RTFM, Inc.

ekr@rtfm.com

Arm Limited

hannes.tschofenig@arm.com

Arm Limited

thomas.fossati@arm.com

Bosch.IO GmbH

achim.kraus@bosch.io

Security TLS Internet-Draft This document specifies the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol version 1.2. A CID is an identifier carried in the record layer header that gives the recipient additional information for selecting the appropriate security association. In “classical” DTLS, selecting a security association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple. If the source IP address and/or source port changes during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context.

The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol was designed for securing connection-less transports, like UDP. DTLS, like TLS, starts with a handshake, which can be computationally demanding (particularly when public key cryptography is used). After a successful handshake, symmetric key cryptography is used to apply data origin authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection. This two-step approach allows endpoints to amortize the cost of the initial handshake across subsequent application data protection. Ideally, the second phase where application data is protected lasts over a long period of time since the established keys will only need to be updated once the key lifetime expires. In DTLS as specified in RFC 6347, the IP address and port of the peer are used to identify the DTLS association. Unfortunately, in some cases, such as NAT rebinding, these values are insufficient. This is a particular issue in the Internet of Things when devices enter extended sleep periods to increase their battery lifetime. The NAT rebinding leads to connection failure, with the resulting cost of a new handshake. This document defines an extension to DTLS 1.2 to add a Connection ID (CID) to the DTLS record layer. The presence of the CID is negotiated via a DTLS extension.

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “NOT RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document assumes familiarity with DTLS 1.2 . The presentation language used in this document is described in Section 4 of .

This document defines the “connection_id” extension, which is used in ClientHello and ServerHello messages. The extension type is specified as follows.

The extension_data field of this extension, when included in the ClientHello, MUST contain the ConnectionId structure. This structure contains the CID value the client wishes the server to use when sending messages to the client. A zero-length CID value indicates that the client is prepared to send using a CID but does not wish the server to use one when sending.

; } ConnectionId; ]]>

A server willing to use CIDs will respond with a “connection_id” extension in the ServerHello, containing the CID it wishes the client to use when sending messages towards it. A zero-length value indicates that the server will send using the client’s CID but does not wish the client to include a CID when sending. Because each party sends the value in the “connection_id” extension it wants to receive as a CID in encrypted records, it is possible for an endpoint to use a deployment-specific constant length for such connection identifiers. This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup, for example by having the length in question be a compile-time constant. Such implementations MUST still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties. Since the CID length information is not included in the record itself, implementations that want to use variable-length CIDs are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its length can be determined on reception. In DTLS 1.2, CIDs are exchanged at the beginning of the DTLS session only. There is no dedicated “CID update” message that allows new CIDs to be established mid-session, because DTLS 1.2 in general does not allow TLS 1.3-style post-handshake messages that do not themselves begin other handshakes. When a DTLS session is resumed or renegotiated, the “connection_id” extension is negotiated afresh. If DTLS peers have not negotiated the use of CIDs, or a zero-length CID has been advertised for a given direction, then the RFC 6347-defined record format and content type MUST be used to send in the indicated direction(s). If DTLS peers have negotiated the use of a non-zero-length CID for a given direction, then once encryption is enabled they MUST send with the record format defined in with the new MAC computation defined in and the content type tls12_cid. Plaintext payloads never use the new record format or the CID content type. When receiving, if the tls12_cid content type is set, then the CID is used to look up the connection and the security association. If the tls12_cid content type is not set, then the connection and security association is looked up by the 5-tuple and a check MUST be made to determine whether a non-zero length CID is expected. If a non-zero-length CID is expected for the retrieved association, then the datagram MUST be treated as invalid, as described in Section 4.1.2.1 of . When receiving a datagram with the tls12_cid content type, the new MAC computation defined in MUST be used. When receiving a datagram with the RFC 6347-defined record format, the MAC calculation defined in Section 4.1.2 of MUST be used.

