Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-des-cbc


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Network Working Group                                          P Metzger
Internet Draft                                                    P Karn
                                                             W A Simpson
expires in six months                                         March 1995

                       The ESP DES-CBC Transform
                  draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-des-cbc-03.txt                     |

Status of this Memo

   This document is a submission to the IP Security Working Group of the
   Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).  Comments should be submitted
   to the mailing list.

   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

   This document is an Internet-Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
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   Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
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   This document describes the DES-CBC security transform for the IP      |
   Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).

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1.  Introduction

   The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [A-ESP] provides
   confidentiality and integrity by encrypting the data to be protected.

   This specification describes the ESP use of the Cipher Block Chaining
   (CBC) mode of the US Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm [FIPS-
   46, FIPS-46-1, FIPS-74, FIPS-81].

   All implementations that claim conformance or compliance with the
   Encapsulating Security Payload specification MUST implement this
   DES-CBC transform.

   Implementors should consult the most recent version of the IAB
   Standards [RFC-1610] for further guidance on the status of this

   This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the related
   document "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [A-SA],
   which defines the overall security plan for IP, and provides
   important background for this specification.

1.1.  Keys

   The secret DES key shared between the communicating parties is eight   |
   octets in length.  This key consists of a 56-bit quantity used by the
   DES algorithm.  The 56-bit key is stored as a 64-bit (eight octet)
   quantity, with the least significant bit of each octet used as a
   parity bit.

1.2.  Initialization Vector

   This mode of DES requires an Initialization Vector (IV) that is eight  |
   octets in length.

   Each datagram contains its own IV.  Including the IV in each datagram
   ensures that decryption of each received datagram can be performed,
   even when other datagrams are dropped, or datagrams are re-ordered in

   The method for selection of the IV values is implementation

      Note: A common technique is simply a counter, beginning with a

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      randomly chosen value.  Other implementations also exhibit
      unpredictability, usually through a pseudo-random number
      generator.  Care should be taken that the periodicity of the
      number generator is long enough to prevent repetition during the
      lifetime of the session key.

1.3.  Data Size

   The DES algorithm operates on blocks of eight octets.  This often      |
   requires padding after the end of the unencrypted payload data.

   Both input and output result in the same number of octets, which
   facilitates in-place encryption and decryption.

   On receipt, if the length of the data to be decrypted is not an
   integral multiple of 8 octets, then an error is indicated.  The
   datagram is discarded, and an appropriate ICMP message is returned.
   The failure SHOULD be recorded in the system or audit log, including   |
   the cleartext values for the Security Parameters Index (SPI),
   date/time, Source, Destination, and other identifying information.

1.4.  Performance

   At the time of writing, at least one hardware implementation can
   encrypt or decrypt at about 1 Gbps [Schneier94, p. 231].

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2.  Payload Format

   |                Security Parameters Index (SPI)                |      |
   |                                                               |
   ~                   Initialization Vector (IV)                  ~
   |                                                               |
   |                                                               |
   ~                          Payload Data                         ~
   |                                                               |
             ... Padding           |  Pad Length   |   Data Type   |

   Security Parameters Index (SPI)                                        |

      A 32-bit value identifying the Security Parameters for this
      datagram.  The value MUST NOT be zero.

   Initialization Vector

      The size of this field is variable, though for any given SPI it
      has a particular known size.  Its position and size are constant
      for all DES-CBC datagrams of the same SPI and IP Destination.

      The field size MUST be a multiple of 32-bits.  Octets are sent in
      network order.

      When the size is 32-bits, a 64-bit value is formed from the 32-bit
      value followed by (concatentated with) the bit-wise complement of
      the 32-bit value.  This field size is most common, as it aligns
      the Payload Data for both 32-bit and 64-bit processing.

      All conformant implementations MUST also correctly process a 64-
      bit field size.  This provides strict compatibility with existing
      hardware implementations.

         It is the intent that the value not repeat during the lifetime
         of the encryption session key.  Even when a full 64-bit IV is
         used, the session key SHOULD be changed at least as frequently
         as 2**32 datagrams.

