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> Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport Layer Security (TLS)

Abstract

This document specifies the use of several Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool curves for authentication and key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.

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1. Introduction

[RFC5639] specifies a new set of elliptic curve groups over finite prime fields for use in cryptographic applications. These groups, denoted as ECC Brainpool curves, were generated in a verifiably pseudo-random way and comply with the security requirements of relevant standards from ISO [ISO1] [ISO2], ANSI [ANSI1], NIST [FIPS], and SecG [SEC2].

[RFC4492] defines the usage of elliptic curves for authentication and key agreement in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1; these mechanisms may also be used with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. While the ASN.1 object identifiers defined in [RFC5639] already allow usage of the ECC Brainpool curves for TLS (client or server) authentication through reference in X.509 certificates according to [RFC3279] and [RFC5480], their negotiation for key exchange according to [RFC4492] requires the definition and assignment of additional NamedCurve IDs. This document specifies such values for three curves from [RFC5639].

2. Brainpool NamedCurve Types

According to [RFC4492], the name space NamedCurve is used for the negotiation of elliptic curve groups for key exchange during a handshake starting a new TLS session. This document adds new NamedCurve types to three elliptic curves defined in [RFC5639] as follows:

```
enum {
          brainpoolP256r1(26),
          brainpoolP384r1(27),
          brainpoolP512r1(28)
} NamedCurve;
```

These curves are suitable for use with Datagram TLS [RFC6347].

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Test vectors for a Diffie-Hellman key exchange using these elliptic curves are provided in Appendix A.

3. IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned numbers for the ECC Brainpool curves listed in Section 2 in the "EC Named Curve" [IANA-TLS] registry of the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters" registry as follows:

| + | + | + | ++ |
|----------------|---|------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Value | Description | DTLS-OK | Reference |
| 26 27 28 | brainpoolP256r1 brainpoolP384r1 brainpoolP512r1 | У У У У | RFC 7027 RFC 7027 RFC 7027 |

Table 1

4. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC5246] apply to the ECC Brainpool curves described in this document.

The confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of the TLS communication is limited by the weakest cryptographic primitive applied. In order to achieve a maximum security level when using one of the elliptic curves from Table 1 for authentication and/or key exchange in TLS, the key derivation function; the algorithms and key lengths of symmetric encryption; and message authentication (as well as the algorithm, bit length, and hash function used for signature generation) should be chosen according to the recommendations of [NIST800-57] and [RFC5639]. Furthermore, the private Diffie-Hellman keys should be selected with the same bit length as the order of the group generated by the base point G and with approximately maximum entropy.

Implementations of elliptic curve cryptography for TLS may be susceptible to side-channel attacks. Particular care should be taken for implementations that internally transform curve points to points on the corresponding "twisted curve", using the map $(x',y') = (x*Z^2, y*Z^3)$ with the coefficient Z specified for that curve in [RFC5639], in order to take advantage of an efficient arithmetic based on the twisted curve's special parameters (A = -3). Although the twisted curve itself offers the same level of security as the corresponding random curve (through mathematical equivalence), an arithmetic based on small curve parameters may be harder to protect against side-

channel attacks. General guidance on resistance of elliptic curve cryptography implementations against side-channel-attacks is given in [BSI1] and [HMV].

5. References

5.1. Normative References

- [RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.
- [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
- [RFC5639] Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation", RFC 5639, March 2010.
- [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012.

5.2. Informative References

- [ANSI1] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 2005.
- [BSI1] Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, "Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations", July 2011.
- [FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, December 1998.
- [HMV] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer Verlag, 2004.

[ISO1] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital
Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete Logarithm
Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006.

[ISO2] International Organization for Standardization,
"Information Technology - Security Techniques Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves Part 2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002.

[NIST800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology,

"Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General

(Revised)", NIST Special Publication 800-57,

March 2007.

[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.

[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.

[SEC1] Certicom Research, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 1, September 2000.

[SEC2] Certicom Research, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 2, September 2000.

Appendix A. Test Vectors

This section provides some test vectors for example Diffie-Hellman key exchanges using each of the curves defined in Table 1. The following notation is used in the subsequent sections:

d_A: the secret key of party A

 x_qA : the x-coordinate of the public key of party A

y_qA: the y-coordinate of the public key of party A

d_B: the secret key of party B

 x_qB : the x-coordinate of the public key of party B

y_qB: the y-coordinate of the public key of party B

 $x_Z\colon$ the x-coordinate of the shared secret that results from completion of the Diffie-Hellman computation, i.e., the hex representation of the pre-master secret

 y_Z : the y-coordinate of the shared secret that results from completion of the Diffie-Hellman computation

The field elements x_qA , y_qA , x_qB , y_qB , x_Z , and y_Z are represented as hexadecimal values using the FieldElement-to-OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1].