This specification defines the DTLS 1.2 record layer format and specifies how to carry the CID in DTLS 1.3. To allow a receiver to determine whether a record has a CID or not, connections which have negotiated this extension use a distinguished record type tls12_cid(TBD2). Use of this content type has the following three implications: The CID field is present and contains one or more bytes. The MAC calculation follows the process described in . The real content type is inside the encryption envelope, as described below. Plaintext records are not impacted by this extension. Hence, the format of the DTLSPlaintext structure is left unchanged, as shown in .

When CIDs are being used, the content to be sent is first wrapped along with its content type and optional padding into a DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. This newly introduced structure is shown in .

Corresponds to the fragment of a given length. The content type describing the cleartext payload. An arbitrary-length run of zero-valued bytes may appear in the cleartext after the type field. This provides an opportunity for senders to pad any DTLS record by a chosen amount as long as the total stays within record size limits. See Section 5.4 of for more details. (Note that the term TLSInnerPlaintext in RFC 8446 refers to DTLSInnerPlaintext in this specification.) The DTLSInnerPlaintext byte sequence is then encrypted. To create the DTLSCiphertext structure shown in the CID is added.

The outer content type of a DTLSCiphertext record carrying a CID is always set to tls12_cid(TBD2). The real content type of the record is found in DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type after decryption. The CID value, cid_length bytes long, as agreed at the time the extension has been negotiated. Recall that (as discussed previously) each peer chooses the CID value it will receive and use to identify the connection, so an implementation can choose to always receive CIDs of a fixed length. If, however, an implementation chooses to receive different lengths of CID, the assigned CID values must be self-delineating since there is no other mechanism available to determine what connection (and thus, what CID length) is in use. The encrypted form of the serialized DTLSInnerPlaintext structure. All other fields are as defined in RFC 6347.

Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. This specification modifies the MAC calculation as defined in and , as well as the definition of the additional data used with AEAD ciphers provided in , for records with content type tls12_cid. The modified algorithm MUST NOT be applied to records that do not carry a CID, i.e., records with content type other than tls12_cid. The following fields are defined in this document; all other fields are as defined in the cited documents. Value of the negotiated CID (variable length). 1 byte field indicating the length of the negotiated CID. The length (in bytes) of the serialized DTLSInnerPlaintext (two-byte integer). The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14. 8 bytes of 0xff Note “+” denotes concatenation.

The following MAC algorithm applies to block ciphers that do not use the Encrypt-then-MAC processing described in .

The rationale behind this construction is to separate the MAC input for DTLS without the connection ID from the MAC input with the connection ID. The former always consists of a sequence number followed by some other content type than tls12_cid; the latter always consists of the seq_num_placeholder followed by tls12_cid. Although 2^64-1 is potentially a valid sequence number, tls12_cid will never be a valid content type when the connection ID is not in use. In addition, the epoch and sequence_number are now fed into the MAC in the same order as they appear on the wire.

The following MAC algorithm applies to block ciphers that use the Encrypt-then-MAC processing described in .

For ciphers utilizing authenticated encryption with additional data the following modification is made to the additional data calculation.

When a record with a CID is received that has a source address different from the one currently associated with the DTLS connection, the receiver MUST NOT replace the address it uses for sending records to its peer with the source address specified in the received datagram, unless the following three conditions are met: The received datagram has been cryptographically verified using the DTLS record layer processing procedures. The received datagram is “newer” (in terms of both epoch and sequence number) than the newest datagram received. Reordered datagrams that are sent prior to a change in a peer address might otherwise cause a valid address change to be reverted. This also limits the ability of an attacker to use replayed datagrams to force a spurious address change, which could result in denial of service. An attacker might be able to succeed in changing a peer address if they are able to rewrite source addresses and if replayed packets are able to arrive before any original. There is a strategy for ensuring that the new peer address is able to receive and process DTLS records. No strategy is mandated by this specification but see note (*) below. The conditions above are necessary to protect against attacks that use datagrams with spoofed addresses or replayed datagrams to trigger attacks. Note that there is no requirement for use of the anti-replay window mechanism defined in Section 4.1.2.6 of DTLS 1.2. Both solutions, the “anti-replay window” or “newer” algorithm, will prevent address updates from replay attacks while the latter will only apply to peer address updates and the former applies to any application layer traffic. Note that datagrams that pass the DTLS cryptographic verification procedures but do not trigger a change of peer address are still valid DTLS records and are still to be passed to the application. (*) Note: Application protocols that implement protection against spoofed addresses depend on being aware of changes in peer addresses so that they can engage the necessary mechanisms. When delivered such an event, an application layer-specific address validation mechanism can be triggered, for example one that is based on successful exchange of a minimal amount of ping-pong traffic with the peer. Alternatively, an DTLS-specific mechanism may be used, as described in . DTLS implementations MUST silently discard records with bad MACs or that are otherwise invalid.

