Qualcomm Technologies Inc.

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Security Theory LLC

lgl@island-resort.com

Qualcomm Technologies Inc.

5775 Morehouse Drive San Diego California USA +1 858 651 4299 mballest@qti.qualcomm.com

Qualcomm Technologies Inc.

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Internet RATS Working Group signing attestation cbor An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides a signed (attested) set of claims that describe state and characteristics of an entity, typically a device like a phone or an IoT device. These claims are used by a relying party to determine how much it wishes to trust the entity. An EAT is either a CWT or JWT with some attestation-oriented claims. To a large degree, all this document does is extend CWT and JWT. TBD

Remote device attestation is a fundamental service that allows a remote device such as a mobile phone, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) device, or other endpoint to prove itself to a relying party, a server or a service. This allows the relying party to know some characteristics about the device and decide whether it trusts the device. Remote attestation is a fundamental service that can underlie other protocols and services that need to know about the trustworthiness of the device before proceeding. One good example is biometric authentication where the biometric matching is done on the device. The relying party needs to know that the device is one that is known to do biometric matching correctly. Another example is content protection where the relying party wants to know the device will protect the data. This generalizes on to corporate enterprises that might want to know that a device is trustworthy before allowing corporate data to be accessed by it. The notion of attestation here is large and may include, but is not limited to the following: Proof of the make and model of the device hardware (HW) Proof of the make and model of the device processor, particularly for security-oriented chips Measurement of the software (SW) running on the device Configuration and state of the device Environmental characteristics of the device such as its GPS location

For flexibility and ease of imlpementation in a wide variety of environments, EATs can be either CBOR or JSON format. This specification simultaneously describes both formats. An EAT is either a CWT as defined in , a UCCS as defined in , or a JWT as defined in . This specification extends those specifications with additional claims for attestation. The identification of a protocol element as an EAT, whether CBOR or JSON format, follows the general conventions used by CWT, JWT and UCCS. Largely this depends on the protocol carrying the EAT. In some cases it may be by content type (e.g., MIME type). In other cases it may be through use of CBOR tags. There is no fixed mechanism across all use cases.

This specification uses CDDL, , as the primary formalism to define each claim. The implementor then interprets the CDDL to come to either the CBOR or JSON representation. In the case of JSON, Appendix E of is followed. Additional rules are given in of this document where Appendix E is insufficient. (Note that this is not to define a general means to translate between CBOR and JSON, but only to define enough such that the claims defined in this document can be rendered unambiguously in JSON). The CWT specification was authored before CDDL was available and did not use it. This specification includes a CDDL definition of most of what is described in .

An “entity” can be any device or device subassembly (“submodule”) that can generate its own attestation in the form of an EAT. The attestation should be cryptographically verifiable by the EAT consumer. An EAT at the device-level can be composed of several submodule EAT’s. Modern devices such as a mobile phone have many different execution environments operating with different security levels. For example, it is common for a mobile phone to have an “apps” environment that runs an operating system (OS) that hosts a plethora of downloadable apps. It may also have a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) that is distinct, isolated, and hosts security-oriented functionality like biometric authentication. Additionally, it may have an eSE (embedded Secure Element) - a high security chip with defenses against HW attacks that is used to produce attestations. This device attestation format allows the attested data to be tagged at a security level from which it originates. In general, any discrete execution environment that has an identifiable security level can be considered an entity.

Here, normative reference is made to , particularly the definition of Evidence, the Verifier, Attestation Results and the Relying Party. Per Figure 1 in , Evidence is a protocol message that goes from the Attester to the Verifier and Attestation Results a message that goes from the Verifier to the Relying Party. EAT is defined such that it can be used to represent either Evidence, Attestation Results or both. No claims defined here are considered exclusive to or are prohibited in either use. It is useful to create EAT profiles as described in for either use. It is useful to characterize the relationship of claims in Evidence to those in Attestation Results. Many claims in Evidence simply will pass through the Verifier to the Relying Party without modification. They will be verified as authentic from the device by the Verifier just through normal verification of the Attester’s signature. They will be protected from modification when they are conveyed to the Relying Party by whatever means is used to protect Attestation Results. (The details of that protection are out of scope of this document.) Some claims in Evidence will be verified by the Verifier by comparison to Reference Values. In this case the claims in Evidence will not likely be conveyed to the Relying Party. Instead, some claim indicating they were checked may be added to the Attestation Results or it may be tacitly known that the Verifier always does this check. In some cases the Verifier may provide privacy-preserving functionality by stripping or modifying claims that do not posses sufficient privacy-preserving characteristics.

TODO: Rewrite (or eliminate) this section in light of the RATS architecture draft. At least the following three participants exist in all EAT operating models. Some operating models have additional participants. This is the phone, the IoT device, the sensor, the sub-assembly or such that the attestation provides information about. The company that made the entity. This may be a chip vendor, a circuit board module vendor or a vendor of finished consumer products. The server, service or company that makes use of the information in the EAT about the entity. In all operating models, the manufacturer provisions some secret attestation key material (AKM) into the entity during manufacturing. This might be during the manufacturer of a chip at a fabrication facility (fab) or during final assembly of a consumer product or any time in between. This attestation key material is used for signing EATs. In all operating models, hardware and/or software on the entity create an EAT of the format described in this document. The EAT is always signed by the attestation key material provisioned by the manufacturer. In all operating models, the relying party must end up knowing that the signature on the EAT is valid and consistent with data from claims in the EAT. This can happen in many different ways. Here are some examples. The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party gets corresponding key material (e.g. a root certificate) from the manufacturer. The relying party performs the verification. The EAT is transmitted to the relying party. The relying party transmits the EAT to a verification service offered by the manufacturer. The server returns the validated claims. The EAT is transmitted directly to a verification service, perhaps operated by the manufacturer or perhaps by another party. It verifies the EAT and makes the validated claims available to the relying party. It may even modify the claims in some way and re-sign the EAT (with a different signing key). All these operating models are supported and there is no preference of one over the other. It is important to support this variety of operating models to generally facilitate deployment and to allow for some special scenarios. One special scenario has a validation service that is monetized, most likely by the manufacturer. In another, a privacy proxy service processes the EAT before it is transmitted to the relying party. In yet another, symmetric key material is used for signing. In this case the manufacturer should perform the verification, because any release of the key material would enable a participant other than the entity to create valid signed EATs.

The following is not standardized for EAT, just the same they are not standardized for CWT or JWT.

EATs may be transmitted by any protocol the same as CWTs and JWTs. For example, they might be added in extension fields of other protocols, bundled into an HTTP header, or just transmitted as files. This flexibility is intentional to allow broader adoption. This flexibility is possible because EAT’s are self-secured with signing (and possibly additionally with encryption and anti-replay). The transmission protocol is not required to fulfill any additional security requirements. For certain devices, a direct connection may not exist between the EAT-producing device and the Relying Party. In such cases, the EAT should be protected against malicious access. The use of COSE and JOSE allows for signing and encryption of the EAT. Therefore, even if the EAT is conveyed through intermediaries between the device and Relying Party, such intermediaries cannot easily modify the EAT payload or alter the signature.

The term “signing scheme” is used to refer to the system that includes end-end process of establishing signing attestation key material in the entity, signing the EAT, and verifying it. This might involve key IDs and X.509 certificate chains or something similar but different. The term “signing algorithm” refers just to the algorithm ID in the COSE signing structure. No particular signing algorithm or signing scheme is required by this standard. There are three main implementation issues driving this. First, secure non-volatile storage space in the entity for the attestation key material may be highly limited, perhaps to only a few hundred bits, on some small IoT chips. Second, the factory cost of provisioning key material in each chip or device may be high, with even millisecond delays adding to the cost of a chip. Third, privacy-preserving signing schemes like ECDAA (Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation) are complex and not suitable for all use cases. Over time to faciliate interoperability, some signing schemes may be defined in EAT profiles or other documents either in the IETF or outside.

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document reuses terminology from JWT , COSE , and CWT . The human-readable name used to identify a claim. The CBOR map key or JSON name used to identify a claim. The value portion of the claim. A claim value can be any CBOR data item or JSON value. The CBOR map or JSON object that contains the claims conveyed by the CWT or JWT. The key material used to sign the EAT token. If it is done symmetrically with HMAC, then this is a simple symmetric key. If it is done with ECC, such as an IEEE DevID , then this is the private part of the EC key pair. If ECDAA is used, (e.g., as used by Enhanced Privacy ID, i.e. EPID) then it is the key material needed for ECDAA.

