Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls
draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls
MMUSIC Working Group C. Holmberg
Internet-Draft I. Sedlacek
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson
Expires: December 22, 2014 G. Salgueiro
Cisco
June 20, 2014
UDP Transport Layer (UDPTL) over Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)
draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-10
Abstract
This document specifies how the UDP Transport Layer (UDPTL) protocol,
the predominant transport protocol for T.38 fax, can be transported
over the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, how the
usage of UDPTL over DTLS is indicated in the Session Description
Protocol (SDP), and how UDPTL over DTLS is negotiated in a session
established using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 22, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Secure Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. SDP Offerer/Answerer Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Generating the Initial Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Generating the Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Offerer Processing of the Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.5. Modifying the Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Miscellaneous Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Anonymous Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. NAT Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. ICE Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.2. STUN Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Compatibility With UDPTL over UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.2. Basic Message Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.3. Message Flow Of T.38 Fax Replacing Audio Media Stream in
An Existing Audio-Only Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1. Introduction
While it is possible to transmit highly sensitive documents using
traditional telephony encryption devices, secure fax on the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) was never widely considered or
prioritized. This was mainly because of the challenges involved with
malevolent physical access to telephony equipment. As real-time
communications transition to IP networks, where information might
potentially be intercepted or spoofed, an appropriate level of
security for fax that offers integrity and confidentiality protection
is vital.
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The overwhelmingly predominant fax transport protocol is UDPTL-based,
as described in section 9.1 of [ITU.T38.2010]. The protocol stack
for fax transport using UDPTL is shown in Figure 1.
+-----------------------------+
| Internet facsimile protocol |
+-----------------------------+
| UDPTL |
+-----------------------------+
| UDP |
+-----------------------------+
| IP |
+-----------------------------+
Figure 1: Protocol stack for UDPTL over UDP
The following mechanisms are available for securing fax:
o [ITU.T30.2005] Annex H specifies a transport protocol-independent
application-layer integrity and confidentiality protection of fax
based on the RSA algorithm for use with the T.30 telephony
protocol by Group 3 facsimile equipment (G3FE).
o [ITU.T38.2010] specifies fax transport over RTP/SAVP which enables
integrity and confidentiality protection of fax in IP network.
Both of these mechanisms have been available for many years and never
gained any significant adoption in the market. This has prompted an
effort to develop an open standards-based approach to secure fax
communications over an IP-based transport.
Telephony-based protocols like T.30 offer application-level security
options like the RSA-based approached detailed in Annex H of the T.30
specification. The problem is that it is very sparingly implemented
and not enforced at the transport level.
It is worth noting that while T.38 over RTP offers a very viable
option for such standards-based IP security solution using SRTP, this
fax over IP transport never gained any traction in the market place
and accounts for a negligible percentage of fax over IP
implementations.
Thus, security mechanisms offering integrity and confidentiality
protection should be limited to UDPTL-based fax transport, which is
the only broad-based fax over IP solution. The 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) launched a study on how best to provide
secure fax in the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) for UDPTL. Results
of the study confirmed that this security was best achieved by using
UDPTL over DTLS.
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This document specifies fax transport using UDPTL over DTLS
[RFC6347], which enables integrity and confidentiality protection of
fax in IP networks. The protocol stack which enhances fax transport
to offer integrity and confidentiality using UDPTL over DTLS is shown
in Figure 2.
+-----------------------------+
| Internet facsimile protocol |
+-----------------------------+
| UDPTL |
+-----------------------------+
| DTLS |
+-----------------------------+
| UDP |
+-----------------------------+
| IP |
+-----------------------------+
Figure 2: Protocol stack for UDPTL over DTLS over UDP
The primary motivations for the mechanism in this document are:
o The design of DTLS [RFC6347] is clearly defined and well
understood and implementations are widely available.
o No DTLS extensions are required in order to enable UDPTL transport
over DTLS.
o Fax transport using UDPTL over DTLS only requires insertion of the
DTLS layer between the UDPTL layer and the UDP layer, as shown in
Figure 2. The UDPTL layer and the layers above the UDPTL layer
require no modifications.
o UDPTL [ITU.T38.2010] is by far the most widely deployed fax
transport protocol in IP networks.
o 3GPP and the IP fax community need a mechanism to transport UDPTL
over DTLS in order to provide secure fax in SIP-based networks
(including IMS).
