Co-operative DDoS
MitigationCisco Systems, Inc.Cessna Business Park, Varthur HobliSarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring RoadBangaloreKarnataka560103Indiatireddy@cisco.comCisco Systems, Inc.170 West Tasman DriveSan JoseCalifornia95134USAdwing@cisco.comCisco Systems, Inc.praspati@cisco.comCisco Systems, Inc.3250Florida33309USAmgeller@cisco.comOrangeRennes35000Francemohamed.boucadair@orange.comHTT ConsultingOak Park, MI42837United Statesrgm@htt-consult.comDOTSThis document specifies a mechanism that a DOTS client can use to
signal that a network is under a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attack to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions
are undertaken (including, blackhole, drop, rate-limit, or add to watch
list) on the suspect traffic. The document specifies both DOTS signal
and data channels. Happy Eyeballs considerations for the DOTS signal
channel are also elaborated.A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make
machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In
most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough
end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the
attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a
client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network, etc.In a lot of cases, it may not be possible for an enterprise to
determine the cause for an attack, but instead just realize that certain
resources seem to be under attack. The document proposes that, in such
cases, the DOTS client just inform the DOTS server that the enterprise
is under a potential attack and that the Mitigator monitor traffic to
the enterprise to mitigate any possible attack. This document also
describes a means for an enterprise, which act as DOTS clients, to
dynamically inform its DOTS server of the IP addresses or prefixes that
are causing DDoS. A Mitigator can use this information to discard flows
from such IP addresses reaching the customer network.The proposed mechanism can also be used between applications from
various vendors that are deployed within the same network, some of them
are responsible for monitoring and detecting attacks while others are
responsible for enforcing policies on appropriate network elements. This
cooperations contributes to a ensure a highly automated network that is
also robust, reliable and secure. The advantage of this mechanism is
that the DOTS server can provide protection to the DOTS client from
bandwidth-saturating DDoS traffic.How a Mitigator determines which network elements should be modified
to install appropriate filtering rules is out of scope. A variety of
mechanisms and protocols (including NETCONF) may be considered to
exchange information through a communication interface between the
server and these underlying elements; the selection of appropriate
mechanisms and protocols to be invoked for that interfaces is
deployment-specific.Terminology and protocol requirements for co-operative DDoS
mitigation are obtained from .The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in .Network applications have finite resources like CPU cycles, number of
processes or threads they can create and use, maximum number of
simultaneous connections it can handle, limited resources of the control
plane, etc. When processing network traffic, such an application uses
these resources to offer its intended task in the most efficient
fashion. However, an attacker may be able to prevent the application
from performing its intended task by causing the application to exhaust
the finite supply of a specific resource.TCP DDoS SYN-flood, for example, is a memory-exhaustion attack on the
victim and ACK-flood is a CPU exhaustion attack on the victim (). Attacks on the link are carried out by
sending enough traffic such that the link becomes excessively congested,
and legitimate traffic suffers high packet loss. Stateful firewalls can
also be attacked by sending traffic that causes the firewall to hold
excessive state and the firewall runs out of memory, and can no longer
instantiate the state required to pass legitimate flows. Other possible
DDoS attacks are discussed in .In each of the cases described above, some of the possible
arrangements to mitigate the attack are:If a DOTS client determines it is under an attack, the DOTS
client can notify the DOTS server using the DOTS signal that it is
under a potential attack and request that the DOTS server take
precautionary measures to mitigate the attack. The DOTS server can
enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by communicating the
DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying any mitigator
feedback to the requesting DOTS client.If a DOTS client determines it is under an attack, the DOTS
client can notify its servicing router (DOTS gateway) using the DOTS
signal that it is under a potential attack and request that the DOTS
gateway take precautionary measures to mitigate the attack. The DOTS
gateway propagates the DOTS signal to a DOTS server.The DOTS server can enable mitigation on behalf of
the DOTS gateway by communicating the DOTS gateway's request to the
mitigator and relaying any mitigator feedback to the DOTS gateway
which in turn propagates the feedback to the requesting DOTS client.
