rfc5361
Network Working Group G. Camarillo
Request for Comments: 5361 Ericsson
Category: Standards Track October 2008
A Document Format for Requesting Consent
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document defines an Extensible Markup Language (XML) format for
a permission document used to request consent. A permission document
written in this format is used by a relay to request a specific
recipient permission to perform a particular routing translation.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Permission Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Recipient Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.2. Identity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. Target Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.4. Validity Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.5. Sphere Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Translation Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Example Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. XML Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
1. Introduction
The framework for consent-based communications in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC5360] identifies the need for a format
to create permission documents. Such permission documents are used
by SIP [RFC3261] relays to request permission to perform
translations. A relay is defined as any SIP server, be it a proxy,
B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or some hybrid, which receives a
request and translates the Request-URI into one or more next-hop URIs
to which it then delivers a request.
The format for permission documents specified in this document is
based on Common Policy [RFC4745], an XML document format for
expressing privacy preferences.
2. Definitions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
This document uses the terms defined in [RFC5360]. For completeness,
these terms are repeated here. Figure 1 of [RFC5360] shows the
relationship between target and recipient URIs in a translation
operation.
Recipient URI:
The Request-URI of an outgoing request sent by an entity (e.g., a
user agent or a proxy). The sending of such request can have been
the result of a translation operation.
Relay:
Any SIP server, be it a proxy, B2BUA (Back-to-Back User Agent), or
some hybrid, that receives a request, translates its Request-URI
into one or more next-hop URIs (i.e., recipient URIs), and
delivers the request to those URIs.
Target URI:
The Request-URI of an incoming request that arrives to a relay
that will perform a translation operation.
Translation logic:
The logic that defines a translation operation at a relay. This
logic includes the translation's target and recipient URIs.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
Translation operation:
Operation by which a relay translates the Request-URI of an
incoming request (i.e., the target URI) into one or more URIs
(i.e., recipient URIs) that are used as the Request-URIs of one or
more outgoing requests.
3. Permission Document Structure
A permission document is an XML document, formatted according to the
schema defined in [RFC4745]. Permission documents inherit the MIME
type of common policy documents, 'application/auth-policy+xml'. As
described in [RFC4745], this type of document is composed of three
parts: conditions, actions, and transformations.
This section defines the new conditions and actions defined by this
specification. This specification does not define any new
transformation.
3.1. Conditions
The conditions in a permission document are a set of expressions,
each of which evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. Note that, as
discussed in [RFC4745], a permission document applies to a
translation if all the expressions in its conditions part evaluate to
TRUE.
3.1.1. Recipient Condition
The recipient condition is matched against the recipient URI of a
translation. Recipient conditions can contain the same elements and
attributes as identity conditions.
When performing a translation, a relay matches the recipient
condition of the permission document that was used to request
permission for that translation against the destination URI of the
outgoing request. When receiving a request granting or denying
permissions (e.g., a SIP PUBLISH request as described in [RFC5360]),
the relay matches the recipient condition of the permission document
that was used to request permission against the identity of the
entity granting or denying permissions (i.e., the sender of the
PUBLISH request). If there is a match, the recipient condition
evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the recipient condition evaluates to
FALSE.
Since only authenticated identities can be matched, this section
defines acceptable means of authentication, which are in line with
those described in Section 5.6.1 of [RFC5360].
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
The 'id' attribute in the elements <one> and <except> MUST contain a
scheme when these elements appear in a permission document.
When used with SIP, a recipient granting or denying a relay
permissions is considered authenticated if one of the following
techniques is used:
SIP Identity [RFC4474], as described in Section 5.6.1.1 of
[RFC5360]. For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the
SIP Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the PUBLISH
request is equal to the SIP URI in the From header field of the
request, assuming that the signature in the Identity header field
has been validated.
P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] (which can only be used in closed
network environments) as described in Section 5.6.1.2 of
[RFC5360]. For PUBLISH requests that are authenticated using the
P-Asserted-Identity mechanism, the identity of the sender of the
PUBLISH request is equal to the P-Asserted-Identity header field
of the request.
Return Routability Test, as described in Section 5.6.1.3 of
[RFC5360]. It can be used for SIP PUBLISH and HTTP GET requests.
No authentication is expected to be used with return routability
tests and, therefore, no identity matching procedures are defined.
SIP digest, as described in Section 5.6.1.4 of [RFC5360]. The
identity of the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record
(AOR) for the user that has authenticated themselves.
3.1.2. Identity Condition
The identity condition, which is defined in [RFC4745], is matched
against the URI of the sender of the request that is used as input
for a translation.
When performing a translation, a relay matches the identity condition
against the identity of the sender of the incoming request. If they
match, the identity condition evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the
identity condition evaluates to FALSE.