      This field is considered to be transparent, though most users will
      not be able to make sense of its contents.

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   Payload Data

      The size of this field is variable.  This field is opaque.

      Prior to encryption and after decryption, the contents of this
      field begins with an entire IP datagram (Tunnel-Mode), or another
      IP Protocol/Payload header (Transport-Mode).


      The size of this field is variable.  This field is opaque.

      Prior to encryption, it is filled with unspecified implementation
      dependent (preferably random) values.

      After decryption, it MUST be ignored.

   Pad Length

      This field indicates the size of the Padding field.  It does not
      include the Pad Length and Data Type fields.  The value typically
      ranges from 0 to 7, but may be up to 255 to permit hiding of the
      actual data length.

      This field is opaque.  That is, the value is set prior to
      encryption, and is examined only after decryption.

   Data Type

      This field indicates the contents of the Payload Data field, using
      the IP Protocol/Payload value.  Up-to-date values of the IP
      Protocol/Payload are specified in the most recent "Assigned
      Numbers" [RFC-1700].

      This field is opaque.  That is, the value is set prior to
      encryption, and is examined only after decryption.

         For example, when encrypting an entire IP datagram (Tunnel-
         Mode), this field will contain the value 4, which indicates
         IP-in-IP encapsulation.

3.  Algorithm

   In DES-CBC, the base DES encryption function is applied to the XOR of
   each plaintext block with the previous ciphertext block to yield the
   ciphertext for the current block.  In formalized notation,

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      DES-CBC:    C[n] = E[k](P[n] XOR C[n-1])
                  P[n] = C[n-1] XOR D[k](C[n])

      E[k](X) indicates the DES encryption function with key k performed
      upon block X.

      D[k](X) indicates the DES decryption function with key k upon
      block X.

      P[n] indicates plaintext block n.

      C[n] indicates ciphertext block n.

      A XOR B indicates the bitwise exclusive-or of blocks A and B.

      For more explanation and implementation information for DES, see

3.1.  Encryption

   Append zero or more octets of (preferably random) padding to the
   plaintext, to make its modulo 8 length equal to 6.  For example, if
   the plaintext length is 41, 5 octets of padding are added.

   Append a Pad Length octet containing the number of padding octets
   just added.

   Append a Data Type octet containing the IP Protocol/Payload value
   which identifies the protocol header that begins the payload.

   Provide an Initialization Vector (IV) of the size indicated by the

   Encrypt the payload with DES in CBC mode, producing a ciphertext of
   the same length.

   Octets are mapped to DES blocks in network order.  Octet 0 (modulo 8)
   of the payload corresponds to bits 1-8 of the 64-bit DES input block,
   while octet 7 (modulo 8) corresponds to bits 57-64 of the DES input

   Contruct a new IP datagram for the target Destination, with the
   indicated SPI, IV, and payload.

   The Total/Payload Length in the IP Header reflects the length of the

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   encrypted data, plus the SPI, IV, padding, pad length, and data type

3.2.  Decryption

   First, the SPI field is removed and examined.  This is used as an      |
   index into the local Security Parameter table to find the negotiated   |
   parameters and decryption key.

   The negotiated form of the IV determines the size of the IV field.
   These octets are removed, and an appropriate 64-bit IV value is

   The encrypted part of the payload is decrypted using DES in the CBC

   The Data Type is removed and examined.  If it is unrecognized, the
   payload is discarded with an appropriate ICMP message.

   The Pad Length is removed and examined.  The specified number of pad
   octets are removed from the end of the decrypted payload, and the IP
   Total/Payload Length is adjusted accordingly.

   The IP Header(s) and the remaining portion of the decrypted payload
   are passed to the protocol receive routine specified by the Data Type

Security Considerations

   Users need to understand that the quality of the security provided by
   this specification depends completely on the strength of the DES
   algorithm, the correctness of that algorithm's implementation, the
   security of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the
   strength of the key [CN94], and upon the correctness of the
   implementations in all of the participating nodes.

