JunHyuk Song
Jicheol Lee
INTERNET DRAFT Samsung Electronics
Expires: November 30, 2005 May 31 2005
The AES-CMAC Algorithm
draft-songlee-aes-cmac-01.txt
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has newly
specified the Cipher based MAC (CMAC) which is equivalent to the
One-Key CBC-MAC1 (OMAC1) algorithm submitted by Iwata and Kurosawa.
OMAC1 efficiently reduces the key size of Extended Cipher Block
Chaining mode (XCBC). This memo specifies the authentication
mechanism based on CMAC mode of operation with 128-bit Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) cipher block. This new authentication
algorithm is named AES-CMAC
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Specification of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. AES-CMAC Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1 Basic Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3 Input and Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1 Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.2 Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4 Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5 Subkey Generation . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6 AES-CMAC Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Test Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Acknowledgement . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Authors address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Test Code . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has newly
specified the Cipher based MAC (CMAC). CMAC [NIST-CMAC] is a keyed
hashed function that is based on a symmetric key block cipher such
as Advanced Encryption Standard [AES]. CMAC is equivalent to the
One-Key CBC-MAC1 (OMAC1) algorithm submitted by Iwata and Kurosawa
[OMAC1]. Although the OMAC1 algorithm is based on the eXtended Cipher
Block Chaining mode (XCBC) algorithm submitted by Rogaway and Black
[XCBC], OMAC1 efficiently reduces the key size of XCBC. This memo
specifies the authentication mechanism based on CMAC mode of
operation with 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) cipher
block. This new authentication algorithm is named AES-CMAC
2. Specification of Language
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3].
In addition, the following words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification.
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3. AES-CMAC Algorithm
3.1 Basic definitions
The following table describes the basic definitions necessary to
explain CMAC algorithm and definitions.
|| Concatenation.
a || b means the concatenation a with following b.
XOR Exclusive OR.
a XOR b means the result of exclusive-OR'ing a
with b.
[x] Ceiling function.
[3.5] results 4. [5] results 5.
<< Left-shift operation.
10010001 << 1 is equal to 00100010.
x^y y-times repeated x.
0^3 means that 000 in binary format
10^4 means that 10000 in binary format
10^i means that 1 and i-times repeated 0.
CBC Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation for message
authentication code.
MAC Message Authentication Code.
A bitstring of a fixed length, computed by MAC
generation algorithm, that is used to established
the authority and hence, the integrity of a message.
CMAC Cipher-based MAC based on an approved symmetric key
block cipher, such as the Advanced Encryption
Standard.
MSB(x) The most-significant bit of x.
MSB(10010001) means 1.
padding(x) 10^i padded output of input x.
It is described in detail in section 3.
Key (K) 128-bits (16bytes) long key for AES-128 cipher block.
Denoted by K.
K1 First subkey, K1 is generated by subkey generation
method.
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K2 Second subkey, K2 is generated by subkey generation
method.
Message (M) Message to be authenticated.
Denoted by M.
The total message M is denoted by sequence of M_i
where M_i is the i'th block with size 128-bit.
Message can be null message which means that the
length of M is 0.
Length (len) The length of message M in bytes.
Denoted by len.
Minimum value of the length can be 0. The maximum
value of the length is not specified in this document.
AES-128(K,M) 128-bit ciphertext, output of performing AES-128
cipher block of 128-bit plaintext M with 128-bit
Key K
AES-CMAC CMAC generation function based on AES block cipher
with 128-bits key
3.2 Overview
The Advanced Encryption Standard [AES] is recently defined symmetric
key block cipher by NIST. AES-CMAC algorithm uses the CBC mode of
operation based on block cipher with 128-bit key for message
authentication code generation. In CBC-mode uses output of the
cipher block in order to exclusive-or with next input block.
The output of CMAC-mode will provide data integrity over whole
input message.
