| RFC : | rfc2356 |
| Title: | |
| Date: | June 1998 |
| Status: | INFORMATIONAL |
Network Working Group G. Montenegro
Request for Comments: 2356 V. Gupta
Category: Informational Sun Microsystems, Inc.
June 1998
Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The Mobile IP specification establishes the mechanisms that enable a
mobile host to maintain and use the same IP address as it changes its
point of attachment to the network. Mobility implies higher security
risks than static operation, because the traffic may at times take
unforeseen network paths with unknown or unpredictable security
characteristics. The Mobile IP specification makes no provisions for
securing data traffic. The mechanisms described in this document
allow a mobile node out on a public sector of the internet to
negotiate access past a SKIP firewall, and construct a secure channel
into its home network.
In addition to securing traffic, our mechanisms allow a mobile node
to roam into regions that (1) impose ingress filtering, and (2) use a
different address space.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ............................................... 2
2. Mobility without a Firewall ................................ 4
3. Restrictions imposed by a Firewall ......................... 4
4. Two Firewall Options: Application relay and IP Security .... 5
4.1 SOCKS version 5 [4] ....................................... 5
4.2 SKIP [3] .................................................. 6
5. Agents and Mobile Node Configurations ...................... 8
6. Supporting Mobile IP: Secure Channel Configurations ........ 9
6.1 I: Encryption only Outside of Private Network ............. 9
6.2 II: End-to-End Encryption ................................. 10
6.3 III: End-to-End Encryption, Intermediate Authentication ... 10
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 1]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
6.4 IV: Encryption Inside and Outside ......................... 10
6.5 Choosing a Secure Channel Configuration ................... 11
7. Mobile IP Registration Procedure with a SKIP Firewall ...... 11
7.1. Registration Request through the Firewall ................ 12
7.1.1. On the Outside (Public) Network ........................ 13
7.1.2. On the Inside (Private) Network ........................ 14
7.2. Registration Reply through the Firewall .................. 14
7.2.1. On the Inside (Private) Network ........................ 15
7.2.2. On the Outside (Public) Network ........................ 15
7.3. Traversal Extension ...................................... 16
8. Data Transfer .............................................. 18
8.1. Data Packet From the Mobile Node to a Correspondent Node . 18
8.2. Data Packet From a Correspondent Node to the Mobile Node . 19
8.2.1 Within the Inside (Private) Network ..................... 20
8.2.2. On the Outside (Public) Network ........................ 21
9. Security Considerations .................................... 21
Acknowledgements .............................................. 22
References .................................................... 22
Authors' Addresses ............................................ 23
Full Copyright Statement ...................................... 24
1. Introduction
This document specifies what support is required at the firewall, the
Mobile IP [1] home agent and the Mobile IP mobile node to enable the
latter to access a private network from the Internet. For example, a
company employee could attach his/her laptop to some Internet access
point by:
a) Dialing into a PPP/SLIP account on an Internet service
provider's network.
b) Connecting into a 10Base-T or similar LAN network available
at, for example, an IETF terminal room, a local university,
or another company's premises.
Notice that in these examples, the mobile node's relevant interface
(PPP or 10Base-T) is configured with an IP address different from
that which it uses "normally" (i.e. at the office). Furthermore, the
IP address used is not necessarily a fixed assignment. It may be
assigned temporarily and dynamically at the beginning of the session
(e.g. by IPCP in the PPP case, or DHCP in the 10Base-T case).
The following discussion assumes a network configuration consisting
of a private network separated by a firewall from the general
Internet or public network. The systems involved are:
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 2]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
Private Network
A protected network separated from the Internet by hosts
enforcing access restrictions (firewalls). A private network
may use a private address space, and its addresses may not
even be routable by the general internet.
Public Network
The Internet at large. Hosts are able to communicate with each
other throughout the public network without firewall-imposed
restrictions.
Mobile Node (MN)
Its permanent address falls within the range of the private
network. The user removes the system from its home network,
and connects it to the Internet at another point. The
mechanisms outlined in this discussion render this mobility
transparent: the mobile node continues accessing its home
network and its resources exactly as if it were still within
it. Notice that when the mobile node leaves its home
network, it may migrate both within and outside of the
private network's boundaries. As defined by Mobile IP [1], a
mobile node uses a care-of address while roaming.
Home Agent (HA) for the mobile node
Serves as a location registry and router as described in the
Mobile IP IETF draft.
Foreign Agent (FA)
Serves as a registration relayer and care of address for the
mobile node as described in the Mobile IP IETF draft.
