]> SandboxAQ

durumcrustulum@gmail.com

Security Transport Layer Security kems tls This memo defines ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024 as NamedGroups and and registers IANA values in the TLS Supported Groups registry for use in TLS 1.3 to achieve post-quantum (PQ) key establishment. About This Document Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction

Motivation FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) is a FIPS standard for post-quantum key establishment via a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). This document defines key establishment options for TLS 1.3 that use solely post-quantum algorithms, without a hybrid construction that also includes a traditional cryptographic algorithm. Use cases include regulatory frameworks that require standalone post-quantum key establishment, constrained environments where smaller key sizes or less computation are needed, and deployments where legacy middleboxes reject larger hybrid key shares.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Key encapsulation mechanisms This document models key establishment as key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), which consist of three algorithms:

• KeyGen() -> (pk, sk): A probabilistic key generation algorithm, which generates a public encapsulation key pk and a secret decapsulation key sk.
• Encaps(pk) -> (ct, shared_secret): A probabilistic encapsulation algorithm, which takes as input a public encapsulation key pk and outputs a ciphertext ct and shared secret shared_secret.
• Decaps(sk, ct) -> shared_secret: A decapsulation algorithm, which takes as input a secret decapsulation key sk and ciphertext ct and outputs a shared secret shared_secret.

ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024 conform to this interface:

• ML-KEM-512 has encapsulation keys of size 800 bytes, expanded decapsulation keys of 1632 bytes, decapsulation key seeds of size 64 bytes, ciphertext size of 768 bytes, and shared secrets of size 32 bytes
• ML-KEM-768 has encapsulation keys of size 1184 bytes, expanded decapsulation keys of 2400 bytes, decapsulation key seeds of size 64 bytes, ciphertext size of 1088 bytes, and shared secrets of size 32 bytes
• ML-KEM-1024 has encapsulation keys of size 1568 bytes, expanded decapsulation keys of 3168 bytes, decapsulation key seeds of size 64 bytes, ciphertext size of 1568 bytes, and shared secrets of size 32 bytes

Construction The KEMs are defined as NamedGroups, sent in the supported_groups extension.

Negotiation Each parameter set of ML-KEM is assigned an identifier, registered by IANA in the TLS Supported Groups registry:

Transmitting encapsulation keys and ciphertexts The public encapsulation key and ciphertext values are each directly encoded with fixed lengths as in . In TLS 1.3 a KEM public encapsulation key pk or ciphertext ct is represented as a KeyShareEntry : ; } KeyShareEntry; ]]> These are transmitted in the extension_data fields of KeyShareClientHello and KeyShareServerHello extensions: ; } KeyShareClientHello; struct { KeyShareEntry server_share; } KeyShareServerHello; ]]> The client's shares are listed in descending order of client preference; the server selects one algorithm and sends its corresponding share. For the client's share, the key_exchange value contains the pk output of the corresponding ML-KEM parameter set's KeyGen algorithm. For the server's share, the key_exchange value contains the ct output of the corresponding ML-KEM parameter set's Encaps algorithm. For all parameter sets, the server MUST perform the encapsulation key check described in Section 7.2 of on the client's encapsulation key, and abort with an illegal_parameter alert if it fails. For all parameter sets, the client MUST check if the ciphertext length matches the selected parameter set, and abort with an illegal_parameter alert if it fails. If ML-KEM decapsulation fails for any other reason, the connection MUST be aborted with an internal_error alert.

Shared secret calculation The shared secret output from the ML-KEM Encaps and Decaps algorithms over the appropriate keypair and ciphertext results in the same shared secret shared_secret as its honest peer, which is inserted into the TLS 1.3 key schedule in place of the (EC)DHE shared secret, as shown in .