The DOTS client must authenticate itself to
the DOTS gateway, which in turn authenticates itself to a DOTS
server, creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication
between the DOTS client and the DOTS server ().If a network resource detects a potential DDoS attack from a set
of IP addresses, the network resource (DOTS client) informs its
servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses that
need to be blocked or black-listed for further investigation.The DOTS client could also specify a list of
protocols and ports in the black-list rule. That DOTS gateway
in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS server
and the DOTS server blocks traffic from these IP addresses to the
DOTS client thus reducing the effectiveness of the attack. The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS
server to check the counters mitigating the attack. If the DOTS
client receives a response that the counters have not incremented
then it can instruct the black-list rules to be removed. If a
blacklisted IPv4 address is shared by multiple subscribers, then the
side effect of applying the black-list rule will be that traffic
from non-attackers will also be blocked by the access network .An example of network diagram showing a deployment of these elements
is shown in . In this example, the DOTS server
operating on the access network.The DOTS server can also be running on the Internet, as depicted in
.In typical deployments, the DOTS client belongs to a different
administrative domain than the DOTS server. For example, the DOTS client
is a web server serving content owned and operated by an domain, while
the DOTS server is owned and operated by a different domain providing
DDoS mitigation services. That domain providing DDoS mitigation service
might, or might not, also provide Internet access service to the website
operator.The DOTS server may (not) be co-located with the DOTS mitigator. In
typical deployments, the DOTS server belongs to the same administrative
domain as the mitigator.The DOTS client can communicate directly with the DOTS server or
indirectly with the DOTS server via a DOTS gateway.DOTS signaling can happen with DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP. A DOTS
client can use DNS to determine the IP address(es) of a DOTS server or a
DOTS client may be provided with the list of DOTS server IP addresses.
The DOTS client must know a DOTS server's domain name; hard-coding the
domain name of the DOTS server into software is NOT RECOMMENDED in case
the domain name is not valid or needs to change for legal or other
reasons. The DOTS client performs A and/or AAAA record lookup of the
domain name and the result will be a list of IP addresses, each of which
can be used to contact the DOTS server using UDP and TCP.If an IPv4 path to reach a DOTS server is found, but the DOTS
server's IPv6 path is not working, a dual-stack DOTS client can
experience a significant connection delay compared to an IPv4-only DOTS
client. The other problem is that if a middlebox between the DOTS client
and DOTS server is configured to block UDP, the DOTS client will fail to
establish a DTLS session with the DOTS
server and will, then, have to fall back to TLS over TCP incurring significant connection delays. discusses that DOTS client
and server will have to support both connectionless and
connection-oriented protocols.To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client can try
connecting to the DOTS server using both IPv6 and IPv4, and try both
DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a fashion similar to the Happy
Eyeballs mechanism . These connection
attempts are performed by the DOTS client when its initializes, and the
client uses that information for its subsequent alert to the DOTS
server. In order of preference (most preferred first), it is UDP over
IPv6, UDP over IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4, which
adheres to address preference order and
the DOTS preference that UDP be used over TCP (to avoid TCP's head of
line blocking).X |
|--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X |
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X |
|--TCP SYN, IPv4----------------------------------------->|
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X |
|--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X |
|<-TCP SYNACK---------------------------------------------|
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X |
|--TCP ACK----------------------------------------------->|
|<------------Establish TLS Session---------------------->|
|----------------DOTS signal----------------------------->|
| |
]]>In reference to , the DOTS
client sends two TCP SYNs and two DTLS ClientHello messages at the same
time over IPv6 and IPv4. In this example, it is assumed that the IPv6
path is broken and UDP is dropped by a middle box but has little impact
to the DOTS client because there is no long delay before using IPv4 and
TCP. The IPv6 path and UDP over IPv6 and IPv4 is retried until the DOTS
client gives up.Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is used for DOTS signal channel. COAP was
designed according to the REST architecture, and thus exhibits
functionality similar to that of HTTP, it is quite straightforward to
map from CoAP to HTTP and from HTTP to CoAP. CoAP has been defined to
make use of both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP. The advantages of
COAP are: (1) Like HTTP, CoAP is based on the successful REST model,
(2) CoAP is designed to use minimal resources, (3) CoAP integrates
with JSON, CBOR or any other data format, (4) asynchronous message
exchanges, etc.JSON payloads is used to convey
signal channel specific payload messages that convey request
parameters and response information such as errors.TBD: Do we want to use CBOR [RFC7049] instead of JSON?The following APIs define the means to convey a DOTS signal from a