Correspondent Node (CH)
A system that is exchanging data packets with the mobile
node.
Firewall (FW)
The system (or collection of systems) that enforces access
control between the private network and the general Internet.
It may do so by a combination of functions such as application
gatewaying, packet filtering and cryptographic techniques.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 3]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
The mechanisms described in this document allow a mobile node out on
a public sector of the network to negotiate access past a SKIP
firewall, and construct a secure channel into its home network. This
enables it to communicate with correspondent nodes that belong to the
private network, and, if bi-directional tunnels are used, with
external hosts that are reachable when the mobile node is at home.
The mobile node enjoys the same level of connectivity and privacy as
it does when it is in its home network.
This document does not address the scenario in which the mobile node
attempts to access its private network, while within another private
network.
Sections 2 and 3 provide an overview of the environment being
considered and the restrictions it imposes. Section 4 examines
firewall technologies. Section 5 discusses the best mode of operation
of the participating entities from the point of view of Mobile IP.
Section 6 discusses possible configuration for the secure channel.
Finally, packet formats are the topic of sections 7 and 8.
2. Mobility without a Firewall
Suppose the mobile node is roaming throughout the general Internet,
but its home network is not protected by a firewall. This is
typically found in academic environment as opposed to corporate
networks.
This works as prescribed by Mobile IP [1]. The only proviso is that
the mobile node would most probably operate with a co-located address
instead of using a separate foreign agent's care-of address. This is
because, at least in the near term, it is far more likely to be able
to secure a temporary care-of-address than it is to find a foreign
agent already deployed at the site you are visiting. For example:
- Internet Service Provider: pre-assigns customers IP addresses,
or assigns them out dynamically via PPP's address negotiation.
- An IETF terminal room may pre-assign addresses for your use or
offer DHCP services.
- Other locations probably would offer DHCP services.
3. Restrictions imposed by a Firewall
The firewall imposes restrictions on packets entering or leaving the
private network. Packets are not allowed through unless they conform
to a filtering specification, or unless there is a negotiation
involving some sort of authentication.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 4]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
Another restriction is imposed by the separation between private
addresses and general Internet addresses. Strictly speaking, this is
not imposed by a firewall, but by the characteristics of the private
network. For example, if a packet destined to an internal address
originates in the general Internet, it will probably not be
delivered. It is not that the firewall drops it. Rather, the
Internet's routing fabric is unable to process it. This elicits an
ICMP host unreachable packet sent back to the originating node.
Because of this, the firewall MUST be explicitly targeted as the
destination node by outside packets seeking to enter the private
network. The routing fabric in the general Internet will only see the
public address of the firewall and route accordingly. Once the
packet arrives at the firewall, the real packet destined to a private
address is recovered.
4. Two Firewall Options: Application relay and IP Security
Before delving into any details, lets examine two technologies which
may provide firewall support for mobile nodes:
- application relaying or proxying, or
- IP Security.
To understand the implications, let's examine two specific schemes to
accomplish the above: SOCKS version 5 and SKIP.
4.1 SOCKS version 5 [4]
There is an effort within the authenticated firewall traversal WG
(aft) of the IETF to provide a common interface for application
relays.
The solution being proposed is a revised specification of the SOCKS
protocol. Version 5 has been extended to include UDP services as
well. The SOCKS solution requires that the mobile node -- or another
node on its behalf -- establish a TCP session to exchange UDP traffic
with the FW. It also has to use the SOCKS library to encapsulate the
traffic meant for the FW. The steps required by a SOCKS solution are:
- TCP connection established to port 1080 (1.5 round trips)
- version identifier/method selection negotiation (1 round trip)
- method-dependent negotiation. For example, the
Username/Password Authentication [5] requires 1 round trip:
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 5]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
1. client sends a Username/Password request
2. FW (server) responds
The GSS-API negotiation requires at least 3 round trips:
1. client context establishment (at least 1 round trip)
2. client initial token/server reply (1 round trip)
3. message protection subnegotiation (at least 1 round trip)
- (finally) SOCKS request/reply (1 round trip)
This is a minimum of 4 (6 with GSS-API) round-trips before the client
is able to pass data through the FW using the following header:
+----+------+------+----------+----------+----------+
|RSV | FRAG | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT | DATA |
+----+------+------+----------+----------+----------+
| 2 | 1 | 1 | Variable | 2 | Variable |
+----+------+------+----------+----------+----------+
Bear in mind that the above must be done each time the mobile
registers a new care-of address. In addition to this inefficiency,
this scheme requires that we use UDP to encapsulate IP datagrams.