This document specifies the transport of UDPTL over DTLS using the
DTLS record layer "application_data" packets [RFC5246] [RFC6347].
Since the DTLS record layer "application_data" packet does not
indicate whether it carries UDPTL, or some other protocol, the usage
of a dedicated DTLS association for transport of UDPTL needs to be
negotiated, e.g. using the Session Description Protocol (SDP)
[RFC4566] and the SDP offer/answer mechanism [RFC3264].
Therefore, this document specifies a new <proto> value [RFC4566] for
the SDP media description ("m=" line) [RFC3264], in order to indicate
UDPTL over DTLS in SDP messages [RFC4566].
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2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119].
DTLS uses the term "session" to refer to a long-lived set of keying
material that spans DTLS associations. In this document, in order to
be consistent with SIP/SDP usage of "session" terminology, we use
"session" to refer to a multimedia session and use the term "DTLS
session" to refer to the DTLS construct. We use the term "DTLS
association" to refer to a particular DTLS cipher suite and keying
material set that is associated with a single host/port quartet. The
same DTLS session can be used to establish the keying material for
multiple DTLS associations. For consistency with other SIP/SDP
usage, we use the term "connection" when what's being referred to is
a multimedia stream that is not specifically DTLS.
3. Secure Channel
The UDPTL over DTLS media stream is negotiated using the SDP offer/
answer mechanism [RFC3264]. See Section 4 for more details.
DTLS is used as specified in [RFC6347]. Once the DTLS handshake is
successfully completed (in order to prevent facsimile data from being
transmitted insecurely), the UDPTL packets MUST be transported in
DTLS record layer "application_data" packets.
4. SDP Offerer/Answerer Procedures
4.1. General
An endpoint (i.e. both the offerer and the answerer) MUST create an
SDP media description ("m=" line) for each UDPTL over DTLS media
stream, and MUST assign a UDP/TLS/UDPTL value (see Table 1) to the
"proto" field of the "m=" line.
The procedures in this section apply to an "m=" line associated with
a UDPTL over DTLS media stream.
In order to negotiate a UDPTL over DTLS media stream, the following
SDP attributes are used:
o The SDP attributes defined for UDPTL over UDP, as described in
[ITU.T38.2010]; and
o The SDP attributes, defined in [RFC4145] and [RFC4572], as
described in this section.
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The endpoint MUST NOT use the SDP "connection" attribute [RFC4145].
In order to negotiate the TLS roles for the UDPTL over DTLS transport
connection, the endpoint MUST use the SDP "setup" attribute
[RFC4145].
If the endpoint supports, and is willing to use, a cipher suite with
an associated certificate, the endpoint MUST include an SDP
"fingerprint" attribute [RFC4572]. The endpoint MUST support SHA-256
for generating and verifying the SDP "fingerprint" attribute value.
The use of SHA-256 is preferred. UPDPTL over DTLS, at a minimum,
MUST support TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and MUST support
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. UDPTL over DTLS MUST prefer
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and any other Perfect Forward
Secrecy (PFS) cipher suites over non-PFS cipher suites.
Implementations SHOULD disable TLS-level compression.
If a cipher suite with an associated certificate is selected during
the DTLS handshake, the certificate received during the DTLS
handshake MUST match the fingerprint received in the SDP
"fingerprint" attribute. If the fingerprint does not match the
hashed certificate, then the endpoint MUST tear down the media
session immediately. Note that it is permissible to wait until the
other side's fingerprint has been received before establishing the
connection; however, this may have undesirable latency effects.