   Among other considerations, applications may wish to take care not to
   select weak keys, although the odds of picking one at random are low
   [Schneier94, p 233].

   At the time of writing of this document, [BS93] demonstrated a         *
   differential cryptanalysis based chosen-plaintext attack requiring
   2^47 plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and [Matsui94] demonstrated a linear
   cryptanalysis based known-plaintext attack requiring only 2^43

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   plaintext-ciphertext pairs.  Although these attacks are not
   considered practical, they must be taken into account.

   More disturbingly, [Weiner94] has shown the design of a DES cracking
   machine costing $1 Million that can crack one key every 3.5 hours.
   This is an extremely practical attack.  The Unicity distance for DES
   is only a couple of blocks, and changing the session key frequently
   will not mitigate the brute force attack.

   It is suggested that DES is not a good encryption algorithm for the
   protection of even moderate value information in the face of such
   equipment.  Triple DES is probably a better choice for such purposes.


   Some of the text of this specification was derived from work by        |
   Randall Atkinson for the SIP, SIPP, and IPv6 Working Groups.

   The use of DES for confidentiality is closely modeled on the work
   done for SNMPv2 [RFC-1446].

   Steve Bellovin, Steve Deering, Charles Lynn, and Dave Mihelcic
   provided useful critiques of earlier versions of this draft.


   [A-SA]   Randall Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the Internet
            Protocol", work in progress.

   [A-ESP]  Randall Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Protocol
            (ESP)", work in progress.

   [BS93]   Biham, E., and Shamir, A., "Differential Cryptanalysis of
            the Data Encryption Standard", Berlin: Springer-Verlag,

   [CN94]   Carroll, J.M., and Nudiati, S., "On Weak Keys and Weak Data:
            Foiling the Two Nemeses", Cryptologia, Vol. 18 No. 23 pp.
            253-280, July 1994.

            US National Bureau of Standards, "Data Encryption Standard",
            Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
            46, January 1977.

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            US National Bureau of Standards, "Data Encryption Standard",
            Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
            46-1, January 1988.

            US National Bureau of Standards, "Guidelines for
            Implementing and Using the Data Encryption Standard",
            Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
            74, April 1981.

            US National Bureau of Standards, "DES Modes of Operation"
            Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication
            81, December 1980.

            Matsui, M., "Linear Cryptanalysis method dor DES Cipher,"
            Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt '93 Proceedings, Berlin:
            Springer-Verlag, 1994.

            Galvin, J., and McCloghrie, K., "Security Protocols for
            Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
            (SNMPv2)", RFC-1446, DDN Network Information Center, April

            Postel, J., "Internet Official Protocol Standards", STD 1,
            RFC 1610, USC/Information Sciences Institute, July 1994.

            Reynolds, J., and Postel, J., "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, RFC
            1700, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994.

            Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography", John Wiley & Sons, New
            York, NY, 1994.  ISBN 0-471-59756-2

            Wiener, M.J., "Efficient DES Key Search", School of Computer
            Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, TR-244, May
            1994.  Presented at the Rump Session of Crypto '93.

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Author's Address

   Questions about this memo can also be directed to:

      Perry Metzger
      Piermont Information Systems Inc.
      160 Cabrini Blvd., Suite #2
      New York, NY  10033

      Phil Karn
      Qualcomm, Inc.
      6455 Lusk Blvd.
      San Diego, California  92121-2779

      William Allen Simpson
      Computer Systems Consulting Services
      1384 Fontaine
      Madison Heights, Michigan  48071

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                           Table of Contents

     1.     Introduction ..........................................    1
        1.1       Keys ............................................    1
        1.2       Initialization Vector ...........................    1
        1.3       Data Size .......................................    2
        1.4       Performance .....................................    2

     2.     Payload Format ........................................    3

     3.     Algorithm .............................................    4
        3.1       Encryption ......................................    5
        3.2       Decryption ......................................    6

     SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ......................................    6

     ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................    7

     REFERENCES ...................................................    7

     AUTHOR'S ADDRESS .............................................    8