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Security TLS WG Internet-Draft This document changes the IANA registry policy for a number of D/TLS-related registries, renames some of the registries for consistency, and adds notes to many of the registries. As a result, this document updates many RFCs (see updates header).

As the authors of this draft are also the WG chairs, the responsible Area Director has agreed to judge consensus. RFC EDITOR: Please delete section prior to publication.

This document requests that IANA make changes to a number of TLS-related IANA registries: Add “TLS” to registries’ names for consistency with other TLS-related registries. Change the IANA registry policy for the TLS ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries. These more relaxes rules are more condusive to TBD. Add the designated expert intructions as a note to the TLS ExtensionType Values, TLS Cipher Suite, and TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers registries to inform IANA-registry-focused, non-RFC-reading what’s expected from the registry. Add notes to indicate whether an extension, certain values of an extension, or an entire registry is only applicable pre-D/TLS 1.3. Rename the NewSessionTicket TLS HandshakeType message registry entry to new_session_ticket to match the naming nomenclature for the other Handshake type names and to match with existing implementations. Rename the SessionTicket TLS to session_ticket to match the nomenclature for the other extensions’ names. Add missing entry to the TLS Alert Registry for the no_application_protocol alert defined in This document proposes no changes to the TLS Alert , TLS ContentType , TLS HandshakeType, and TLS Certificate Status Types ; Standards Action, for the 1st three, and IETF Review, for the last, are appropriate for these one-byte code points because of their scarcity. This document proposes no changes to the EC Curve Type, EC Point Format registries , and Supported Groups Registry (see ). The lengthy updates header is a result of requests for IANA to refer to this draft in addition to the original RFC that defined a particular registry.

IANA is to update the names of the following registries to add “TLS” to for consistency with the other TLS-related extensions: Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs, ExtensionType Values, Heartbeat Message Types, Heartbeat Modes, and Supported Groups. IANA is also to add a reference to this document for the registry whose names have been updated as a result of the above change. NOTE: Henceforth in this document the registries will be referred to using the “TLS” prefix.

Many of the TLS-related IANA registries were defined prior to where “IETF Consensus” was used instead of the RFC5226-defined “IETF Review”. To align with the new terminology, IANA is to update to use “IETF Review” in place of “IETF Consensus” in the following registries: TLS Authorization Data Formats TLS Supplemental Data Formats (SupplementalDataType) NOTE: Not that this is not a universal change as some registries originally defined with “IETF Consensus” are undergoing other changes either as a result of this document or .

IANA is to update the TLS ExtensionType Values registry as follows: Change the registry policy to: Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required . Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use . Update the “References” to also refer to this document. Add the following note: Note: Experts are to verify that there is in fact a publicly available standard.

IANA is to update the TLS Cipher Suite registry as follows: Change the registry policy to: Values with the first byte in the range 0-254 (decimal) are assigned via Specification Required . Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use . Add a “Recommended” column to the cipher suite registry. All ciphers listed in Appendix A.4 are marked as “Yes”. All other cipher suites are marked as “No”. Add the following: Note: Cipher suites marked as “Yes” are those allocated via Standards Track RFCs. Cipher suites marked as “No” are not; cipher suites marked “No” range from “good” to “bad” from a cryptographic standpoint. The designated expert only ensures that the specification is publically available.

IANA is to update the TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers registry as follows: Change the registry policy to: Values in the range 0-223 are assigned via Specification Required . Values 224-255 are are reserved for Private Use. Add the following: Note: The designated expert only ensures that the specification is publically available.

To align with TLS implementations and to align the naming nomenclature for other Handshake message types, IANA is to rename entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType registry to “new_session_ticket (renamed from NewSessionTicket)”. IANA is to also add a reference to this document in the Reference column for entry 4 in the TLS HandshakeType registry.

The nomenclature for the registry entries in the TLS ExtensionType Values registry correspond to the presentation language field name except for entry 35. To ensure that the values in the registry are consistently identified in the registry, IANA is to rename entry 35 to “session_ticket (renamed from “SessionTicket TLS”)”.