Since only authenticated identities can be matched, the following
subsections define acceptable means of authentication, the procedure
for representing the identity of the sender as a URI, and the
procedure for converting an identifier of the form user@domain,
present in the 'id' attribute of the <one> and <except> elements,
into a URI.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
3.1.2.1. Acceptable Means of Authentication
When used with SIP, a request sent by a sender is considered
authenticated if one of the following techniques is used:
SIP Digest: the relay authenticates the sender using SIP digest
authentication [RFC2617]. However, if the anonymous
authentication described on page 194 of [RFC3261] is used, the
sender is not considered authenticated.
Asserted Identity: if a request contains a P-Asserted-ID header
field [RFC3325] and the request is coming from a trusted element,
the sender is considered authenticated.
Cryptographically Verified Identity: if a request contains an
Identity header field as defined in [RFC4474], and it validates
the From header field of the request, the request is considered to
be authenticated. Note that this is true even if the request
contained a From header field of the form
sip:anonymous@example.com. As long as the signature verifies that
the request legitimately came from this identity, it is considered
authenticated.
3.1.2.2. Computing a URI for the Sender
For requests that are authenticated using SIP Digest, the identity of
the sender is set equal to the SIP Address of Record (AOR) for the
user that has authenticated themselves. For example, consider the
following "user record" in a database:
SIP AOR: sip:alice@example.com
digest username: ali
digest password: f779ajvvh8a6s6
digest realm: example.com
If the relay receives a request and challenges it with the realm set
to "example.com", and the subsequent request contains an
Authorization header field with a username of "ali" and a digest
response generated with the password "f779ajvvh8a6s6", the identity
used in matching operations is "sip:alice@example.com".
For requests that are authenticated using [RFC3325], the identity of
the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the P-Asserted-ID header field.
If there are multiple values for the P-Asserted-ID header field
(there can be one sip URI and one tel URI [RFC3966]), then each of
them is used for the comparisons outlined in [RFC4745]; if either of
them match a <one> or <except> element, it is considered a match.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
For requests that are authenticated using the SIP Identity mechanism
[RFC4474], identity of the sender is equal to the SIP URI in the From
header field of the request, assuming that the signature in the
Identity header field has been validated.
SIP also allows for anonymous requests. If a request is anonymous
because the digest challenge/response used the "anonymous" username,
the request is considered unauthenticated and will not match the
<identity> condition. If a request is anonymous because it contains
a Privacy header field [RFC3323], but still contains a P-Asserted-ID
header field, the identity in the P-Asserted-ID header field is still
used in the authorization computations; the fact that the request was
anonymous has no impact on the identity processing. However, if the
request had traversed a trust boundary and the P-Asserted-ID header
field and the Privacy header field had been removed, the request will
be considered unauthenticated when it arrives at the relay, and thus
not match the <sender> condition. Finally, if a request contained an
Identity header field that was validated, and the From header field
contained a URI of the form sip:anonymous@example.com, then the
sender is considered authenticated, and it will have an identity
equal to sip:anonymous@example.com. Had such an identity been placed
into a <one> or <except> element, there will be a match.
3.1.2.3. Computing a SIP URI from the id Attribute
If the <one> or <except> condition does not contain a scheme,
conversion of the value in the 'id' attribute to a SIP URI is done
trivially. If the characters in the 'id' attribute are valid
characters for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI, a
'sip:' is appended to the contents of the 'id' attribute, and the
result is the SIP URI. If the characters in the 'id' attribute are
not valid for the user and hostpart components of the SIP URI,
conversion is not possible and, thus, the identity condition
evaluates to FALSE. This happens, for example, when the user portion
of the 'id' attribute contains UTF-8 characters.
3.1.3. Target Condition
The target condition is matched against the target URI of a
translation. The target condition can contain the same elements and
attributes as identity conditions.
When performing a translation, a relay matches the target condition
against the destination of the incoming request, which is typically
contained in the Request-URI. If they match, the target condition
evaluates to TRUE. Otherwise, the target condition evaluates to
FALSE.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
3.1.4. Validity Condition
The <validity> element is not applicable to this document. Each
<permission> element has an infinite lifetime and can be revoked
using an independent mechanism, as described in Section 5.8 of
[RFC5360]. In any case, as discussed in Section 4.1 of [RFC5360],
permissions are only valid as long as the context where they were
granted is valid. If present, <validity> elements MUST be ignored.
3.1.5. Sphere Condition
The <sphere> element is not applicable to this document and therefore
is not used. If present, <sphere> elements MUST be ignored.
3.2. Actions
The actions in a permission document provide URIs to grant or deny
permission to perform the translation described in the document.
Note that the <trans-handling> element is not an action, as
defined in Common Policy [RFC4745], but rather an informational
element. Therefore, the conflict resolution mechanism does not
apply to it.