4.2. Generating the Initial Offer
The offerer SHOULD assign the SDP "setup" attribute with a value of
"actpass", unless the offerer insists on being either the sender or
receiver of the DTLS ClientHello message, in which case the offerer
can use either a value of "active" (the offerer will be the sender of
ClientHello) or "passive" (the offerer will be the receiver of
ClientHello). The offerer MUST NOT assign an SDP "setup" attribute
with a "holdconn" value.
If the offerer assigns the SDP "setup" attribute with a value of
"actpass" or "passive", the offerer MUST be prepared to receive a
DTLS ClientHello message before it receives the SDP answer.
4.3. Generating the Answer
If the answerer accepts the offered UDPTL over DTLS transport
connection, in the associated SDP answer the answerer MUST assign an
SDP "setup" attribute with a value of either "active" or "passive",
according to the procedures in [RFC4145]. The answerer MUST NOT
assign an SDP "setup" attribute with a value of "holdconn".
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If the answerer assigns an SDP "setup" attribute with a value of
"active" value, the answerer MUST initiate a DTLS handshake by
sending a DTLS ClientHello message on the negotiated media stream,
towards the IP address and port of the offerer.
4.4. Offerer Processing of the Answer
When the offerer receives an SDP answer, if the offerer ends up being
active it MUST initiate a DTLS handshake by sending a DTLS
ClientHello message on the negotiated media stream, towards the IP
address and port of the answerer.
4.5. Modifying the Session
Once an offer/answer exchange has been completed, either endpoint MAY
send a new offer in order to modify the session. The endpoints can
reuse the existing DTLS association if the key fingerprint values and
transport parameters indicated by each endpoint are unchanged.
Otherwise, following the rules as for the initial offer/answer
exchange, the endpoints can negotiate and create a new DTLS
association and, once created, delete the previous DTLS association,
following the same rules for the initial offer/answer exchange. Each
endpoint needs to be prepared to receive data on both the new and old
DTLS associations, as long as both are alive.
5. Miscellaneous Considerations
5.1. Anonymous Calls
When making anonymous calls, a new self-signed certificate SHOULD be
used for each call and attributes inside the certificate MUST NOT
contain information that either allows correlation or identification
of the user making anonymous calls. This is particularly important
for the subjectAltName and commonName attributes.
5.2. NAT Traversal
5.2.1. ICE Usage
When ICE [RFC5245] is being used, the ICE connectivity checks are
performed before the DTLS handshake begins. Note that if aggressive
nomination mode is used, multiple candidate pairs may be marked valid
before ICE finally converges on a single candidate pair. UAs MUST
treat all ICE candidate pairs associated with a single component as
part of the same DTLS association. Thus, there will be only one DTLS
handshake even if there are multiple valid candidate pairs. Note
that this may mean adjusting the endpoint IP addresses if the
selected candidate pair shifts, just as if the DTLS packets were an
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ordinary media stream. In case of an ICE restart, the DTLS handshake
procedure is repeated and a new DTLS association is created. Once
the DTLS handshake is completed ,and the new DTLS association has
been created, the previous DTLS association is deleted.
5.2.2. STUN Interaction
The UA MUST send the STUN packets [RFC5389] directly over UDP, not
over DTLS.
The UA MUST support the following mechanism for demultiplexing
packets arriving on the IP address and port associated with the DTLS
association:
o If the value of the first byte of the packet is 0 or 1, then the
packet is STUN.
o If the value of the first byte of the packet is between 20 and 63
(inclusive), the packet is DTLS.
5.3. Rekeying
During rekeying, packets protected by the previous set of keys can
arrive after the DTLS handshake caused by rekeying has completed,
because packets can be reordered on the wire. To compensate for this
fact, receivers MUST maintain both sets of keys for some time in
order to be able to decrypt and verify older packets. The duration
of maintaining the previous set of keys after the finish of the DTLS
handshake is out of scope for this document.