There is at least one commercial network that does this, but it is
not the best solution.
Furthermore, SOCKS defines how to establish authenticated
connections, but currently it does not provide a clear solution to
the problem of encrypting the traffic.
This header contains the relay information needed by all parties
involved to reach those not directly reachable.
4.2 SKIP [3]
Alternatively, traffic from the mobile node to the firewall could be
encrypted and authenticated using a session-less IP security
mechanism like SKIP. This obviates the need to set up a session just
to exchange UDP traffic with the firewall.
A solution based on SKIP is very attractive in this scenario, as no
round trip times are incurred before the mobile node and the firewall
achieve mutual trust: the firewall can start relaying packets for the
mobile node as soon as it receives the first one. This, of course,
implies that SKIP is being used with AH [7] so that authentication
information is contained in each packet. Encryption by using ESP [6]
is also assumed in this scenario, since the Internet at large is
considered a hostile environment. An ESP transform that provides
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 6]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
both authentication and encryption could be used, in which case the
AH header need not be included.
The firewall and the mobile node may be previously configured with
each other's authenticated Diffie-Hellman public components (also
known as public values). Alternatively, they could exchange them in
real-time using any of the mechanisms defined by the SKIP protocol
(on-line certificate directory service or certificate discovery
protocol). Home agents and the firewall also MUST have, be able to
exchange or obtain each other's public components.
There are other proposals besides SKIP to achieve IP layer security.
However, they are session-oriented key management solutions, and
typically imply negotiations spanning several round-trip times before
cryptographically secure communications are possible. In this
respect they raise similar concerns to those outlined previously in
the discussion on SOCKS-based solutions. Others have arrived at
similar conclusions regarding the importance of session-less key
management for Mobile IP applications [8].
Another advantage of SKIP is its support for nomadic applications.
Typically, two hosts communicating via a secure IP layer channel use
the IP source and destination addresses on incoming packets to arrive
at the appropriate security association. The SKIP header can easily
supersede this default mechanism by including the key ID the
recipient must use to obtain the right certificate.
The key id is specified by two fields in the SKIP header:
1) a name space identifier (NSID) to indicate which of the
possible name spaces is being used, and,
2) a master key identifier (MKID) that uniquely indicates (within
the given name space) an id to use in fetching the proper
certificate.
As an example, by setting NSID to 1 and MKID to its home address, a
mobile node tells a receiver "ignore the IP source and use my home
address instead to look up my public component". Similarly, setting
NSID to 8 enables using Unsigned Diffie-Hellman (UDH) certificates.
In this case, the MKID is set to the MD5 hash of the DH public
component [10].
In addition to the NSID/MKID feature, Mobile IP is best supported by
an appropriate policy at the SKIP firewall in the form of a "nomadic"
access control list entry. This is an entry which is filtered by key
ID, instead of by IP source address, as is the usual case. It
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 7]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
translates to "allow access from any IP source address for a given
NSID/MKID combination". Furthermore, incoming packets MUST have an
AH header, so that after properly authenticating them, the firewall
establishes a "current address" or "dynamic binding" for the nomadic
host. The NSID/MKID combination determines which key should be used
with the nomadic host [9].
Notice that this supports Mobile IP, because the mobile node always
initiates contact. Hence, the SKIP firewall has a chance to learn the
mobile node's "current address" from an incoming packet before it
attempts to encrypt an outgoing packet.
However, this precludes the use of simultaneous bindings by a mobile
node. At the firewall, the last Registration Request sent by the
mobile node replaces the association between its permanent address
and any prior care-of address. In order to support simultaneous
bindings the firewall must be able to interpret Mobile IP
registration messages.
Section 7.2.2 discusses another advantage of making the firewall
understand Mobile IP packet formats.
In what follows we assume a SKIP-based solution.
5. Agents and Mobile Node Configurations
Depending on which address it uses as its tunnel endpoint, the Mobile
IP protocol specifies two ways in which a mobile node can register a
mobility binding with its home agent.
a) an address advertised for that purpose by the foreign agent
b) an address belonging to one of the mobile node's interfaces
(i.e. operation with a co-located address).