This section describes new claims defined for attestation. It also mentions several claims defined by CWT and JWT that are particularly important for EAT. Note also: * Any claim defined for CWT or JWT may be used in an EAT including those in the CWT and JWT IANA claims registries. All claims are optional No claims are mandatory All claims that are not understood by implementations MUST be ignored There are no default values or meanings assigned to absent claims other than they are not reported. The reason for a claim’s absence may be the implementation not supporting the claim, an inability to determine its value, or a preference to report in a different way such as a proprietary claim. CDDL along with text descriptions is used to define each claim indepdent of encoding. Each claim is defined as a CDDL group (the group is a general aggregation and type definition feature of CDDL). In the encoding section , the CDDL groups turn into CBOR map entries and JSON name/value pairs. Map labels are assigned both an integer and string value. CBOR encoded tokens MUST use only integer labels. JSON encoded tokens MUST use only string labels. TODO: add paragraph here about use for Attestation Evidence and for Results.

CWT defines the “cti” claim. JWT defines the “jti” claim. These are equivalent to each other in EAT and carry a unique token identifier as they do in JWT and CWT. They may be used to defend against re use of the token but are distinct from the nonce that is used by the relying party to guarantee freshness and defend against replay.

The “iat” claim defined in CWT and JWT is used to indicate the date-of-creation of the token, the time at which the claims are collected and the token is composed and signed. The data for some claims may be held or cached for some period of time before the token is created. This period may be long, even days. Examples are measurements taken at boot or a geographic position fix taken the last time a satellite signal was received. There are individual timestamps associated with these claims to indicate their age is older than the “iat” timestamp. CWT allows the use floating-point for this claim. EAT disallows the use of floating-point. No token may contain an iat claim in float-point format. Any recipient of a token with a floating-point format iat claim may consider it an error. A 64-bit integer representation of epoch time can represent a range of +/- 500 billion years, so the only point of a floating-point timestamp is to have precession greater than one second. This is not needed for EAT.

All EATs should have a nonce to prevent replay attacks. The nonce is generated by the relying party, the end consumer of the token. It is conveyed to the entity over whatever transport is in use before the token is generated and then included in the token as the nonce claim. This documents the nonce claim for registration in the IANA CWT claims registry. This is equivalent to the JWT nonce claim that is already registered. The nonce must be at least 8 bytes (64 bits) as fewer are unlikely to be secure. A maximum of 64 bytes is set to limit the memory a constrained implementation uses. This size range is not set for the already-registered JWT nonce, but it should follow this size recommendation when used in an EAT. Multiple nonces are allowed to accommodate multistage verification and consumption.

nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ] ) ]]>

UEID’s identify individual manufactured entities / devices such as a mobile phone, a water meter, a Bluetooth speaker or a networked security camera. It may identify the entire device or a submodule or subsystem. It does not identify types, models or classes of devices. It is akin to a serial number, though it does not have to be sequential. UEID’s must be universally and globally unique across manufacturers and countries. UEIDs must also be unique across protocols and systems, as tokens are intended to be embedded in many different protocols and systems. No two products anywhere, even in completely different industries made by two different manufacturers in two different countries should have the same UEID (if they are not global and universal in this way, then relying parties receiving them will have to track other characteristics of the device to keep devices distinct between manufacturers). There are privacy considerations for UEID’s. See . The UEID is permanent. It never change for a given device / entity. UEIDs are variable length. All implementations MUST be able to receive UEIDs that are 33 bytes long (1 type byte and 256 bits). The recommended maximum sent is also 33 bytes. When the entity constructs the UEID, the first byte is a type and the following bytes the ID for that type. Several types are allowed to accommodate different industries and different manufacturing processes and to give options to avoid paying fees for certain types of manufacturer registrations. Creation of new types requires a Standards Action . Type Byte Type Name Specification 0x01 RAND This is a 128, 192 or 256 bit random number generated once and stored in the device. This may be constructed by concatenating enough identifiers to make up an equivalent number of random bits and then feeding the concatenation through a cryptographic hash function. It may also be a cryptographic quality random number generated once at the beginning of the life of the device and stored. It may not be smaller than 128 bits. 0x02 IEEE EUI This makes use of the IEEE company identification registry. An EUI is either an EUI-48, EUI-60 or EUI-64 and made up of an OUI, OUI-36 or a CID, different registered company identifiers, and some unique per-device identifier. EUIs are often the same as or similar to MAC addresses. This type includes MAC-48, an obsolete name for EUI-48. (Note that while devices with multiple network interfaces may have multiple MAC addresses, there is only one UEID for a device) , 0x03 IMEI This is a 14-digit identifier consisting of an 8-digit Type Allocation Code and a 6-digit serial number allocated by the manufacturer, which SHALL be encoded as byte string of length 14 with each byte as the digit’s value (not the ASCII encoding of the digit; the digit 3 encodes as 0x03, not 0x33). The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include Luhn checksum or SVN information. UEID’s are not designed for direct use by humans (e.g., printing on the case of a device), so no textual representation is defined. The consumer (the relying party) of a UEID MUST treat a UEID as a completely opaque string of bytes and not make any use of its internal structure. For example, they should not use the OUI part of a type 0x02 UEID to identify the manufacturer of the device. Instead they should use the oemid claim that is defined elsewhere. The reasons for this are: UEIDs types may vary freely from one manufacturer to the next. New types of UEIDs may be created. For example, a type 0x07 UEID may be created based on some other manufacturer registration scheme. Device manufacturers are allowed to change from one type of UEID to another anytime they want. For example, they may find they can optimize their manufacturing by switching from type 0x01 to type 0x02 or vice versa. The main requirement on the manufacturer is that UEIDs be universally unique.

ueid-type ) ]]>

An SEUID is of the same format as a UEID, but it may change to a different value on device life-cycle events. Examples of these events are change of ownership, factory reset and on-boarding into an IoT device management system. A device may have both a UEID and SUEIDs, neither, one or the other. There may be multiple SUEIDs. Each one has a text string label the purpose of which is to distinguish it from others in the token. The label may name the purpose, application or type of the SUEID. Typically, there will be few SUEDs so there is no need for a formal labeling mechanism like a registry. The EAT profile may describe how SUEIDs should be labeled. If there is only one SUEID, the claim remains a map and there still must be a label. For example, the label for the SUEID used by FIDO Onboarding Protocol could simply be “FDO”. There are privacy considerations for SUEID’s. See .

ueid-type } sueids-claim = ( sueids => sueids-type ) ]]>

The IEEE operates a global registry for MAC addresses and company IDs. This claim uses that database to identify OEMs. The contents of the claim may be either an IEEE MA-L, MA-M, MA-S or an IEEE CID . An MA-L, formerly known as an OUI, is a 24-bit value used as the first half of a MAC address. MA-M similarly is a 28-bit value uses as the first part of a MAC address, and MA-S, formerly known as OUI-36, a 36-bit value. Many companies already have purchased one of these. A CID is also a 24-bit value from the same space as an MA-L, but not for use as a MAC address. IEEE has published Guidelines for Use of EUI, OUI, and CID and provides a lookup services Companies that have more than one of these IDs or MAC address blocks should pick one and prefer that for all their devices. Commonly, these are expressed in Hexadecimal Representation also called the Canonical format. When this claim is encoded the order of bytes in the bstr are the same as the order in the Hexadecimal Representation. For example, an MA-L like “AC-DE-48” would be encoded in 3 bytes with values 0xAC, 0xDE, 0x48. For JSON encoded tokens, this is further base64url encoded.

bstr ) ]]>

The hardware version can be claimed at three different levels, the chip, the circuit board and the final device assembly. An EAT can include any combination these claims. The hardware version is a simple text string the format of which is set by each manufacturer. The structure and sorting order of this text string can be specified using the version-scheme item from CoSWID . The hardware version can also be given by a 13-digit . A new CoSWID version scheme is registered with IANA by this document in . An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article Number or most commonly as a bar code.

tstr ) chip-version-scheme-claim = ( chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme ) board-version-claim = ( board-version => tstr ) board-version-scheme-claim = ( board-version-scheme => $version-scheme ) device-version-claim = ( device-version => tstr ) device-version-scheme-claim = ( device-version-scheme => $version-scheme ) hardware-version-claims = ( ? chip-version-claim, ? board-version-claim, ? device-version-claim, ? chip-version-scheme-claim, ? board-version-scheme-claim, ? device-version-scheme-claim, ) ]]>

TODO: Add claims that reference CoSWID.