shows an example exchange where a CID is used uni-directionally from the client to the server. To indicate that a zero-length CID is present in the “connection_id” extension we use the notation ‘connection_id=empty’.

(connection_id=empty) <-------- HelloVerifyRequest (cookie) ClientHello --------> (connection_id=empty) (cookie) ServerHello (connection_id=100) Certificate ServerKeyExchange CertificateRequest <-------- ServerHelloDone Certificate ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished --------> [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- Finished Application Data ========> <======== Application Data Legend: <...> indicates that a connection id is used in the record layer (...) indicates an extension [...] indicates a payload other than a handshake message ]]>

Note: In the example exchange the CID is included in the record layer once encryption is enabled. In DTLS 1.2 only one handshake message is encrypted, namely the Finished message. Since the example shows how to use the CID for payloads sent from the client to the server, only the record layer payloads containing the Finished message or application data include a CID.

The CID replaces the previously used 5-tuple and, as such, introduces an identifier that remains persistent during the lifetime of a DTLS connection. Every identifier introduces the risk of linkability, as explained in . An on-path adversary observing the DTLS protocol exchanges between the DTLS client and the DTLS server is able to link the observed payloads to all subsequent payloads carrying the same ID pair (for bi-directional communication). Without multi-homing or mobility, the use of the CID exposes the same information as the 5-tuple. With multi-homing, a passive attacker is able to correlate the communication interaction over the two paths. The lack of a CID update mechanism in DTLS 1.2 makes this extension unsuitable for mobility scenarios where correlation must be considered. Deployments that use DTLS in multi-homing environments and are concerned about these aspects SHOULD refuse to use CIDs in DTLS 1.2 and switch to DTLS 1.3 where a CID update mechanism is provided and sequence number encryption is available. The specification introduces record padding for the CID-enhanced record layer, which is a privacy feature not available with the original DTLS 1.2 specification. Padding allows to inflate the size of the ciphertext making traffic analysis more difficult. More details about record padding can be found in Section 5.4 and Appendix E.3 of RFC 8446. Finally, endpoints can use the CID to attach arbitrary per-connection metadata to each record they receive on a given connection. This may be used as a mechanism to communicate per-connection information to on-path observers. There is no straightforward way to address this concern with CIDs that contain arbitrary values. Implementations concerned about this aspect SHOULD refuse to use CIDs.

An on-path adversary can create reflection attacks against third parties because a DTLS peer has no means to distinguish a genuine address update event (for example, due to a NAT rebinding) from one that is malicious. This attack is of particular concern when the request is small and the response large. See for more on address updates. Additionally, an attacker able to observe the data traffic exchanged between two DTLS peers is able to replay datagrams with modified IP address/port numbers. The topic of peer address updates is discussed in .

This document requests three actions from IANA.

IANA is requested to add an extra column named “DTLS-Only” to the “TLS ExtensionType Values” registry to indicate whether an extension is only applicable to DTLS and to include this document as an additional reference for the registry.

IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the existing “TLS ExtensionType Values” registry, for connection_id(TBD1) as described in the table below. Although the value 53 has been allocated by early allocation for a previous version of this document, it is incompatible with this document. Once this document is approved for publication, the early allocation will be deprecated in favor of this assignment.

A new column “DTLS-Only” is added to the registry. The valid entries are “Y” if the extension is only applicable to DTLS, “N” otherwise. All the pre-existing entries are given the value “N”. Note: The value “N” in the Recommended column is set because this extension is intended only for specific use cases. This document describes the behavior of this extension for DTLS 1.2 only; it is not applicable to TLS, and its usage for DTLS 1.3 is described in .

IANA is requested to allocate tls12_cid(TBD2) in the “TLS ContentType” registry. The tls12_cid ContentType is only applicable to DTLS 1.2.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communications privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document describes a means of negotiating the use of the encrypt-then-MAC security mechanism in place of the existing MAC-then-encrypt mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). The MAC-then-encrypt mechanism has been the subject of a number of security vulnerabilities over a period of many years. This document offers guidance for developing privacy considerations for inclusion in protocol specifications. It aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols aware of privacy-related design choices. It suggests that whether any individual RFC warrants a specific privacy considerations section will depend on the document's content. This document specifies Version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The DTLS 1.3 protocol is intentionally based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection/non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document obsoletes RFC 6347. Arm Limited Arm Limited This document specifies a return routability check for use in context of the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol versions 1.2 and 1.3.

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE THIS SECTION draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-12 Improved peer address update text Editorial improvements Clarification regarding the use of the TLS ExtensionType Values Registry draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-11 Enhanced IANA considerations section Clarifications regarding CID negotiation and zero-length CIDs draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-10 Clarify privacy impact. Have security considerations point to . draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-09 Changed MAC/additional data calculation. Disallow sending MAC failure fatal alerts to non-validated peers. Incorporated editorial review comments by Ben Kaduk. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-08 RRC draft moved from normative to informative. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 Wording changes in the security and privacy consideration and the peer address update sections. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-06 Updated IANA considerations Enhanced security consideration section to describe a potential man-in-the-middle attack concerning address validation. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05 Restructed Section 5 “Record Payload Protection” draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-04 Editorial simplifications to the ‘Record Layer Extensions’ and the ‘Record Payload Protection’ sections. Added MAC calculations for block ciphers with and without Encrypt-then-MAC processing. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-03 Updated list of contributors Updated list of contributors and acknowledgements Updated example Changed record layer design Changed record payload protection Updated introduction and security consideration section Author- and affiliation changes draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-02 Move to internal content types a la DTLS 1.3. draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-01 Remove 1.3 based on the WG consensus at IETF 101 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-00 Initial working group version (containing a solution for DTLS 1.2 and 1.3) draft-rescorla-tls-dtls-connection-id-00 Initial version

RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE THIS SECTION The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the e-mail address tls@ietf.org. Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the list is at https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/index.html

Many people have contributed to this specification, and we would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions:

Additionally, we would like to thank the Connection ID task force team members: Martin Thomson (Mozilla) Christian Huitema (Private Octopus Inc.) Jana Iyengar (Google) Daniel Kahn Gillmor (ACLU) Patrick McManus (Mozilla) Ian Swett (Google) Mark Nottingham (Fastly) The task force team discussed various design ideas, including cryptographically generated session ids using hash chains and public key encryption, but dismissed them due to their inefficiency. The approach described in this specification is the simplest possible design that works given the limitations of DTLS 1.2. DTLS 1.3 provides better privacy features and developers are encouraged to switch to the new version of DTLS.

We would like to thank Hanno Becker, Martin Duke, Lars Eggert, Ben Kaduk, Warren Kumari, Francesca Palombini, Tom Petch, John Scudder, Sean Turner, Eric Vyncke, and Robert Wilton for their review comments. Finally, we want to thank the IETF TLS working group chairs, Chris Wood, Joseph Salowey, and Sean Turner, for their patience, support and feedback.