From the firewall's point of view, the main difference between these
two cases hinges on which node prepares the outermost encrypting
encapsulation. The firewall MUST be able to obtain the Diffie-
Hellman public component of the node that creates the outermost SKIP
header in an incoming packet. This is only possible to guarantee in
case "b", because the mobile node and the firewall both belong to the
same administrative domain. The problem is even more apparent when
the mobile node attempts a Registration Request. Here, the foreign
agent is not just a relayer, it actually examines the packet sent by
the mobile node, and modifies its agent services accordingly. In
short, assuming the current specification of Mobile IP and the
current lack of trust in the internet at large, only case "b" is
possible. Case "a" would require an extension (e.g. a "relay"
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 8]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
Registration Request), and modifying code at the home agent, the
firewall and the foreign agent.
Assuming that the firewall offers a secure relay service (i.e.
decapsulation and forwarding of packets), the mobile node can reach
addresses internal to the private network by encapsulating the
packets in a SKIP header and directing them to the firewall.
Therefore, It is simplest to assume that the mobile node operates
with a co-located address.
6. Supporting Mobile IP: Secure Channel Configurations
The mobile node participates in two different types of traffic:
Mobile IP registration protocol and data. For the sake of simplicity,
the following discussion evaluates different secure channel
configurations by examining the initial Registration Request sent by
the mobile node to its home agent.
Assuming the mobile node operates with a co-located address, it can
communicate directly with the firewall. The latter is able to reach
the home agent in the private network. Also, the firewall MUST be
able to authenticate the mobile node.
The following channel configurations assume the mobile node operates
with a co-located address. The region between the HA (home agent) and
the FW (firewall) is a private network. The region between the FW and
the MN (mobile node) is the outside or public network.
6.1 I: Encryption only Outside of Private Network
HA FW MN
<=====================> SKIP (AH + ESP)
<-----------------------------------> Registration Request path
The traffic is only encrypted between the mobile node out on the
general Internet, and the firewall's external interface. This is
minimum required. It is the most desirable configuration as the more
expensive encrypted channel is only used where it is necessary: on
the public network.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 9]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
6.2 II: End-to-End Encryption
Another possible configuration extends the encrypted tunnel through
the firewall:
HA FW MN
<===================================> SKIP (AH + ESP)
<-----------------------------------> Registration Request path
This limits the firewall to perform a simple packet relay or
gatewaying function. Even though this could be accomplished by using
the proper destination NSID in the packet, in practice it is probably
unrealizable. The reason is that this alternative is probably not
very popular with computer security personnel, because authentication
is not carried out by the firewall but by the home agent, and the
latter's security is potentially much weaker than the former's.
6.3 III: End-to-End Encryption, Intermediate Authentication
A third alternative is to allow the firewall to be party to the
security association between the home agent and the mobile node.
After verifying authentication (AH header), the firewall forwards the
encrypted packet (ESP hdr) to the home agent.
HA FW MN
<+++++++++++++++++++++> SKIP authentication
<===================================> SKIP encryption
<-----------------------------------> Registration Request path
Here, SKIP is used to provide intermediate authentication with end-
to-end security. Although possible, this option implies that the
participating entities disclose their pairwise long-term Diffie-
Hellman shared secret to the intermediate node.
Whereas Option 2 above is probably not agreeable to security and
system administration personnel, option 3 is unsavory to the end
user.
6.4 IV: Encryption Inside and Outside
HA FW MN
<============><=====================> SKIP (AH + ESP)
<-----------------------------------> Registration Request path
Traffic is encrypted on the public as well as on the private network.
On the public network, encryption is dictated by a security
association between the mobile node and the firewall. On the private
network, it is dictated by a security association between the home
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 10]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
agent and the firewall.
6.5 Choosing a Secure Channel Configuration
A potential problem in both options 2 and 3 is that their end-to-end
channel components assume that the mobile node and the home agent can
exchange IP traffic directly with each other. This is generally not
the case, as the Internet routing fabric may not have routes to
addresses that belong to private networks, and the private routing
fabric may ignore how to route to public addresses -- or doing so may
be administratively restricted. Therefore, it is necessary for
packets to be addressed directly to the firewall, and indirectly --
via some tunneling or relaying capability -- to the real destination
on the other side of the firewall.
Options 1 and 4 are essentially equivalent. The latter may be
considered overkill, because it uses encryption even within the
private network, and this is generally not necessary. What is
necessary even within the private network is for the home agent to
add an encapsulation (not necessarily encrypted) so as to direct
datagrams to the mobile node via the firewall. The type of
encapsulation used determines the difference between options 1 and 4.
Whereas option 4 uses SKIP, option 1 uses a cleartext encapsulation
mechanism. This is obtainable by, for example, using IP in IP
encapsulation [2].