This claim characterizes the device/entity ability to defend against attacks aimed at capturing the signing key, forging claims and at forging EATs. This is done by defining four security levels as described below. This is similar to the key protection types defined by the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alliance . These claims describe security environment and countermeasures available on the end-entity / client device where the attestation key reside and the claims originate. There is some expectation that implementor will protect the attestation signing keys at this level. Otherwise the EAT provides no meaningful security assurances. Entities at this level should not be general-purpose operating environments that host features such as app download systems, web browsers and complex productivity applications. It is akin to the Secure Restricted level (see below) without the security orientation. Examples include a Wi-Fi subsystem, an IoT camera, or sensor device. Entities at this level must meet the criteria defined by FIDO Allowed Restricted Operating Environments . Examples include TEE’s and schemes using virtualization-based security. Like the FIDO security goal, security at this level is aimed at defending well against large-scale network / remote attacks against the device. Entities at this level must include substantial defense against physical or electrical attacks against the device itself. It is assumed any potential attacker has captured the device and can disassemble it. Example include TPMs and Secure Elements. The entity should claim the highest security level it achieves and no higher. This set is not extensible so as to provide a common interoperable description of security level to the relying party. If a particular implementation considers this claim to be inadequate, it can define its own proprietary claim. It may consider including both this claim as a coarse indication of security and its own proprietary claim as a refined indication. This claim is not intended as a replacement for a proper end-device security certification schemes such as those based on FIPS 140 or those based on Common Criteria . The claim made here is solely a self-claim made by the Entity Originator.

security-level-cbor-type / security-level-json-type ) ]]>

The value of true indicates secure boot is enabled. Secure boot is considered enabled when base software, the firmware and operating system, are under control of the entity manufacturer identified in the oemid claimd described in . This may because the software is in ROM or because it is cryptographically authenticated or some combination of the two or other.

bool ) ]]>

This applies to system-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities of the target device / submodule like JTAG and diagnostic hardware built into chips. It applies to any software debug facilities related to root, operating system or privileged software that allow system-wide memory inspection, tracing or modification of non-system software like user mode applications. This characterization assumes that debug facilities can be enabled and disabled in a dynamic way or be disabled in some permanent way such that no enabling is possible. An example of dynamic enabling is one where some authentication is required to enable debugging. An example of permanent disabling is blowing a hardware fuse in a chip. The specific type of the mechanism is not taken into account. For example, it does not matter if authentication is by a global password or by per-device public keys. As with all claims, the absence of the debug level claim means it is not reported. A conservative interpretation might assume the Not Disabled state. It could however be that it is reported in a proprietary claim. This claim is not extensible so as to provide a common interoperable description of debug status to the relying party. If a particular implementation considers this claim to be inadequate, it can define its own proprietary claim. It may consider including both this claim as a coarse indication of debug status and its own proprietary claim as a refined indication. The higher levels of debug disabling requires that all debug disabling of the levels below it be in effect. Since the lowest level requires that all of the target’s debug be currently disabled, all other levels require that too. There is no inheritance of claims from a submodule to a superior module or vice versa. There is no assumption, requirement or guarantee that the target of a superior module encompasses the targets of submodules. Thus, every submodule must explicitly describe its own debug state. The verifier or relying party receiving an EAT cannot assume that debug is turned off in a submodule because there is a claim indicating it is turned off in a superior module. An individual target device / submodule may have multiple debug facilities. The use of plural in the description of the states refers to that, not to any aggregation or inheritance. The architecture of some chips or devices may be such that a debug facility operates for the whole chip or device. If the EAT for such a chip includes submodules, then each submodule should independently report the status of the whole-chip or whole-device debug facility. This is the only way the relying party can know the debug status of the submodules since there is no inheritance.

If any debug facility, even manufacturer hardware diagnostics, is currently enabled, then this level must be indicated.

This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled. It may be possible to enable them in the future, and it may also be possible that they were enabled in the past after the target device/sub-system booted/started, but they are currently disabled.

This level indicates all debug facilities are currently disabled and have been so since the target device/sub-system booted/started.

This level indicates all non-manufacturer facilities are permanently disabled such that no end user or developer cannot enable them. Only the manufacturer indicated in the OEMID claim can enable them. This also indicates that all debug facilities are currently disabled and have been so since boot/start.

This level indicates that all debug capabilities for the target device/sub-module are permanently disabled.

debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type ) ]]>

An EAT may include a cryptographic key such as a public key. The signing of the EAT binds the key to all the other claims in the token. The purpose for inclusion of the key may vary by use case. For example, the key may be included as part of an IoT device onboarding protocol. When the FIDO protocol includes a pubic key in its attestation message, the key represents the binding of a user, device and relying party. This document describes how claims containing keys should be defined for the various use cases. It does not define specific claims for specific use cases. Keys in CBOR format tokens SHOULD be the COSE_Key format and keys in JSON format tokens SHOULD be the JSON Web Key format . These two formats support many common key types. Their use avoids the need to decode other serialization formats. These two formats can be extended to support further key types through their IANA registries. The general confirmation claim format , may also be used. It provides key encryption. It also allows for inclusion by reference through a key ID. The confirmation claim format may employed in the definition of some new claim for a a particular use case. When the actual confirmation claim is included in an EAT, this document associates no use case semantics other than proof of posession. Different EAT use cases may choose to associate further semantics. The key in the confirmation claim MUST be protected the same as the key used to sign the EAT. That is, the same, equivalent or better hardware defenses, access controls, key generation and such must be used.

The location claim gives the location of the device entity from which the attestation originates. It is derived from the W3C Geolocation API . The latitude, longitude, altitude and accuracy must conform to . The altitude is in meters above the ellipsoid. The two accuracy values are positive numbers in meters. The heading is in degrees relative to true north. If the device is stationary, the heading is NaN (floating-point not-a-number). The speed is the horizontal component of the device velocity in meters per second. When encoding floating-point numbers half-precision should not be used. It usually does not provide enough precision for a geographic location. It is not a requirement that the receiver of an EAT implement half-precision, so the receiver may not be able to decode the location. The location may have been cached for a period of time before token creation. For example, it might have been minutes or hours or more since the last contact with a GPS satellite. Either the timestamp or age data item can be used to quantify the cached period. The timestamp data item is preferred as it a non-relative time. The age data item can be used when the entity doesn’t know what time it is either because it doesn’t have a clock or it isn’t set. The entity must still have a “ticker” that can measure a time interval. The age is the interval between acquisition of the location data and token creation. See location-related privacy considerations in below.

number, longitude => number, ? altitude => number, ? accuracy => number, ? altitude-accuracy => number, ? heading => number, ? speed => number, ? timestamp => ~time-int, ? age => uint } latitude = 1 / "latitude" longitude = 2 / "longitude" altitude = 3 / "altitude" accuracy = 4 / "accuracy" altitude-accuracy = 5 / "altitude-accuracy" heading = 6 / "heading" speed = 7 / "speed" timestamp = 8 / "timestamp" age = 9 / "age" location-claim = ( location-label => location-type ) ]]>

The “uptime” claim contains a value that represents the number of seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submod was last booted.

uint ) ]]>

The Boot Seed claim is a random value created at system boot time that will allow differentiation of reports from different boot sessions. This value is usually public and not protected. It is not the same as a seed for a random number generator which must be kept secret.

bytes ) ]]>

EAT’s may be used in the context of several different applications. The intended-use claim provides an indication to an EAT consumer about the intended usage of the token. This claim can be used as a way for an application using EAT to internally distinguish between different ways it uses EAT. Generic attestation describes an application where the EAT consumer requres the most up-to-date security assessment of the attesting entity. It is expected that this is the most commonly-used application of EAT. Entities that are registering for a new service may be expected to provide an attestation as part of the registration process. This intended-use setting indicates that the attestation is not intended for any use but registration. Entities may be provisioned with different values or settings by an EAT consumer. Examples include key material or device management trees. The consumer may require an EAT to assess device security state of the entity prior to provisioning. Certifying authorities (CA’s) may require attestations prior to the issuance of certificates related to keypairs hosted at the entity. An EAT may be used as part of the certificate signing request (CSR). An EAT consumer may require an attestation as part of an accompanying proof-of-possession (PoP) appication. More precisely, a PoP transaction is intended to provide to the recipient cryptographically-verifiable proof that the sender has posession of a key. This kind of attestation may be neceesary to verify the security state of the entity storing the private key used in a PoP application.

intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type ) ]]>

See for the detailed description of a profile. A profile is identified by either a URL or an OID. Typically, the URI will reference a document describing the profile. An OID is just a unique identifier for the profile. It may exist anywhere in the OID tree. There is no requirement that the named document be publicly accessible. The primary purpose of the profile claim is to uniquely identify the profile even if it is a private profile. The OID is encoded in CBOR according to and the URI according to . Both are unwrapped and thus not tags. The OID is always absolute and never relative. If the claims CBOR type is a text string it is a URI and if a byte string it is an OID. Note that this named “eat_profile” for JWT and is distinct from the already registered “profile” claim in the JWT claims registry.