IANA is to add the following note to the TLS Exporter Label Registry:

IANA is to add the following entry to the TLS Alert Registry (the entry was omitted from the IANA instructions in ):

To make it clear that D/TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain extensions (i.e., they are only applicable to version of D/TLS prior to 1.3), IANA is to add the following to the TLS ExtensionType Values registry:

To make it clear that D/TLS 1.3 has orphaned certain registries (i.e., they are only applicable to version of D/TLS protocol versions prior to 1.3), IANA is to: Add the following to the TLS Compression Method Identifiers registry : Note: Value 0 (NULL) is the only value in this registry applicable to D/TLS protocol versions prior to 1.3. Add the following to the TLS Hash Algorithm and TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries : Note: The values in this registry are only applicable to D/TLS protocol versions prior to 1.3. Update the “References” in the TLS Compression Method Identifiers, TLS Hash Algorithm and TLS SignatureAlgorithm registries to also refer to this document.

TBSL

This document is entirely about changes to TLS-related IANA registries.

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol (RFC 2246) includes features to negotiate selection of a lossless data compression method as part of the TLS Handshake Protocol and to then apply the algorithm associated with the selected method as part of the TLS Record Protocol. TLS defines one standard compression method which specifies that data exchanged via the record protocol will not be compressed. This document describes an additional compression method associated with a lossless data compression algorithm for use with TLS, and it describes a method for the specification of additional TLS compression methods. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes a mechanism that enables the Transport Layer Security (TLS) server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a ticket and forwards it to the client. The client can subsequently resume a session using the obtained ticket. This document obsoletes RFC 4507. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This specification defines a TLS handshake message for exchange of supplemental application data. TLS hello message extensions are used to determine which supplemental data types are supported by both the TLS client and the TLS server. Then, the supplemental data handshake message is used to exchange the data. Other documents will define the syntax of these extensions and the syntax of the associated supplemental data types. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Many protocols make use of identifiers consisting of constants and other well-known values. Even after a protocol has been defined and deployment has begun, new values may need to be assigned (e.g., for a new option type in DHCP, or a new encryption or authentication transform for IPsec). To ensure that such quantities have consistent values and interpretations across all implementations, their assignment must be administered by a central authority. For IETF protocols, that role is provided by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).In order for IANA to manage a given namespace prudently, it needs guidelines describing the conditions under which new values can be assigned or when modifications to existing values can be made. If IANA is expected to play a role in the management of a namespace, IANA must be given clear and concise instructions describing that role. This document discusses issues that should be considered in formulating a policy for assigning values to a namespace and provides guidelines for authors on the specific text that must be included in documents that place demands on IANA.This document obsoletes RFC 2434. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK] A number of protocols wish to leverage Transport Layer Security (TLS) to perform key establishment but then use some of the keying material for their own purposes. This document describes a general mechanism for allowing that. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies authorization extensions to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Handshake Protocol. Extensions are carried in the client and server hello messages to confirm that both parties support the desired authorization data types. Then, if supported by both the client and the server, authorization information, such as attribute certificates (ACs) or Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) assertions, is exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message. This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community. This document describes the Heartbeat Extension for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocols.The Heartbeat Extension provides a new protocol for TLS/DTLS allowing the usage of keep-alive functionality without performing a renegotiation and a basis for path MTU (PMTU) discovery for DTLS. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document discusses issues that should be considered in formulating a policy for assigning values to a name space and provides guidelines to document authors on the specific text that must be included in documents that place demands on the IANA. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This document defines the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Certificate Status Version 2 Extension to allow clients to specify and support several certificate status methods. (The use of the Certificate Status extension is commonly referred to as "OCSP stapling".) Also defined is a new method based on the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) that servers can use to provide status information about not only the server's own certificate but also the status of intermediate certificates in the chain. This document describes key exchange algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In particular, it specifies the use of Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Edwards Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) as new authentication mechanisms.