DOTS client to a DOTS server:are used to convey the DOTS signal
from a DOTS client to a DOTS server over the signal channel,
possibly traversing a DOTS gateway, indicating the DOTS client's
need for mitigation, as well as the scope of any requested
mitigation (). DOTS gateway act as a
CoAP-to-CoAP Proxy (explained in ).are used by the DOTS client to
withdraw the request for mitigation from the DOTS server ().are used by the DOTS client to
retrieve the DOTS signal(s) it had conveyed to the DOTS server
().are used by the DOTS client to convey
mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS server ().Reliability is provided to the POST, DELETE, GET, and PUT requests
by marking them as Confirmable (CON) messages. As explained in Section
2.1 of , a Confirmable message is
retransmitted using a default timeout and exponential back-off between
retransmissions, until the DOTS server sends an Acknowledgement
message (ACK) with the same Message ID conveyed from the DOTS
client.TBD: Do we want any of the above requests to be Non-confirmable
?A POST request is used to convey a DOTS signal to the DOTS server
().The header fields are described below.Identifier of the policy represented
using a number. This identifier MUST be unique for each policy
bound to the DOTS client, i.e. ,the policy-id needs to be unique
relative to the active policies with the DOTS server. This
identifier must be generated by the DOTS client. This document
does not make any assumption about how this identifier is
generated. This is a mandatory attribute.A list of IP addresses or prefixes
under attack. This is an optional attribute.A list of ports under attack. This is
an optional attribute.A list of protocols under attack.
Valid protocol values include tcp, udp, sctp, and dccp. This is
an optional attribute.Lifetime of the mitigation request
policy in seconds. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the
request is not refreshed, the mitigation request is removed. The
request can be refreshed by sending the same request again. The
default lifetime of the policy is 60 minutes -- this value was
chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a
burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the policy where the
client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. A lifetime of
zero indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request.
The server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the
response. This is an optional attribute in the request.The relative order of two rules is determined by comparing their
respective policy identifiers. The rule with lower numeric policy
identifier value has higher precedence (and thus will match before)
than the rule with higher numeric policy identifier value.If the DOTS server is not able to respond immediately to a POST
request carried in a Confirmable message, it simply responds with an
Empty Acknowledgement message so that the DOTS client can stop
retransmitting the request. When the response is ready, the server
sends it in a new Confirmable message which then in turn needs to be
acknowledged by the DOTS client (see Sections 5.2.1 and Sections
5.2.2 in ).To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the consequently
decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure
that the DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. If the Path
MTU is not known to the DOTS server, an IP MTU of 1280 bytes SHOULD
be assumed. The length of the URL MUST NOT exceed 256 bytes. If UDP
is used to convey the DOTS signal and the request size exceeds the
Path MTU then the DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into
separate messages, for example the list of addresses in the
'target-ip' field could be split into multiple lists and each list
conveyed in a new POST request.Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works
well with IPv6 and with most of today's IPv4 paths. However, with
IPv4, it is harder to absolutely ensure that there is no IP
fragmentation. If IPv4 support on unusual networks is a
consideration and path MTU is unknown, implementations may want to
limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as
576 bytes, as per IP packets up to
576 bytes should never need to be fragmented, thus sending a maximum
of 500 bytes of DOTS signal over a UDP datagram will generally avoid
IP fragmentation. shows a POST request to signal
that ports 80, 8080, and 443 on the servers 2002:db8:6401::1 and
2002:db8:6401::2 are being attacked.The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST
request using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2xx codes are success, CoAP
4xx codes are some sort of invalid request and 5xx codes are
returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing
the mitigation. Response code 2.01 (Created) will be returned in the
response if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation request and
will try to mitigate the attack. If the request is missing one or
more mandatory attributes then 4.00 (Bad Request) will be returned
in the response or if the request contains invalid or unknown
parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) will be returned in the
response. The CoAP response will include the JSON body received in
the request.A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS signal from a DOTS
server ().If the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in
the DELETE request in its policy state data, then it responds with a
4.04 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully
acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the DOTS signal
using 2.02 (Deleted) response code, and ceases mitigation activity
as quickly as possible.A GET request is used to retrieve information and status of a
DOTS signal from a DOTS server (). If
the DOTS server does not find the policy number conveyed in the GET
request in its policy state data, then it responds with a 4.04 (Not
Found) error response code.