~uri / ~oid ) ]]>

This claim contains descriptions of software that is present on the device. These manifests are installed on the device when the software is installed or are created as part of the installation process. Installation is anything that adds software to the device, possibly factory installation, the user installing elective applications and so on. The defining characteristic is that they are created by the software manufacturer. The purpose of these claims in an EAT is to relay them without modification to the Verifier and/or the Relying Party. In some cases these will be signed by the software manufacturer independent of any signing for the purpose of EAT attestation. Manifest claims should include the manufacturer’s signature (which will be signed over by the attestation signature). In other cases the attestation signature will be the only one. This claim allows multiple formats for the manifest. For example the manifest may be a CBOR-format CoSWID, an XML-format SWID or other. Identification of the type of manifest is always by a CBOR tag. In many cases, for examples CoSWID, a tag will already be registered with IANA. If not, a tag MUST be registered. It can be in the first-come-first-served space which has minimal requirements for registration. The claim is an array of one or more manifests. To facilitate hand off of the manifest to a decoding library, each manifest is contained in a byte string. This occurs for CBOR-format manifests as well as non-CBOR format manifests. If a particular manifest type uses CBOR encoding, then the item in the array for it MUST be a byte string that contains a CBOR tag. The EAT decoder must decode the byte string and then the CBOR within it to find the tag number to identify the type of manifest. The contents of the byte string is then handed to the particular manifest processor for that type of manifest. CoSWID and SUIT manifest are examples of this. If a particular manifest type does not use CBOR encoding, then the item in the array for it must be a CBOR tag that contains a byte string. The EAT decoder uses the tag to identify the processor for that type of manifest. The contents of the tag, the byte string, are handed to the manifest processor. Note that a byte string is used to contain the manifest whether it is a text based format or not. An example of this is an XML format ISO/IEC 19770 SWID. It is not possible to describe the above requirements in CDDL so the type for an individual manifest is any in the CDDL below. The above text sets the encoding requirement. This claim allows for multiple manifests in one token since multiple software packages are likely to be present. The multiple manifests may be of multiple formats. In some cases EAT submodules may be used instead of the array structure in this claim for multiple manifests. When the format is used, it MUST be a payload CoSWID, not an evidence CoSWID.

manifests-type ) manifests-type = [+ $manifest-formats] ; Must be a CoSWID payload type $manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag $manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope_Tagged ]]>

This claim contains descriptions, lists, evidence or measurements of the software that exists on the device. The defining characteristic of this claim is that its contents are created by processes on the device that inventory, measure or otherwise characterize the software on the device. The contents of this claim do not originate from the software manufacturer. In most cases the contents of this claim are signed as part of attestation signing, but independent signing in addition to the attestation signing is not ruled out when a particular evidence format supports it. This claim uses the same mechanism for identification of the type of the swevidence as is used for the type of the manifest in the manifests claim. It also uses the same byte string based mechanism for containing the claim and easing the hand off to a processing library. See the discussion above in the manifests claim. When the format is used, it MUST be evidence CoSWIDs, not payload CoSWIDS.

swevidence-type ) swevidence-type = [+ $swevidence-formats] ; Must be a CoSWID evidence type $swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag ]]>

Some devices are complex, having many subsystems or submodules. A mobile phone is a good example. It may have several connectivity submodules for communications (e.g., Wi-Fi and cellular). It may have subsystems for low-power audio and video playback. It may have one or more security-oriented subsystems like a TEE or a Secure Element. The claims for each these can be grouped together in a submodule. The submods part of a token are in a single map/object with many entries, one per submodule. There is only one submods map in a token. It is identified by its specific label. It is a peer to other claims, but it is not called a claim because it is a container for a claim set rather than an individual claim. This submods part of a token allows what might be called recursion. It allows claim sets inside of claim sets inside of claims sets…

Each entry in the submod map is one of two types: A non-token submodule that is a map or object directly containing claims for the submodule. A nested EAT that is a fully formed, independently signed EAT token

This is simply a map or object containing claims about the submodule. It may contain claims that are the same as its surrounding token or superior submodules. For example, the top-level of the token may have a UEID, a submod may have a different UEID and a further subordinate submodule may also have a UEID. It is signed/encrypted along with the rest of the token and thus the claims are secured by the same Attester with the same signing key as the rest of the token. If a token is in CBOR format (a CWT or a UCCS), all non-token submodules must be CBOR format. If a token in in JSON format (a JWT), all non-token submodules must be in JSON format. When decoding, this type of submodule is recognized from the other type by being a data item of type map for CBOR or type object for JSON.

This type of submodule is a fully formed secured EAT as defined in this document except that it MUST NOT be a UCCS or an unsecured JWT. A nested token that is one that is always secured using COSE or JOSE, usually by an independent Attester. When the surrounding EAT is a CWT or secured JWT, the nested token becomes securely bound with the other claims in the surrounding token. It is allowed to have a CWT as a submodule in a JWT and vice versa, but this SHOULD be avoided unless necessary.

They type of an EAT nested in a CWT is determined by whether the CBOR type is a text string or a byte string. If a text string, then it is a JWT. If a byte string, then it is a CWT. A CWT nested in a CBOR-format token is always wrapped by a byte string for easier handling with standard CBOR decoders and token processing APIs that will typically take a byte buffer as input. Nested CWTs may be either a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message. COSE layers in nested CWT EATs MUST be a COSE_Tagged_Message, never a COSE_Untagged_Message. If a nested EAT has more than one level of COSE, for example one that is both encrypted and signed, a COSE_Tagged_message must be used at every level.

When a CWT is nested in a JWT, it must be as a 55799 tag in order to distinguish it from a nested JWT. When a nested EAT in a JWT is decoded, first remove the base64url encoding. Next, check to see if it starts with the bytes 0xd9d9f7. If so, then it is a CWT as a JWT will never start with these four bytes. If not if it is a JWT. Other than the 55799 tag requirement, tag usage for CWT’s nested in a JSON format token follow the same rules as for CWTs nested in CBOR-format tokens. It may be a CWT CBOR tag or a CWT Protocol Message and COSE_Tagged_Message MUST be used at all COSE layers.

To incorporate a UCCS token as a submodule, it MUST be as a non-token submodule. This can be accomplished inserting the content of the UCCS Tag into the submodule map. The content of a UCCS tag is exactly a map of claims as required for a non-token submodule. If the UCCS is not a UCCS tag, then it can just be inserted into the submodule map directly. The definition of a nested EAT type of submodule is that it is one that is secured (signed) by an Attester. Since UCCS tokens are unsecured, they do not fulfill this definition and must be non-token submodules. To incorporate an Unsecured JWT as a submodule, the null-security JOSE wrapping should be removed. The resulting claims set should be inserted as a non-token submodule. To incorporate a UCCS token in a surrounding JSON token, the UCCS token claims should be translated from CBOR to JSON. To incorporate an Unsecured JWT into a surrounding CBOR-format token, the null-security JOSE should be removed and the claims translated from JSON to CBOR.

The subordinate modules do not inherit anything from the containing token. The subordinate modules must explicitly include all of their claims. This is the case even for claims like the nonce and age. This rule is in place for simplicity. It avoids complex inheritance rules that might vary from one type of claim to another.

The security level of the non-token subordinate modules should always be less than or equal to that of the containing modules in the case of non-token submodules. It makes no sense for a module of lesser security to be signing claims of a module of higher security. An example of this is a TEE signing claims made by the non-TEE parts (e.g. the high-level OS) of the device. The opposite may be true for the nested tokens. They usually have their own more secure key material. An example of this is an embedded secure element.

The label or name for each submodule in the submods map is a text string naming the submodule. No submodules may have the same name.

submods-type ) submods-type = { + submod-type } ; The type of a submodule which can either be a nested claim set or a ; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in a bstr ; or a tstr. submod-type = ( submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token ) ; When this is a bstr, the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS ; format. When this is a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT ; format. nested-token = bstr / tstr; ; Each submodule has a unique text string name. submod-name = tstr ]]>

The Verifier must possess the correct key when it performs the cryptographic part of an EAT verification (e.g., verifying the COSE signature). This section describes several ways to identify the verification key. There is not one standard method. The verification key itself may be a public key, a symmetric key or something complicated in the case of a scheme like Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA). RATS Architecture describes what is called an Endorsement. This is an input to the Verifier that is usually the basis of the trust placed in an EAT and the Attester that generated it. It may contain the public key for verification of the signature on the EAT. It may contain Reference Values to which EAT claims are compared as part of the verification process. It may contain implied claims, those that are passed on to the Relying Party in Attestation Results. There is not yet any standard format(s) for an Endorsement. One format that may be used for an Endorsement is an X.509 certificate. Endorsement data like Reference Values and implied claims can be carried in X.509 v3 extensions. In this use, the public key in the X.509 certificate becomes the verification key, so identification of the Endorsement is also identification of the verification key. The verification key identification and establishment of trust in the EAT and the attester may also be by some other means than an Endorsement. For the components (Attester, Verifier, Relying Party,…) of a particular end-end attestation system to reliably interoperate, its definition should specify how the verification key is identified. Usually, this will be in the profile document for a particular attestation system.

