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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-trammell-panrg-questions-00" category="info">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="PAN questions">Open Questions in Path Aware Networking</title>

    <author initials="B." surname="Trammell" fullname="Brian Trammell">
      <organization>ETH Zurich</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Gloriastrasse 35</street>
          <city>8092 Zurich</city>
          <country>Switzerland</country>
        </postal>
        <email>ietf@trammell.ch</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2017" month="October" day="24"/>

    
    <workgroup>Path Aware Networking RG</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

    <abstract>


<t>write me</t>



    </abstract>


  </front>

  <middle>


<section anchor="introduction-to-path-aware-networking" title="Introduction to Path-Aware Networking">

<t>In the current Internet architecture, the network layer provides an
unverifiable, best-effort service: an application can assume that a packet
with a given destination address will eventually be forwarded toward that
destination, but little else. A transport layer protocol such as TCP can
provide reliability over this best-effort service, and a protocol above the
network layer such as IPsec AH <xref target="RFC4302"/> or TLS <xref target="RFC5246"/> can
authenticate the remote endpoint. However, no explicit information about the
path is available, and assumptions about that path sometimes do not hold,
sometimes with serious impacts on the application, as in the case with BGP
hijacking attacks.</t>

<t>By contrast, in a path-aware networking architecture, endpoints have the
ability to select or influence the path through the network used by any given
packet, and the network layer explicitly exposes information about the path or
paths available between two endpoints to those endpoints so that they can make
this selection. Path control at the packet level enables new transport
protocols that can leverage multipath connectivity even over a single
interface.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="questions" title="Questions">

<t>Realizing path-aware networking requires answers to a set of open research
questions. This document poses these questions, as a starting point for
discussions about how to realize path awareness in the Internet, and to direct
future research efforts within the Path Aware Networking Research Group.</t>

<section anchor="a-vocabulary-of-path-properties" title="A Vocabulary of Path Properties">

<t>In order for information about paths to be exposed to the endpoints, and for
those endpoints to be able to use that information, it is necessary to define
a common vocabulary for path properties. The elements of this vocabulary could
include relatively static properties, such as the presence of a given node on
the path; as well as relatively dynamic properties, such as the current values
of metrics such as loss and latency.</t>

<t>This vocabulary must be defined carefully, as its design will have impacts on
the expressiveness of a given path-aware internetworking architecture. This
expressiveness also exhibits tradeoffs. For example, a system that exposes
node-level information for the topology through each network would maximize
information about the individual components of the path at the endpoints at
the expense of making internal network topology universally public, which may
be in conflict with the business goals of each network’s operator.</t>

<t>The first question is therefore: how are path properties defined and represented?</t>

</section>
<section anchor="discovery-distribution-and-trustworthiness-of-path-properties" title="Discovery, Distribution, and Trustworthiness of Path Properties">

<t>Once endpoints and networks have a shared vocabulary for expressing path
properties, the network must have some method for distributing those path
properties to the endpoint. Regardless of how path property information is
distributed to the endpoints, the endpoints require a method to authenticate
the properties – to determine that they originated from and pertain to the
path that they purport to. The end goal of authentication is not necessarily
to establish that a given property is actually bound to a given path, but to
ensure that the information is trustworthy, that actions taken based on it
will have the predicted result.</t>

<t>Choices in an distribution and authentication methods will have impacts on the
scalability of a path-aware architecture. Possible dimensions in the space of
distribution methods include in-band versus out-of-band, push versus pull
versus publish-subscribe, and so on. There are temporal issues with path
property dissemination as well, especially with dynamic properties, since the
measurement or elicitation of dynamic properties may be outdated by the time
that information is available at the endpoints, and interactions between the
measurement and dissemination delay may exhibit pathological behavior for
unlucky points in the parameter space.</t>

<t>The second question: how do endpoints get access to trustworthy path properties?</t>

</section>
<section anchor="supporting-path-selection" title="Supporting Path Selection">

<t>Access to trustworthy path properties is only half of the challenge in
establishing a path-aware architecture. Endpoints must be able to use this
information in order to select paths for traffic they send. As with path
property distribution, choices made in path selection methods will also have
an impact on the scalability and expressiveness of a path-aware architecture,
and dimensions included in-band versus out-of-band, as well. Paths may also be
selected on multiple levels of granularity – per packet, per flow, per
aggregate – and this choice also has impacts on the scalabilty/expressiveness
tradeoff.</t>

<t>The third question: how can endpoints select paths to use for traffic in a way
that can be trusted by the network?</t>

</section>
<section anchor="interfaces-for-path-awareness" title="Interfaces for Path Awareness">

<t>In order for applications to make effective use of a path-aware networking
architecture, the interfaces presented by the network and transport layers
must also expose path properties to the application in a useful way, and
provide a useful selection for path selection. Path selection must be possible
based not only on the preferences and policies of the application developer,
but of end-users as well.</t>

<t>The fourth question: how can interfaces to the transport and application
layers support the use of path awareness?</t>

</section>
<section anchor="operating-a-path-aware-network" title="Operating a Path Aware Network">

<t>The network operations model in the current Internet architecture assumes that
traffic flows are controlled by the decisions and policies made by network
operators, as expressed in interdomain routing protocols. In a path-aware
network with effective path selection, however, this assumption no longer
holds, as endpoints may react to path properties by selecting alternate paths.
Competing control inputs from path-aware endpoints and the interdomain routing
control plane may lead to more difficult traffic engineering or nonconvergent
routing, especially if the endpoints’ and operators’ idea of the “best” path
for given traffic differs significantly.</t>

<t>The fifth question: how can a path aware network in a path aware internetwork
be effectively operated?</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="acknowledgments" title="Acknowledgments">

<t>Many thanks to Adrian Perrig, Jean-Pierre Smith, Mirja Kuehlewind, and Olivier
Bonaventure, for discussions leading to questions in this document.</t>

<t>This work is partially supported by the European Commission under Horizon 2020
grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture for a Middleboxed
Internet (MAMI), and by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research, and
Innovation under contract no. 15.0268. This support does not imply endorsement.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>

    <references title='Normative References'>





<reference  anchor="RFC4302" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302'>
<front>
<title>IP Authentication Header</title>
<author initials='S.' surname='Kent' fullname='S. Kent'><organization /></author>
<date year='2005' month='December' />
<abstract><t>This document describes an updated version of the IP Authentication Header (AH), which is designed to provide authentication services in IPv4 and IPv6.  This document obsoletes RFC 2402 (November 1998).  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4302'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4302'/>
</reference>



<reference  anchor="RFC5246" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246'>
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
<author initials='T.' surname='Dierks' fullname='T. Dierks'><organization /></author>
<author initials='E.' surname='Rescorla' fullname='E. Rescorla'><organization /></author>
<date year='2008' month='August' />
<abstract><t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet.  The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5246'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5246'/>
</reference>




    </references>




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