HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Tue, 09 Apr 2002 08:05:30 GMT Server: Apache/1.3.20 (Unix) Last-Modified: Fri, 23 Oct 1998 10:57:00 GMT ETag: "323962-1a3ce-363060fc" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 107470 Connection: close Content-Type: text/plain S/MIME Working Group R. Housley Internet Draft SPYRUS expires in six months October 1998 Cryptographic Message Syntax Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Abstract This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax. This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary messages. The Cryptographic Message Syntax is derived from PKCS #7 version 1.5 [RFC 2315]. Wherever possible, backward compatibility is preserved; however, changes were necessary to accommodate attribute certificate transfer and key agreement techniques for key management. This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-smime" mailing list. To join the list, send a message to with the single word "subscribe" in the body of the message. Also, there is a Web site for the mailing list at . Housley [Page 1] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 Acknowledgments This document is the result of contributions from many professionals. I appreciate the hard work of all members of the IETF S/MIME Working Group. I extend a special thanks to Rich Ankney, Tim Dean, Steve Dusse, Paul Hoffman, Scott Hollenbeck, Burt Kaliski, John Pawling, Blake Ramsdell, Jim Schaad, and Dave Solo for their efforts and support. 1 Introduction This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax. This syntax is used to digitally sign or encrypt arbitrary messages. The Cryptographic Message Syntax describes an encapsulation syntax for data protection. It supports digital signatures and encryption. The syntax allows multiple encapsulation, so one encapsulation envelope can be nested inside another. Likewise, one party can digitally sign some previously encapsulated data. It also allows arbitrary attributes, such as signing time, to be signed along with the message content, and provides for other attributes such as countersignatures to be associated with a signature. The Cryptographic Message Syntax can support a variety of architectures for certificate-based key management, such as the one defined by the PKIX working group. The Cryptographic Message Syntax values are generated using ASN.1, using BER-encoding. Values are typically represented as octet strings. While many systems are capable of transmitting arbitrary octet strings reliably, it is well known that many electronic-mail systems are not. This document does not address mechanisms for encoding octet strings for reliable transmission in such environments. 2 General Overview The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is general enough to support many different content types. This document defines one protection content, ContentInfo. ContentInfo encapsulates one or more protection content type. This document defines six content types: data, signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, and authenticated-data. Additional content types can be defined outside this document. An implementation that conforms to this specification must implement the protection content type and the data, signed-data, and Housley [Page 2] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 enveloped-data content types. The other content types may be implemented if desired. As a general design philosophy, content types permit single pass processing using indefinite-length Basic Encoding Rules (BER) encoding. Single-pass operation is especially helpful if content is large, stored on tapes, or is "piped" from another process. Single- pass operation has one significant drawback: it is difficult to perform encode operations using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoding in a single pass since the lengths of the various components may not be known in advance. However, signed attributes within the signed-data content type and authenticated attributes within the authenticated-data content type require DER encoding. Signed attributes and authenticated attributes must be transmitted in DER form to ensure that recipients can validate a content that contains an unrecognized attribute. 3 General Syntax The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) associates a protection content type with a protection content. The syntax shall have ASN.1 type ContentInfo: ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType ContentType, content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType } ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER The fields of ContentInfo have the following meanings: contentType indicates the type of protection content. It is an object identifier; it is a unique string of integers assigned by an authority that defines the content type. content is the protection content. The type of protection content can be determined uniquely by contentType. Protection content types for signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted- data, and authenticated-data are defined in this document. If additional protection content types are defined in other documents, the ASN.1 type defined along with the object identifier should not be a CHOICE type. 4 Data Content Type The following object identifier identifies the data content type: Housley [Page 3] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 } The data content type is intended to refer to arbitrary octet strings, such as ASCII text files; the interpretation is left to the application. Such strings need not have any internal structure (although they could have their own ASN.1 definition or other structure). The data content type is generally encapsulated in the signed-data, enveloped-data, digested-data, encrypted-data, or authenticated-data content type. Object identifiers other than id-data may be used to identify the specific type of encapsulated content, but such usage is outside the scope of this specification. 5 Signed-data Content Type The signed-data content type consists of a content of any type and zero or more signature values. Any number of signers in parallel can sign any type of content. The typical application of the signed-data content type represents one signer's digital signature on content of the data content type. Another typical application disseminates certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). The process by which signed-data is constructed involves the following steps: 1. For each signer, a message digest, or hash value, is computed on the content with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm. If two signers employ the same message digest algorithm, then the message digest need be computed for only one of them. If the signer is signing any information other than the content, the message digest of the content and the other information are digested with the signer's message digest algorithm (see Section 5.4), and the result becomes the "message digest." 2. For each signer, the message digest is digitally signed using the signer's private key. 3. For each signer, the signature value and other signer-specific information are collected into a SignerInfo value, as defined in Section 5.3. Certificates and CRLs for each signer, and those not corresponding to any signer, are collected in this step. 4. The message digest algorithms for all the signers and the SignerInfo values for all the signers are collected together with Housley [Page 4] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 the content into a SignedData value, as defined in Section 5.1. A recipient independently computes the message digest. This message digest and the signer's public key are used to validate the signature value. The signer's public key is referenced by an issuer distinguished name and an issuer-specific serial number that uniquely identify the certificate containing the public key. The signer's certificate may be included in the SignedData certificates field. This section is divided into six parts. The first part describes the top-level type SignedData, the second part describes EncapsulatedContentInfo, the third part describes the per-signer information type SignerInfo, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth parts describe the message digest calculation, signature generation, and signature validation processes, respectively. 5.1 SignedData Type The following object identifier identifies the signed-data content type: id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 } The signed-data content type shall have ASN.1 type SignedData: SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL, crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL, signerInfos SignerInfos } DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo The fields of type SignedData have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. If no attribute certificates are present in the certificates field and the encapsulated content type is id-data, then the value of version shall be 1; however, if attribute certificates are present or the encapsulated content type is other than id-data, then the value of version shall be 3. Housley [Page 5] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 digestAlgorithms is a collection of message digest algorithm identifiers. There may be any number of elements in the collection, including zero. Each element identifies the message digest algorithm, along with any associated parameters, used by one or more signer. The collection is intended to list the message digest algorithms employed by all of the signers, in any order, to facilitate one-pass signature verification. The message digesting process is described in Section 5.4. encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. Details of the EncapsulatedContentInfo type are discussed in section 5.2. certificates is a collection of certificates. It is intended that the set of certificates be sufficient to contain chains from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to all of the signers in the signerInfos field. There may be more certificates than necessary, and there may be certificates sufficient to contain chains from two or more independent top- level certification authorities. There may also be fewer certificates than necessary, if it is expected that recipients have an alternate means of obtaining necessary certificates (e.g., from a previous set of certificates). If no attribute certificates are present in the collection, then the value of version shall be 1; however, if attribute certificates are present, then the value of version shall be 3. crls is a collection of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). It is intended that the set contain information sufficient to determine whether or not the certificates in the certificates field are valid, but such correspondence is not necessary. There may be more CRLs than necessary, and there may also be fewer CRLs than necessary. signerInfos is a collection of per-signer information. There may be any number of elements in the collection, including zero. The details of the SignerInfo type are discussed in section 5.3. The optional omission of the eContent within the EncapsulatedContentInfo field makes it possible to construct "external signatures." In the case of external signatures, the content being signed is absent from the EncapsulatedContentInfo value included in the signed-data content type. If the eContent value within EncapsulatedContentInfo is absent, then the signatureValue is calculated and the eContentType is assigned as though the eContent value was present. In the degenerate case where there are no signers, the Housley [Page 6] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 EncapsulatedContentInfo value being "signed" is irrelevant. In this case, the content type within the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being "signed" should be id-data (as defined in section 4), and the content field of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value should be omitted. 