Following is a list of possible methods of key identification. A specific attestation system may employ any one of these or one not listed here. The following assumes Endorsements are X.509 certificates or equivalent and thus does not mention or define any identifier for Endorsements in other formats. If such an Endorsement format is created, new identifiers for them will also need to be created.

The COSE standard header parameter for Key ID (kid) may be used. See and COSE leaves the semantics of the key ID open-ended. It could be a record locator in a database, a hash of a public key, an input to a KDF, an authority key identifier (AKI) for an X.509 certificate or other. The profile document should specify what the key ID’s semantics are.

COSE X.509 and JSON Web Siganture define several header parameters (x5t, x5u,…) for referencing or carrying X.509 certificates any of which may be used. The X.509 certificate may be an Endorsement and thus carrying additional input to the Verifier. It may be just an X.509 certificate, not an Endorsement. The same header parameters are used in both cases. It is up to the attestation system design and the Verifier to determine which.

Compressed X.509 and CBOR Native certificates are defined by CBOR Certificates . These are semantically compatible with X.509 and therefore can be used as an equivalent to X.509 as described above. These are identified by their own header parameters (c5t, c5u,…).

For some attestation systems, a claim may be re-used as a key identifier. For example, the UEID uniquely identifies the device and therefore can work well as a key identifier or Endorsement identifier. This has the advantage that key identification requires no additional bytes in the EAT and makes the EAT smaller. This has the disadvantage that the unverified EAT must be substantially decoded to obtain the identifier since the identifier is in the COSE/JOSE payload, not in the headers.

In all cases there must be some way that the verification key is itself verified or determined to be trustworthy. The key identification itself is never enough. This will always be by some out-of-band mechanism that is not described here. For example, the Verifier may be configured with a root certificate or a master key by the Verifier system administrator. Often an X.509 certificate or an Endorsement carries more than just the verification key. For example, an X.509 certificate might have key usage constraints and an Endorsement might have Reference Values. When this is the case, the key identifier must be either a protected header or in the payload such that it is cryptographically bound to the EAT. This is in line with the requirements in section 6 on Key Identification in JSON Web Signature .

This EAT specification does not gaurantee that implementations of it will interoperate. The variability in this specification is necessary to accommodate the widely varying use cases. An EAT profile narrows the specification for a specific use case. An ideal EAT profile will gauarantee interoperability. The profile can be named in the token using the profile claim described in .

A profile document doesn’t have to be in any particular format. It may be simple text, something more formal or a combination. In some cases CDDL may be created that replaces CDDL in this or other document to express some profile requirements. For example, to require the altitude data item in the location claim, CDDL can be written that replicates the location claim with the altitude no longer optional.

The following is a list of EAT, CWT, UCCS, JWS, COSE, JOSE and CBOR options that a profile should address.

The profile should indicate whether the token format should be CBOR, JSON, both or even some other encoding. If some other encoding, a specification for how the CDDL described here is serialized in that encoding is necessary. This should be addressed for the top-level token and for any nested tokens. For example, a profile might require all nested tokens to be of the same encoding of the top level token.

The profile should indicate whether definite-length arrays/maps, indefinite-length arrays/maps or both are allowed. A good default is to allow only definite-length arrays/maps. An alternate is to allow both definite and indefinite-length arrays/maps. The decoder should accept either. Encoders that need to fit on very small hardware or be actually implement in hardware can use indefinite-length encoding. This applies to individual EAT claims, CWT and COSE parts of the implementation.

The profile should indicate whether definite-length strings, indefinite-length strings or both are allowed. A good default is to allow only definite-length strings. As with map and array encoding, allowing indefinite-length strings can be beneficial for some smaller implementations.

The profile should indicate whether encoders must use preferred serialization. The profile should indicate whether decoders must accept non-preferred serialization.

COSE and JOSE have several options for signed, MACed and encrypted messages. EAT/CWT has the option to have no protection using UCCS and JOSE has a NULL protection option. It is possible to implement no protection, sign only, MAC only, sign then encrypt and so on. All combinations allowed by COSE, JOSE, JWT, CWT and UCCS are allowed by EAT. The profile should list the protections that must be supported by all decoders implementing the profile. The encoders them must implement a subset of what is listed for the decoders, perhaps only one. Implementations may choose to sign or MAC before encryption so that the implementation layer doing the signing or MACing can be the smallest. It is often easier to make smaller implementations more secure, perhaps even implementing in solely in hardware. The key material for a signature or MAC is a private key, while for encryption it is likely to be a public key. The key for encryption requires less protection.

The profile document should list the COSE algorithms that a Verifier must implement. The Attester will select one of them. Since there is no negotiation, the Verifier should implement all algorithms listed in the profile.

Section describes a number of methods for identifying a verification key. The profile document should specify one of these or one that is not described. The ones described in this document are only roughly described. The profile document should go into the full detail.

Similar to, or perhaps the same as Verification Key Identification, the profile may wish to specify how Endorsements are to be identified. However note that Endorsement Identification is optional, where as key identification is not.

Just about every use case will require some means of knowing the EAT is recent enough and not a replay of an old token. The profile should describe how freshness is achieved. The section on Freshness in describes some of the possible solutions to achieve this.

The profile can list claims whose absence results in Verification failure.

The profile can list claims whose presence results in Verification failure.

The profile may describe entirely new claims. These claims can be required or optional.

The profile may lock down optional aspects of individual claims. For example, it may require altitude in the location claim, or it may require that HW Versions always be described using EAN-13.

The profile should specify whether the token should be a CWT Tag or not. Similarly, the profile should specify whether the token should be a UCCS tag or not. When COSE protection is used, the profile should specify whether COSE tags are used or not. Note that RFC 8392 requires COSE tags be used in a CWT tag. Often a tag is unncessary because the surrounding or carrying protocol identifies the object as an EAT.

The profile should specify which formats are allowed for the manifests and software evidence claims. The profile may also go on to say which parts and options of these formats are used, allowed and prohibited.

This makes use of the types defined in CDDL Appendix D, Standard Prelude. Some of the CDDL included here is for claims that are defined in CWT or JWT or are in the IANA CWT or JWT registries. CDDL was not in use when these claims where defined.

time-int is identical to the epoch-based time, but disallows floating-point representation. Note that unless expliclity indicated, URIs are not the URI tag defined in . They are just text strings that contain a URI.

This section provides CDDL for the claims defined in CWT. It is non-normative as is the authoritative definition of these claims. Note that the subject, issue and audience claims may be a text string containing a URI per and . These are never the URI tag defined in .

text, ? subject => text, ? audience => text, ? expiration => time, ? not-before => time, ? issued-at => time, ? cwt-id => bytes, ) issuer = 1 subject = 2 audience = 3 expiration = 4 not-before = 5 issued-at = 6 cwt-id = 7 ]]>

JSON should be encoded per RFC 8610 Appendix E. In addition, the following CDDL types are encoded in JSON as follows: bstr – must be base64url encoded time – must be encoded as NumericDate as described section 2 of . string-or-uri – must be encoded as StringOrURI as described section 2 of . uri – must be a URI . oid – encoded as a string using the well established dotted-decimal notation (e.g., the text “1.2.250.1”).

CBOR allows data items to be serialized in more than one form. If the sender uses a form that the receiver can’t decode, there will not be interoperability. This specification gives no blanket requirements to narrow CBOR serialization for all uses of EAT. This allows individual uses to tailor serialization to the environment. It also may result in EAT implementations that don’t interoperate. One way to guarantee interoperability is to clearly specify CBOR serialization in a profile document. See for a list of serialization issues that should be addressed. EAT will be commonly used where the device generating the attestation is constrained and the receiver/verifier of the attestation is a capacious server. Following is a set of serialization requirements that work well for that use case and are guaranteed to interoperate. Use of this serialization is recommended where possible, but not required. An EAT profile may just reference the following section rather than spell out serialization details.