There are two cases of operation in CMAC. Figure 3.1 illustrated the
operation of CBC-MAC with two cases. If the size of input
message block is equal to multiple of block size namely 128-bits,
the last block processing shall be exclusive-OR'ed with K1.
Otherwise, the last block shall be padded with 10^i (notation is
described in section 3.1) and exclusive-OR'ed with K2. The result
of the previous process will be the input of the last CBC operation.
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+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +---+----+
| M_1 | | M_2 | | M_n | | M_1 | | M_2 | |M_n|10^i|
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +---+----+
| | | | | |
| +--->(+) +--->(+)<- K1 | +--->(+) +--->(+)<- K2
| | | | | | | | | |
+-----+ | +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ | +-----+
| E_k | | | E_k | | | E_k | | E_k | | | E_k | | | E_k |
+-----+ | +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ | +-----+
| | | | | | | | | |
+-----+ +-----+ | +-----+ +-----+ |
| |
T T
(a) multiple block size (b) not multiple block size
Figure 3.1 Illustration of two cases of CMAC generation
E_k is cipher block function with key, k. In this memo,
E is the AES-128 cipher block and k is input key namely K.
M_i means the message block with length 128-bit where i = 1...n.
K1 is the key for the case (a).
K2 is the key for the case (b).
K1 and K2 is generated by subkey generation method described in
section 3.4.2.
3.3 Input and Output
3.3.1 Input
A given block cipher and key typically fixed across most CMAC
invocations are called prerequisites. A given block cipher in
this memo is AES-128 and length of key is 128-bits (16bytes).
Other input parameters defined in this memo are 'M' denoting
the message to be authenticated and 'len' denoting the length
of message M in bytes. The total message M is denoted by sequence
of M_i where M_i is the i'th block with size 128-bit.
3.3.2 Output
The output of AES-CMAC can validate the input message.
Validating the message provide assurance of the integrity and
authenticity over the message from the source. According to
[NIST-CMAC] at least 64-bits should be used for against guessing
attack. Result of truncation should be taken in most significant
bits first order.
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3.4 Padding
AES-CMAC uses cipher block with fixed length (128-bit). There
should be a special treatment in case that the length of plaintext is
not divided by cipher block length. The special treatment is to pad
10^i bit-string for adjusting size of the last-block up to the cipher
block length.
The method of padding is described as [OMAC1].
Padding(x) means 10^i padded output with 128-bit length.
If the input x has length r-bytes, padding(x) is defined as follows:
- padding(x) = x || 10^i where i is 128-8*r-1
3.5 Subkey Generation
AES-CMAC algorithm requires the subkeys K1 and K2. K1 is used
for the case that the size of last block is equal to cipher block
size. K2 is used for the case that the size of last block is less
than cipher block size.
Through Generate_Subkey algorithm, we get K1 and K2 from the input K
which is the input key described 3.3.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Algorithm Generate_Subkey +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ Input : K (128-bit Key described in section 4.1) +
+ Output : K1 (128-bit subkey) +
+ K2 (128-bit subkey) +
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ +
+ Constants: const_Zero is 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 +
+ const_Rb is 0x00000000000000000000000000000087 +
+ Variables: L for output of AES-128 applied to 0^128 +
+ +
+ Step 1. L := AES-128(K, const_Zero); +
+ Step 2. if MSB(L) is equal to 0 +
+ then K1 := L << 1; +
+ else K1 := (L << 1) XOR const_Rb; +
+ Step 3. if MSB(K1) is equal to 0 +
+ then K2 := K1 << 1; +
+ else K2 := (K1 << 1) XOR const_Rb; +
+ Step 4. return K1, K2; +
+ +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 3.2 Generate_Subkey Algorithm
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Figure 3.2 describes the algorithm generating subkeys.
In step 1. AES-128 is applied to all zero bits with key K.
In step 2 K1 is derive through following operation:
If the most significant bit of L is equal to 0, left-shift L by 1
bit. Otherwise, exclusive-OR const_Rb with the result of 1-bit
left-shift of L.