5.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo Type The content is represented in the type EncapsulatedContentInfo: EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { eContentType ContentType, eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER The fields of type EncapsulatedContentInfo have the following meanings: eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies the content type. eContent is the content itself, carried as an octet string. The eContent need not be DER encoded. 5.3 SignerInfo Type Per-signer information is represented in the type SignerInfo: SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL, signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signature SignatureValue, unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL } SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attrValues SET OF AttributeValue } AttributeValue ::= ANY Housley [Page 7] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING The fields of type SignerInfo have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number; it shall be 1. issuerAndSerialNumber specifies the signer's certificate (and thereby the signer's public key) by issuer distinguished name and issuer-specific serial number. digestAlgorithm identifies the message digest algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the signer. The message digest is computed over the encapsulated content and signed attributes, if present. The message digest algorithm should be among those listed in the digestAlgorithms field of the associated SignerData. The message digesting process is described in Section 5.4. signedAttributes is a collection of attributes that are signed. The field is optional, but it must be present if the content type of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed is not id-data. Each SignedAttribute in the SET must be DER encoded. Useful attribute types, such as signing time, are defined in Section 11. If the field is present, it must contain, at a minimum, the following two attributes: A content-type attribute having as its value the content type of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed. Section 11.1 defines the content-type attribute. A message-digest attribute, having as its value the message digest of the content. Section 11.2 defines the message-digest attribute. signatureAlgorithm identifies the signature algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the signer to generate the digital signature. signature is the result of digital signature generation, using the message digest and the signer's private key. unsignedAttributes is a collection of attributes that are not signed. The field is optional. Useful attribute types, such as countersignatures, are defined in Section 11. The fields of type SignedAttribute and UnsignedAttribute have the following meanings: attrType indicates the type of attribute. It is an object Housley [Page 8] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 identifier. attrValues is a set of values that comprise the attribute. The type of each value in the set can be determined uniquely by attrType. 5.4 Message Digest Calculation Process The message digest calculation process computes a message digest on either the content being signed or the content together with the signed attributes. In either case, the initial input to the message digest calculation process is the "value" of the encapsulated content being signed. Specifically, the initial input is the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING to which the signing process is applied. Only the octets comprising the value of the eContent OCTET STRING are input to the message digest algorithm, not the tag or the length octets. The result of the message digest calculation process depends on whether the signedAttributes field is present. When the field is absent, the result is just the message digest of the content as described above. When the field is present, however, the result is the message digest of the complete DER encoding of the SignedAttributes value contained in the signedAttributes field. Since the SignedAttributes value, when present, must contain the content type and the content message digest attributes, those values are indirectly included in the result. A separate encoding of the signedAttributes field is performed for message digest calculation. The IMPLICIT [0] tag in the signedAttributes field is not used for the DER encoding, rather an EXPLICIT SET OF tag is used. That is, the DER encoding of the SET OF tag, rather than of the IMPLICIT [0] tag, is to be included in the message digest calculation along with the length and content octets of the SignedAttributes value. When the signedAttributes field is absent, then only the octets comprising the value of the signedData encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING (e.g., the contents of a file) are input to the message digest calculation. This has the advantage that the length of the content being signed need not be known in advance of the signature generation process. Although the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING tag and length octets are not included in the message digest calculation, they are still protected by other means. The length octets are protected by the nature of the message digest algorithm since it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct messages of any length that have the same message digest. Housley [Page 9] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 5.5 Message Signature Generation Process The input to the signature generation process includes the result of the message digest calculation process and the signer's private key. The details of the signature generation depend on the signature algorithm employed. The object identifier, along with any parameters, that specifies the signature algorithm employed by the signer is carried in the signatureAlgorithm field. The signature value generated by the signer is encoded as an OCTET STRING and carried in the signature field. 5.6 Message Signature Validation Process The input to the signature validation process includes the result of the message digest calculation process and the signer's public key. The details of the signature validation depend on the signature algorithm employed. The recipient may not rely on any message digest values computed by the originator. If the signedData signerInfo includes signedAttributes, then the content message digest must be calculated as described in section 5.4. For the signature to be valid, the message digest value calculated by the recipient must be the same as the value of the messageDigest attribute included in the signedAttributes of the signedData signerInfo. 6 Enveloped-data Content Type The enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content of any type and encrypted content-encryption keys for one or more recipients. The combination of the encrypted content and one encrypted content-encryption key for a recipient is a "digital envelope" for that recipient. Any type of content can be enveloped for an arbitrary number of recipients using any of the three key management techniques for each recipient. The typical application of the enveloped-data content type will represent one or more recipients' digital envelopes on content of the data or signed-data content types. Enveloped-data is constructed by the following steps: 1. A content-encryption key for a particular content-encryption algorithm is generated at random. 2. The content-encryption key is encrypted for each recipient. The details of this encryption depend on the key management algorithm used, but three general techniques are supported: Housley [Page 10] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 key transport: the content-encryption key is encrypted in the recipient's public key; key agreement: the recipient's public key and the sender's private key are used to generate a pairwise symmetric key, then the content-encryption key is encrypted in the pairwise symmetric key; and mail list keys: the content-encryption key is encrypted in a previously distributed symmetric key. 3. For each recipient, the encrypted content-encryption key and other recipient-specific information are collected into a RecipientInfo value, defined in Section 6.2. 4. The content is encrypted with the content-encryption key. Content encryption may require that the content be padded to a multiple of some block size; see Section 6.3. 5. The RecipientInfo values for all the recipients are collected together with the encrypted content to form an EnvelopedData value as defined in Section 6.1. A recipient opens the digital envelope by decrypting one of the encrypted content-encryption keys and then decrypting the encrypted content with the recovered content-encryption key. This section is divided into four parts. The first part describes the top-level type EnvelopedData, the second part describes the per- recipient information type RecipientInfo, and the third and fourth parts describe the content-encryption and key-encryption processes. 