Preferred serialization described in section 4.1 of is not required. The EAT decoder must accept all forms of number serialization. The EAT encoder may use any form it wishes. The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length arrays and maps as described in section 3.2.2 of . The EAT encoder may use indefinite length arrays and maps if it wishes. The EAT decoder must accept indefinite length strings as described in section 3.2.3 of . The EAT encoder may use indefinite length strings if it wishes. Sorting of maps by key is not required. The EAT decoder must not rely on sorting. Deterministic encoding described in Section 4.2 of is not required. Basic validity described in section 5.3.1 of must be followed. The EAT encoder must not send duplicate map keys/labels or invalid UTF-8 strings.

text, ? subject => text, ? audience => text, ? expiration => time, ? not-before => time, ? issued-at => time, ? cwt-id => bytes, ) issuer = 1 subject = 2 audience = 3 expiration = 4 not-before = 5 issued-at = 6 cwt-id = 7 debug-status-cbor-type = &( enabled: 0, disabled: 1, disabled-since-boot: 2, disabled-permanently: 3, disabled-fully-and-permanently: 4 ) debug-status-json-type = "enabled" / "disabled" / "disabled-since-boot" / "disabled-permanently" / "disabled-fully-and-permanently" debug-status-claim = ( debug-status => debug-status-cbor-type / debug-status-json-type ) location-type = { latitude => number, longitude => number, ? altitude => number, ? accuracy => number, ? altitude-accuracy => number, ? heading => number, ? speed => number, ? timestamp => ~time-int, ? age => uint } latitude = 1 / "latitude" longitude = 2 / "longitude" altitude = 3 / "altitude" accuracy = 4 / "accuracy" altitude-accuracy = 5 / "altitude-accuracy" heading = 6 / "heading" speed = 7 / "speed" timestamp = 8 / "timestamp" age = 9 / "age" location-claim = ( location-label => location-type ) nonce-type = bstr .size (8..64) nonce-claim = ( nonce => nonce-type / [ 2* nonce-type ] ) oemid-claim = ( oemid => bstr ) chip-version-claim = ( chip-version => tstr ) chip-version-scheme-claim = ( chip-version-scheme => $version-scheme ) board-version-claim = ( board-version => tstr ) board-version-scheme-claim = ( board-version-scheme => $version-scheme ) device-version-claim = ( device-version => tstr ) device-version-scheme-claim = ( device-version-scheme => $version-scheme ) hardware-version-claims = ( ? chip-version-claim, ? board-version-claim, ? device-version-claim, ? chip-version-scheme-claim, ? board-version-scheme-claim, ? device-version-scheme-claim, ) secure-boot-claim = ( secure-boot => bool ) security-level-cbor-type = &( unrestricted: 1, restricted: 2, secure-restricted: 3, hardware: 4 ) security-level-json-type = "unrestricted" / "restricted" / "secure-restricted" / "hardware" security-level-claim = ( security-level => security-level-cbor-type / security-level-json-type ) ; The part of a token that contains all the submodules. It is a peer ; with the claims in the token, but not a claim, only a map/object to ; hold all the submodules. submods-part = ( submods => submods-type ) submods-type = { + submod-type } ; The type of a submodule which can either be a nested claim set or a ; nested separately signed token. Nested tokens are wrapped in a bstr ; or a tstr. submod-type = ( submod-name => eat-claim-set / nested-token ) ; When this is a bstr, the contents are an eat-token in CWT or UCCS ; format. When this is a tstr, the contents are an eat-token in JWT ; format. nested-token = bstr / tstr; ; Each submodule has a unique text string name. submod-name = tstr ueid-type = bstr .size (7..33) ueid-claim = ( ueid => ueid-type ) sueids-type = { + tstr => ueid-type } sueids-claim = ( sueids => sueids-type ) intended-use-cbor-type = &( generic: 1, registration: 2, provisioning: 3, csr: 4, pop: 5 ) intended-use-json-type = "generic" / "registration" / "provisioning" / "csr" / "pop" intended-use-claim = ( intended-use => intended-use-cbor-type / intended-use-json-type ) oid = #6.4000(bstr) ; TODO: fill this in with correct CDDL from OID RFC uptime-claim = ( uptime => uint ) manifests-claim = ( manifests => manifests-type ) manifests-type = [+ $manifest-formats] ; Must be a CoSWID payload type $manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag $manifest-formats /= bytes .cbor SUIT_Envelope_Tagged swevidence-claim = ( swevidence => swevidence-type ) swevidence-type = [+ $swevidence-formats] ; Must be a CoSWID evidence type $swevidence-formats /= bytes .cbor concise-swid-tag oid = #6.4000(bstr) ; TODO: fill this in with correct CDDL from OID RFC profile-claim = ( profile => ~uri / ~oid ) boot-seed-claim = ( boot-seed => bytes ) ]]>

Claims defined for EAT are compatible with those of CWT so the CWT Claims Registry is re used. No new IANA registry is created. All EAT claims should be registered in the CWT and JWT Claims Registries.

The following is design guidance for creating new EAT claims, particularly those to be registered with IANA. Much of this guidance is generic and could also be considered when designing new CWT or JWT claims.

It is a broad goal that EATs can be processed by relying parties in a general way regardless of the type, manufacturer or technology of the device from which they originate. It is a goal that there be general-purpose verification implementations that can verify tokens for large numbers of use cases with special cases and configurations for different device types. This is a goal of interoperability of the semantics of claims themselves, not just of the signing, encoding and serialization formats. This is a lofty goal and difficult to achieve broadly requiring careful definition of claims in a technology neutral way. Sometimes it will be difficult to design a claim that can represent the semantics of data from very different device types. However, the goal remains even when difficult.

Claims should be defined such that they are not specific to an operating system. They should be applicable to multiple large high-level operating systems from different vendors. They should also be applicable to multiple small embedded operating systems from multiple vendors and everything in between. Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a SW environment or programming language. Claims should not be defined such that they are specific to a chip or particular hardware. For example, they should not just be the contents of some HW status register as it is unlikely that the same HW status register with the same bits exists on a chip of a different manufacturer. The boot and debug state claims in this document are an example of a claim that has been defined in this neutral way.

Many use cases will have EATs generated by some of the most secure hardware and software that exists. Secure Elements and smart cards are examples of this. However, EAT is intended for use in low-security use cases the same as high-security use case. For example, an app on a mobile device may generate EATs on its own. Claims should be defined and registered on the basis of whether they are useful and interoperable, not based on security level. In particular, there should be no exclusion of claims because they are just used only in low-security environments.

Where possible, claims should use already standardized data items, identifiers and formats. This takes advantage of the expertise put into creating those formats and improves interoperability. Often extant claims will not be defined in an encoding or serialization format used by EAT. It is preferred to define a CBOR and JSON format for them so that EAT implementations do not require a plethora of encoders and decoders for serialization formats. In some cases, it may be better to use the encoding and serialization as is. For example, signed X.509 certificates and CRLs can be carried as-is in a byte string. This retains interoperability with the extensive infrastructure for creating and processing X.509 certificates and CRLs.

EAT allows the definition and use of proprietary claims. For example, a device manufacturer may generate a token with proprietary claims intended only for verification by a service offered by that device manufacturer. This is a supported use case. In many cases proprietary claims will be the easiest and most obvious way to proceed, however for better interoperability, use of general standardized claims is preferred.

This specification adds the following values to the “JSON Web Token Claims” registry established by and the “CBOR Web Token Claims Registry” established by . Each entry below is an addition to both registries (except for the nonce claim which is already registered for JWT, but not registered for CWT). The “Claim Description”, “Change Controller” and “Specification Documents” are common and equivalent for the JWT and CWT registries. The “Claim Key” and “Claim Value Types(s)” are for the CWT registry only. The “Claim Name” is as defined for the CWT registry, not the JWT registry. The “JWT Claim Name” is equivalent to the “Claim Name” in the JWT registry.

RFC Editor: in the final publication this section should be combined with the following section as it will no longer be necessary to distinguish claims with early assignment. Also, the following paragraph should be removed. The claims in this section have been (requested for / given) early assignment according to . They have been assigned values and registered before final publication of this document. While their semantics is not expected to change in final publication, it is possible that they will. The JWT Claim Names and CWT Claim Keys are not expected to change. Claim Name: Nonce Claim Description: Nonce JWT Claim Name: “nonce” (already registered for JWT) Claim Key: 10 Claim Value Type(s): byte string Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): , this document   Claim Name: UEID Claim Description: The Universal Entity ID JWT Claim Name: “ueid” CWT Claim Key: 11 Claim Value Type(s): byte string Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: OEMID Claim Description: IEEE-based OEM ID JWT Claim Name: “oemid” Claim Key: 13 Claim Value Type(s): byte string Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: Security Level Claim Description: Characterization of the security of an Attester or submodule JWT Claim Name: “seclevel” Claim Key: 14 Claim Value Type(s): integer Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: Secure Boot Claim Description: Indicate whether the boot was secure JWT Claim Name: “secboot” Claim Key: 15 Claim Value Type(s): Boolean Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: Debug Status Claim Description: Indicate status of debug facilities JWT Claim Name: “dbgstat” Claim Key: 16 Claim Value Type(s): integer Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: Location Claim Description: The geographic location JWT Claim Name: “location” Claim Key: 17 Claim Value Type(s): map Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: Profile Claim Description: Indicates the EAT profile followed JWT Claim Name: “eat_profile” Claim Key: 18 Claim Value Type(s): map Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document   Claim Name: Submodules Section Claim Description: The section containing submodules (not actually a claim) JWT Claim Name: “submods” Claim Key: 20 Claim Value Type(s): map Change Controller: IESG Specification Document(s): this document

TODO: add the rest of the claims in here

IANA is requested to register a new value in the “Software Tag Version Scheme Values” established by . The new value is a version scheme a 13-digit European Article Number . An EAN-13 is also known as an International Article Number or most commonly as a bar code. This version scheme is the ASCII text representation of EAN-13 digits, the same ones often printed with a bar code. This version scheme must comply with the EAN allocation and assignment rules. For example, this requires the manufacturer to obtain a manufacture code from GS1. Index Version Scheme Name Specification 5 ean-13 This document

Certain EAT claims can be used to track the owner of an entity and therefore, implementations should consider providing privacy-preserving options dependent on the intended usage of the EAT. Examples would include suppression of location claims for EAT’s provided to unauthenticated consumers.