Key schedule for key establishment HKDF-Extract = Early Secret | +-----> Derive-Secret(...) +-----> Derive-Secret(...) +-----> Derive-Secret(...) | v Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") | v shared_secret -> HKDF-Extract = Handshake Secret ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ | +-----> Derive-Secret(...) +-----> Derive-Secret(...) | v Derive-Secret(., "derived", "") | v 0 -> HKDF-Extract = Master Secret | +-----> Derive-Secret(...) +-----> Derive-Secret(...) +-----> Derive-Secret(...) +-----> Derive-Secret(...) ]]>

Security Considerations

Standalone versus hybrid key establishment This document defines standalone ML-KEM key establishment for TLS 1.3. Hybrid key establishment mechanisms, which combine a post-quantum algorithm with a traditional algorithm such as ECDH, are supported generically via with some concrete definitions in . Hybrid mechanisms provide security as long as at least one of the component algorithms remains unbroken, combining both a lattice-based and a traditional cryptographic assumption. Standalone ML-KEM relies on lattice-based and hash function cryptographic assumptions for its security.

IND-CCA The main security property for KEMs is indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA), which means that shared secret values should be indistinguishable from random strings even given the ability to have other arbitrary ciphertexts decapsulated. IND-CCA corresponds to security against an active attacker, and the public encapsulation key / secret decapsulation key pair can be treated as a long-term key or reused. ML-KEM satisfies IND-CCA security in the random oracle model .

Key reuse ML-KEM is explicitly designed to be secure in the event that the keypair is reused, satisfying IND-CCA security via a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform . While it is recommended that implementations avoid reuse of ML-KEM keypairs to ensure forward secrecy, implementations that do reuse MUST ensure that the number of reuses abides by bounds in or subsequent security analyses of ML-KEM. Implementations MUST NOT reuse randomness in the generation of ML-KEM ciphertexts. includes guidelines and requirements for implementations on using KEMs securely. Implementers are encouraged to use implementations resistant to side-channel attacks, especially those that can be applied by remote attackers.

Binding properties TLS 1.3's key schedule commits to the ML-KEM encapsulation key and the ciphertext as the key_exchange field of the key_share extension is populated with those values, which are included as part of the handshake messages. This provides resilience against re-encapsulation attacks against KEMs used for key establishment .

IANA Considerations This document requests/registers three new entries to the TLS Named Group (or Supported Group) registry, according to the procedures in .

Value:

0x0200

Description:

MLKEM512

DTLS-OK:

Y

Recommended:

N

Reference:

This document

Comment:

FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-512

Value:

0x0201

Description:

MLKEM768

DTLS-OK:

Y

Recommended:

N

Reference:

This document

Comment:

FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-768

Value:

0x0202

Description:

MLKEM1024

DTLS-OK:

Y

Recommended:

N

Reference:

This document

Comment:

FIPS 203 version of ML-KEM-1024

References Normative References National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.) In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. Informative References CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security Springer Science and Business Media LLC PQShield AWS Cloudflare University of Waterloo This draft defines three hybrid key agreement mechanisms for TLS 1.3 - X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768, and SecP384r1MLKEM1024 - that combine the post-quantum ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism) with an ECDHE (Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman) exchange. Springer Science and Business Media LLC Springer International Publishing This document describes a scheme for hybrid public key encryption (HPKE). This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key. HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric KEM, key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function. Some authenticated variants may not be supported by all KEMs. We provide instantiations of the scheme using widely used and efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA2. This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. University of Waterloo Cisco Systems University of Haifa and Meta Hybrid key exchange refers to using multiple key exchange algorithms simultaneously and combining the result with the goal of providing security even if a way is found to defeat the encryption for all but one of the component algorithms. It is motivated by transition to post-quantum cryptography. This document provides a construction for hybrid key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3. n.d. n.d. National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.) One aspect of the transition to post-quantum algorithms in cryptographic protocols is the development of hybrid schemes that incorporate both post-quantum and traditional asymmetric algorithms. This document defines terminology for such schemes. It is intended to be used as a reference and, hopefully, to ensure consistency and clarity across different protocols, standards, and organisations. Venafi sn3rd This document updates the changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries made in RFC 8447. It adds a new value "D" for discouraged to the Recommended column of the selected TLS registries and adds a "Comment" column to all active registries that do not already have a "Comment" column. Finally, it updates the registration request instructions. This document updates RFC 8447.

Acknowledgments Thanks to Douglas Stebila for consultation on the draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design design, and to Scott Fluhrer, Eric Rescorla, and Rebecca Guthrie for reviews.