6.1 EnvelopedData Type The following object identifier identifies the enveloped-data content type: id-envelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 3 } The enveloped-data content type shall have ASN.1 type EnvelopedData: EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL, recipientInfos RecipientInfos, encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo } Housley [Page 11] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 OriginatorInfo ::= SEQUENCE { certs [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL, crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL } RecipientInfos ::= SET OF RecipientInfo EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType ContentType, contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL } EncryptedContent ::= OCTET STRING The fields of type EnvelopedData have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. If originatorInfo is present, then version shall be 2. If any of the RecipientInfo structures included have a version other than 0, then the version shall be 2. If originatorInfo is absent and all of the RecipientInfo structures are version 0, then version shall be 0. originatorInfo optionally provides information about the originator. It is present only if required by the key management algorithm. It may contain certificates and CRLs: certs is a collection of certificates. certs may contain originator certificates associated with several different key management algorithms. certs may also contain attribute certificates associated with the originator. The certificates contained in certs are intended to be sufficient to make chains from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to all recipients. However, certs may contain more certificates than necessary, and there may be certificates sufficient to make chains from two or more independent top- level certification authorities. Alternatively, certs may contain fewer certificates than necessary, if it is expected that recipients have an alternate means of obtaining necessary certificates (e.g., from a previous set of certificates). crls is a collection of CRLs. It is intended that the set contain information sufficient to determine whether or not the certificates in the certs field are valid, but such correspondence is not necessary. There may be more CRLs than necessary, and there may also be fewer CRLs than necessary. recipientInfos is a collection of per-recipient information. There must be at least one element in the collection. Housley [Page 12] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 encryptedContentInfo is the encrypted content information. The fields of type EncryptedContentInfo have the following meanings: contentType indicates the type of content. contentEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the content-encryption algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt the content. The content-encryption process is described in Section 6.3. The same content-encryption algorithm and content-encryption key is used for all recipients. encryptedContent is the result of encrypting the content. The field is optional, and if the field is not present, its intended value must be supplied by other means. The recipientInfos field comes before the encryptedContentInfo field so that an EnvelopedData value may be processed in a single pass. 6.2 RecipientInfo Type Per-recipient information is represented in the type RecipientInfo. RecipientInfo has a different format for the three key management techniques that are supported: key transport, key agreement, and previously distributed mail list keys. Any of the three key management techniques can be used for each recipient of the same encrypted content. In all cases, the content-encryption key is transferred to one or more recipient in encrypted form. RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE { ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo, kari [1] KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, mlri [2] MailListRecipientInfo } EncryptedKey ::= OCTET STRING 6.2.1 KeyTransRecipientInfo Type Per-recipient information using key transport is represented in the type KeyTransRecipientInfo. Each instance of KeyTransRecipientInfo transfers the content-encryption key to one recipient. KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0 or 2 rid RecipientIdentifier, keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedKey EncryptedKey } Housley [Page 13] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 RecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier } The fields of type KeyTransRecipientInfo have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. If the RecipientIdentifier is the CHOICE issuerAndSerialNumber, then the version shall be 0. If the RecipientIdentifier is subjectKeyIdentifier, then the version shall be 2. rid specifies the recipient's certificate or key that was used by the sender to protect the content-encryption key. The RecipientIdentifier provides two alternatives for specifying the recipient's certificate, and thereby the recipient's public key. The recipient's certificate must contain a key transport public key. The content-encryption key is encrypted with the recipient's public key. The issuerAndSerialNumber alternative identifies the recipient's certificate by the issuer's distinguished name and the certificate serial number; the subjectKeyIdentifier identifies the recipient's certificate by the X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension value. keyEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the key-encryption algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt the content- encryption key for the recipient. The key-encryption process is described in Section 6.4. encryptedKey is the result of encrypting the content-encryption key for the recipient. 6.2.2 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo Type Recipient information using key agreement is represented in the type KeyAgreeRecipientInfo. Each instance of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo will transfer the content-encryption key to one or more recipient. KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, -- always set to 3 originator [0] EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, ukm [1] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL, keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, recipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys } OriginatorIdentifierOrKey ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier, originatorKey [1] OriginatorPublicKey } Housley [Page 14] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 OriginatorPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, publicKey BIT STRING } RecipientEncryptedKeys ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientEncryptedKey RecipientEncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE { rid KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, encryptedKey EncryptedKey } KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, rKeyId [0] IMPLICIT RecipientKeyIdentifier } RecipientKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier, date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL } SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING The fields of type KeyAgreeRecipientInfo have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. It shall always be 3. originator is a CHOICE with three alternatives specifying the sender's key agreement public key. The sender uses the corresponding private key and the recipient's public key to generate a pairwise key. The content-encryption key is encrypted in the pairwise key. The issuerAndSerialNumber alternative identifies the sender's certificate, and thereby the sender's public key, by the issuer's distinguished name and the certificate serial number. The subjectKeyIdentifier alternative identifies the sender's certificate, and thereby the sender's public key, by the X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension value. The originatorKey alternative includes the algorithm identifier and sender's key agreement public key. Permitting originator anonymity since the public key is not certified. ukm is optional. With some key agreement algorithms, the sender provides a User Keying Material (UKM) to ensure that a different key is generated each time the same two parties generate a pairwise key. keyEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the key-encryption algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt the content- encryption key in the key-encryption key. The key-encryption process is described in Section 6.4. Housley [Page 15] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 recipientEncryptedKeys includes a recipient identifier and the encrypted key for one or more recipients. The KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier is a CHOICE with two alternatives specifying the recipient's certificate, and thereby the recipient's public key, that was used by the sender to generate a pairwise key. The recipient's certificate must contain a key agreement public key. The content-encryption key is encrypted in the pairwise key. The issuerAndSerialNumber alternative identifies the recipient's certificate by the issuer's distinguished name and the certificate serial number; the RecipientKeyIdentifier is described below. The encryptedKey is the result of encrypting the content-encryption key in the pairwise key generated using the key agreement algorithm. The fields of type RecipientKeyIdentifier have the following meanings: subjectKeyIdentifier identifies the recipient's certificate by the X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension value. date is optional. When present, the date specifies which of the recipient's previously distributed UKMs was used by the sender. other is optional. When present, this field contains additional information used by the recipient to locate the public keying material used by the sender. 6.2.3 MailListRecipientInfo Type Recipient information using previously distributed symmetric keys is represented in the type MailListRecipientInfo. Each instance of MailListRecipientInfo will transfer the content-encryption key to one or more recipients who have the previously distributed key-encryption key. MailListRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, -- always set to 4 mlkid MailListKeyIdentifier, keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedKey EncryptedKey } MailListKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { kekIdentifier OCTET STRING, date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL } The fields of type MailListRecipientInfo have the following meanings: Housley [Page 16] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 version is the syntax version number. It shall always be 4. mlkid specifies a symmetric key encryption key that was previously distributed to the sender and one or more recipients. keyEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the key-encryption algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt the content- encryption key in the key-encryption key. The key-encryption process is described in Section 6.4. encryptedKey is the result of encrypting the content-encryption key in the key-encryption key. The fields of type MailListKeyIdentifier have the following meanings: kekIdentifier identifies the key-encryption key that was previously distributed to the sender and one or more recipients. date is optional. When present, the date specifies a single key- encryption key from a set that was previously distributed. other is optional. When present, this field contains additional information used by the recipient to determine the key-encryption key used by the sender. 