A UEID is usually not privacy-preserving. Any set of relying parties that receives tokens that happen to be from a single device will be able to know the tokens are all from the same device and be able to track the device. Thus, in many usage situations UEID violates governmental privacy regulation. In other usage situations a UEID will not be allowed for certain products like browsers that give privacy for the end user. It will often be the case that tokens will not have a UEID for these reasons. An SUEID is also usually not privacy-preserving. In some cases it may have fewer privacy issues than a UEID depending on when and how and when it is generated. There are several strategies that can be used to still be able to put UEIDs and SUEIDs in tokens: The device obtains explicit permission from the user of the device to use the UEID/SUEID. This may be through a prompt. It may also be through a license agreement. For example, agreements for some online banking and brokerage services might already cover use of a UEID/SUEID. The UEID/SUEID is used only in a particular context or particular use case. It is used only by one relying party. The device authenticates the relying party and generates a derived UEID/SUEID just for that particular relying party. For example, the relying party could prove their identity cryptographically to the device, then the device generates a UEID just for that relying party by hashing a proofed relying party ID with the main device UEID/SUEID. Note that some of these privacy preservation strategies result in multiple UEIDs and SUEIDs per device. Each UEID/SUEID is used in a different context, use case or system on the device. However, from the view of the relying party, there is just one UEID and it is still globally universal across manufacturers.

Geographic location is most always considered personally identifiable information. Implementers should consider laws and regulations governing the transmission of location data from end user devices to servers and services. Implementers should consider using location management facilities offered by the operating system on the device generating the attestation. For example, many mobile phones prompt the user for permission when before sending location data.

The security considerations provided in Section 8 of and Section 11 of apply to EAT in its CWT and JWT form, respectively. In addition, implementors should consider the following.

Private key material can be used to sign and/or encrypt the EAT, or can be used to derive the keys used for signing and/or encryption. In some instances, the manufacturer of the entity may create the key material separately and provision the key material in the entity itself. The manfuacturer of any entity that is capable of producing an EAT should take care to ensure that any private key material be suitably protected prior to provisioning the key material in the entity itself. This can require creation of key material in an enclave (see for definition of “enclave”), secure transmission of the key material from the enclave to the entity using an appropriate protocol, and persistence of the private key material in some form of secure storage to which (preferably) only the entity has access.

Regarding transmission of key material from the enclave to the entity, the key material may pass through one or more intermediaries. Therefore some form of protection (“key wrapping”) may be necessary. The transmission itself may be performed electronically, but can also be done by human courier. In the latter case, there should be minimal to no exposure of the key material to the human (e.g. encrypted portable memory). Moreover, the human should transport the key material directly from the secure enclave where it was created to a destination secure enclave where it can be provisioned.

As stated in Section 8 of , “The security of the CWT relies upon on the protections offered by COSE”. Similar considerations apply to EAT when sent as a CWT. However, EAT introduces the concept of a nonce to protect against replay. Since an EAT may be created by an entity that may not support the same type of transport security as the consumer of the EAT, intermediaries may be required to bridge communications between the entity and consumer. As a result, it is RECOMMENDED that both the consumer create a nonce, and the entity leverage the nonce along with COSE mechanisms for encryption and/or signing to create the EAT. Similar considerations apply to the use of EAT as a JWT. Although the security of a JWT leverages the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and JSON Web Signature (JWS) specifications, it is still recommended to make use of the EAT nonce.

In many cases, more than one EAT consumer may be required to fully verify the entity attestation. Examples include individual consumers for nested EATs, or consumers for individual claims with an EAT. When multiple consumers are required for verification of an EAT, it is important to minimize information exposure to each consumer. In addition, the communication between multiple consumers should be secure. For instance, consider the example of an encrypted and signed EAT with multiple claims. A consumer may receive the EAT (denoted as the “receiving consumer”), decrypt its payload, verify its signature, but then pass specific subsets of claims to other consumers for evaluation (“downstream consumers”). Since any COSE encryption will be removed by the receiving consumer, the communication of claim subsets to any downstream consumer should leverage a secure protocol (e.g.one that uses transport-layer security, i.e. TLS), However, assume the EAT of the previous example is hierarchical and each claim subset for a downstream consumer is created in the form of a nested EAT. Then transport security between the receiving and downstream consumers is not strictly required. Nevertheless, downstream consumers of a nested EAT should provide a nonce unique to the EAT they are consuming.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification. The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format. A JSON Web Key (JWK) is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structure that represents a cryptographic key. This specification also defines a JWK Set JSON data structure that represents a set of JWKs. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and IANA registries established by that specification. JSON Web Token (JWT) is a compact, URL-safe means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a JWT are encoded as a JSON object that is used as the payload of a JSON Web Signature (JWS) structure or as the plaintext of a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) structure, enabling the claims to be digitally signed or integrity protected with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and/or encrypted. This specification describes how to declare in a JSON Web Token (JWT) that the presenter of the JWT possesses a particular proof-of- possession key and how the recipient can cryptographically confirm proof of possession of the key by the presenter. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need for the ability to have basic security services defined for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON. This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON. This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) (which is defined by RFC 8392) that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of-possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also sometimes described as being the holder-of-key. This specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800) but using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and CWTs rather than JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] National Imagery and Mapping Agency IANA IANA 3GPP The FIDO Alliance GS1 Universität Bremen TZI The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR, RFC 8949) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. The present document defines CBOR tags for object identifiers (OIDs). It is intended as the reference document for the IANA registration of the CBOR tags so defined. Fraunhofer SIT Microsoft Sandelman Software Works Intel Corporation Huawei Technologies In network protocol exchanges it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary claims. An attempt is made to provide for a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of claims, and protocols. This specification defines a Uniform Resource Name namespace for UUIDs (Universally Unique IDentifier), also known as GUIDs (Globally Unique IDentifier). A UUID is 128 bits long, and can guarantee uniqueness across space and time. UUIDs were originally used in the Apollo Network Computing System and later in the Open Software Foundation\'s (OSF) Distributed Computing Environment (DCE), and then in Microsoft Windows platforms.This specification is derived from the DCE specification with the kind permission of the OSF (now known as The Open Group). Information from earlier versions of the DCE specification have been incorporated into this document. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo describes the process for early allocation of code points by IANA from registries for which "Specification Required", "RFC Required", "IETF Review", or "Standards Action" policies apply. This process can be used to alleviate the problem where code point allocation is needed to facilitate desired or required implementation and deployment experience prior to publication of an RFC, which would normally trigger code point allocation. The procedures in this document are intended to apply only to IETF Stream documents. Worldwide Web Consortium The FIDO Alliance National Institue of Standards

This is shown in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by COSE is shown.

This calculation is to determine the probability of a collision of UEIDs given the total possible entity population and the number of entities in a particular entity management database. Three different sized databases are considered. The number of devices per person roughly models non-personal devices such as traffic lights, devices in stores they shop in, facilities they work in and so on, even considering individual light bulbs. A device may have individually attested subsystems, for example parts of a car or a mobile phone. It is assumed that the largest database will have at most 10% of the world’s population of devices. Note that databases that handle more than a trillion records exist today. The trillion-record database size models an easy-to-imagine reality over the next decades. The quadrillion-record database is roughly at the limit of what is imaginable and should probably be accommodated. The 100 quadrillion datadbase is highly speculative perhaps involving nanorobots for every person, livestock animal and domesticated bird. It is included to round out the analysis. Note that the items counted here certainly do not have IP address and are not individually connected to the network. They may be connected to internal buses, via serial links, Bluetooth and so on. This is not the same problem as sizing IP addresses. People Devices / Person Subsystems / Device Database Portion Database Size 10 billion 100 10 10% trillion (10^12) 10 billion 100,000 10 10% quadrillion (10^15) 100 billion 1,000,000 10 10% 100 quadrillion (10^17) This is conceptually similar to the Birthday Problem where m is the number of possible birthdays, always 365, and k is the number of people. It is also conceptually similar to the Birthday Attack where collisions of the output of hash functions are considered. The proper formula for the collision calculation is

However, for the very large values involved here, this formula requires floating point precision higher than commonly available in calculators and SW so this simple approximation is used. See .

