the algorithms (i.e. RSASSA-PSS and RSAES-OAEP) in this
document.
Regardless of the object identifier used, the RSA public key is
encoded in the same manner in the subject public key information.
The RSA public key MUST be encoded using the type RSAPublicKey type:
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 3
Here, the modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public
exponent e. The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is carried in the
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING within the subject public key
information.
The intended application for the key MAY be indicated in the key
usage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], section 4.2.1.3).
If the keyUsage extension is present in an end entity certificate
that conveys an RSA public key with the id-RSASSA-PSS object
identifier, then the key usage extension MUST contain one or both of
the following values:
nonRepudiation; and
digitalSignature.
If the keyUsage extension is present in a certification authority
certificate that conveys an RSA public key with the id-RSASSA-PSS
object identifier, then the key usage extension MUST contain one or
more of the following values:
nonRepudiation;
digitalSignature;
keyCertSign; and
cRLSign.
When a certificate that conveys an RSA public key with the id-
RSASSA-PSS object identifier, the certificate user MUST only use the
certified RSA public key for RSASSA-PSS operations, and, if RSASSA-
PSS-params is present, the certificate user MUST perform those
operations using the one-way hash function, mask generation
function, and trailer field identified in the subject public key
algorithm identifier parameters within the certificate.
If the keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that conveys
an RSA public key with the id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier, then the
key usage extension MUST contain only the following values:
keyEncipherment; and
dataEncipherment.
However, both keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment SHOULD NOT be
present.
When a certificate that conveys an RSA public key with the id-RSAES-
OAEP object identifier, the certificate user MUST only use the
certified RSA public key for RSAES-OAEP operations, and, if RSAES-
OAEP-params is present, the certificate user MUST perform those
operations using the one-way hash function and mask generation
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 4
function identified in the subject public key algorithm identifier
parameters within the certificate.
2 Common Functions
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm and the RSAES-OAEP key transport
algorithm make use of one-way hash functions and mask generation
functions.
2.1 One-way Hash Functions
PKCS #1 version 2.1 [P1v2.1] supports four one-way hash functions
for use with the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm and the RSAES-OAEP
key transport algorithm: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
[SHA2]. This document adds additional support for SHA-224 [SHA-224]
with both the RSASSA-PSS and the RSAES-OAEP algorithms. While
support for additional one-way hash functions could be added in the
future, no other one-way hash functions are supported by this
specification.
These one-way hash functions are identified by the following object
identifiers:
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {{ joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
There are two possible encodings for the AlgorithmIdentifier
parameters field associated with these object identifiers. The two
alternatives arise from the fact that when the 1988 syntax for
AlgorithmIdentifier was translated into the 1997 syntax the OPTIONAL
associated with the algorithm identifier parameters got lost. Later
the OPTIONAL was recovered via a defect report, but by then many
people thought that algorithm parameters were mandatory. Because of
this history some implementations encode parameters as a NULL
element and others omit them entirely. The correct encoding is to
omit the parameters field; however, at the time that RSASSA-PSS and
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 5
RSAES-OAEP were defined it was done using the NULL parameters rather
than absent parameters.
All implementations MUST accept both NULL and absent parameters as
legal and equivalent encodings.
To be clear, the following algorithm identifiers are used when a
NULL parameter MUST be present:
sha1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha1, NULL }
sha224Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha224, NULL }
sha256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha256, NULL }
sha384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha384, NULL }
sha512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha512, NULL }
2.2 Mask Generation Functions
One mask generation function is used with the RSASSA-PSS signature
algorithm and the RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm: MGF1 [P1v2.1].
No other mask generation functions are supported by this
specification.
MGF1 is identified by the following object identifier:
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
The parameters field associated with id-mgf1 MUST have a
hashAlgorithm value, which identifies the hash function being used
with MGF1. This value MUST be sha1Identifier, sha224Identifier,
sha256Identifier, sha384Identifier, or sha512Identifier, as
specified in section 2.1. Implementations MUST support the default
value, sha1Identifier, and implementations MAY support the other
four values.
The following algorithm identifiers have been assigned for each of
these alternatives:
mgf1SHA1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha1Identifier }
mgf1SHA224Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha224Identifier }
mgf1SHA256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha256Identifier }
mgf1SHA384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha384Identifier }
mgf1SHA512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha512Identifier }
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 6
3 RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm
This section describes the conventions for using the RSASSA-PSS
signature algorithm with the Internet X.509 certificate and CRL
profile [PROFILE]. The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is specified
in PKCS #1 version 2.1 [P1v2.1]. The five one-way hash functions
discussed in section 2.1 and the one mask generation function
discussed in section 2.2 can be used with RSASSA-PSS.
CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSASSA-PSS algorithm
identifier SHOULD require that the parameters be present in the
publicKeyAlgorithms field if the cA boolean flag is set in the basic
constraints extension. CAs MAY require that the parameters be
present in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for end-entity
certificates.
CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates,
SHOULD have RSASSA-PSS-params the parameters present in their own
certificates. CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing,
certificates and CRLs MUST include RSASSA-PSS-params the parameters
in the signature algorithm field of the TBSCertificate and
TBSCertList structures.
Entities that validate RSASSA-PSS signatures MUST have support for
SHA-1. They MAY also support the other hashing algorithms in
section 2.1.
The data to be signed (e.g., the one-way hash function output value)
is formatted for the signature algorithm to be used. Then, a
private key operation (e.g., RSA encryption) is performed to
generate the signature value. This signature value is then ASN.1
encoded as a BIT STRING and included in the Certificate or
CertificateList in the signature field. Section 3.2 specifies the
format of RSASSA-PSS signature values.
3.1 RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
When RSASSA-PSS is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier,the parameters
MUST employ the RSASSA-PSS-params syntax. The parameters may be
either absent or present when used as subject public key
information. The parameters MUST be present when used in the
algorithm identifier associated with for a signature value.
When signing, it is RECOMMENDED that, except for saltLength, the
parameters remain fixed for all usages of a given RSA key pair.
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT
sha1Identifier,
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maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20,
trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 }
The fields of type RSASSA-PSS-params have the following meanings:
hashAlgorithm
The hashAlgorithm field identifies the hash function. It MUST
be one of the algorithm identifiers listed in section 2.1, and
the default hash function is SHA-1. Implementations MUST
support SHA-1, and implementations MAY support other one-way
hash functions listed in section 2.1. Implementations that
perform signature generation MUST omit the hashAlgorithm field
when SHA-1 is used, indicating that the default algorithm was
used. Implementations that perform signature validation MUST
recognize both the id-sha1 object identifier and an absent
hashAlgorithm field as an indication that SHA-1 was used.
maskGenAlgorithm
The maskGenAlgorithm field identifies the mask generation
function. The default mask generation function is MGF1 with
SHA-1. For MGF1, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that the
underlying hash function be the same as the one identified by
hashAlgorithm. Implementations MUST support MGF1. MGF1
requires a one-way hash function, and it is identified in the
parameters field of the MGF1 algorithm identifier.
Implementations MUST support SHA-1, and implementations MAY
support other one-way hash functions listed in section 2.1.
The MGF1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the id-mgf1
object identifier and a parameter that contains the algorithm
identifier of the one-way hash function employed with MGF1.
The SHA-1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the id-sha1
object identifier and an (optional) parameter of NULL.
Implementations that perform signature generation MUST omit
the maskGenAlgorithm field when MGF1 with SHA-1 is used,
indicating that the default algorithm was used.
Although mfg1SHA1Identifier is defined as the default value
for this field, implementations MUST accept both the default
value encoding (i.e. an absent field) and mfg1SHA1Identifier
to be explicitly present in the encoding.
saltLength
The saltLength field is the octet length of the salt. For a
given hashAlgorithm, the minimum value of saltLength is the
number of octets in the hash value. Unlike the other fields
of type RSASSA-PSS-params, saltLength does not need to be
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 8
fixed for a given RSA key pair; a different value could be
used for each RSASSA-PSS signature generated.
trailerField
The trailerField field is an integer. It provides
compatibility with the draft IEEE P1363a [P1363a]. The value
MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal
value 0xBC. Other trailer fields, including the trailer field
composed of HashID concatenated with 0xCC that is specified in
IEEE P1363a, are not supported. Implementations that perform
signature generation MUST omit the trailerField field,
indicating that the default trailer field value was used.
Implementations that perform signature validation MUST
recognize both a present trailerField field with value 1 and
an absent trailerField field.
If the default values of the hashAlgorithm, maskGenAlgorithm, and
trailerField fields of RSASSA-PSS-params are used, then the
algorithm identifier will have the following value:
rSASSA-PSS-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
id-RSASSA-PSS, rSASSA-PSS-Default-Params }
rSASSA-PSS-Default-Params RSASSA-PSS-Params ::= {
sha1Identifier, mgf1SHA1Identifier, 20, 1}
3.2 RSASSA-PSS Signature Values
The output of the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is an octet string,
which has the same length in octets as the RSA modulus n.