6.3 Content-encryption Process The content-encryption key for the desired content-encryption algorithm is randomly generated. The data to be protected is padded as described below, then the padded data is encrypted using the content-encryption key. The encryption operation maps an arbitrary string of octets (the data) to another string of octets (the ciphertext) under control of a content-encryption key. The encrypted data is included in the envelopedData encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. The input to the content-encryption process is the "value" of the content being enveloped. Only the value octets of the envelopedData encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING are encrypted; the OCTET STRING tag and length octets are not encrypted. Some content-encryption algorithms assume the input length is a multiple of k octets, where k is greater than one. For such algorithms, the input shall be padded at the trailing end with k-(l mod k) octets all having value k-(l mod k), where l is the length of the input. In other words, the input is padded at the trailing end with one of the following strings: Housley [Page 17] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 01 -- if l mod k = k-1 02 02 -- if l mod k = k-2 . . . k k ... k k -- if l mod k = 0 The padding can be removed unambiguously since all input is padded, including input values that are already a multiple of the block size, and no padding string is a suffix of another. This padding method is well defined if and only if k is less than 256. 6.4 Key-encryption Process The input to the key-encryption process -- the value supplied to the recipient's key-encryption algorithm --is just the "value" of the content-encryption key. Any of the three key management techniques can be used for each recipient of the same encrypted content. 7 Digested-data Content Type The digested-data content type consists of content of any type and a message digest of the content. Typically, the digested-data content type is used to provide content integrity, and the result generally becomes an input to the enveloped-data content type. The following steps construct digested-data: 1. A message digest is computed on the content with a message- digest algorithm. 2. The message-digest algorithm and the message digest are collected together with the content into a DigestedData value. A recipient verifies the message digest by comparing the message digest to an independently computed message digest. The following object identifier identifies the digested-data content type: id-digestedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 5 } The digested-data content type shall have ASN.1 type DigestedData: Housley [Page 18] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, digest Digest } Digest ::= OCTET STRING The fields of type DigestedData have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. If the encapsulated content type is id-data, then the value of version shall be 0; however, if the encapsulated content type is other than id-data, then the value of version shall be 2. digestAlgorithm identifies the message digest algorithm, and any associated parameters, under which the content is digested. The message-digesting process is the same as in Section 5.4 in the case when there are no signed attributes. encapContentInfo is the content that is digested, as defined in section 5.2. digest is the result of the message-digesting process. The ordering of the digestAlgorithm field, the encapContentInfo field, and the digest field makes it possible to process a DigestedData value in a single pass. 8 Encrypted-data Content Type The encrypted-data content type consists of encrypted content of any type. Unlike the enveloped-data content type, the encrypted-data content type has neither recipients nor encrypted content-encryption keys. Keys must be managed by other means. The typical application of the encrypted-data content type will be to encrypt the content of the data content type for local storage, perhaps where the encryption key is a password. The following object identifier identifies the encrypted-data content type: id-encryptedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 6 } The encrypted-data content type shall have ASN.1 type EncryptedData: Housley [Page 19] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo } The fields of type EncryptedData have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. It shall be 0. encryptedContentInfo is the encrypted content information, as defined in Section 6.1. 9 Authenticated-data Content Type The authenticated-data content type consists of content of any type, a message authentication code (MAC), and encrypted authentication keys for one or more recipients. The combination of the MAC and one encrypted authentication key for a recipient is necessary for that recipient to validate the integrity of the content. Any type of content can be integrity protected for an arbitrary number of recipients. The process by which authenticated-data is constructed involves the following steps: 1. A message-authentication key for a particular message- authentication algorithm is generated at random. 2. The message-authentication key is encrypted for each recipient. The details of this encryption depend on the key management algorithm used. 3. For each recipient, the encrypted message-authentication key and other recipient-specific information are collected into a RecipientInfo value, defined in Section 6.2. 4. Using the message-authentication key, the originator computes a MAC value on the content. If the originator is authenticating any information in addition to the content (see Section 9.2), the MAC value of the content and the other information are generated using the same message authentication code algorithm and key, and the result becomes the "MAC value." 9.1 AuthenticatedData Type The following object identifier identifies the authenticated-data content type: id-ct-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) Housley [Page 20] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 2 } The authenticated-data content type shall have ASN.1 type AuthenticatedData: AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL, recipientInfos RecipientInfos, macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, authenticatedAttributes [1] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL, mac MessageAuthenticationCode, unauthenticatedAttributes [2] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL } AuthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute UnauthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute MessageAuthenticationCode ::= OCTET STRING The fields of type AuthenticatedData have the following meanings: version is the syntax version number. It shall be 0. originatorInfo optionally provides information about the originator. It is present only if required by the key management algorithm. It may contain certificates, attribute certificates, and CRLs, as defined in Section 6.1. recipientInfos is a collection of per-recipient information, as defined in Section 6.1. There must be at least one element in the collection. macAlgorithm is a message authentication code algorithm identifier. It identifies the message authentication code algorithm, along with any associated parameters, used by the originator. Placement of the macAlgorithm field facilitates one- pass processing by the recipient. encapContentInfo is the content that is authenticated, as defined in section 5.2. authenticatedAttributes is a collection of attributes that are authenticated. The field is optional, but it must be present if the content type of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being authenticated is not id-data. Each AuthenticatedAttribute in the Housley [Page 21] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 SET must be DER encoded. Useful attribute types are defined in Section 11. If the field is present, it must contain, at a minimum, the following two attributes: A content-type attribute having as its value the content type of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed. Section 11.1 defines the content-type attribute. A mac-value attribute, having as its value the message authentication code of the content. Section 11.5 defines the mac-value attribute. mac is the message authentication code. unauthenticatedAttributes is a collection of attributes that are not authenticated. The field is optional. To date, no attributes have been defined for use as unauthenticated attributes, but other useful attribute types are defined in Section 11. 9.2 MAC Generation The MAC calculation process computes a message authentication code (MAC) on either the message being authenticated or the message being authenticated together with the originator's authenticated attributes. If authenticatedAttributes field is absent, the input to the MAC calculation process is the value of the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING. Only the octets comprising the value of the eContent OCTET STRING are input to the MAC algorithm; the tag and the length octets are omitted. This has the advantage that the length of the content being authenticated need not be known in advance of the MAC generation process. Although the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING tag and length octets are not included in the MAC calculation, they are still protected by other means. The length octets are protected by the nature of the MAC algorithm since it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct messages of any length that have the same MAC. If authenticatedAttributes field is present, the content-type attribute (as described in Section 11.1) and the mac-value attribute (as described in section 11.5) must be included, and the input to the MAC calculation process is the DER encoding of authenticatedAttributes. A separate encoding of the authenticatedAttributes field is performed for MAC calculation. The IMPLICIT [0] tag in the authenticatedAttributes field is not used for Housley [Page 22] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 the DER encoding, rather an EXPLICIT SET OF tag is used. The DER encoding of the SET OF tag, rather than of the IMPLICIT [0] tag, is to be included in the MAC calculation along with the length and content octets of the authenticatedAttributes value. The fact that the MAC is computed on part of a DER encoding does not mean that DER is the required method of representing that part for data transfer. Indeed, it is expected that some implementations will store objects in forms other than their DER encodings, but such practices do not affect MAC computation. The input to the MAC calculation process includes the MAC input data, defined above, and an authentication key conveyed in a recipientInfo structure. The details of MAC calculation depend on the MAC algorithm employed (e.g., DES-MAC and HMAC). The object identifier, along with any parameters, that specifies the MAC algorithm employed by the originator is carried in the macAlgorithm field. The MAC value generated by the originator is encoded as an OCTET STRING and carried in the mac field. 9.3 MAC Validation The input to the MAC validation process includes the input data (determined based on the presence or absence of authenticated attributes, as defined in 9.2), and the authentication key conveyed in recipientInfo. The details of the MAC validation process depend on the MAC algorithm employed. The recipient may not rely on any MAC values computed by the originator. If the originator includes authenticated attributes, then the content of the authenticatedAttributes must be authenticated as described in section 9.2. For the MAC to be valid, the message MAC value calculated by the recipient must be the same as the value of the macValue attribute included in the authenticatedAttributes. Likewise, the attribute MAC value calculated by the recipient must be the same as the value of the mac field included in the authenticatedData. 