5.4. Compatibility With UDPTL over UDP
If a user requires fax to be transported securely using UDPTL over
DTLS, and if the remote user does not support UDPTL over DTLS, then a
fax media stream cannot be established.
If a user prefers fax to be transported securely using UDPTL over
DTLS, but is willing to transport the fax insecurely in case the
remote user does not support UDPTL over DTLS, then the SDP Capability
Negotiation mechanism [RFC5939] can be used to offer both UDPTL over
DTLS and UDPTL over UDP. Alternatively, if the remote user rejects
an SDP offer for UDPTL over DTLS, a new SDP offer for a UDPTL over
UDP media stream can be sent.
6. Security Considerations
Fax may be used to transmit a wide range of sensitive data, including
personal, corporate, and governmental information. It is therefore
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critical to be able to protect against threats to the confidentiality
and integrity of the transmitted data.
The mechanism in this document provides integrity and confidentiality
protection for fax by specifying fax transport using UDPTL over DTLS
[RFC6347].
DTLS media stream negotiated using SIP/SDP requires a mechanism to
ensure that the certificate received via DTLS was issued by the
remote party of the SIP session.
The standard DTLS strategy for authenticating the communicating
parties is to give the server (and optionally the client) a PKIX
[RFC5280] certificate. The client then verifies the certificate and
checks that the name in the certificate matches the server's domain
name. This works because there are a relatively small number of
servers and the cost for issuing and deploying PKIX certificates can
be justified. Issuing and deploying PKIX certificates to all clients
is not realistic in most deployment scenarios.
The design described in this document is intended to leverage the
integrity protection of the SIP signaling, while not requiring
confidentiality. As long as each side of the connection can verify
the integrity of the SDP received from the other side, then the DTLS
handshake cannot be hijacked via a man-in-the-middle attack. This
integrity protection is easily provided by the caller to the callee
via the SIP Identity [RFC4474] mechanism. Other mechanisms, such as
the S/MIME mechanism [RFC3261], or perhaps future mechanisms yet to
be specified could also serve this purpose.
While this mechanism can still be used without such integrity
mechanisms, the security provided is limited to defense against
passive attack by intermediaries. An active attack on the signaling
plus an active attack on the media plane can allow an attacker to
attack the connection (R-SIG-MEDIA in the notation of [RFC5479]).
7. IANA Considerations
This document updates the "Session Description Protocol (SDP)
Parameters" registry as specified in Section 8.2.2 of [RFC4566].
Specifically, it adds the values in Table 1 to the table for the SDP
"proto" field registry.
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+-------+---------------+------------+
| Type | SDP Name | Reference |
+-------+---------------+------------+
| proto | UDP/TLS/UDPTL | [RFC-XXXX] |
+-------+---------------+------------+
Table 1: SDP "proto" field values
[RFC EDITOR NOTE: Please replace RFC-XXXX with the RFC number of this
document.]
8. Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Peter Dawes, who provided comments on the initial
version of the draft, and to Paul E. Jones, James Rafferty, Albrecht
Schwarz, Oscar Ohlsson, David Hanes, Adam Gensler, Ari Keranen,
Flemming Andreasen, John Mattsson and Marc Petit-Huguenin who
provided valuable feedback and input. Barry Leiba, Spencer Dawkins,
Pete Resnick, Kathleen Moriarty and Stephen Farrell provided valuable
feedback during the IESG review. Thanks to Scott Brim for performing
the Gen-ART review. Thanks to Alissa Cooper for her help as
sponsoring Area Director.