Signature values in CMS [CMS] are represented as octet strings, and
the output is used directly. However, signature values in
certificates and CRLs [PROFILE] are represented as bit strings, and
conversion is needed.
To convert a signature value to a bit string, the most significant
bit of the first octet of the signature value SHALL become the first
bit of the bit string, and so on through the least significant bit
of the last octet of the signature value, which SHALL become the
last bit of the bit string.
3.3 RSASSA-PSS Signature Parameter Validation
Three possible parameter validation scenarios exist for RSASSA-PSS
signature values.
1. The key is identified by the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier.
In this case no parameter validation is needed.
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 9
2. The key is identified by the id-RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm
identifier, but the parameters field is absent. In this case no
parameter validation is needed.
3. The key is identified by the id-RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm
identifier and the parameters are present. In this case all
parameters in the signature structure algorithm identifier MUST
match the parameters in the key structure algorithm identifier
except the saltLength field. The saltLength field in the signature
parameters MUST be greater or equal to that in the key parameters
field.
4 RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm
This section describes the conventions for using the RSAES-OAEP key
transport algorithm with the Internet X.509 certificate and CRL
profile [PROFILE]. RSAES-OAEP is specified in PKCS #1 version 2.1
[P1v2.1]. The five one-way hash functions discussed in section 2.1
and the one mask generation function discussed in section 2.2 can be
used with RSAES-OAEP. Conforming CAs and applications MUST support
RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm using SHA-1. The other three
one-way hash functions MAY also be supported.
CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm
identifier SHOULD require that the parameters be present in the
publicKeyAlgorithms field for all certificates.
Entities that use a certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of
id-RSA-OAEP where the parameters are absent SHOULD use the default
set of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params. Entities that use a
certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of rsaEncryption SHOULD
use the default set of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params
4.1 RSAES-OAEP Public Keys
When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters
MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax. The parameters may be
either absent or present when used as subject public key
information. The parameters MUST be present when used in the
algorithm identifier associated with an encryption value.
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 }
RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
sha1Identifier,
maskGenFunc [1] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSourceFunc [2] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 10
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-pSpecified, nullOctetString }
nullOctetString OCTET STRING (SIZE (0)) ::= { ''H }
The fields of type RSAES-OAEP-params have the following meanings:
hashFunc
The hashFunc field identifies the one-way hash function. It
MUST be one of the algorithm identifiers listed in section
2.1, and the default hash function is SHA-1. Implementations
MUST support SHA-1, and implementations MAY support other one-
way hash functions listed in section 2.1. Implementations
that perform encryption MUST omit the hashFunc field when SHA-
1 is used, indicating that the default algorithm was used.
Implementations that perform decryption MUST recognize both
the id-sha1 object identifier and an absent hashFunc field as
an indication that SHA-1 was used.
maskGenFunc
The maskGenFunc field identifies the mask generation function.
The default mask generation function is MGF1 with SHA-1. For
MGF1, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that the underlying hash
function be the same as the one identified by hashFunc.
Implementations MUST support MGF1. MGF1 requires a one-way
hash function, and it is identified in the parameter field of
the MGF1 algorithm identifier. Implementations MUST support
SHA-1, and implementations MAY support other one-way hash
functions listed in section 2.1. The MGF1 algorithm
identifier is comprised of the id-mgf1 object identifier and a
parameter that contains the algorithm identifier of the one-
way hash function employed with MGF1. The SHA-1 algorithm
identifier is comprised of the id-sha1 object identifier and
an (optional) parameter of NULL. Implementations that perform
encryption MUST omit the maskGenFunc field when MGF1 with SHA-
1 is used, indicating that the default algorithm was used.
Although mfg1SHA1Identifier is defined as the default value
for this field, implementations MUST accept both the default
value encoding (i.e. an absent field) and the
mfg1SHA1Identifier to be explicitly present in the encoding.
pSourceFunc
The pSourceFunc field identifies the source (and possibly the
value) of the encoding parameters, commonly called P.
Implementations MUST represent P by an algorithm identifier,
id-pSpecified, indicating that P is explicitly provided as an
OCTET STRING in the parameters. The default value for P is an
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 11
empty string. In this case, pHash in EME-OAEP contains the
hash of a zero length string. Implementations MUST support a
zero length P value. Implementations that perform encryption
MUST omit the pSourceFunc field when a zero length P value is
used, indicating that the default value was used.