Each policy rule contains at least two <trans-handling> elements; one
element with a URI to grant and another with a URI to deny
permission.
3.2.1. Translation Handling
The <trans-handling> provides URIs for a recipient to grant or deny
the relay permission to perform a translation. The defined values
are:
deny: this action tells the relay not to perform the translation.
grant: this action tells the server to perform the translation.
The 'perm-uri' attribute in the <trans-handling> element provides a
URI to grant or deny permission to perform a translation.
4. Example Document
In the following example, a client adds 'sip:bob@example.org' to the
translation whose target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com'.
The relay handling the translation generates the following permission
document in order to ask for permission to relay requests sent to
'sip:alices-friends@example.com' to 'sip:bob@example.org'. The
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
target URI is 'sip:alices-friends@example.com', and the recipient URI
is 'sip:bob@example.org'. The sender's identity does not play a role
in this example. Therefore, the permission document does not put any
restriction on potential senders.
+--------+ +--------------------------------+ Permission
| | | | Request
| Client | | Relay | with
| | | sip:alices-friends@example.com | Permission
+--------+ | | Document
| |+-------+ |-------------+
| ||Transl.| | |
|Manipulation ||Logic | | |
+------------>|+-------+ | |
Add +--------------------------------+ |
sip:bob@example.org V
+---------------------+
| |
| Recipient |
| sip:bob@example.org |
| |
+---------------------+
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cp:ruleset
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy">
<cp:rule id="f1">
<cp:conditions>
<cp:identity>
<cp:many/>
</cp:identity>
<recipient>
<cp:one id="sip:bob@example.org"/>
</recipient>
<target>
<cp:one id="sip:alices-friends@example.com"/>
</target>
</cp:conditions>
<cp:actions>
<trans-handling
perm-uri="sips:grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34@example.com"
>grant</trans-handling>
<trans-handling
perm-uri="https://example.com/grant-1awdch5Fasddfce34"
>grant</trans-handling>
<trans-handling
perm-uri="sips:deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye@example.com"
>deny</trans-handling>
<trans-handling
perm-uri="https://example.com/deny-23rCsdfgvdT5sdfgye"
>deny</trans-handling>
</cp:actions>
<cp:transformations/>
</cp:rule>
</cp:ruleset>
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
5. XML Schema
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
xmlns:cr="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules"
xmlns:cp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<!-- Conditions -->
<xs:element name="recipient" type="cp:identityType"/>
<xs:element name="target" type="cp:identityType"/>
<!-- Actions -->
<xs:simpleType name="trans-values">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="deny"/>
<xs:enumeration value="grant"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:element name="trans-handling">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleContent>
<xs:extension base="trans-values">
<xs:attribute name="perm-uri" type="xs:anyURI"
use="required"/>
</xs:extension>
</xs:simpleContent>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
6. Extensibility
This specification defines elements that do not have extension points
in the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace. Instance
documents that utilize these element definitions SHOULD be schema
valid. Applications processing instance documents with content that
is not understood by the application MUST ignore that content. IETF
extension documents of this specification MAY reuse the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules" namespace to define new
elements.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
7. IANA Considerations
This section registers a new XML namespace and a new XML schema per
the procedures in [RFC3688].
7.1. XML Namespace Registration
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules
Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>,
Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>
XML:
BEGIN
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type"
content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
<title>Consent Rules Namespace</title>
</head>
<body>
<h1>Namespace for Permission Documents</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:consent-rules</h2>
<p>See <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5361.txt">RFC 5361
</a>.</p>
</body>
</html>
END
7.2. XML Schema Registration
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:consent-rules
Registrant Contact: IETF SIPPING working group <sipping@ietf.org>,
Gonzalo Camarillo <Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com>
XML: The XML schema to be registered is contained in Section 5.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
8. Security Considerations
RFC 5360 [RFC5360] discusses security-related issues, such as how to
authenticate SIP and HTTP requests granting permissions and how to
transport permission documents between relays and recipients, that
are directly related to this specification.
9. Acknowledgements
Jonathan Rosenberg provided useful ideas on this document. Hannes
Tschofenig helped align this document with common policy. Ben
Campbell and Mary Barnes performed a thorough review of this
document. Lakshminath Dondeti provided useful comments.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3323] Peterson, J., "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3323, November 2002.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
[RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
February 2007.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
[RFC5360] Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., and D. Willis, "A Framework
for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5360, October 2008.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers",
RFC 3966, December 2004.
[RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
November 2002.
Author's Address
Gonzalo Camarillo
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
Jorvas 02420
Finland
EMail: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 5361 Permission Document Format October 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Camarillo Standards Track [Page 14]
ERRATA
