Computing Energy Consumption Path in Segment Routing Networks

Introduction The integration of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with classical IP networks, specifically for securing IPsec tunnels, is an active area of standardization within the IETF. However, a critical challenge remains in large-scale QKD networks: the reliance on Trusted Relay Nodes. In current deployments, if a QKD link exceeds the physical distance limit, keys are decrypted, stored, and re-encrypted at intermediate nodes. If any single trusted node is compromised (physically or logically), the end-to-end secrecy of the key is completely broken. Taking an operational "QKD trunk line" as an example, 32 trusted relay nodes are distributed along a 2,000-kilometer path, and an attacker only needs to breach one node to undermine the end-to-end security of QKD. This document proposes a Multi-Path Secret Sharing (MPSS) scheme to address this vulnerability. Instead of transmitting the raw key through a single path of trusted nodes, the scheme adopts a (t, n)-threshold secret sharing mechanism, splits the key material into n shares, and utilizes the physical isolation capability of network forwarding paths provided by Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) to transmit the shares simultaneously over n physically disjoint paths. The original key can only be reconstructed if the receiver successfully obtains at least t shares, ensuring that even if fewer than t nodes are compromised, the attacker cannot obtain any valid information about the key. This mechanism can serve as a security enhancement layer for the QKD-IPsec integration architecture, effectively defending against insider threats and node compromise risks in the relay network. The scheme is designed to be compatible with the key management interfaces defined in [I-D.nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd] and supports various secret sharing algorithms.

Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] (Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997) and [RFC8174] (Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017).

Terminology QKD: Quantum Key Distribution. Trusted Node (TN): An intermediate node in a QKD network that temporarily holds the key material in plaintext during the relay process. Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS): A cryptographic method for distributing a secret among a group of participants, where the secret can only be reconstructed when a specific threshold number of shares are combined. Examples include Shamir's Secret Sharing and Blakley's scheme. (t, n)-Threshold Scheme: A scheme where the secret can be reconstructed only if at least $t$ out of $n$ shares are combined. SRv6: Segment Routing over IPv6. KMP: Key Management Plane, the logical entity responsible for coordinating QKD key generation, distribution, path calculation, and SRv6 policy enforcement. Disjoint Paths: Network paths that do not share any common intermediate nodes (node-disjoint) or links (link-disjoint). QKD-DOH: A proposed IPv6 Destination Option Header extension for carrying QKD share metadata.

Motivation In traditional QKD relay networks, the security model assumes that all intermediate nodes are fully trusted. The key flow is typically: Alice --(QKD)--> TN_1 --(Classical)--> TN_2 --(...)--> Bob If an attacker compromises TN_i, they can access the plaintext key material being relayed. As the network scales, the probability of at least one node being compromised increases, creating a significant bottleneck for high-security applications.

Proposed Architecture: MPSS over SRv6

Key Splitting and Share Generation Upon generation of a QKD key seed R at the source node, the KMP invokes a Threshold Secret Sharing algorithm. Input: Seed R, Threshold t, Total Shares n, Algorithm Identifier. Output: Set of shares S_1, S_2, S_n. Property: Any subset of shares with size < t provides no information about R.

Multi-Path Enforcement via SRv6 To ensure that the compromise of intermediate nodes does not lead to key leakage, the n shares shall be forwarded through disjoint paths as much as possible. This document leveragesSRv6 to explicitly encode these paths in the packet header. The source node constructs n IPv6 packets, each carrying one share S_i, and encapsulates information such as the sharing algorithm and share sequence number into the DOH header. Each share S_i is mapped to a different SRv6 Policy through the information in the DOH header. By utilizing the SRv6 Policy mechanism, the source can ensure: No two paths share a common intermediate Trusted Node Minimizing latency differences to facilitate timely reconstruction Comprehensively considering parameters such as the link quality and trust level of quantum links

Key Reconstruction at the Destination The destination node collects the incoming shares. Once t valid shares are received, the KMP reconstructs the original seed R using the corresponding inverse algorithm. The reconstructed seed is then processed to generate the final key, which is used for IPsec/IKEv2 as defined in and [I-D.nagayama-ipsecme-ipsec-with-qkd].