Options 1 and 4 are mostly interchangeable. The difference is, of
course, that the former does not protect the data from eavesdroppers
within the private network itself. This may be unacceptable in
certain cases. Traffic from some departments in a company (for
example payroll or legal) may need to be encrypted as it traverses
other sections of the company.
In the interest of being conservative, in what follows we assume
option 4 (i.e. traffic is encrypted on the general Internet, as well
as within the private network.
Since the firewall is party to the security associations governing
encryption on both the public and private networks, it is always able
to inspect the traffic being exchanged by the home agent and the
mobile node. If this is of any concern, the home agent and mobile
node could set up a bi-directional tunnel and encrypt it.
7. Mobile IP Registration Procedure with a SKIP Firewall
When roaming within a private network, a mobile node sends
Registration Requests directly to its home agent. On the public
Internet, it MUST encapsulate the original Registration Request in a
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 11]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
SKIP packet destined to the firewall. The mobile node MUST
distinguish between "inside" and "outside" addresses. This could be
accomplished by a set of rules defining the address ranges.
Nevertheless, actual installations may present serious difficulties
in defining exactly what is a private address and what is not.
Direct human input is a very effective method: it may be obvious to
the user that the current point of attachment is outside its private
network, and it should be possible to communicate this knowledge to
the mobile node software.
The home agent must also distinguish between "inside" and "outside"
addresses, but lacks the potential benefit of direct user input.
Accordingly, it should be possible for the mobile node to communicate
that knowledge to the home agent. To accomplish this we define a
Traversal Extension to the Registration Requests and Replies. This
extension is also useful when traversing multiple firewalls.
In spite of the above mechanisms, errors in judgement are to be
expected. Accordingly, the firewall SHOULD be configured such that
it will still perform its relaying duties even if they are
unnecessarily required by a mobile node with an inside care-of
address.
Upon arriving at a foreign net and acquiring a care-of address, the
mobile node must first -- before any data transfer is possible --
initiate a registration procedure. This consists of an authenticated
exchange by which the mobile node informs its home agent of its
current whereabouts (i.e. its current care-of address), and receives
an acknowledgement. This first step of the protocol is very
convenient, because the SKIP firewall can use it to dynamically
configure its packet filter.
The remainder of this section shows the packet formats used. Section
7.1 discusses how a mobile node sends a Registration Request to its
home agent via the SKIP firewall. Section 7.2 discusses how the home
agent send the corresponding Registration Reply to the mobile node.
Section 7.3 defines the Traversal Extension for use with Registration
Requests and Replies.
7.1. Registration Request through the Firewall
The mobile node arrives at a foreign net, and using mechanisms
defined by Mobile IP, discovers it has moved away from home. It
acquires a local address at the foreign site, and composes a
Registration Request meant for its home agent. The mobile node must
decide whether this packet needs to be processed by SKIP or not.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 12]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
This is not a simple rule triggered by a given destination address.
It must be applied whenever the following conditions are met:
a) the mobile node is using a care-of address that does not
belong to the private network (i.e. the mobile node is
currently "outside" its private network), and
b) either of:
b1) the source address of the packet is the mobile node's
home address (e.g. this packet's endpoints are
dictated by a connection initiated while at home), or
b2) the source address of the packet is the care-of
address and the destination address belongs to the
private network
Since the above conditions are mobility related, it is best for the
Mobile IP function in the node to evaluate them, and then request the
appropriate security services from SKIP.
7.1.1. On the Outside (Public) Network
The SKIP module must use the firewall destination address and the
firewall's certificate in order to address and encrypt the packet.
It encrypts it using SKIP combined with the ESP [6] protocol and
possibly the AH [7] protocol.
The SKIP header's source NSID equals 1, indicating that the Master
Key-ID is the mobile node's home address. Notice that the IP packet's
source address corresponds to the care-of address -- an address whose
corresponding public component is unknown to the firewall.
It is also possible to use Unsigned Diffie-Hellman public components
[10]. Doing so greatly reduces SKIP's infrastructure requirements,
because there is no need for a Certificate Authority. Of course, for
this to be possible the principals' names MUST be securely
communicated.
REGISTRATION REQUEST: BETWEEN THE MOBILE NODE AND THE FIREWALL
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+--------------+
| IP Hdr (SKIP) | SKIP Hdr | AH | ESP | Inner IP Hdr | Reg. Request |
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+--------------+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source mobile node's care-of address
Destination firewall's public (outside) address
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 13]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 1
Master Key-ID = IPv4 address of the mobile node
Destination NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Inner IP Hdr:
Source mobile node's care-of address
Destination home agent's address
7.1.2. On the Inside (Private) Network
The SKIP Firewall's dynamic packet filtering uses this information to
establish a dynamic binding between the care-of address and the
mobile node's permanent home address.