Implementations that perform decryption MUST recognize both
the id-pSpecified object identifier and an absent pSourceFunc
field as an indication that a zero length P value was used.
Implementations that perform decryption MUST support a zero
length P value, and they MAY support other values. Compliant
implementations MUST NOT use any value other than id-
pSpecifieid for pSourceFunc.
If the default values of the hashFunc, maskGenFunc, and pSourceFunc
fields of RSAES-OAEP-params are used, then the algorithm identifier
will have the following value:
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Params }
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Params RSASSA-OAEP-params ::=
{ sha1Identifier,
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
5 PKCS #1 Version 1.5 Signature Algorithm
RFC 2313 [P1v1.5] specifies the PKCS #1 Version 1.5 signature
algorithm. This specification is also included in PKCS #1 Version
2.1 [P1v2.1]. RFC 3279 [PKALGS] specifies the use of the PKCS #1
Version 1.5 signature algorithm with the MD2, MD5, and the SHA-1
one-way hash functions. This section specifies the algorithm
identifiers for using the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
one-way hash functions with the PKCS #1 version 1.5 signature
algorithm.
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is preferred over the PKCS #1
Version 1.5 signature algorithm. Although no attacks are known
against PKCS #1 Version 1.5 signature algorithm, in the interest of
increased robustness, RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is recommended
for eventual adoption, especially by new applications. This section
is included for compatibility with existing applications, and while
still appropriate for new applications, a gradual transition to the
RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is encouraged.
The PKCS #1 Version 1.5 signature algorithm with these one-way hash
functions and the RSA encryption algorithm is implemented using the
padding and encoding conventions described in RFC 2313 [P1v1.5].
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 12
The message digest is computed using the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
or SHA-512 one-way hash function.
The PKCS #1 version 1.5 signature algorithm, as specified in RFC
2313 includes a data encoding step. In this step, the message
digest and the object identifier for the one-way hash function used
to compute the message digest are combined. When performing the
data encoding step, the id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-
sha512 object identifiers (see section 2.1) MUST be used to specify
the SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 one-way hash functions,
respectively.
The object identifier used to identify the PKCS #1 version 1.5
signature algorithm with SHA-224 is:
sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 14 }
The object identifier used to identify the PKCS #1 version 1.5
signature algorithm with SHA-256 is:
sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
The object identifier used to identify the PKCS #1 version 1.5
signature algorithm with SHA-384 is:
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
The object identifier used to identify the PKCS #1 version 1.5
signature algorithm with SHA-512 is:
sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
When any of these three object identifiers appears within an
AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters MUST be NULL. Implementations
MUST accept the parameters being absent as well as present.
The RSA signature generation process and the encoding of the result
is described in detail in RFC 2313 [P1v1.5].
6 ASN.1 Module
PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
-- EXPORTS All;
IMPORTS
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 13
AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- Found in [PROFILE]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;
-- ============================
-- Basic object identifiers
-- ============================
pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 }
-- When rsaEncryption is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
-- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 }
-- When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier,
-- and the parameters field is present, it MUST be RSAES-OAEP-params
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 }
-- When id-pSpecified is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
-- parameters MUST be an OCTET STRING.
id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }
-- When id-RSASSA-PSS is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, and the
-- parameters field is present, it MUST be RSASSA-PSS-params.
id-RSASSA-PSS OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 10 }
-- When id-mgf1 is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the parameters
-- MUST be present and MUST be a HashAlgorithm.
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
-- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the
-- parameters MUST be present and MUST be NULL.
sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 14 }
sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 11 }
sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 12 }
sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 13 }
-- When the following OIDs are used in an AlgorithmIdentifier the
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 14
-- parameters SHOULD be absent, but if the parameters are present,
-- they MUST be NULL.