9. Change Log
[RFC EDITOR NOTE: Please remove this section when publishing]
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-09
o Removal of previous changes based on comments by Marc Petit-
Huguenin:
o - Future correction might be needed based on generic NAT traversal
work in IETF.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-08
o Changes based on comments by Marc Petit-Huguenin:
o - Corrected text on how to distinguish STUN, TURN and DTLS
packets.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-07
o Changes based on IESG comments by Barry Leiba:
o - SHALL replaced with MUST.
o - Text modifications in sections 4.2, 4.4, 5.2.2, 5.3 and 6.
o Changes based on IESG comments by Pete Resnick and Kathleen
Moriarty:
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o - Additional text on existing mechanisms for securing fax in
section 1.
o Changes based on IESG comments by Stephen Farrell:
o - Added text regarding MTI cipher suites.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-06
o Changes based on WGLC comments by Paul Kyzivat
o - Indicating that, when a new and an old DTLS association exist,
each endpoint needs to be prepared to receive data on both.
o - Editorial nit.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-05
o Changes based on comments by Flemming Andreasen
o - SDP Offer/Answer sections structured according to RFC 3264.
o - Clarified that ICE considerations also apply to ICE restart.
o - Editorial changes.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-04
o Changes based on comments by Flemming Andreasen
o - Addition of SDP Offer/Answer procedure section.
o - Removal of non-ICE NAT traversal procedures.
o - Addition of guidance regarding compatibility with UDPTL over
UDP.
o - Editorial corrections.
o Minor editorial corrections
o -Spelling of Ari's family name.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-03
o Changes based on comments by Adam Gensler (http://www.ietf.org/
mail-archive/web/mmusic/current/msg12945.html)
o -Indicating that, in case of rekeying, entities MUST maintain both
set of keys for some time (previously SHOULD).
o -Explicit mentioning of the commonName attribute in text about
correlation/identification of users.
o Changes based on comments by Ari Keranen (http://www.ietf.org/
mail-archive/web/mmusic/current/msg12966.html)
o -Informative reference to RFC 5246 added.
o -Re-naming of sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
o -Clarifying that documented STUN/DTLS demux mechanism is only one
way of doing the demux.
o -Editorial corrections.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-02
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o Editorial comments based on review comments by James Rafferty
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/mmusic/current/
msg12890.html)
o Editorial comments based on review comments by David Hanes
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/mmusic/current/
msg12886.html)
o Editorial comments based on review comments by Oscar Ohlsson
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/mmusic/current/
msg12882.html)
o Editorial comments based on review comments by Albrecht Schwartz
(http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/mmusic/current/
msg12900.html)
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-01
o Usage of the SDP fingerprint attribute depends on whether a cipher
suite with an associated certificate is used.
o Editor's note in section 4.2 removed. Procedure text added.
Changes from draft-ietf-mmusic-udptl-dtls-00
o SDP offerer is allowed to assign an a=setup:active or
a=setup:passive value, in addition to the recommended
a=setup:actpass (http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/mmusic/current/msg12331.html).
o The example for secure fax replacing audio stream in audio-only
session added (http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/mmusic/current/msg12428.html).
o Editor's note on the connection attribute resolved by prohibiting
usage of the SDP connection attribute (http://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/mmusic/current/msg12772.html).
o Editorial corrections.
Changes from draft-holmberg-mmusic-udptl-dtls-02
o Milestone adopted - draft-ietf-mmusic version of the draft
submitted.
Changes from draft-holmberg-mmusic-udptl-dtls-01
o Gonzalo Salgueiro added as co-author.
o PSTN comparison text and Introduction text modified.
Changes from draft-holmberg-mmusic-udptl-dtls-00
o Text about T.30 added.
o Latest version of T.38 referenced.
o Additional text about the need for secure fax in IP networks.
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Changes from draft-holmberg-dispatch-udptl-dtls-00
o WG changed to MMUSIC.
o Added text about 3GPP need for UDPTL/DTLS.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June
2002.
[RFC4145] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in
the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4145,
September 2005.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572, July 2006.
[RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
2010.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
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[RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
October 2008.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.