A.1. 256-Bit Curve

Curve brainpoolP256r1

dA =

81DB1EE100150FF2EA338D708271BE38300CB54241D79950F77B063039804F1D

 $x_qA =$

44106E913F92BC02A1705D9953A8414DB95E1AAA49E81D9E85F929A8E3100BE5

 $y_qA =$

8AB4846F11CACCB73CE49CBDD120F5A900A69FD32C272223F789EF10EB089BDC

dB =

55E40BC41E37E3E2AD25C3C6654511FFA8474A91A0032087593852D3E7D76BD3

 $x_qB =$

8D2D688C6CF93E1160AD04CC4429117DC2C41825E1E9FCA0ADDD34E6F1B39F7B

 $y_qB =$

990C57520812BE512641E47034832106BC7D3E8DD0E4C7F1136D7006547CEC6A

 $x_Z =$

89AFC39D41D3B327814B80940B042590F96556EC91E6AE7939BCE31F3A18BF2B

 $y_Z =$

49C27868F4ECA2179BFD7D59B1E3BF34C1DBDE61AE12931648F43E59632504DE

A.2. 384-Bit Curve

Curve brainpoolP384r1

- dA = 1E20F5E048A5886F1F157C74E91BDE2B98C8B52D58E5003D57053FC4B0BD6 5D6F15EB5D1EE1610DF870795143627D042
- $x_qA = 68B665DD91C195800650CDD363C625F4E742E8134667B767B1B476793588F885AB698C852D4A6E77A252D6380FCAF068$
- $y_qA = 55BC91A39C9EC01DEE36017B7D673A931236D2F1F5C83942D049E3FA206$ 07493E0D038FF2FD30C2AB67D15C85F7FAA59
- dB = 032640BC6003C59260F7250C3DB58CE647F98E1260ACCE4ACDA3DD869F74E 01F8BA5E0324309DB6A9831497ABAC96670
- $x_qB = 4D44326F269A597A5B58BBA565DA5556ED7FD9A8A9EB76C25F46DB69D19DC8CE6AD18E404B15738B2086DF37E71D1EB4$
- y_qB = 62D692136DE56CBE93BF5FA3188EF58BC8A3A0EC6C1E151A21038A42E91
 85329B5B275903D192F8D4E1F32FE9CC78C48
- $x_Z = 0BD9D3A7EA0B3D519D09D8E48D0785FB744A6B355E6304BC51C229FBBCE239BBADF6403715C35D4FB2A5444F575D4F42$
- $y_Z = 0DF213417EBE4D8E40A5F76F66C56470C489A3478D146DECF6DF0D94BAE9$ E598157290F8756066975F1DB34B2324B7BD

A.3. 512-Bit Curve

Curve brainpoolP512r1

- dA = 16302FF0DBBB5A8D733DAB7141C1B45ACBC8715939677F6A56850A38BD87B D59B09E80279609FF333EB9D4C061231FB26F92EEB04982A5F1D1764CAD5766542 2
- $x_qA = 0A420517E406AAC0ACDCE90FCD71487718D3B953EFD7FBEC5F7F27E28C6149999397E91E029E06457DB2D3E640668B392C2A7E737A7F0BF04436D11640FD09FD$
- y_qA = 72E6882E8DB28AAD36237CD25D580DB23783961C8DC52DFA2EC138AD472
 A0FCEF3887CF62B623B2A87DE5C588301EA3E5FC269B373B60724F5E82A6AD147F
 DE7
- dB = 230E18E1BCC88A362FA54E4EA3902009292F7F8033624FD471B5D8ACE49D1 2CFABBC19963DAB8E2F1EBA00BFFB29E4D72D13F2224562F405CB80503666B2542 9
- $x_qB = 9D45F66DE5D67E2E6DB6E93A59CE0BB48106097FF78A081DE781CDB31FC$ E8CCBAAEA8DD4320C4119F1E9CD437A2EAB3731FA9668AB268D871DEDA55A54731 99F
- y_qB = 2FDC313095BCDD5FB3A91636F07A959C8E86B5636A1E930E8396049CB48
 1961D365CC11453A06C719835475B12CB52FC3C383BCE35E27EF194512B7187628
 5FA
- x_Z = A7927098655F1F9976FA50A9D566865DC530331846381C87256BAF322624 4B76D36403C024D7BBF0AA0803EAFF405D3D24F11A9B5C0BEF679FE1454B21C4CD 1F
- y_Z = 7DB71C3DEF63212841C463E881BDCF055523BD368240E6C3143BD8DEF8B3 B3223B95E0F53082FF5E412F4222537A43DF1C6D25729DDB51620A832BE6A26680 A2

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