In step 3. K2 is derived through following operation:
If the most significant bit of K1 is equal to 0, left-shift
K1 by 1 bit. Otherwise, exclusive-OR const_Rb with the result
of 1-bit left-shift of K1.
In step 4. return K1 and K2.
The mathematical meaning of procedure in step 2 and step 3 including
const_Rb can be found in [OMAC1].
3.6 AES-CMAC Generation
To perform the algorithm, we should have Generate_Subkey algorithm
which is described in section 3.4.2 and padding function which is
used in case that the size of last block is less than the cipher
block size.
Inputs of AES-CMAC are K, M, len which are described in section 3.3.
Output of AES-CMAC is T which is the authentication code described
in section 3.3.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Algorithm AES-CMAC +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ +
+ Input : K ( 128-bit Symmetric Key ) +
+ : M ( message to be authenticated ) +
+ : len ( length of message in bytes ) +
+ Output : T ( message authenticated code ) +
+ +
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
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+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ Constants: const_Zero is 0x00000000000000000000000000000000 +
+ const_Rb is 0x00000000000000000000000000000087 +
+ const_Bsize is 16 in bytes for 128-bit block +
+ +
+ Variables: K1, K2 for 128-bit subkeys +
+ M_i means i'th 128-bit block (i=1..[M/const_Bsize]) +
+ M_last for last block xor-ed with K1 or K2 +
+ n for number of block to be processed +
+ r for number of bytes of last block +
+ flag for denoting if last block is complete or not +
+ +
+ Step 1. (K1,K2) := Generate_Subkey(K); +
+ Step 2. n := [ len/const_Bsize ]; +
+ Step 3. if n = 0 +
+ then +
+ n := 1; +
+ flag := false; +
+ else +
+ if len mod const_Bsize is 0 +
+ then flag := true; +
+ else flag := false; +
+ +
+ Step 4. if flag is true +
+ then M_last := M_n XOR K1; +
+ else M_last := padding(M_n) XOR K2; +
+ Step 5. X := const_Zero; +
+ Step 6. for i := 1 to n-1 do +
+ begin +
+ Y := X XOR M_i; +
+ X := AES-128(K,Y); +
+ end +
+ Y := M_last XOR X; +
+ X := AES-128(K,Y); +
+ Step 7. return T; +
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Figure 3.3 AES-CMAC Algorithm
Figure 3.3 describes the AES-CMAC authentication code generation
algorithm
In step 1, Derive subkeys, K1 and K2 with K
In step 2, Calculate the number of blocks. The number of blocks
is a smallest integer value greater than or equal to quotient by
dividing length parameter by 128-bit (16 bytes).
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In step 3, Check if the last block is complete block.
If the input length is less than 128-bit (16 bytes), the number of
blocks to be processed shall be 1 and mark the flag as not-complete
-block (false). Otherwise, if the last block size is 128-bit, mark
the flag as complete-block (true), else mark the flag as not-
complete-block (false).
In step 4, Pre-calculate the M_last block with exclusive-OR'ing
previously calculated subkeys. If the last block is complete block
(true), exclusive-OR the last block with K1.
Otherwise, exclusive-OR the padded last block with K2.
In step 5. Initialize the variable X.
In step 6. Perform AES-CBC mode of operation with the input
message M_1 to M_{n-1}. And the M_last which is calculated in step
4, shall be the last input block for CBC mode of operation.
In step 7. we finally return authentication code with 128-bit.
4. Security Considerations
The security provided by AES-CMAC is based upon the strength of AES.
At the time of this writing there are no practical cryptographic
attacks against AES or AES-CMAC.
As is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its strength
lies in the correctness of the algorithm implementation, the security
of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the strength
of the associated secret key, and upon the correctness of the
implementation in all of the participating systems. This document
contains test vectors to assist in verifying the correctness of
AES-CMAC code.