10 Useful Types This section is divided into two parts. The first part defines algorithm identifiers, and the second part defines other useful types. Housley [Page 23] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 10.1 Algorithm Identifier Types All of the algorithm identifiers have the same type: AlgorithmIdentifier. The definition of AlgorithmIdentifier is imported from X.509. There are many alternatives for each type of algorithm listed. For each of these five types, Section 12 lists the algorithms that must be included in a CMS implementation. 10.1.1 DigestAlgorithmIdentifier The DigestAlgorithmIdentifier type identifies a message-digest algorithm. Examples include SHA-1, MD2, and MD5. A message-digest algorithm maps an octet string (the message) to another octet string (the message digest). DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 10.1.2 SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier The SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier type identifies a signature algorithm. Examples include DSS and RSA. A signature algorithm supports signature generation and verification operations. The signature generation operation uses the message digest and the signer's private key to generate a signature value. The signature verification operation uses the message digest and the signer's public key to determine whether or not a signature value is valid. Context determines which operation is intended. SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 10.1.3 KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier The KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier type identifies a key-encryption algorithm used to encrypt a content-encryption key. The encryption operation maps an octet string (the key) to another octet string (the encrypted key) under control of a key-encryption key. The decryption operation is the inverse of the encryption operation. Context determines which operation is intended. The details of encryption and decryption depend on the key management algorithm used. Key transport, key agreement, and previously distributed symmetric key-encrypting keys are supported. KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier Housley [Page 24] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 10.1.4 ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier The ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier type identifies a content- encryption algorithm. Examples include Triple-DES and RC2. A content-encryption algorithm supports encryption and decryption operations. The encryption operation maps an octet string (the message) to another octet string (the ciphertext) under control of a content-encryption key. The decryption operation is the inverse of the encryption operation. Context determines which operation is intended. ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 10.1.5 MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm The MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm type identifies a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm. Examples include DES-MAC and HMAC. A MAC algorithm supports generation and verification operations. The MAC generation and verification operations use the same symmetric key. Context determines which operation is intended. MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 10.2 Other Useful Types This section defines types that are used other places in the document. The types are not listed in any particular order. 10.2.1 CertificateRevocationLists The CertificateRevocationLists type gives a set of certificate revocation lists (CRLs). It is intended that the set contain information sufficient to determine whether the certificates and attribute certificates with which the set is associated are revoked or not. However, there may be more CRLs than necessary or there may be fewer CRLs than necessary. The CertificateList may contain a CRL, an Authority Revocation List (ARL), a Delta Revocation List, or an Attribute Certificate Revocation List. All of these lists share a common syntax. The definition of CertificateList is imported from X.509. CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList Housley [Page 25] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 10.2.2 CertificateChoices The CertificateChoices type gives either a PKCS #6 extended certificate [PKCS #6], an X.509 certificate, or an X.509 attribute certificate. The PKCS #6 extended certificate is obsolete. It is included for backward compatibility, and its use should be avoided. The definitions of Certificate and AttributeCertificate are imported from X.509. CertificateChoices ::= CHOICE { certificate Certificate, -- See X.509 extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate, -- Obsolete attrCert [1] IMPLICIT AttributeCertificate } -- See X.509 and X9.57 10.2.3 CertificateSet The CertificateSet type provides a set of certificates. It is intended that the set be sufficient to contain chains from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to all of the sender certificates with which the set is associated. However, there may be more certificates than necessary, or there may be fewer than necessary. The precise meaning of a "chain" is outside the scope of this document. Some applications may impose upper limits on the length of a chain; others may enforce certain relationships between the subjects and issuers of certificates within a chain. CertificateSet ::= SET OF CertificateChoices 10.2.4 IssuerAndSerialNumber The IssuerAndSerialNumber type identifies a certificate, and thereby an entity and a public key, by the distinguished name of the certificate issuer and an issuer-specific certificate serial number. The definition of Name is imported from X.501, and the definition of CertificateSerialNumber is imported from X.509. IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { issuer Name, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER Housley [Page 26] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 10.2.5 CMSVersion The Version type gives a syntax version number, for compatibility with future revisions of this document. CMSVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0), v1(1), v2(2), v3(3), v4(4) } 10.2.6 UserKeyingMaterial The UserKeyingMaterial type gives a syntax user keying material (UKM). Some key agreement algorithms require UKMs to ensure that a different key is generated each time the same two parties generate a pairwise key. The sender provides a UKM for use with a specific key agreement algorithm. UserKeyingMaterial ::= OCTET STRING 10.2.7 OtherKeyAttribute The OtherKeyAttribute type gives a syntax for the inclusion of other key attributes that permit the recipient to select the key used by the sender. The attribute object identifier must be registered along with the syntax of the attribute itself. Use of this structure should be avoided since it may impede interoperability. OtherKeyAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { keyAttrId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, keyAttr ANY DEFINED BY keyAttrId OPTIONAL } 11 Useful Attributes This section defines attributes that may used with signed-data or authenticated-data. Some of the attributes defined in this section were originally defined in PKCS #9 [PKCS #9], others were not previously defined. The attributes are not listed in any particular order. Additional attributes are defined in many places, notably the S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification [MSG] and the Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME [ESS], which also include recommendations on the placement of these attributes. 11.1 Content Type The content-type attribute type specifies the content type of the ContentInfo value being signed in signed-data. The content-type attribute type is required if there are any authenticated attributes present. Housley [Page 27] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 The content-type attribute must be a signed attribute or an authenticated attribute; it cannot be an unsigned attribute or unauthenticated attribute. The following object identifier identifies the content-type attribute: id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 3 } Content-type attribute values have ASN.1 type ContentType: ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER A content-type attribute must have a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There must not be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present. The SignedAttributes and AuthAttributes syntaxes are each defined as a SET OF Attributes. The SignedAttributes in a signerInfo must not include multiple instances of the content-type attribute. Similarly, the AuthAttributes in an AuthenticatedData must not include multiple instances of the content-type attribute. 11.2 Message Digest The message-digest attribute type specifies the message digest of the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING being signed in signed-data (see section 5.4), where the message digest is computed using the signer's message digest algorithm. Within signed-data, the message-digest signed attribute type is required if there are any attributes present. The message-digest attribute must be a signed attribute; it cannot be an unsigned attribute, an authenticated attribute, or unauthenticated attribute. The following object identifier identifies the message-digest attribute: id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 4 } Message-digest attribute values have ASN.1 type MessageDigest: MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING Housley [Page 28] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 A message-digest attribute must have a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There must not be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present. The SignedAttributes syntax is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The SignedAttributes in a signerInfo must not include multiple instances of the message-digest attribute. 