Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) object profile for Signed Checklist (RSC)

This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) profile for a general purpose listing of checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) . The objective is to allow an attestation, in the form of a listing of one or more checksums of arbitrary files, to be signed "with resources", and for validation to provide a means to confirm a given Internet Resource Holder produced the RPKI Signed Checklist (RSC). The profile is intended to provide for the signing of a checksum listing with a specific set of Internet Number Resources. Signed Checklists are expected to facilitate inter-domain business use-cases which depend on an ability to verify resource holdership. RPKI-based validation processes are expected to become the industry norm for automated Bring Your Own IP (BYOIP) on-boarding or establishment of physical interconnection between Autonomous Systems. The RSC concept borrows heavily from RTA, Manifests , and OpenBSD's utility. The main difference between RSC and RTA is that the RTA profile allows multiple signers to attest a single digital object through a checksum of its content, while the RSC profile allows a single signer to attest the existence of multiple digital objects. A single signer profile is considered a simplification for both implementers and operators.

RSC follows the Signed Object Template for the RPKI with one exception. Because RSCs MUST NOT be distributed through the global RPKI repository system, the Subject Information Access (SIA) extension MUST be omitted from the RSC's X.509 EE certificate. What constitutes suitable transport for RSC files is deliberately unspecified. It might be a USB stick, a web interface secured with conventional HTTPS, PGP-signed email, a T-shirt printed with a QR code, or a carrier pigeon.

The ContentType for an RSC is defined as rpkiSignedChecklist, and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.48. This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see ).

The content of an RSC indicates that a checklist for arbitrary digital objects has been signed "with resources". An RSC is formally defined as:

The version number of the RpkiSignedChecklist MUST be 0.

The resources contained here are the resources used to mark the attestation, and MUST match the set of resources listed by the EE certificate carried in the CMS certificates field.

The digest algorithm used to create the message digest of the attested digital object. This algorithm MUST be a hashing algorithm defined in .

This field is a sequence of FilenameAndHash objects. There is one FilenameAndHash entry for each arbitrary object referenced on the Signed Checklist. Each FilenameAndHash is an ordered pair of the name of the directory entry containing the digital object and the message digest of the digital object. The filename field is OPTIONAL.

Before a relying party can use an RSC to validate a set of digital objects, the relying party MUST first validate the RSC. To validate an RSC, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional RSC-specific validation steps. The IP Addresses and AS Identifiers extension is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the RSC), and each IP address prefix(es) and/or AS Identifier(s) in the RSC is contained within the set of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP address delegation extension. For each FilenameAndHash entry in the RSC, if a filename field is present, the field's content MUST contain only characters specified in the Portable Filename Character Set as defined in . To validate a set of digital objects against an RSC: The message digest of each referenced digital object, using the digest algorithm specified in the the digestAlgorithm field, MUST be calculated and MUST match the value given in the messageDigest field of the associated FilenameAndHash, for the digital object to be considered valid as against the RSC.

When creating digital objects of a plain-text nature (such as ASCII, UTF-8, HTML, Javascript, XML, etc) it is RECOMMENDED to convert such objects into a lossless compressed form. Distributing plain-text objects within a compression envelope (such as GZIP) might help avoid unexpected canonicalization at intermediate systems (which in turn would lead to checksum verification errors). Validator implementations are expected to treat a checksummed digital object as string of arbitrary single octets. If a filename field is present, but no referenced digital object has a filename that matches the content of that field, a validator implementation SHOULD compare the message digest of each digital object to the value from the messageDigest field of the associated FilenameAndHash, and report matches to the client for further consideration.

Relying parties are hereby warned that the data in a RPKI Signed Checklist is self-asserted. When determining the meaning of any data contained in an RPKI Signed Checklist, Relying Parties MUST NOT make any assuptions about the signer beyond the fact that it had sufficient control of the issuing CA to create the object. These data have not been verified by the Certificate Authority (CA) that issued the CA certificate to the entity that issued the EE certificate used to validate the Signed Checklist. RPKI Certificates are not bound to real world identities, see for an elaboration. Relying Parties can only associate real world entities to Internet Number Resources by additionally consulting an exogenous authority. Signed Checklists are a tool to communicate assertions 'signed with Internet Number Resources', not about any other aspect of the resource holder's business operations such as the identity of the resource holder itself. RSC objects are not distributed through the global RPKI repository system, so whether a given CA is making use of them is not immediately apparent from the state of the repository. However, because RSC objects depend on EE certificates, and because all existing applications for EE certificates involve their publication in the repository, an observer may be able to infer indirectly from the state of the repository that RSC objects are in use. For example, if the CA sets the serial number on a new EE certificate to be one greater than the serial number used for the previous EE certificate, then an observer could infer that RSCs are in use if there is a gap between serial numbers used in published EE certificates. Similarly, if the CA includes an unpublished serial number in a CRL, an observer could infer that an RSC object has been revoked.

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist. According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit". A signer and validator implementation written in Perl based on OpenSSL was provided by Tom Harrison from APNIC. A signer implementation written in Python was developed by Ben Maddison. Example .sig files were created by Job Snijders with the use of OpenSSL. A validator implementation based on OpenBSD rpki-client and LibreSSL was developed by Job Snijders. A validator implementation based on the FORT validator was developed by Alberto Leiva.

The IANA has permanently allocated for this document in the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry:

Decimal Description References --------------------------------------------------------------- 48 id-ct-signedChecklist [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc] Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.

The IANA is requested to register the OID for the RPKI Signed Checklist in the registry created by [RFC6488] as following:

Name OID Specification ------------------------------------------------------------- Signed Checklist 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.48 [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]

The IANA is requested to add an item for the Signed Checklist file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created by as follows:

Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference ----------------------------------------------------------------------- .sig Signed Checklist [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]

The IANA is requested to add an item to the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier" registry as follows:

Decimal Description References ------------------------------------------------------------------------- TBD id-mod-rpkiSignedChecklist-2021 [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]

The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-checklist in the Provisional Standard Media Type registry as follows:

Intended usage: COMMON Restrictions on usage: None Author: Job Snijders Change controller: Job Snijders ]]>

The I in RPKI does not stand for Identity Arrcus & Internet Initiative Japan Vigil Security signify - cryptographically sign and verify files A proof-of-concept for constructing and validating RPKI Signed Checklists (RSCs). APNIC rpkimancer Workonline FORT LACNIC and NIC.MX The Open Group's Base Specifications, Issue 7 IEEE and The Open Group

The authors wish to thank George Michaelson, Tom Harrison, Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Stephen Kent, Matt Lepinski, Rob Austein, Ted Unangst, and Marc Espie for prior art. The authors thank Russ Housley for reviewing the ASN.1 notation and providing suggestions. The authors would like to thank Nimrod Levy, Tim Bruijnzeels, and Alberto Leiva for document review and suggestions.

Alberto pointed out the asID validation also needs to be documented.

Reference the IANA assigned OID Clarify validation rules

Clarify RSC is part of a puzzle, not panacea. Thanks Randy & Russ

Readability improvements Update document category to match the registry allocation policy requirement.

On-the-wire change: the 'Filename' switched from 'required' to 'optional'. Some SIDROPS Working Group participants proposed a checksum itself is the most minimal information required to address digital objects.