5. Test Vectors
Following test vectors are same as those of [NIST-CMAC].
The following vectors are also output of the test program in
appendix A.
--------------------------------------------------
Subkey Generation
K 2b7e1516 28aed2a6 abf71588 09cf4f3c
AES_128(key,0) 7df76b0c 1ab899b3 3e42f047 b91b546f
K1 fbeed618 35713366 7c85e08f 7236a8de
K2 f7ddac30 6ae266cc f90bc11e e46d513b
--------------------------------------------------
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--------------------------------------------------
Example 1: len = 0
M
AES_CMAC bb1d6929 e9593728 7fa37d12 9b756746
--------------------------------------------------
Example 2: len = 16
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
AES_CMAC 070a16b4 6b4d4144 f79bdd9d d04a287c
--------------------------------------------------
Example 3: len = 40
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411
AES_CMAC dfa66747 de9ae630 30ca3261 1497c827
--------------------------------------------------
Example 4: len = 64
M 6bc1bee2 2e409f96 e93d7e11 7393172a
ae2d8a57 1e03ac9c 9eb76fac 45af8e51
30c81c46 a35ce411 e5fbc119 1a0a52ef
f69f2445 df4f9b17 ad2b417b e66c3710
AES_CMAC 51f0bebf 7e3b9d92 fc497417 79363cfe
--------------------------------------------------
6. Acknowledgement
Portions of this text were borrowed from [NIST-CMAC]. We would like
to thank to OMAC1 author Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa, and CMAC
author Morris Dworkin, and special thanks to David Johnston for
providing AES cipher block test code.
7. Author's Address
Junhyuk Song
Samsung Electronics
+82-31-279-3639
santajunman@hanafos.com
Jicheol Lee
Samsung Electronics
+82-31-279-3605
jicheol.lee@samsung.com
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8. References
[NIST-CMAC] NIST, Special Publication 800-38B Draft,"Recommendation
for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Method
for Authentication," March 9, 2005
[AES] NIST, FIPS 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),"
November 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/
fips197/fips-197.pdf
[OMAC1] "OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC," Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa,
Department of Computer and Information Sciences,
Ilbaraki University, March 10, 2003.
[XCBC] Black, J. and P. Rogaway, "A Suggestion for Handling
Arbitrary-Length Messages with the CBC MAC," NIST
Second Modes of Operation Workshop, August 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes/
xcbc-mac/xcbc-mac-spec.pdf
Appendix A. Test Code
/****************************************************************/
/* AES-CMAC with AES-128 bit */
/* AES-128 from David Johnston (802.16) */
/* CMAC Algorithm described in SP800-38B draft */
/* Author: Junhyuk Song (junhyuk.song@samsung.com) */
/* Jicheol Lee (jicheol.lee@samsung.com) */
/****************************************************************/
#include
/******** SBOX Table *********/
unsigned char sbox_table[256] = {
0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5,
0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xab, 0x76,
0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0,
0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4, 0x72, 0xc0,
0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc,
0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8, 0x31, 0x15,
0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a,
0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27, 0xb2, 0x75,
0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0,
0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3, 0x2f, 0x84,
0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b,
0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x58, 0xcf,
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0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85,
0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c, 0x9f, 0xa8,
0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5,
0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff, 0xf3, 0xd2,
0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x73,