Protocol Details

IPv6 Destination Option for QKD Metadata (QKD‑DOH) To carry necessary metadata without modifying the upper-layer protocol, this document defines a new IPv6 Destination Option, which is used to map SRv6 Policies and enable the receiver to identify the sharing algorithm and parameters required for reconstruction.

Option Type: To be assigned by IANA (TBD) Option Data Format: Key ID (4 bytes): Identifies the QKD session Share Index (1 byte): Indicates which share (1…n) this packet carries Total Shares (1 byte): Value n Threshold (1 byte): Value t Algorithm ID (1 byte): Identifies the secret sharing algorithm used (e.g., 0x01 for Shamir, 0x02 for Blakley, etc.), ensuring extensibility This option is primarily processed by the source node and the destination node.

Integration with Key Management Plane (KMP) The MPSS mechanism is transparent to the IPsec stack. The KMP interacts with the following modules: QKD Quantum Layer: To fetch raw key seeds SDN Controller/PCE: To compute n disjoint paths and generate SIDs Application Layer (IPsec/IKE Daemon): To deliver the reconstructed key for use as a PPK, in accordance with The KMP is responsible for synchronizing the state of share transmission, negotiating the Algorithm ID during session setup, and triggering retransmission if fewer than t shares arrive within a timeout window.

Security Analysis

Traditional Single-Path Model The random number R is transmitted through a single path, and any compromised intermediate node can obtain the plaintext R, leading to the complete exposure of Key_AB. The security risk is 1/N_node (N_node is the number of intermediate nodes in the path), and the attack success rate is 100% for a single node compromise.

MPSS Mechanism R is split into N shares through (k, N) threshold secret sharing, and each share is transmitted through a completely non-overlapping path. An attacker needs to compromise at least k paths (i.e., at least one node in each of k paths) to obtain k valid shares and reconstruct R. The security improvement is reflected in two aspects: Threshold Security: The attack threshold is raised from "compromise 1 node" to "compromise k paths (at least k nodes)". For (2,3) configuration, the attacker needs to compromise at least 2 non-overlapping paths (2 nodes) to reconstruct R, and the attack success rate is significantly reduced. Isolation of Shares: Since the paths are completely non-overlapping, compromising a single node only exposes a single share, and the attacker cannot obtain any information about R from a single share (due to the perfect secrecy of the threshold secret sharing algorithm).

Quantitative Analysis Assume that the probability of a single QKD node being compromised is P, and the MPSS mechanism uses (k, N) threshold sharing with completely non-overlapping paths (each path has m intermediate nodes). The probability of the attacker successfully reconstructing R is: P_{MPSS} = C_N^k * (P^m)^k For the traditional single-path model (1 path, m nodes), the probability of successful attack is: P_{Traditional} = 1 - (1-P)^m Example: If P=0.01 (1% compromise probability per node), m=3 (3 intermediate nodes per path), (k=2, N=3) for MPSS: P_{MPSS} = C_3^2 * (0.01^3)^2 = 3 * 10^(-12) P_{Traditional} = 1 - (1-0.01)^3 ≈ 0.0297 The attack success probability of MPSS is reduced by 9 orders of magnitude compared with the traditional model, which significantly improves security.

IANA Considerations This document requests IANA to assign: 1. A new IPv6 Destination Option type under the "IPv6 Extension Header Types" registry for the QKD‑DOH defined in Section 5.1. 2. A new "QKD Secret Sharing Algorithm IDs" registry to manage the Algorithm ID field, initially populated with: - 0x01: Shamir's Secret Sharing - 0x02: Blakley's Scheme - 0x03‑0xFF: Unassigned / Experimental # Security Considerations TBD.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the following for their valuable contributions of this document: TBD