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }
id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }
id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
-- =============
-- Constants
-- =============
nullOctetString OCTET STRING (SIZE (0)) ::= ''H
nullParameters NULL ::= NULL
-- =========================
-- Algorithm Identifiers
-- =========================
sha1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha1,
parameters nullParameters }
sha224Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha224,
parameters nullParameters }
sha256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha256,
parameters nullParameters }
sha384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha384,
parameters nullParameters }
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 15
sha512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-sha512,
parameters nullParameters }
mgf1SHA1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1,
parameters sha1Identifier }
mgf1SHA224Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1,
parameters sha224Identifier }
mgf1SHA256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1,
parameters sha256Identifier }
mgf1SHA384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1,
parameters sha384Identifier }
mgf1SHA512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-mgf1,
parameters sha512Identifier }
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-pSpecified,
parameters nullOctetString }
rSASSA-PSS-Default-Params RSASSA-PSS-params ::= {
hashAlgorithm sha1Identifier,
maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA1Identifier,
saltLength 20,
trailerField 1 }
rSASSA-PSS-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters rSASSA-PSS-Default-Params }
rSASSA-PSS-SHA224-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters rSASSA-PSS-SHA224-Params }
rSASSA-PSS-SHA224-Params RSASSA-PSS-params ::= {
hashAlgorithm sha224Identifier,
maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA224Identifier,
saltLength 20,
trailerField 1 }
rSASSA-PSS-SHA256-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters rSASSA-PSS-SHA256-Params }
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 16
rSASSA-PSS-SHA256-Params RSASSA-PSS-params ::= {
hashAlgorithm sha256Identifier,
maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA256Identifier,
saltLength 20,
trailerField 1 }
rSASSA-PSS-SHA384-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters rSASSA-PSS-SHA384-Params }
rSASSA-PSS-SHA384-Params RSASSA-PSS-params ::= {
hashAlgorithm sha384Identifier,
maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA384Identifier,
saltLength 20,
trailerField 1 }
rSASSA-PSS-SHA512-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSASSA-PSS,
parameters rSSASSA-PSS-SHA512-params }
rSSASSA-PSS-SHA512-params RSASSA-PSS-params ::= {
hashAlgorithm sha512Identifier,
maskGenAlgorithm mgf1SHA512Identifier,
saltLength 20,
trailerField 1 }
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Params RSAES-OAEP-params ::= {
hashFunc sha1Identifier,
maskGenFunc mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSourceFunc pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters rSAES-OAEP-Default-Params }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA224-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters rSAES-OAEP-SHA224-Params }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA224-Params RSAES-OAEP-params ::= {
hashFunc sha224Identifier,
maskGenFunc mgf1SHA224Identifier,
pSourceFunc pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Params }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Params RSAES-OAEP-params ::= {
hashFunc sha256Identifier,
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 17
maskGenFunc mgf1SHA256Identifier,
pSourceFunc pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Params }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Params RSAES-OAEP-params ::= {
hashFunc sha384Identifier,
maskGenFunc mgf1SHA384Identifier,
pSourceFunc pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
algorithm id-RSAES-OAEP,
parameters rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Params }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Params RSAES-OAEP-params ::= {
hashFunc sha512Identifier,
maskGenFunc mgf1SHA512Identifier,
pSourceFunc pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
-- ===================
-- Main structures
-- ===================
-- Used in SubjectPublicKeyInfo of X.509 Certificate.
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
-- AlgorithmIdentifier parameters for id-RSASSA-PSS.
-- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.
RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm DEFAULT
sha1Identifier,
maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm DEFAULT
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
saltLength [2] INTEGER DEFAULT 20,
trailerField [3] INTEGER DEFAULT 1 }
HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
-- AlgorithmIdentifier parameters for id-RSAES-OAEP.
-- Note that the tags in this Sequence are explicit.
RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 18
hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
sha1Identifier,
maskGenFunc [1] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSourceFunc [2] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
END
7 References
This section provides normative and informative references.
7.1 Normative References
[P1v1.5] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5",
RFC 2313, March 1998.
[P1v2.1] Jonsson, J., and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #1: RSA
Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447,
February 2003.
[PROFILE] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL
Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
[SHA2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard, 1 August 2002.
[SHA224] Housley, R, "A 224-bit One-way Hash Function: SHA-224",
draft-ietf-pkix-sha224-00.txt, December 2003.
[STDWORDS] S. Bradner, "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
[X.208-88] CCITT Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), 1988.
[X.209-88] CCITT Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1),
1988.
[X.509-88] CCITT Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework. 1988.
7.2 Informative References
[CMS] Housley, R, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369,
August 2002.
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 19
[GUIDE] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Second Draft: "Key Management Guideline, Part 1:
General Guidance." June 2002.
[http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/guideline-1.pdf]
[P1363a] IEEE P1363 working group, IEEE P1363a D11: Standard
Specifications for Public Key Cryptography: Additional
Techniques, December 16, 2002
Available from http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/.
[PKALGS] Polk, W., Housley, R., and L. Bassham, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security, RFC 1750, December 1994.
8 Security Considerations
This specification supplements RFC 3280 [PROFILE]. The security
considerations section of that document applies to this
specification as well.