0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88,
0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e, 0x0b, 0xdb,
0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c,
0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xe4, 0x79,
0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9,
0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a, 0xae, 0x08,
0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6,
0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd, 0x8b, 0x8a,
0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e,
0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1, 0x1d, 0x9e,
0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94,
0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55, 0x28, 0xdf,
0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68,
0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54, 0xbb, 0x16
};
/* For CMAC Calculation */
unsigned char const_Rb[16] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x87
};
unsigned char const_Zero[16] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
};
/*****************************/
/**** Function Prototypes ****/
/*****************************/
void xor_128(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out);
void xor_32(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out);
unsigned char sbox(unsigned char a);
void next_key(unsigned char *key, int round);
void byte_sub(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
void shift_row(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
void mix_column(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
void add_round_key( unsigned char *shiftrow_in,
unsigned char *mcol_in,
unsigned char *block_in,
int round,
unsigned char *out);
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void AES_128(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *data, unsigned char
*ciphertext);
void leftshift_onebit(unsigned char *input,unsigned char *output);
/****************************************/
/* AES_128() */
/* Performs a 128 bit AES encrypt with */
/* 128 bit data. */
/****************************************/
void xor_128(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out)
{
int i;
for (i=0;i<16; i++)
{
out[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
}
}
void xor_32(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b, unsigned char *out)
{
int i;
for (i=0;i<4; i++)
{
out[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
}
}
unsigned char sbox(unsigned char a)
{
return sbox_table[(int)a];
}
void next_key(unsigned char *key, int round)
{
unsigned char rcon;
unsigned char sbox_key[4];
unsigned char rcon_table[12] = {
0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80,
0x1b, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};
sbox_key[0] = sbox(key[13]);
sbox_key[1] = sbox(key[14]);
sbox_key[2] = sbox(key[15]);
sbox_key[3] = sbox(key[12]);
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rcon = rcon_table[round];
xor_32(&key[0], sbox_key, &key[0]);
key[0] = key[0] ^ rcon;
xor_32(&key[4], &key[0], &key[4]);
xor_32(&key[8], &key[4], &key[8]);
xor_32(&key[12], &key[8], &key[12]);
}
void byte_sub(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
int i;
for (i=0; i< 16; i++)
{
out[i] = sbox(in[i]);
}
}
void shift_row(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
out[0] = in[0];
out[1] = in[5];
out[2] = in[10];
out[3] = in[15];
out[4] = in[4];
out[5] = in[9];
out[6] = in[14];
out[7] = in[3];
out[8] = in[8];
out[9] = in[13];
out[10] = in[2];
out[11] = in[7];
out[12] = in[12];
out[13] = in[1];
out[14] = in[6];
out[15] = in[11];
}
void mix_column(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
int i;
unsigned char add1b[4];
unsigned char add1bf7[4];
unsigned char rotl[4];
unsigned char swap_halfs[4];
unsigned char andf7[4];
unsigned char rotr[4];
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unsigned char temp[4];
unsigned char tempb[4];
for (i=0 ; i<4; i++)
{
if ((in[i] & 0x80)== 0x80)
add1b[i] = 0x1b;
else
add1b[i] = 0x00;
}
swap_halfs[0] = in[2]; /* Swap halfs */