The destination NSID field in the above packet is zero, prompting the
firewall to process the SKIP header and recover the internal packet.
It then delivers the original packet to another outbound interface,
because it is addressed to the home agent (an address within the
private network). Assuming secure channel configuration number 4, the
firewall encrypts the packet using SKIP before forwarding to the home
agent.
REGISTRATION REQUEST: BETWEEN THE FIREWALL AND THE HOME AGENT
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+--------------+
| IP Hdr (SKIP) | SKIP Hdr | AH | ESP | Inner IP Hdr | Reg. Request |
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+--------------+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source firewall's private (inside) address
Destination home agent's address
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Destination NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Inner IP Hdr:
Source mobile node's care-of address
Destination home agent's address
7.2. Registration Reply through the Firewall
The home agent processes the Registration Request, and composes a
Registration Reply. Before responding, it examines the care-of
address reported by the mobile node, and determines whether or not it
corresponds to an outside address. If so, the home agent needs to
send all traffic back through the firewall. The home agent can
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 14]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
accomplish this by encapsulating the original Registration Reply in a
SKIP packet destined to the firewall (i.e. we assume secure channel
configuration number 4).
7.2.1. On the Inside (Private) Network
The packet from the home agent to the mobile node via the SKIP
Firewall has the same format as shown above. The relevant fields are:
REGISTRATION REPLY: BETWEEN THE HOME AGENT AND THE FIREWALL
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+------------+
| IP Hdr (SKIP) | SKIP Hdr | AH | ESP | Inner IP Hdr | Reg. Reply |
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+------------+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source home agent's address
Destination firewall's private (inside) address
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Destination NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Inner IP Hdr:
Source home agent's address
Destination mobile node's care-of address
7.2.2. On the Outside (Public) Network
The SKIP Firewall recovers the original Registration Reply packet and
looks at the destination address: the mobile node's care-of address.
The SKIP Firewall's dynamic packet filtering used the initial
Registration Request (Secton 7.1) to establish a dynamic mapping
between the care-of address and the mobile node's Master Key-ID.
Hence, before forwarding the Registration Reply, it encrypts it using
the mobile node's public component.
This dynamic binding capability and the use of tunneling mode ESP
obviate the need to extend the Mobile IP protocol with a "relay
Registration Request". However, it requires that the Registration
Reply exit the private network through the same firewall that
forwarded the corresponding Registration Request.
Instead of obtaining the mobile node's permanent address from the
dynamic binding, a Mobile IP aware firewall could also obtain it from
the Registration Reply itself. This renders the firewall stateless,
and lets Registration Requests and Replies traverse the periphery of
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 15]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
the private network through different firewalls.
REGISTRATION REPLY: BETWEEN THE FIREWALL AND THE MOBILE NODE
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+------------+
| IP Hdr (SKIP) | SKIP Hdr | AH | ESP | Inner IP Hdr | Reg. Reply |
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+------------+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source firewall's public (outside) address
Destination mobile node's care-of address
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Destination NSID = 1
Master Key-ID = IPv4 addr of the mobile node
Inner IP Hdr:
Source home agent's address
Destination mobile node's care-of address
7.3. Traversal Extension
The Traversal Extension MAY be included by mobile nodes in
Registration Requests, and by home agents in Registration Replies.
As per Section 3.6.1.3 of [1], the Traversal Extension must appear
before the Mobile-Home Authentication Extension. A Traversal
Extension is an explicit notification that there are one or more
traversal points (firewalls, fireridges, etc) between the mobile node
and its home agent. Negotiating access past these systems may imply a
new authentication header, and possibly a new encapsulating header
(perhaps as part of tunnel-mode ESP) whose IP destination address is
the traversal address.
Negotiating access past traversal points does not necessarily require
cryptographic techniques. For example, systems at the boundary
between separate IP address spaces must be explicitly targetted
(perhaps using unencrypted IP in IP encapsulation).
A mobile node SHOULD include one Traversal Extension per traversal
point in its Registration Requests. If present, their order MUST
exactly match the order in which packets encounter them as they flow
from the mobile node towards the home agent.