For this calculation:

Database Size 128-bit UEID 192-bit UEID 256-bit UEID trillion (10^12) 2 * 10^-15 8 * 10^-35 5 * 10^-55 quadrillion (10^15) 2 * 10^-09 8 * 10^-29 5 * 10^-49 100 quadrillion (10^17) 2 * 10^-05 8 * 10^-25 5 * 10^-45 Next, to calculate the probability of a collision occurring in one year’s operation of a database, it is assumed that the database size is in a steady state and that 10% of the database changes per year. For example, a trillion record database would have 100 billion states per year. Each of those states has the above calculated probability of a collision. This assumption is a worst-case since it assumes that each state of the database is completely independent from the previous state. In reality this is unlikely as state changes will be the addition or deletion of a few records. The following tables gives the time interval until there is a probability of a collision based on there being one tenth the number of states per year as the number of records in the database.

Database Size 128-bit UEID 192-bit UEID 256-bit UEID trillion (10^12) 60,000 years 10^24 years 10^44 years quadrillion (10^15) 8 seconds 10^14 years 10^34 years 100 quadrillion (10^17) 8 microseconds 10^11 years 10^31 years Clearly, 128 bits is enough for the near future thus the requirement that UEIDs be a minimum of 128 bits. There is no requirement for 256 bits today as quadrillion-record databases are not expected in the near future and because this time-to-collision calculation is a very worst case. A future update of the standard may increase the requirement to 256 bits, so there is a requirement that implementations be able to receive 256-bit UEIDs.

A UEID is not a UUID by conscious choice for the following reasons. UUIDs are limited to 128 bits which may not be enough for some future use cases. Today, cryptographic-quality random numbers are available from common CPUs and hardware. This hardware was introduced between 2010 and 2015. Operating systems and cryptographic libraries give access to this hardware. Consequently, there is little need for implementations to construct such random values from multiple sources on their own. Version 4 UUIDs do allow for use of such cryptographic-quality random numbers, but do so by mapping into the overall UUID structure of time and clock values. This structure is of no value here yet adds complexity. It also slightly reduces the number of actual bits with entropy. UUIDs seem to have been designed for scenarios where the implementor does not have full control over the environment and uniqueness has to be constructed from identifiers at hand. UEID takes the view that hardware, software and/or manufacturing process directly implement UEID in a simple and direct way. It takes the view that cryptographic quality random number generators are readily available as they are implemented in commonly used CPU hardware.

This section describes several distinct ways in which an IEEE IDevID relates to EAT, particularly to UEID and SUEID. orients around the definition of an implementation called a “DevID Module.” It describes how IDevIDs and LDevIDs are stored, protected and accessed using a DevID Module. A particular level of defense against attack that should be achieved to be a DevID is defined. The intent is that IDevIDs and LDevIDs are used with an open set of network protocols for authentication and such. In these protocols the DevID secret is used to sign a nonce or similar to proof the association of the DevID certificates with the device. By contrast, EAT defines network protocol for proving trustworthiness to a relying party, the very thing that is not defined in . Nor does not give details on how keys, data and such are stored protected and accessed. EAT is intended to work with a variety of different on-device implementations ranging from minimal protection of assets to the highest levels of asset protection. It does not define any particular level of defense against attack, instead providing a set of security considerations. EAT and DevID can be viewed as complimentary when used together or as competing to provide a device identity service.

As just described, EAT defines a network protocol and doesn’t. Vice versa, EAT doesn’t define a an device implementation and DevID does. Hence, EAT can be the network protocol that a DevID is used with. The DevID secret becomes the attestation key used to sign EATs. The DevID and its certificate chain become the Endorsement sent to the Verifier. In this case the EAT and the DevID are likely to both provide a device identifier (e.g. a serial number). In the EAT it is the UEID (or SUEID). In the DevID (used as an endorsement), it is a device serial number included in the subject field of the DevID certificate. It is probably a good idea in this use for them to be the same serial number or for the UEID to be a hash of the DevID serial number.

The UEID, SUEID and other claims like OEM ID are equivalent to the secure device identity put into the subject field of a DevID certificate. These EAT claims can represent all the same fields and values that can be put in a DevID certificate subject. EAT explicitly and carefully defines a variety of useful claims. EAT secures the conveyance of these claims by having them signed on the device by the attestation key when the EAT is generated. EAT also signs the nonce that gives freshness at this time. Since these claims are signed for every EAT generated, they can include things that vary over time like GPS location. DevID secures the device identity fields by having them signed by the manufacturer of the device sign them into a certificate. That certificate is created once during the manufacturing of the device and never changes so the fields cannot change. So in one case the signing of the identity happens on the device and the other in a manufacturing facility, but in both cases the signing of the nonce that proves the binding to the actual device happens on the device. While EAT does not specify how the signing keys, signature process and storage of the identity values should be secured against attack, an EAT implementation may have equal defenses against attack. One reason EAT uses CBOR is because it is simple enough that a basic EAT implementation can be constructed entirely in hardware. This allows EAT to be implemented with the strongest defenses possible.

It is possible to define a way to encode EAT claims in an X.509 certificate. For example, the EAT claims might be mapped to X.509 v3 extensions. It is even possible to stuff a whole CBOR-encoded unsigned EAT token into a X.509 certificate. If that X.509 certificate is an IDevID or LDevID, this becomes another way to use EAT and DevID together. Note that the DevID must still be used with an authentication protocol that has a nonce or equivalent. The EAT here is not being used as the protocol to interact with the rely party.

In terms of permanence, an IDevID is similar to a UEID in that they do not change over the life of the device. They cease to exist only when the device is destroyed. An SUEID is similar to an LDevID. They change on device life-cycle events. describes much of this permanence as resistant to attacks that seek to change the ID. IDevID permanence can be described this way because is oriented around the definition of an implementation with a particular level of defense against attack. EAT is not defined around a particular implementation and must work on a range of devices that have a range of defenses against attack. EAT thus can’t be defined permanence in terms of defense against attack. EAT’s definition of permanence is in terms of operations and device lifecycle.

The following is a list of known changes from the previous drafts. This list is non-authoritative. It is meant to help reviewers see the significant differences.

Added UEID design rationale appendix

This is a fairly large change in the orientation of the document, but no new claims have been added. Separate information and data model using CDDL. Say an EAT is a CWT or JWT Use a map to structure the boot_state and location claims

Clarifications and corrections for OEMID claim Minor spelling and other fixes Add the nonce claim, clarify jti claim

Roll all EUIs back into one UEID type UEIDs can be one of three lengths, 128, 192 and 256. Added appendix justifying UEID design and size. Submods part now includes nested eat tokens so they can be named and there can be more tha one of them Lots of fixes to the CDDL Added security considerations

Split boot_state into secure-boot and debug-disable claims Debug disable is an enumerated type rather than Booleans

Change IMEI-based UEIDs to be encoded as a 14-byte string CDDL cleaned up some more CDDL allows for JWTs and UCCSs CWT format submodules are byte string wrapped Allows for JWT nested in CWT and vice versa Allows UCCS (unsigned CWTs) and JWT unsecured tokens Clarify tag usage when nesting tokens Add section on key inclusion Add hardware version claims Collected CDDL is now filled in. Other CDDL corrections. Rename debug-disable to debug-status; clarify that it is not extensible Security level claim is not extensible Improve specification of location claim and added a location privacy section Add intended use claim

CDDL format issues resolved Corrected reference to Location Privacy section

Added boot-seed claim Rework CBOR interoperability section Added profiles claim and section

Filled in IANA and other sections for possible preassignment of claim keys for well understood claims

Change profile claim to be either a URL or an OID rather than a test string

Add SUEIDs Add appendix comparing IDevID to EAT Added section on use for Evidence and Attestation Results Fill in the key ID and endorsements identificaiton section Remove origination claim as it is replaced by key IDs and endorsements Added manifests and software evidence claims Add string labels non-claim labels for use with JSON (e.g. labels for members of location claim) EAN-13 HW versions are no longer a separate claim. Now they are folded in as a CoSWID version scheme.