swap_halfs[1] = in[3];
swap_halfs[2] = in[0];
swap_halfs[3] = in[1];
rotl[0] = in[3]; /* Rotate left 8 bits */
rotl[1] = in[0];
rotl[2] = in[1];
rotl[3] = in[2];
andf7[0] = in[0] & 0x7f;
andf7[1] = in[1] & 0x7f;
andf7[2] = in[2] & 0x7f;
andf7[3] = in[3] & 0x7f;
for (i = 3; i>0; i--) /* logical shift left 1 bit */
{
andf7[i] = andf7[i] << 1;
if ((andf7[i-1] & 0x80) == 0x80)
{
andf7[i] = (andf7[i] | 0x01);
}
}
andf7[0] = andf7[0] << 1;
andf7[0] = andf7[0] & 0xfe;
xor_32(add1b, andf7, add1bf7);
xor_32(in, add1bf7, rotr);
temp[0] = rotr[0]; /* Rotate right 8 bits */
rotr[0] = rotr[1];
rotr[1] = rotr[2];
rotr[2] = rotr[3];
rotr[3] = temp[0];
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xor_32(add1bf7, rotr, temp);
xor_32(swap_halfs, rotl,tempb);
xor_32(temp, tempb, out);
}
void AES_128(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *data, unsigned char
*ciphertext)
{
int round;
int i;
unsigned char intermediatea[16];
unsigned char intermediateb[16];
unsigned char round_key[16];
for(i=0; i<16; i++) round_key[i] = key[i];
for (round = 0; round < 11; round++)
{
if (round == 0)
{
xor_128(round_key, data, ciphertext);
next_key(round_key, round);
}
else if (round == 10)
{
byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
xor_128(intermediateb, round_key, ciphertext);
}
else /* 1 - 9 */
{
byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
mix_column(&intermediateb[0], &intermediatea[0]);
mix_column(&intermediateb[4], &intermediatea[4]);
mix_column(&intermediateb[8], &intermediatea[8]);
mix_column(&intermediateb[12], &intermediatea[12]);
xor_128(intermediatea, round_key, ciphertext);
next_key(round_key, round);
}
}
}
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void print_hex(char *str, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
int i;
for ( i=0; i=0; i-- ) {
output[i] = input[i] << 1;
output[i] |= overflow;
overflow = (input[i] & 0x80)?1:0;
}
return;
}
void generate_subkey(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *K1, unsigned
char *K2)
{
unsigned char L[16];
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unsigned char Z[16];
unsigned char tmp[16];
int i;
for ( i=0; i<16; i++ ) Z[i] = 0;
AES_128(key,Z,L);
if ( (L[0] & 0x80) == 0 ) { /* If MSB(L) = 0, then K1 = L << 1 */
leftshift_onebit(L,K1);
} else { /* Else K1 = ( L << 1 ) (+) Rb */
leftshift_onebit(L,tmp);
xor_128(tmp,const_Rb,K1);
}
if ( (K1[0] & 0x80) == 0 ) {
leftshift_onebit(K1,K2);
} else {
leftshift_onebit(K1,tmp);
xor_128(tmp,const_Rb,K2);
}
return;
}
void padding ( unsigned char *lastb, unsigned char *pad, int length )
{
int j;
/* original last block */
for ( j=0; j<16; j++ ) {
if ( j < length ) {
pad[j] = lastb[j];
} else if ( j == length ) {
pad[j] = 0x80;
} else {
pad[j] = 0x00;
}
}
}
void AES_CMAC ( unsigned char *key, unsigned char *input, int length,
unsigned char *mac )
{
unsigned char X[16],Y[16], M_last[16], padded[16];
unsigned char K1[16], K2[16];
int n, i, flag;
generate_subkey(key,K1,K2);
n = (length+15) / 16; /* n is number of rounds */
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if ( n == 0 ) {
n = 1;
flag = 0;
} else {
if ( (length%16) == 0 ) { /* last block is a complete block */
flag = 1;
} else { /* last block is not complete block */
flag = 0;
}
}
if ( flag ) { /* last block is complete block */
xor_128(&input[16*(n-1)],K1,M_last);
} else {
padding(&input[16*(n-1)],padded,length%16);
xor_128(padded,K2,M_last);
}
for ( i=0; i<16; i++ ) X[i] = 0;
for ( i=0; i\n");
AES_CMAC(key,M,0,T);
printf("AES_CMAC "); print128(T); printf("\n");
printf("\nExample 2: len = 16\n");
printf("M "); print_hex(" ",M,16);
AES_CMAC(key,M,16,T);
printf("AES_CMAC "); print128(T); printf("\n");
printf("\nExample 3: len = 40\n");
printf("M "); print_hex(" ",M,40);
AES_CMAC(key,M,40,T);
printf("AES_CMAC "); print128(T); printf("\n");
printf("\nExample 4: len = 64\n");
printf("M "); print_hex(" ",M,64);
AES_CMAC(key,M,64,T);
printf("AES_CMAC "); print128(T); printf("\n");
printf("--------------------------------------------------\n");
return 0;
}
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