Implementations must protect the RSA private key. Compromise of the
RSA private key may result in the disclosure of all messages
protected with that key.
The generation of RSA public/private key pairs relies on a random
numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators
(PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no
security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG
environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small
set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole
key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult.
RFC 1750 [RANDOM] offers important guidance in this area.
Generally, good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
in only one scheme. This practice avoids the risk that
vulnerability in one scheme may compromise the security of the
other, and may be essential to maintain provable security. While
PKCS #1 Version 1.5 [P1v1.5] has been employed for both key
transport and digital signature without any known bad interactions,
such a combined use of an RSA key pair is not recommended in the
future. Therefore, an RSA key pair used for RSASSA-PSS signature
generation should not also be used for other purposes. For similar
reasons, one RSA key pair should always be used with the same
RSASSA-PSS parameters. Likewise, an RSA key pair used for RSAES-
OAEP key transport should not also be used for other purposes. For
similar reasons, one RSA key pair should always be used with the
same RSAES-OAEP parameters.
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 20
This specification requires implementations to support the SHA-1
one-way hash function for interoperability, but support for other
one-way hash function is permitted. At the time of this writing,
the best (known) collision attacks against SHA-1 are generic attacks
with complexity 2^80, where 80 is one-half the bit length of the
hash value. In general, when a one-way hash function is used with a
digital signature scheme, a collision attack is easily translated
into a signature forgery. Therefore, the use of SHA-1 in a digital
signature scheme provides a security level of no more than 80 bits.
If a greater level of security is desired, then a secure one-way
hash function with a longer hash value is needed. SHA-256, SHA-384,
and SHA-512 are reasonable choices [SHA2].
The metrics for choosing a one-way hash function for use in digital
signatures do not directly apply to the RSAES-OAEP key transport
algorithm, since a collision attack on the one-way hash function
does not directly translate into an attack on the key transport
algorithm, unless the encoding parameters P varies (in which case a
collision the hash value for different encoding parameters might be
exploited).
Nevertheless, for consistency with the practice for digital
signature schemes, and in case the encoding parameters P is not the
empty string, it is recommended that the same rule of thumb be
applied to selection of a one-way hash function for use with RSAES-
OAEP. That is, the one-way hash function should be selected so that
the bit length of the hash value is at least twice as long as the
desired security level in bits.
This specification does not constrain the size of public keys or
their parameters for use in the Internet PKI. However, the key size
selected impacts the strength achieved when implementing
cryptographic services. Selection of appropriate key sizes is
critical to implementing appropriate security. However, a 1024-bit
RSA public key and SHA-1 both provide a security level of about 80
bits. In [GUIDE], the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) suggests that a security level of 80 bits is
adequate for the protection of sensitive information until 2015.
This recommendation is likely to be revised based on recent
advances, and the revised recommendation is expected to be more
conservative, suggesting that a security level of 80 bits is
adequate for the protection of sensitive information until 2010
currently being brought in to the year 2010 as a more conservative
measure. If a security level greater than 80 bits is needed, then a
longer RSA public key and a secure one-way hash function with a
longer hash value are needed. Again, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
are reasonable choices for such a one-way hash function. For this
reason, the algorithm identifiers for these one-way hash functions
are included in the ASN.1 module in section 5.
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 21
When using RSASSA-PSS, the same one-way hash function should be
employed for the hashAlgorithm and the maskGenAlgorithm, but it is
not required. Using the same one-way hash function helps with
security analysis, and it reduces implementation complexity.
When using RSAES-OAEP, the same one-way hash function should be
employed for the hashFunc and the maskGenFunc, but it is not
required. In each case, using the same one-way hash function helps
with security analysis, and it reduces implementation complexity.
9 IANA Considerations
Within the certificates and CRLs, algorithms are identified by
object identifiers. All of the object identifiers used in this
document were assigned in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)
documents or by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). No further action by the IANA is necessary for this
document or any anticipated updates.
10 Author Addresses
Russell Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
housley@vigilsec.com
Burt Kaliski
RSA Laboratories
174 Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA 01730
USA
bkaliski@rsasecurity.com
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
PO Box 675
Gold Bar, WA 98251
USA
jimsch@exmsft.com
11 Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
are included on all such copies and derivative works.
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 22
In addition, the ASN.1 modules presented in Section 5 may be used in
whole or in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However,
this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by
removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society
or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This
document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS
IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT
NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN
WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Schaad, Kaliski & Housley Page 23