[ITU.T30.2005]
International Telecommunications Union, "Procedures for
document facsimile transmission in the general switched
telephone network", ITU-T Recommendation T.30, September
2005.
[ITU.T38.2010]
International Telecommunications Union, "Procedures for
real-time Group 3 facsimile communication over IP
networks", ITU-T Recommendation T.38, September 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5479] Wing, D., Fries, S., Tschofenig, H., and F. Audet,
"Requirements and Analysis of Media Security Management
Protocols", RFC 5479, April 2009.
[RFC5939] Andreasen, F., "Session Description Protocol (SDP)
Capability Negotiation", RFC 5939, September 2010.
Appendix A. Examples
A.1. General
Prior to establishing the session, both Alice and Bob generate self-
signed certificates which are used for a single session or, more
likely, reused for multiple sessions.
The SIP signaling from Alice to her proxy is transported over TLS to
ensure an integrity protected channel between Alice and her identity
service. Alice's identity service asserts identity of Alice and
protects the SIP message, e.g. using SIP Identity. Transport between
proxies should also be protected, e.g. by use of TLS.
In order to simplify the flow, only one element is shown for Alice's
and Bob's proxies.
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For the sake of brevity and simplicity, only the mandatory SDP T.38
attributes are shown.
A.2. Basic Message Flow
Figure 3 shows an example message flow of session establishment for
T.38 fax securely transported using UDPTL over DTLS.
In this example flow, Alice acts as the passive endpoint of the DTLS
association and Bob acts as the active endpoint of the DTLS
association.
Alice Proxies Bob
| (1) SIP INVITE | |
|----------------------->| |
| | (2) SIP INVITE |
| |----------------------->|
| | (3) DTLS ClientHello |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| (4) remaining messages of DTLS handshake |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| | |
| | |
| | (5) SIP 200 OK |
| |<-----------------------|
| (6) SIP 200 OK | |
|<-----------------------| |
| (7) SIP ACK | |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| (8) T.38 message using UDPTL over DTLS |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| | |
Figure 3: Basic message flow
Message (1):
Figure 4 shows the initial INVITE request sent by Alice to Alice's
proxy. The initial INVITE request contains an SDP offer.
The "m=" line in the SDP offer indicates T.38 fax using UDPTL over
DTLS.
The SDP "setup" attribute with a value of "actpass" in the SDP
offer indicates that Alice has requested to be either the active
or passive endpoint.
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The SDP "fingerprint" attribute in the SDP offer contains the
certificate fingerprint computed from Alice's self-signed
certificate.
INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0
To: <sip:bob@example.com>
From: "Alice"<sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS ua1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldkfj
Contact: <sip:alice@ua1.example.com>
Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, UPDATE
Max-Forwards: 70
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: xxxx
Supported: from-change
v=0
o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4 ua1.example.com
s=-
c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com
t=0 0
m=image 6056 UDP/TLS/UDPTL t38
a=setup:actpass
a=fingerprint: SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=T38FaxRateManagement:transferredTCF
Figure 4: Message (1)
Message (2):
Figure 5 shows the SIP INVITE request sent by Bob's proxy to Bob.
When received, Bob verifies the identity provided in the SIP
INVITE request.
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INVITE sip:bob@ua2.example.com SIP/2.0
To: <sip:bob@example.com>
From: "Alice"<sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS proxy.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldk
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS ua1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldkfj
Record-Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;lr>
Contact: <sip:alice@ua1.example.com>
Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, UPDATE
Max-Forwards: 69
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: xxxx
Supported: from-change
v=0
o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4 ua1.example.com
s=-
c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com
t=0 0
m=image 6056 UDP/TLS/UDPTL t38
a=setup:actpass
a=fingerprint: SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=T38FaxRateManagement:transferredTCF
Figure 5: Message (2)
Message (3):
Assuming that Alice's identity is valid, Bob sends a DTLS
ClientHello directly to Alice.
