Internet DRAFT - draft-mavrogiannopoulos-pkcs8-validated-parameters
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-pkcs8-validated-parameters
Network Working Group N. Mavrogiannopoulos
Internet-Draft Red Hat
Intended status: Informational August 21, 2018
Expires: February 22, 2019
Storing validation parameters in PKCS#8
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-pkcs8-validated-parameters-04
Abstract
This memo describes a method of storing parameters needed for private
key validation in the Private-Key Information Syntax Specification as
defined in RFC5208 (PKCS#8) format. It is equally applicable to the
alternative implementation of the Private-Key Information Syntax
Specification as defined in RFC 5958.
The approach described in this document encodes the parameters under
a private enterprise extension and does not form part of a formal
standard.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 22, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
RSA or DSA private keys generated using the Shawe-Taylor prime
generation algorithm describled in [FIPS186-4] allow for parameter
validation, i.e., verify whether the primes are actually prime, and
were correctly generated. That is done by generating the parameters
from a known seed and a selected hash algorithm.
Storing these parameters in a private key format such as the RSA
Private Key Syntax from PKCS#1 [RFC8017], or common representations
for DSA private keys, does not allow attaching information on the
parameters needed for validation. The purpose of the document is to
describe such a method using the Private-Key Information Syntax
Specification as defined in [RFC5208], as well as on the alternative
specification on [RFC5958].
The approach described in this document encodes the parameters under
a private enterprise extension and does not form part of a formal
standard. The encoding can be used as is, or could be used as the
basis for a standard at a later time.
2. ValidationParams attribute
The information related to the validation parameters is stored as an
attribute in the PrivateKeyInfo structure. The attribute is
identified by the id-attr-validation-parameters object identifier and
contains as AttributeValue a single ValidationParams structure.
id-attr-validation-parameters OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{1 3 6 1 4 1 2312 18 8 1}
ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgo OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
seed OCTET STRING
}
The algorithm identifier in the ValidationParams should be a hash
algorithm identifier for the [FIPS186-4] methods. The
ValidationParams sequence must be DER encoded [CCITT.X690.2002].
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3. Example Structure
The following structure contains an RSA key generated using the
[FIPS186-4] section B.3.3 algorithm with SHA2-384 hash. The seed
used is
'8af4328c87bebcec31e303b8f5537effcb6a91d947084d99a369823b36f01462'
(hex encoded).
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
4. Compatibility notes
For compatibility it is recommended that implementations following
this document, support generation and validation using the SHA2-384
hash algorithm.
The extension defined in this document is applicable both to the
Private-Key Information Syntax Specification defined in [RFC5958] and
PKCS#8 [RFC5208].
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5. Security Considerations
All the considerations in [RFC5208] and [RFC5958] apply.
6. IANA Considerations
None.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC5208] Kaliski, B., "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #8:
Private-Key Information Syntax Specification Version 1.2",
RFC 5208, DOI 10.17487/RFC5208, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5208>.
[CCITT.X680.2002]
International International Telephone and Telegraph
Consultative Committee, "Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
CCITT Recommendation X.680, July 2002.
[CCITT.X690.2002]
International International Telephone and Telegraph
Consultative Committee, "ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of basic encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
encoding rules (CER) and Distinguished encoding rules
(DER)", CCITT Recommendation X.690, July 2002.
[FIPS186-4]
Kerry, C. and P. Gallagher, "FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING
STANDARDS PUBLICATION , July 2013.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
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[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Russ Housley for his comments and for
the ASN.1 module appendix.
Appendix B. ASN.1 module
This appendix provides non-normative ASN.1 definitions for the
structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
[CCITT.X680.2002] and [RFC5912].
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PrivateKeyValidationAttrV1
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
private(4) enterprise(1) 2312 18 1 1 }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL
IMPORTS
ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } ;
-- PrivateKeyInfo is defined in [RFC5208].
-- This definition adds the validation parameters attribute
-- to the set of allowed attributes.
PrivateKeyInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= {
at-validation-parameters, ... }
at-validation-parameters ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE ValidationParams
IDENTIFIED BY id-attr-validation-parameters }
id-attr-validation-parameters OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 1 3 6 1 4 1 2312 18 8 1 }
ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlg OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
seed OCTET STRING }
END
Author's Address
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Red Hat, Inc.
Brno
Czech Republic
Email: nmav@redhat.com
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