Observe : 0]]> shows the response of all the
active policies on the DOTS server.The various possible values of status field are explained
below:Attack mitigation is in
progress (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the
inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator).Attack is successfully
mitigated (e.g., attack traffic is dropped).Attack has stopped and the DOTS
client can withdraw the mitigation request.The observe option defined in
extends the CoAP core protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to
"observe" a resource on a CoAP server: the client retrieves a
representation of the resource and requests this representation be
updated by the server as long as the client is interested in the
resource. A DOTS client conveys the observe option set to 0 in the
GET request to receive unsolicited notifications of attack
mitigation status from the DOTS server. Unidirectional notifications
within the bidirectional signal channel allows unsolicited message
delivery, enabling asynchronous notifications between the
agents. |
| Token: 0x4a | Registration
| Observe: 0 |
+-------------------------->|
| |
| 2.05 Content |
| Token: 0x4a | Notification of
| Observe: 12 | the current state
| status: "mitigation |
| in progress" |
|<--------------------------+
| 2.05 Content |
| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon
| Observe: 44 | a state change
| status: "mitigation |
| complete" |
|<--------------------------+
| 2.05 Content |
| Token: 0x4a | Notification upon
| Observe: 60 | a state change
| status: "attack stopped" |
|<--------------------------+
| |
]]>A DOTS client retrieves the information about a DOTS signal at
frequent intervals to determine the status of an attack. If the
DOTS server has been able to mitigate the attack and the attack
has stopped, the DOTS server indicates as such in the status, and
the DOTS client recalls the mitigation request.A DOTS client should react to the status of the attack from the
DOTS server and not the fact that it has recognized, using its own
means, that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the
DOTS client does not recall a mitigation request in a premature
fashion because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense
the DDOS attack on its resources but the DOTS server could be
actively mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely
averted.While DDoS mitigation is active, a DOTS client MAY frequently
transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS
server. An PUT request () is used to
convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server. The PUT
request MUST include all the header fields used in the POST request
to convey the DOTS signal (). If the DOTS
server does not find the policy number conveyed in the PUT request
in its policy state data, it responds with a 4.04 (Not Found) error
response code.