Message (4):
Alice and Bob exchange further messages of DTLS handshake
(HelloVerifyRequest, ClientHello, ServerHello, Certificate,
ServerKeyExchange, CertificateRequest, ServerHelloDone,
Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify,
ChangeCipherSpec, Finished).
When Bob receives the certificate of Alice via DTLS, Bob checks
whether the certificate fingerprint calculated from Alice's
certificate received via DTLS matches the certificate fingerprint
received in the a=fingerprint SDP attribute of Figure 5. In this
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message flow, the check is successful and thus session setup
continues.
Note that, unlike in this example, it is not necessary to wait for
the DTLS handshake to finish before the SDP answer is sent. If
Bob has sent the SIP 200 (OK) response and later detects that the
certificate fingerprints do not match, he will terminate the
session.
Message (5):
Figure 6 shows a SIP 200 (OK) response to the initial SIP INVITE
request, sent by Bob to Bob's proxy. The SIP 200 (OK) response
contains an SDP answer.
The "m=" line in the SDP answer indicates T.38 fax using UDPTL
over DTLS.
The SDP "setup" attribute with a value of "active" in the SDP
answer indicates that Bob has requested to be the active endpoint.
The SDP "fingerprint" attribute in the SDP answer contains the
certificate fingerprint computed from Bob's self-signed
certificate.
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SIP/2.0 200 OK
To: <sip:bob@example.com>;tag=6418913922105372816
From: "Alice" <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS proxy.example.com:5061;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldk
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS ua1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldkfj
Record-Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;lr>
Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Contact: <sip:bob@ua2.example.com>
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: xxxx
Supported: from-change
v=0
o=- 8965454521 2105372818 IN IP4 ua2.example.com
s=-
c=IN IP4 ua2.example.com
t=0 0
m=image 12000 UDP/TLS/UDPTL t38
a=setup:active
a=fingerprint: SHA-1 \
FF:FF:FF:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=T38FaxRateManagement:transferredTCF
Figure 6: Message (5)
Message (6):
Figure 7 shows a SIP 200 (OK) response to the initial SIP INVITE
request, sent by Alice's proxy to Alice. Alice checks if the
certificate fingerprint calculated from the Bob's certificate
received via DTLS is the same as the certificate fingerprint
received in the a=fingerprint SDP attribute of Figure 7. In this
message flow, the check is successful and thus the session setup
continues.
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SIP/2.0 200 OK
To: <sip:bob@example.com>;tag=6418913922105372816
From: "Alice" <sip:alice@example.com>;tag=843c7b0b
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS ua1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-0e53sadfkasldkfj
Record-Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;lr>
Call-ID: 6076913b1c39c212@REVMTEpG
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Contact: <sip:bob@ua2.example.com>
Content-Type: application/sdp
Content-Length: xxxx
Supported: from-change
v=0
o=- 8965454521 2105372818 IN IP4 ua2.example.com
s=-
c=IN IP4 ua2.example.com
t=0 0
m=image 12000 UDP/TLS/UDPTL t38
a=setup:active
a=fingerprint: SHA-1 \
FF:FF:FF:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=T38FaxRateManagement:transferredTCF
Figure 7: Message (6)
Message (7):
Alice sends the SIP ACK request to Bob.
Message (8):
At this point, Bob and Alice can exchange T.38 fax securely
transported using UDPTL over DTLS.
A.3. Message Flow Of T.38 Fax Replacing Audio Media Stream in An
Existing Audio-Only Session
Traditionally, most sessions with non-secure transport of T.38 fax,
transported using UDPTL, are established by modifying an ongoing
audio session into a fax session. Figure 8 shows an example message
flow of modifying an existing audio session into a session with T.38
fax securely transported using UDPTL over DTLS.
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In this example flow, Alice acts as the passive endpoint of the DTLS
association and Bob acts as the active endpoint of the DTLS
association.