11.3 Signing Time The signing-time attribute type specifies the time at which the signer (purportedly) performed the signing process. The signing-time attribute type is intended for use in signed-data. The signing-time attribute may be a signed attribute; it cannot be an unsigned attribute, an authenticated attribute, or an unauthenticated attribute. The following object identifier identifies the signing-time attribute: id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 } Signing-time attribute values have ASN.1 type SigningTime: SigningTime ::= Time Time ::= CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalizedTime GeneralizedTime } Note: The definition of Time matches the one specified in the 1997 version of X.509. Dates through the year 2049 must be encoded as UTCTime, and dates in the year 2050 or later must be encoded as GeneralizedTime. UTCTime values must be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and must include seconds (i.e., times are YYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. Midnight (GMT) must be represented as "YYMMDD000000Z". Century information is implicit, and the century must be determined as follows: Where YY is greater than or equal to 50, the year shall be interpreted as 19YY; and Where YY is less than 50, the year shall be interpreted as 20YY. Housley [Page 29] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 GeneralizedTime values shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu) and must include seconds (i.e., times are YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ), even where the number of seconds is zero. GeneralizedTime values must not include fractional seconds. A signing-time attribute must have a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There must not be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present. The SignedAttributes syntax is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The SignedAttributes in a signerInfo must not include multiple instances of the signing-time attribute. No requirement is imposed concerning the correctness of the signing time, and acceptance of a purported signing time is a matter of a recipient's discretion. It is expected, however, that some signers, such as time-stamp servers, will be trusted implicitly. 11.4 Countersignature The countersignature attribute type specifies one or more signatures on the contents octets of the DER encoding of the signatureValue field of a SignerInfo value in signed-data. Thus, the countersignature attribute type countersigns (signs in serial) another signature. The countersignature attribute must be an unsigned attribute; it cannot be a signed attribute, an authenticated attribute, or an unauthenticated attribute. The following object identifier identifies the countersignature attribute: id-countersignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 6 } Countersignature attribute values have ASN.1 type Countersignature: Countersignature ::= SignerInfo Countersignature values have the same meaning as SignerInfo values for ordinary signatures, except that: 1. The signedAttributes field must contain a message-digest attribute if it contains any other attributes, but need not contain a content-type attribute, as there is no content type for countersignatures. Housley [Page 30] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 2. The input to the message-digesting process is the contents octets of the DER encoding of the signatureValue field of the SignerInfo value with which the attribute is associated. A countersignature attribute can have multiple attribute values. The syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue, and there must be one or more instances of AttributeValue present. The UnsignedAttributes syntax is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The UnsignedAttributes in a signerInfo may include multiple instances of the countersignature attribute. A countersignature, since it has type SignerInfo, can itself contain a countersignature attribute. Thus it is possible to construct arbitrarily long series of countersignatures. 11.5 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Value The MAC-value attribute type specifies the MAC of the encapContentInfo eContent OCTET STRING being authenticated in authenticated-data (see section 9), where the MAC value is computed using the originator's MAC algorithm and the data-authentication key. Within authenticated-data, the MAC-value attribute type is required if there are any authenticated attributes present. The MAC-value attribute must be a authenticated attribute; it cannot be an signed attribute, an unsigned attribute, or unauthenticated attribute. The following object identifier identifies the MAC-value attribute: id-macValue OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 8 } MAC-value attribute values have ASN.1 type MACValue: MACValue ::= OCTET STRING A MAC-value attribute must have a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There must not be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present. The AuthAttributes syntax is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The AuthAttributes in an AuthenticatedData must not include multiple instances of the MAC-value attribute. Housley [Page 31] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 12 Supported Algorithms This section lists the algorithms that must be implemented. Additional algorithms that should be implemented are also included. 12.1 Digest Algorithms CMS implementations must include SHA-1. CMS implementations may include MD5. Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, and the DigestedData digestAlgorithm field. Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field, and digest values are located in the Message Digest authenticated attribute. In addition, digest values are input to signature algorithms. 12.1.1 SHA-1 The SHA-1 digest algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 180-1 [SHA1]. The algorithm identifier for SHA-1 is: sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field is optional. If present, the parameters field must contain an ASN.1 NULL. Implementations should accept SHA-1 AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters as well as NULL parameters. Implementations should generate SHA-1 AlgorithmIdentifiers with NULL parameters. 12.1.2 MD5 The MD5 digest algorithm is defined in RFC 1321 [RFC 1321]. The algorithm identifier for MD5 is: md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be present, and the parameters field must contain NULL. Implementations may accept the MD5 AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters as well as NULL parameters. Housley [Page 32] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 12.2 Signature Algorithms CMS implementations must include DSA. CMS implementations may include RSA. Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field. Also, signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of countersignature attributes. Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field. Also, signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of countersignature attributes. 12.2.1 DSA The DSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186 [DSS]. DSA is always used with the SHA-1 message digest algorithm. The algorithm identifier for DSA is: id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57 (10040) x9cm(4) 3 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must not be present. 12.2.2 RSA The RSA signature algorithm is defined in RFC 2313 [RFC 2313]. RFC 2313 specifies the use of the RSA signature algorithm with the MD5 message digest algorithm. That definition is extended here to include support for the SHA-1 message digest algorithm as well. The algorithm identifier for RSA is: rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be present, and the parameters field must contain NULL. This specification modifies RFC 2313 to include SHA-1 as an additional message digest algorithm. Section 10.1.2 of RFC 2313 is modified to list SHA-1 in the bullet item about digestAlgorithm. The following object identifier is added to the list in section 10.1.2 of RFC 2313: sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 } Housley [Page 33] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 12.3 Key Management Algorithms CMS accommodates three general key management techniques: key agreement, key transport, and mail list keys. 12.3.1 Key Agreement Algorithms CMS implementations must include key agreement using X9.42 Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman. CMS implementations must include key agreement of Triple-DES pairwise key-encryption keys and Triple- DES wrapping Triple-DES content-encryption keys. CMS implementations should include key agreement of RC2 pairwise key-encryption keys and RC2 wrapping RC2 content-encryption keys. The key wrap algorithm is described in section 12.6. Key agreement algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo recipientEncryptedKeys encryptedKey field. 12.3.1.1 X9.42 Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman with Triple-DES Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman key agreement is defined in RFC TBD1 [RFC TBD1]. When using Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman with Triple- DES, the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used as follows: version must be 3. originator must be the originatorKey alternative. The originatorKey algorithm fields must contain the dh-public-number object identifier with absent parameters. The originatorKey publicKey field must contain the sender's ephemeral public key. The dh-public-number object identifier is: dh-public-number OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } ukm must be absent. keyEncryptionAlgorithm must be the id-alg-ESDHwith3DES algorithm identifier with absent parameters. The id-alg-ESDHwith3DES algorithm identifier is: id-alg-ESDHwith3DES OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 1 } Housley [Page 34] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier must contain either the issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey must contain the content- encryption Triple-DES key wrapped in the pairwise key agreement Triple-DES key. 12.3.1.1 X9.42 Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman with RC2 Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman key agreement is defined in RFC TBD1 [RFC TBD1]. When using Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman with RC2, the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used as follows: version must be 3. originator must be the originatorKey alternative. The originatorKey algorithm fields must contain the dh-public-number object identifier with absent parameters. The originatorKey publicKey field must contain the sender's ephemeral public key. The dh-public-number object identifier is: dh-public-number OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } ukm must be absent. keyEncryptionAlgorithm must be the id-alg-ESDHwithRC2 algorithm identifier with absent parameters. The id-alg-ESDHwithRC2 algorithm identifier is: id-alg-ESDHwithRC2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 2 } recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier must contain either the issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static public key. RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey must contain the content- encryption RC2 key wrapped in the pairwise key agreement RC2 key. Housley [Page 35] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 12.3.2 Key Transport Algorithms CMS implementations should include key transport using RSA. RSA implementations must include key transport of Triple-DES content- encryption keys. RSA implementations should include key transport of RC2 content-encryption keys. Key transport algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyTransRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. Key transport encrypted content-encryption keys are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyTransRecipientInfo EncryptedKey field. 