Accept: application/json
Content-Format: application/json
{
"target-ip": "string",
"target-port": "string",
"target-protocol": "string",
"lifetime": "number",
"attack-status": "string"
}
]]>The 'attack-status' field is a mandatory attribute. The various
possible values contained in the 'attack-status' field are explained
below:DOTS client determines that it is
still under attack.Attack is successfully mitigated
(e.g., attack traffic is dropped).The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges and
requires a reliable transport, CoAP over TLS over TCP is used for data
channel.JSON payloads is used to convey both filtering rules as well as data
channel specific payload messages that convey request parameters and
response information such as errors. All data channel URIs defined in
this document, and in subsequent documents, MUST NOT have a URI
containing "/DOTS signal".One of the possible arrangements for DOTS client to signal filtering
rules to a DOTS server via the DOTS gateway is discussed below:The DOTS conveys the black-list rules to the DOTS gateway. The DOTS
gateway validates if the DOTS client is authorized to signal the
black-list rules and if the client is authorized propagates the rules to
the DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server validates if the DOTS gateway
is authorized to signal the black-list rules. To create or purge
filters, the DOTS client sends CoAP requests to the DOTS gateway. The
DOTS gateway acts as a proxy, validates the rules and proxies the
requests containing the black-listed IP addresses to a DOTS server. When
the DOTS gateway receives the associated CoAP response from the DOTS
server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS client. If an attack
is detected by the DOTS gateway then it can act as a DOTS client and
signal the black-list rules to the DOTS server. The DOTS gateway plays
the role of both client and server.The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure
filtering rules on a DOTS server.An POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server
().The header fields are described below:Identifier of the policy represented
using a number. This identifier MUST be unique for each policy
bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the policy-id needs to be unique
relative to the active policies with the DOTS server. This
identifier must be generated by the client. This document does
not make any assumption about how this identifier is generated.
This is an mandatory attribute.Valid protocol values include
tcp, udp, sctp, and dccp. This is an mandatory attribute.The source port number,
port number range (using "-"). For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the
source range of ports (e.g., 1024-65535). This is an optional
attribute.The destination port
number, port number range (using "-"). For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or
DCCP: the destination range of ports (e.g., 443-443). This
information is useful to avoid disturbing a group of customers
when address sharing is in use .
This is an optional attribute.The destination IP address, IP
addresses separated by commas, or prefixes using "/" notation.
This is an optional attribute.The source IP addresses, IP addresses
separated by commas, or prefixes using "/" notation. This is an
optional attribute.Lifetime of the rule in seconds. Upon
the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not
refreshed, this particular rule is removed. The rule can be
refreshed by sending the same message again. The default
lifetime of the rule is 60 minutes -- this value was chosen to
be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a burden on
the DOTS client, while expiring the rule where the client has
unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. A lifetime of zero
indicates indefinite lifetime for the rule. The server MUST
always indicate the actual lifetime in the response. This is an
optional attribute in the request.This is the allowed traffic rate in
bytes per second indicated in IEEE floating point format. The value 0 indicates all
traffic for the particular flow to be discarded. This is a
mandatory attribute.The relative order of two rules is determined by comparing their
respective policy identifiers. The rule with lower numeric policy
identifier value has higher precedence (and thus will match before)
than the rule with higher numeric policy identifier value. shows a POST request to block
traffic from attacker IPv6 prefix 2001:db8:abcd:3f01::/64 to network
resource using IPv6 address 2002:db8:6401::1 to operate a server on
TCP port 443.A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS
server ().A GET request is used to retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS
server. shows an example to retrieve all
the black-lists rules programmed by the DOTS client while shows an example to retrieve specific
black-list rules programmed by the DOTS client.TODO: show responseThis section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal
channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as machine-in-the-middle and
protocol downgrade. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and not specific
to DOTS over (D)TLS; please refer to the (D)TLS RFCs for discussion of
these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the (D)TLS
implementation recommendations and security considerations of except with respect to (D)TLS version. Since
encryption of DOTS using (D)TLS is virtually a green-field deployment
DOTS agents MUST implement only (D)TLS 1.2 or later.Implementations compliant with this profile MUST implement all of the
following items:DOTS client can use (D)TLS session resumption without server-side
state to resume session and convey
the DOTS signal.While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent, the DOTS
client may want to probe the server to ensure it has maintained
cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall or NAT
bindings. This probing reduces the frequency of needing a new
handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed to the DOTS
server. A (D)TLS heartbeat verifies the
DOTS server still has DTLS state by returning a DTLS message. If
the server has lost state, it returns a DTLS Alert. Upon receipt
of an unauthenticated DTLS Alert, the DTLS client validates the
Alert is within the replay window (Section 4.1.2.6 of ). It is difficult for the DTLS client
to validate the DTLS Alert was generated by the DTLS server in
response to a request or was generated by an on- or off-path
attacker. Thus, upon receipt of an in-window DTLS Alert, the
client SHOULD continue re-transmitting the DTLS packet (in the
event the Alert was spoofed), and at the same time it SHOULD
initiate DTLS session resumption.TLS runs over TCP, so a simple probe is a 0-length TCP packet
(a "window probe"). This verifies the TCP connection is still
working, which is also sufficient to prove the server has
retained TLS state, because if the server loses TLS state it
abandons the TCP connection. If the server has lost state, a TCP
RST is returned immediately.Raw public keys which reduce
the size of the ServerHello, and can be used by servers that
cannot obtain certificates (e.g., DOTS gateways on private
networks).Implementations compliant with this profile SHOULD implement all of
the following items to reduce the delay required to deliver a DOTS
signal:TLS False Start
which reduces round-trips by allowing the TLS second flight of
messages (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the DOTS signal.Cached Information Extension which avoids transmitting
the server's certificate and certificate chain if the client has
cached that information from a previous TLS handshake.TCP Fast Open can reduce the
number of round-trips to convey DOTS signal.(D)TLS based on client certificate can be used for mutual
authentication between DOTS agents. If a DOTS gateway is involved, DOTS
clients and DOTS gateway MUST perform mutual authentication; only
authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a DOTS
server.+ +<---------------->+ DOTS |
| | (DOTS client)| | DOTS | | | Server |
| +--------------+ | Gateway | | | |
| +----+--------+ | +---------------+
| ^ |
| | |
| +----------------+ | |
| | DDOS detector | | |
| | (DOTS client) +<--------------+ |
| +----------------+ |
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+
]]>In the example depicted in ,
the DOTS gateway and DOTS clients within the 'example.com' domain
mutually authenticate with each other. After the DOTS gateway validates
the identity of a DOTS client, it communicates with the AAA server in
the 'example.com' domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized
to request DDOS mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01
(Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In this
example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and DDOS
detector to request DDOS mitigation, but does not permit the user of
type 'guest' to request DDOS mitigation.Also, DOTS gateway and DOTS server MUST perform mutual authentication
using certificates. A DOTS server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a
certificate for a particular domain to request mitigation for that
domain. In reference to , the DOTS server
only allows the DOTS gateway to request mitigation for 'example.com'
domain and not for other domains.TODOAuthenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and
message integrity. (D)TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for
mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and Transport Layer Security
(TLS) with a ciphersuite offering confidentiality protection and the
guidance given in MUST be followed to
avoid attacks on (D)TLS.If TCP is used between DOTS agents, attacker may be able to inject
RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS
authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected,
this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it
will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by
using TCP-AO . If TCP-AO is used, then any
bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO
integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation
of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of the
network (including connectivity and services delivered over that
network).Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish
exchange instructions and notification over a secure and authenticated
channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid that nodes outside a
trusted domain can inject request such as deleting filtering rules.
Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated from within the trusted domain if
an entity has been corrupted. Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes
should also be enabled.Thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Roland Dobbins, Andrew Mortensen,
Roman D. Danyliw, and Gilbert Clark for the discussion and comments.Standard for Binary Floating-Point ArithmeticInstitute of Electrical and Electronics
EngineersBGP defines a mechanism as described in that can be used to automate inter-domain
coordination of traffic filtering, such as what is required in order to
mitigate DDoS attacks. However, support for BGP in an access network
does not guarantee that traffic filtering will always be honored. Since
a DOTS client will not receive an acknowledgment for the filtering
request, the DOTS client should monitor and apply similar rules in its
own network in cases where the DOTS server is unable to enforce the
filtering rules. In addition, enforcement of filtering rules of BGP on
Internet routers are usually governed by the maximum number of data
elements the routers can hold as well as the number of events they are
able to process in a given unit of time.