Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update

draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update



IETF PKIX WG                                          Sean Turner, IECA 
Internet Draft                                   Daniel Brown, Certicom 
Intended Status: Standard Track                   Kelvin Yiu, Microsoft 
Updates: 4055 (once approved)              Russ Housley, Vigil Security 
Expires: September 9, 2009                               Tim Polk, NIST
                                                          March 9, 2009 
                                      
                Update for RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Parameters 
                   draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update-02.txt 


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   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. 
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Abstract 

   This document updates RFC 4055.  It updates the conventions for using 
   the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding 
   (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key 
   Infrastructure (PKI).  Specifically, it updates the conventions for 
   algorithm parameters in an X.509 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo 
   field. 

Conventions used in this document 

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 

Discussion 

   This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-pkix' mailing list. To 
   subscribe, send a message to ietf-pkix-request@imc.org with the 
   single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site 
   for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix/>. 

1. Introduction 

   RFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme - 
   Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport 
   algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  It 
   provides algorithm identifiers and parameters for RSAES-OAEP. 

   This document updates the conventions for RSAES-OAEP parameters in 
   the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate. The PKIX WG 
   Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) design team recommended that Key 
   Derivation Functions (KDFs) should not be constrained within a 
   certificate; rather, KDF constraints should be negotiated in 
   protocols that need to employ certificates. 

   Only two paragraphs in [RFC4055] discuss RSAES-OAEP parameters in 
   X.509 certificates: the second paragraph of section 4 and the first 
   paragraph of section 4.1.  This document only updates these two 
 
 
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   paragraphs.  Section 3 updates the second paragraph in section 4 
   while section 3 updates the second paragraph in section 4.1.  "Old:" 
   prefaces the text to be replaced and "New:" prefaces the replacement 
   text. 

   This document also replaces incorrect references to the 
   publicKeyAlgorithms field in Section 3 with references to the 
   parameters field in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field. No 
   other changes are made to the RSASSA-PSS sections.  

2. Changes to Section 3 2nd and 3rd Paragraph 

   This change clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the 
   signature, signatureAlgorithm, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields for CA 
   and EE certificates.  It also clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-
   params in the signatureAlgorithm field in CRLs. 

   Old:  

   CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSASSA-PSS algorithm 
   identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the 
   publicKeyAlgorithms field if the cA boolean flag is set in the basic 
   constraints certificate extension.  CAs MAY require that the 
   parameters be present in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for end-entity 
   certificates. 

   CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates SHOULD 
   include RSASSA-PSS-params in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm 
   parameters in their own certificates.  CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS 
   algorithm for signing certificates or CRLs MUST include RSASSA-PSS- 
   params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in the TBSCertificate or 
   TBSCertList structures. 

   New: 

   When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the 
   TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature algorithm field, then the 
   RSASSA-PSS-params structure MUST be included in the TBSCertificate or 
   TBSCertList signature parameters field. 

   When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the 
   TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of CA 
   certificates, then the parameters field SHOULD include the RSASSA-
   PSS-params structure. When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier 
   appears in the TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of 
   EE certificates, then the parameters field MAY include the RSASSA-
   PSS-params structure. 
 
 
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   All certificates and CRLs signed by a CA that supports the id-RSASSA- 
   PSS algorithm MUST include the RSASSA-PSS-params in the 
   signatureAlgorithm parameters in Certificate and CertList structures, 
   respectively. 

3. Changes to Section 4 2nd Paragraph 

   This change prohibits the inclusion of RSAES-OAEP-params in the 
   subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  This was done because a) it does not 
   affect interoperability b) aligns with PKIX practice to not include 
   limitations on how the public key can be used in 
   subjectPublicKeyInfo.  A poll of implementers was taken and there 
   were no objections to this change as it did not affect current 
   implmentations. 

   Old: 

   CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm 
   identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the 
   publicKeyAlgorithms field for all certificates.  Entities that use a 
   certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of id-RSA-OAEP where the 
   parameters are absent SHOULD use the default set of parameters for 
   RSAES-OAEP-params.  Entities that use a certificate with a 
   publicKeyAlgorithm value of rsaEncryption SHOULD use the default set 
   of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params. 

   New: 

   CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm 
   identifier MUST NOT include parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo 
   algorithm field. 

4. Changes to Section 4.1 1st Paragraph 

   This change prohibits the inclusion of parameters in the 
   subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  This was done because a) it does not 
   affect interoperability b) aligns with PKIX practice to not include 
   limitations on how the public key can be used in 
   subjectPublicKeyInfo.  A poll of implementers was taken and there 
   were no objections to this change as it did not affect current 
   implmentations. 

   Old: 

   When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters 
   MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax.  The parameters may be 
   either absent or present when used as subject public key information.  
 
 
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   The parameters MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier 
   associated with an encrypted value. 

   New: 

   When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters 
   MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax.  The parameters MUST be 
   absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  The parameters 
   MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with 
   an encrypted value. 

5. Security Considerations 

   The security considerations from [RFC4055] apply. 

   If the RSAES-OAEP-params are negotiated, then the negotiation 
   mechanism needs to provide integrity for these parameters.  For 
   example, an S/MIME Agent can advertise their capabilities in the 
   SMIMECapabilities attribute, which is either signed attribute 
   [RFC3851bis] or a certificate extension [RFC4262]. 

6. IANA Considerations 

   None 

   {{Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC.}} 

7. References 

7.1. Normative References 

   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 
                 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 

   [RFC4055]     Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 
                 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for 
                 use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 
                 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 
                 Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. 








 
 
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7.2. Informative References 

   [RFC4262]     S. Santesson, "X.509 Certificate Extension for    
                 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 
                 Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. 

   [RFC3851bis]  Turner, S., Farrell, S., and R. Housley, "An Internet 
                 Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization", 
                 draft-ietf-pkix-3281update-04.txt, work-in-progress. 

   /*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace RFC3851bis with RFCXYAZ when draft-
                 ietf-pkix-3281update is published. 



































 
 
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Author's Addresses 

   Sean Turner 

   IECA, Inc. 
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 
   Fairfax, VA 22031 
   USA 

   EMail: turners@ieca.com 

   Kelvin Yiu 

   Microsoft 
   One Microsoft Way 
   Redmond, WA 98052-6399 
   USA 

   Email: kelviny@microsoft.com 

   Daniel R. L. Brown 

   Certicom Corp 
   5520 Explorer Drive #400 
   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 
   CANADA 

   EMail: dbrown@certicom.com 

   Russ Housley 

   Vigil Security, LLC 
   918 Spring Knoll Drive 
   Herndon, VA 20170 
   USA 

   EMail: housley@vigilsec.com 

   Tim Polk 

   NIST 
   Building 820, Room 426 
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899 
   USA 

   EMail: wpolk@nist.gov 

 
 
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