12.3.2.1 RSA The RSA key transport algorithm is defined in RFC 2313 [RFC 2313]. RFC 2313 specifies the transport of content-encryption keys, including Triple-DES and RC2 keys. The algorithm identifier for RSA is: rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be present, and the parameters field must contain NULL. 12.3.3 Mail List Key Algorithms CMS implementations may include mail list key management. Mail list key management implementations must include Triple-DES mail list keys wrapping Triple-DES content-encryption keys. Mail list key management implementations should include key transport of RC2 content-encryption keys. The key wrap algorithm is specified in section 12.6. Key mail list key algorithm identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo MailListRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm field. Wrapped content-encryption keys are located in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo MailListRecipientInfo encryptedKey field. 12.3.3.1 Triple-DES Key Wrap Mail list key encryption with Triple-DES has the algorithm identifier: id-alg-3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) Housley [Page 36] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 3 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field must be NULL. Distribution of the Triple-DES mail list keying material used to encrypt the content-encryption key is out of the scope of this document. 12.3.3.2 RC2 Key Wrap Mail list key encryption with RC2 has the algorithm identifier: id-alg-RC2wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) 4 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameter field must be RC2wrapParameter: RC2wrapParameter ::= RC2ParameterVersion RC2ParameterVersion ::= INTEGER The RC2 effective-key-bits (key size) greater than 32 and less than 256 is encoded in the RC2ParameterVersion. For the effective-key- bits of 40, 64, and 128, the rc2ParameterVersion values are 160, 120, and 58 respectively. These values are not simply the RC2 key length. Note that the value 160 must be encoded as two octets (00 A0), because the one octet (A0) encoding represents a negative number. Distribution of the RC2 mail list keying material used to encrypt the content-encryption key is out of the scope of this document. 12.4 Content Encryption Algorithms CMS implementations must include Triple-DES in CBC mode. CMS implementations should include RC2 in CBC mode. Content encryption algorithms identifiers are located in the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm field and the EncryptedData EncryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm field. Content encryption algorithms are used to encipher the content located in the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field and the EncryptedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field. Housley [Page 37] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 12.4.1 Triple-DES CBC The Triple-DES algorithm is described in [3DES]. The algorithm identifier for Triple-DES is: des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be present and contain a CBCParameter: CBCParameter ::= IV IV ::= OCTET STRING -- exactly 8 octets 12.4.2 RC2 CBC The RC2 algorithm is described in RFC 2268 [RFC 2268]. The algorithm identifier for RC2 in CBC mode is: RC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 2 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be present and contain a RC2-CBC: RC2-CBC parameter ::= SEQUENCE { rc2ParameterVersion INTEGER, iv OCTET STRING -- exactly 8 octets -- } The RC2 effective-key-bits (key size) greater than 32 and less than 256 is encoded in the rc2ParameterVersion. For the effective-key- bits of 40, 64, and 128, the rc2ParameterVersion values are 160, 120, and 58 respectively. These values are not simply the RC2 key length. Note that the value 160 must be encoded as two octets (00 A0), since the one octet (A0) encoding represents a negative number. 12.5 Message Authentication Code Algorithms CMS implementations that support authenticatedData must include HMAC with SHA-1. CMS implementations may also include DES MAC. MAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedData macAlgorithm field. MAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData mac field. MAC values are also located in the mac-value authenticated attribute. Housley [Page 38] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 12.5.1 HMAC with SHA-1 The HMAC with SHA-1 algorithm is described in RFC 2104 [RFC 2104]. The algorithm identifier for HMAC with SHA-1 is: HMAC-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) 8 1 2 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be absent. 12.5.2 DES MAC The DES MAC algorithm is described in FIPS Pub 113 [DES MAC]. CMS implementations choosing to implement DES MAC must support 32 bit MAC values. CMS implementations should also support 64 bit MAC values. The algorithm identifier for DES MAC is: DES-MAC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 10 } The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field must be present. The parameters contain an INTEGER identifying the length in bits of the MAC value, constrained to multiples of eight between 16 and 64: DESMACLength ::= INTEGER -- may be 16, 24, 32, 40, 48, 56, or 64 12.6 CMS Key Wrap Algorithm CMS implementations must implement the key wrap algorithm specified in this section. Key Transport algorithms allow for the content-encryption key to be directly encrypted; however, key agreement and mail list key algorithms encrypt the content-encryption key with a second (possibly different) symmetric encryption algorithm. This section describes how the content-encryption key is formatted and encrypted. Key agreement algorithms generate a pairwise key-encryption key, and this key wrap algorithm is used to encrypt the content-encryption key in that pairwise key-encryption key. Similarly, this key wrap algorithm is used to encrypt the content-encryption key in a mail list key. The key-encryption key is generated by the key agreement algorithm or distributed as a mail list key. With key agreement, the minimum number of bits needed to form the key-encryption key must be used. As an example, only the first 40 bits of Diffie-Hellman generated keying material are used for a RC2/40 key-encryption key. Housley [Page 39] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 The block size of the key-encryption algorithm must be implicitly determined from the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier field. Likewise, the size of the content-encryption key must be implicitly determined from the ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier field. Since the same algorithm identifier is used for both 2-key and 3-key Triple DES, three keys are always wrapped for Triple-DES. Thus, 2- key Triple-DES provides three keys where the first and third keys are the same. 12.6.1 Sum of Sums Key Checksum The Sum of Sums [SUM] key checksum algorithm is: 1. Initialize two 16 bit integers, sum1 and sum2, to zero. 2. Loop through the octets of the content-encryption key, most significant octet to least significant octet. 2a. Create a 16 bit integer, called temp, by concatenating eight zero bits and the key octet. 2b. sum1 = sum1 + temp. 2c. sum2 = sum2 + sum1. 3. Use sum2 as the checksum value. 12.6.2 Key Wrap 1. Modify the content-encryption key to meet any restrictions on the key. For example, adjust the parity bits for DES and Triple-DES keys. 2. Compute a 16-bit key checksum value on the content-encryption key as described above. 3. Generate a 32-bit random salt value. 4. Concatenate the salt, content-encryption key, and key checksum value. 5. Randomly generate the number of pad octets necessary to make the result a multiple of block size of the key-encryption algorithm (the Triple-DES block size is 8 bytes), then append them to the result. 6. Encrypt the result with the key-encryption algorithm key. Use an IV with each octet equal to 'A5' hexadecimal. Some key-encryption algorithm identifiers include an IV as part of the parameters. The IV must still be the constant above. 12.6.3 Key Unwrap The key unwrap algorithm is: 1. Decrypt the ciphertext using the key-encryption key. Use an IV with each octet equal to 'A5' hexadecimal. 2. Decompose the result into the content-encryption key and key checksum values. The salt and pad values are discarded. Housley [Page 40] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 3. Compute a 16-bit key checksum value on the content-encryption key as described above. 4. If computed key checksum value does not match the decrypted key checksum value, then there is an error. 5. If there are restrictions on keys, then check if the content-encryption key meets these restrictions. For example, check for odd parity of each octet in a DES or Triple-DES key. If any restriction is incorrect then there is an error. Housley [Page 41] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 Appendix A: ASN.1 Module CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms(1) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS All -- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use in -- the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for their -- own purposes. IMPORTS -- Directory Information Framework (X.501) Name FROM InformationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) modules(1) informationFramework(1) 3 } -- Directory Authentication Framework (X.509) AlgorithmIdentifier, AttributeCertificate, Certificate, CertificateList, CertificateSerialNumber FROM AuthenticationFramework { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) authenticationFramework(7) 3 } ; -- Cryptographic Message Syntax ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType ContentType, content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER SignedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL, crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL, signerInfos SignerInfos } DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo Housley [Page 42] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { eContentType ContentType, eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL, signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signature SignatureValue, unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL } SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attrValues SET OF AttributeValue } AttributeValue ::= ANY SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING EnvelopedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL, recipientInfos RecipientInfos, encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo } OriginatorInfo ::= SEQUENCE { certs [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL, crls [1] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL } RecipientInfos ::= SET OF RecipientInfo EncryptedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { contentType ContentType, contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedContent [0] IMPLICIT EncryptedContent OPTIONAL } EncryptedContent ::= OCTET STRING RecipientInfo ::= CHOICE { ktri KeyTransRecipientInfo, Housley [Page 43] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 kari [1] KeyAgreeRecipientInfo, mlri [2] MailListRecipientInfo } EncryptedKey ::= OCTET STRING KeyTransRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, -- always set to 0 or 2 rid RecipientIdentifier, keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedKey EncryptedKey } RecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier } KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, -- always set to 3 originator [0] EXPLICIT OriginatorIdentifierOrKey, ukm [1] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL, keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, recipientEncryptedKeys RecipientEncryptedKeys } OriginatorIdentifierOrKey ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier, originatorKey [1] OriginatorPublicKey } OriginatorPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, publicKey BIT STRING } RecipientEncryptedKeys ::= SEQUENCE OF RecipientEncryptedKey RecipientEncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE { rid KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier, encryptedKey EncryptedKey } KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier ::= CHOICE { issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber, rKeyId [0] IMPLICIT RecipientKeyIdentifier } RecipientKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier, date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL } SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING Housley [Page 44] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 MailListRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, -- always set to 4 mlkid MailListKeyIdentifier, keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedKey EncryptedKey } MailListKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { kekIdentifier OCTET STRING, date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL } DigestedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, digest Digest } Digest ::= OCTET STRING EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo } AuthenticatedData ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, originatorInfo [0] IMPLICIT OriginatorInfo OPTIONAL, recipientInfos RecipientInfos, macAlgorithm MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, authenticatedAttributes [1] IMPLICIT AuthAttributes OPTIONAL, mac MessageAuthenticationCode, unauthenticatedAttributes [2] IMPLICIT UnauthAttributes OPTIONAL } AuthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute UnauthAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute MessageAuthenticationCode ::= OCTET STRING DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier Housley [Page 45] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 CertificateRevocationLists ::= SET OF CertificateList CertificateChoices ::= CHOICE { certificate Certificate, -- See X.509 extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate, -- Obsolete attrCert [1] IMPLICIT AttributeCertificate } -- See X.509 & X9.57 CertificateSet ::= SET OF CertificateChoices IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE { issuer Name, serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } CMSVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0), v1(1), v2(2), v3(3), v4(4) } UserKeyingMaterial ::= OCTET STRING UserKeyingMaterials ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF UserKeyingMaterial OtherKeyAttribute ::= SEQUENCE { keyAttrId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, keyAttr ANY DEFINED BY keyAttrId OPTIONAL } -- CMS Attributes MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING SigningTime ::= Time Time ::= CHOICE { utcTime UTCTime, generalTime GeneralizedTime } Countersignature ::= SignerInfo MACValue ::= OCTET STRING -- Object Identifiers id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 } id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 } id-envelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) Housley [Page 46] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 3 } id-digestedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 5 } id-encryptedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 6 } id-ct-authData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 2 } id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 3 } id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 4 } id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 } id-countersignature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 6 } id-macValue OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 8 } -- Obsolete Extended Certificate syntax from PKCS#6 ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE { certificate Certificate, extendedCertificate [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate } ExtendedCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { extendedCertificateInfo ExtendedCertificateInfo, signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signature Signature } ExtendedCertificateInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version CMSVersion, certificate Certificate, attributes UnauthAttributes } Signature ::= BIT STRING -- Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters Housley [Page 47] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 } END -- of CryptographicMessageSyntax Housley [Page 48] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 References 3DES Tuchman, W. "Hellman Presents No Shortcut Solutions To DES". IEEE Spectrum, v. 16, n. 7, pp40-41. July 1979. DES American National Standards Institute. ANSI X3.106, "American National Standard for Information Systems - Data Link Encryption". 1983. DES MAC National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 113: Computer Data Authentication. May 1985. DSS National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 186: Digital Signature Standard. 19 May 1994. ESS Hoffman, P. Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME. Internet draft, draft-ietf-smime-ess-*.txt. MSG Ramsdell, B. S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification. Internet Draft, draft-ietf-smime-msg-*.txt. PKCS #6 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard, Version 1.5. November 1993. PKCS #9 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #9: Selected Attribute Types, Version 1.1. November 1993. RFC 1321 Rivest, R. The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. April 1992. RFC 1750 Eastlake, D.; S. Crocker; J. Schiller. Randomness Recommendations for Security. December 1994. RFC 2104 Krawczyk, H. HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication. February 1997. RFC 2268 Rivest, R. A Description of the RC2 (r) Encryption Algorithm. March 1998. RFC 2313 Kaliski, B. PKCS #1: RSA Encryption, Version 1.5. March 1998. RFC 2315 Kaliski, B. PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax, Version 1.5. March 1998. RFC TBD1 Rescorla, E. Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method. (currently draft-ietf-smime-x942). SHA1 National Institute of Standards and Technology. Housley [Page 49] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 FIPS Pub 180-1: Secure Hash Standard. 17 April 1995. SUM Fletcher, J. An Arithmetic Checksum for Serial Transmissions. Reprint UCRL-82569, Lawrence Livermore Laboraory, University of California. May 1979. X.208 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. X.209 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. X.501 CCITT. Recommendation X.501: The Directory - Models. 1988. X.509 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication Framework. 1988. Security Considerations The Cryptographic Message Syntax provides a method for digitally signing data, digesting data, encrypting data, and authenticating data. Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of the signer's private key permits masquerade. Implementations must protect the key management private key, the mail list key, and the content-encryption key. Compromise of the key management private key or the mail list key may result in the disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Similarly, compromise of the content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated encrypted content. Implementations must protect the key management private key and the message-authentication key. Compromise of the key management private key permits masquerade of authenticated data. Similarly, compromise of the message-authentication key may result in undetectable modification of the authenticated content. Implementations must randomly generate content-encryption keys, message-authentication keys, initialization vectors (Ivs), salt values, and padding. Also, the generation of public/private key pairs relies on a random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo- random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier Housley [Page 50] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 1750 offers important guidance in this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186 [DSS] provides one quality PRNG technique. The countersignature unauthenticated attribute includes a digital signature that is computed on the content signature value, thus the countersigning process need not know the original signed content. This structure permits implementation efficiency advantages; however, this structure may also permit the countersigning of an inappropriate signature value. Therefore, implementations that perform countersignatures should either validate the original signature value prior to countersigning it (this validation requires processing of the original content), or implementations should perform countersigning in a context that ensures that only appropriate signature values are countersigned. Users of CMS, particularly those employing CMS to support interactive applications, should be aware that PKCS #1 [RFC 2313] is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks when applied for encryption purposes. Exploitation of this identified vulnerability, revealing the result of a particular RSA decryption, requires access to an oracle which will respond to a large number of ciphertexts (based on currently available results, hundreds of thousands or more), which are constructed adaptively in response to previously-received replies providing information on the successes or failures of attempted decryption operations. As a result, the attack appears significantly less feasible to perpetrate for store-and-forward S/MIME environments than for directly interactive protocols. Where CMS constructs are applied as an intermediate encryption layer within an interactive request-response communications environment, exploitation could be more feasible. An updated version of PKCS #1 has been published, PKCS #1 Version 2.0. This new document may succeed RFC 2313. To resolve the adaptive chosen ciphertext vulnerability, the new document specifies and recommends use of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) when RSA encryption is applied to provide secrecy. Designers of protocols and systems employing CMS for interactive environments should either consider usage of OAEP, or should ensure that information which could reveal the success or failure of attempted PKCS #1 decryption operations is not provided. Support for OAEP may be added to a future version of the CMS specification. Housley [Page 51] INTERNET DRAFT October 1998 Author Address Russell Housley SPYRUS 381 Elden Street Suite 1120 Herndon, VA 20170 USA housley@spyrus.com Housley [Page 52]