Alice Proxies Bob
| | |
| (1) Audio-only session initiation |
|<-----------------------+----------------------->|
| | |
| (2) SIP re-INVITE | |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| | (3) DTLS ClientHello |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| (4) remaining messages of DTLS handshake |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| | |
| | |
| | (5) SIP 200 OK |
|<------------------------------------------------|
| (6) SIP ACK | |
|------------------------------------------------>|
| (7) T.38 message using UDPTL over DTLS |
|<----------------------------------------------->|
| | |
Figure 8: Message Flow Of T.38 Fax Replacing Audio Media Stream in An
Existing Audio-Only Session
Message (1):
Session establishment of audio-only session. The proxies decide
not to record-route.
Message (2):
Alice sends SIP re-INVITE request. The SDP offer included in the
SIP re-INVITE request is shown in Figure 9.
The first "m=" line in the SDP offer indicates audio media stream
being removed. The second "m=" line in the SDP offer indicates
T.38 fax using UDPTL over DTLS being added.
The SDP "setup" attribute with a value of "actpass" in the SDP
offer indicates that Alice has requested to be either the active
or passive endpoint.
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The SDP "fingerprint" attribute in the SDP offer contains the
certificate fingerprint computed from Alice's self-signed
certificate.
v=0
o=- 2465353433 3524244442 IN IP4 ua1.example.com
s=-
c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com
t=0 0
m=audio 0 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP 0
m=image 46056 UDP/TLS/UDPTL t38
a=setup:actpass
a=fingerprint: SHA-1 \
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=T38FaxRateManagement:transferredTCF
Figure 9: SDP offer of message (2)
Message (3):
Bob sends a DTLS ClientHello directly to Alice.
Message (4):
Alice and Bob exchange further messages of DTLS handshake
(HelloVerifyRequest, ClientHello, ServerHello, Certificate,
ServerKeyExchange, CertificateRequest, ServerHelloDone,
Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify,
ChangeCipherSpec, Finished).
When Bob receives the certificate of Alice via DTLS, Bob checks
whether the certificate fingerprint calculated from Alice's
certificate received via DTLS matches the certificate fingerprint
received in the SDP "fingerprint" attribute of Figure 9. In this
message flow, the check is successful and thus session setup
continues.
Message (5):
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Bob sends a SIP 200 (OK) response to the SIP re-INVITE request.
The SIP 200 (OK) response contains an SDP answer shown in
Figure 10.
The first "m=" line in the SDP offer indicates audio media stream
being removed. The second "m=" line in the SDP answer indicates
T.38 fax using UDPTL over DTLS being added.
The SDP "setup" attribute with a value of "active" in the SDP
answer indicates that Bob has requested to be the active endpoint.
The SDP "fingerprint" attribute in the SDP answer contains the
certificate fingerprint computed from Bob's self-signed
certificate.
v=0
o=- 4423478999 5424222292 IN IP4 ua2.example.com
s=-
c=IN IP4 ua2.example.com
t=0 0
m=audio 0 UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVP 0
m=image 32000 UDP/TLS/UDPTL t38
a=setup:active
a=fingerprint: SHA-1 \
FF:FF:FF:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
a=T38FaxRateManagement:transferredTCF
Figure 10: SDP answer of message (5)
Message (6):
Alice sends the SIP ACK request to Bob.
Message (7):
At this point, Bob and Alice can exchange T.38 fax securely
transported using UDPTL over DTLS.
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Authors' Addresses
Christer Holmberg
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland
Email: christer.holmberg@ericsson.com
Ivo Sedlacek
Ericsson
Sokolovska 79
Praha 18600
Czech Republic
Email: ivo.sedlacek@ericsson.com
Gonzalo Salgueiro
Cisco Systems, Inc.
7200-12 Kit Creek Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
US
Email: gsalguei@cisco.com
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