Notice that there may be additional firewalls along the way, but the
list of traversal points SHOULD only include those systems with which
an explicit negotiation is required.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 16]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
Similarly, the home agent SHOULD include one Traversal Extension per
traversal point in its Registration Replies. If present, their order
MUST exactly match the order in which packets encounter them as they
flow from the home agent to the mobile node.
A Traversal Extension does not include any indication about how
access is negotiated. Presumably, this information is obtained
through separate means. This document does not attempt to solve the
firewall discovery problem, that is, it does not specify how to
discover the list of traversal points.
As per section 1.9 of [1], the fact that the type value falls within
the range 128 to 255 implies that if a home agent or a mobile node
encounter a Traversal Extension in a Registration Request or Reply,
they may silently ignore it. This is consistent with the fact that
the Traversal Extension is essentially a hint.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| MN to HA Traversal Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HA to MN Traversal Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
129
Length
10
Reserved
0
MN to HA Traversal Address
The IP address of the an intermediate system or firewall
encountered by datagrams sent by the mobile node towards the
home agent. Typically, this is the external address of a
firewall or firewall complex.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 17]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
This field MUST be initialized in Registration Requests. In
Registration Replies, it is typically all 0's, otherwise, the
mobile node SHOULD interpret it as a hint.
HA to MN Traversal Address
The IP address of an intermediate system or firewall
encountered by datagrams sent by the home agent towards the
mobile node. Typically, this is the internal address of a
firewall or firewall complex.
This field MUST be initialized in Registration Replies. In
Registration Requests, it is typically all 0's, otherwise, the
home agent SHOULD interpret it as a hint.
8. Data Transfer
Data transfer proceeds along lines similar to the Registration
Request outlined above. Section 8.1 discusses data traffic sent by a
mobile node to a correspondent node. Section 8.2 shows packet formats
for the reverse traffic being tunneled by the home agent to the
mobile node.
8.1. Data Packet From the Mobile Node to a Correspondent Node
The mobile node composes a packet destined to a correspondent node
located within the private network.
The Mobile IP function in the mobile node examines the Inner IP
header, and determines that it satisfies conditions "a" and "b1" from
Section 7.1. The mobile node requests the proper encryption and
encapsulation services from SKIP.
Thus, the mobile node with a co-located address sends encrypted
traffic to the firewall, using the following format:
DATA PACKET: FROM THE MOBILE NODE VIA THE FIREWALL
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+------+
| IP Hdr (SKIP) | SKIP Hdr | AH | ESP | Inner IP Hdr | ULP |
+---------------+----------+----+-----+--------------+------+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source mobile node's care-of address
Destination public (outside) address on the firewall
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 18]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 1
Master Key-ID = IPv4 address of the mobile node
Destination NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Inner IP Hdr:
Source mobile node's home address
Destination correspondent node's address
The SKIP Firewall intercepts this packet, decrypts the Inner IP Hdr
and upper-layer payload (ULP) and checks the destination address.
Since the packet is destined to a correspondent node in the private
network, the "Inner" IP datagram is delivered internally. Once the
SKIP firewall injects this packet into the private network, it is
routed independently of its source address.
As this last assumption is not always true, the mobile node may
construct a bi-directional tunnel with its home agent. Doing so,
guarantees that the "Inner IP Hdr" is:
Inner IP Hdr:
Source care-of address
Destination home agent address
When at home, communication between the the mobile node and certain
external correspondent nodes may need to go through application-
specific firewalls or proxies, different from the SKIP firewall.
While on the public network, the mobile node's communication with
these hosts, MUST use a bi-directional tunnel.
8.2. Data Packet From a Correspondent Node to the Mobile Node
The home agent intercepts a packet from a correspondent node to the
mobile node. It encapsulates it such that the Mobile IP encapsulating
IP header's source and destination addresses are the home agent and
care-of addresses, respectively. This would suffice for delivery
within the private network. Since the current care-of address of the
mobile node is not within the private network, this packet MUST be
sent via the firewall. The home agent can accomplish this by
encapsulating the datagram in a SKIP packet destined to the firewall
(i.e. we assume secure channel configuration number 4).
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 19]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
8.2.1 Within the Inside (Private) Network
From the home agent to the private (inside) address of the firewall
the packet format is:
DATA PACKET: BETWEEN THE HOME AGENT AND THE FIREWALL
+--------+------+----+-----+--------+--------+-----+
| IP Hdr | SKIP | AH | ESP | mobip | Inner | ULP |
| (SKIP) | Hdr | | | IP Hdr | IP Hdr | |
+--------+------+----+-----+--------+--------+-----+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source home agent's address
Destination private (inside) address on the firewall
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Destination NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Mobile-IP IP Hdr:
Source home agent's address
Destination care-of address
Inner IP Hdr:
Source correspondent node's address
Destination mobile node's address
ULP: upper-layer payload
The packet format above does not require the firewall to have a
dynamic binding. The association between the mobile node's permanent
address and it care-of address can be deduced from the contents of
the "Mobile-IP IP Hdr" and the "Inner IP Hdr".
Nevertheless, a nomadic binding is an assurance that currently the
mobile node is, in fact, at the care-of address.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 20]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
8.2.2. On the Outside (Public) Network
The SKIP firewall intercepts the packet, and recovers the Mobile IP
encapsulated datagram. Before sending it out, the dynamic packet
filter configured by the original Registration Request triggers
encryption of this packet, this time by the SKIP firewall for
consumption by the mobile node. The resultant packet is:
DATA PACKET: BETWEEN THE FIREWALL AND THE MOBILE NODE
+--------+------+----+-----+--------+--------+-----+
| IP Hdr | SKIP | AH | ESP | mobip | Inner | ULP |
| (SKIP) | Hdr | | | IP Hdr | IP Hdr | |
+--------+------+----+-----+--------+--------+-----+
IP Hdr (SKIP):
Source firewall's public (outside) address
Destination mobile node's care-of address
SKIP Hdr:
Source NSID = 0
Master Key-ID = none
Destination NSID = 1
Master Key-ID = IPv4 address of the mobile node
Mobile-IP IP Hdr:
Source home agent's address
Destination care-of address
Inner IP Hdr:
Source correspondent node's address
Destination mobile node's address
ULP: upper-layer payload
At the mobile node, SKIP processes the packets sent by the firewall.
Eventually, the inner IP header and the upper-layer packet (ULP) are
retrieved and passed on.
9. Security Considerations
The topic of this document is security. Nevertheless, it is
imperative to point out the perils involved in allowing a flow of IP
packets through a firewall. In essence, the mobile host itself MUST
also take on responsibility for securing the private network, because
it extends its periphery. This does not mean it stops exchanging
unencrypted IP packets with hosts on the public network. For
example, it MAY have to do so in order to satisfy billing
requirements imposed by the foreign site, or to renew its DHCP lease.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 21]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
In the latter case it might filter not only on IP source address, but
also on protocol and port numbers.
Therefore, it MUST have some firewall capabilities, otherwise, any
malicious individual that gains access to it will have gained access
to the private network as well.
Acknowledgements
Ideas in this document have benefited from discussions with at least
the following people: Bill Danielson, Martin Patterson, Tom Markson,
Rich Skrenta, Atsushi Shimbo, Behfar Razavi, Avinash Agrawal, Tsutomu
Shimomura and Don Hoffman. Jim Solomon has also provided many helpful
comments on this document.
References
[1] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, October 1996.
[2] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003, October
1996.
[3] A. Aziz and M. Patterson, Design and Implementation of SKIP,
available on-line at http://skip.incog.com/inet-95.ps. A
previous version of the paper was presented at INET '95 under
the title Simple Key Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP),
and appears in the conference proceedings under that title.
[4] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y, Kuris, R., Koblas, D., and
L. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", RFC 1928, March 1996.
[5] Leech, M., "Username/Password Authentication for SOCKS V5",
RFC 1929, March 1996.
[6] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Payload", RFC 1827, August
1995.
[7] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826, August
1995.
[8] Stephen Kent, message to the IETF's IPSEC mailing list,
Message-Id: <v02130500ae569a3e904e@[128.89.30.29]>, September
6, 1996.
[9] Tom Markson, private communication, June 12, 1996.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 22]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
[10] A. Aziz, T. Markson, H. Prafullchandra. Encoding of an
Unsigned Diffie-Hellman Public Value. Available on-line as
http://skip.incog.com/spec/EUDH.html.
Authors' Addresses
Gabriel E. Montenegro
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
901 San Antonio Road
Mailstop UMPK 15-214
Mountain View, California 94303
Phone: (415)786-6288
Fax: (415)786-6445
EMail: gabriel.montenegro@Eng.Sun.COM
Vipul Gupta
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
901 San Antonio Road
Mailstop UMPK 15-214
Mountain View, California 94303
Phone: (415)786-3614
Fax: (415)786-6445
EMail: vipul.gupta@Eng.Sun.COM
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 23]
RFC 2356 Sun's SKIP Firewall Traversal for Mobile IP June 1998
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Montenegro & Gupta Informational [Page 24]