Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-sha


INTERNET-DRAFT                                    Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
UPDATES RFC 2845                                   Motorola Laboratories
Expires: July 2006                                          January 2006

                  HMAC SHA TSIG Algorithm Identifiers
                  ---- --- ---- --------- -----------

Status of This Document

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   Use of the Domain Name System TSIG resource record requires
   specification of a cryptographic message authentication code.
   Currently identifiers have been specified only for the HMAC MD5
   (Message Digest) and GSS (Generic Security Service) TSIG algorithms.
   This document standardizes identifiers and implementation
   requirements for additional HMAC SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) TSIG
   algorithms and standardizes how to specify and handle the truncation
   of HMAC values in TSIG.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 1]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

Table of Contents

      Status of This Document....................................1
      Copyright Notice...........................................1

      Table of Contents..........................................2

      1. Introduction............................................3

      2. Algorithms and Identifiers..............................4

      3. Specifying Truncation...................................5
      3.1 Truncation Specification...............................5

      4. TSIG Truncation Policy and Error Provisions.............6

      5. IANA Considerations.....................................7
      6. Security Considerations.................................7
      7. Copyright and Disclaimer................................7

      8. Normative References....................................8
      9. Informative References..................................8

      Author's Address...........................................9
      Additional IPR Provisions..................................9
      Expiration and File Name...................................9

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 2]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

1. Introduction

   [RFC 2845] specifies a TSIG Resource Record (RR) that can be used to
   authenticate DNS (Domain Name System [STD 13]) queries and responses.
   This RR contains a domain name syntax data item which names the
   authentication algorithm used. [RFC 2845] defines the HMAC-MD5.SIG-
   ALG.REG.INT name for authentication codes using the HMAC [RFC 2104]
   algorithm with the MD5 [RFC 1321] hash algorithm. IANA has also
   registered "gss-tsig" as an identifier for TSIG authentication where
   the cryptographic operations are delegated to the Generic Security
   Service (GSS) [RFC 3645].

   It should be noted that use of TSIG presumes prior agreement, between
   the resolver and server involved, as to the algorithm and key to be

   In Section 2, this document specifies additional names for TSIG
   authentication algorithms based on US NIST SHA (United States,
   National Institute of Science and Technology, Secure Hash Algorithm)
   algorithms and HMAC and specifies the implementation requirements for
   those algorithms.

   In Section 3, this document specifies the effect of inequality
   between the normal output size of the specified hash function and the
   length of MAC (message authentication code) data given in the TSIG
   RR. In particular, it specifies that a shorter length field value
   specifies truncation and a longer length field is an error.

   In Section 4, policy restrictions and implications related to
   truncation and a new error code to indicate truncation shorter than
   permitted by policy are described and specified.

   The use herein of MUST, SHOULD, MAY, MUST NOT, and SHOULD NOT is as
   defined in [RFC 2119].

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 3]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

2. Algorithms and Identifiers

   TSIG Resource Records (RRs) [RFC 2845] are used to authenticate DNS
   queries and responses.  They are intended to be efficient symmetric
   authentication codes based on a shared secret. (Asymmetric signatures
   can be provided using the SIG RR [RFC 2931]. In particular, SIG(0)
   can be used for transaction signatures.) Used with a strong hash
   function, HMAC [RFC 2104] provides a way to calculate such symmetric
   authentication codes. The only specified HMAC based TSIG algorithm
   identifier has been HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT based on MD5 [RFC 1321].

   The use of SHA-1 [FIPS 180-2, RFC 3174], which is a 160 bit hash, as
   compared with the 128 bits for MD5, and additional hash algorithms in
   the SHA family [FIPS 180-2, RFC 3874, SHA2draft] with 224, 256, 384,
   and 512 bits, may be preferred in some cases particularly since
   increasingly successful cryptanalytic attacks are being made on the
   shorter hashes.

   Use of TSIG between a DNS resolver and server is by mutual agreement.
   That agreement can include the support of additional algorithms and
   criteria as to which algorithms and truncations are acceptable,
   subject to the restriction and guidelines in Section 3 and 4 below.
   Key agreement can be by the TKEY mechanism [RFC 2930] or other
   mutually agreeable method.

   The current HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT and gss-tsig identifiers are
   included in the table below for convenience.  Implementations which
   support TSIG MUST also implement HMAC SHA1 and HMAC SHA256 and MAY
   implement gss-tsig and the other algorithms listed below.

         Mandatory      HMAC-MD5.SIG-ALG.REG.INT
         Optional       gss-tsig
         Mandatory      hmac-sha1
         Optional       hmac-sha224
         Mandatory      hmac-sha256
         Optional       hamc-sha384
         Optional       hmac-sha512

   SHA-1 truncated to 96 bits (12 octets) SHOULD be implemented.

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 4]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

3. Specifying Truncation

   When space is at a premium and the strength of the full length of an
   HMAC is not needed, it is reasonable to truncate the HMAC output and
   use the truncated value for authentication. HMAC SHA-1 truncated to
   96 bits is an option available in several IETF protocols including
   IPSEC and TLS.

   The TSIG RR [RFC 2845] includes a "MAC size" field, which gives the
   size of the MAC field in octets. But [RFC 2845] does not specify what
   to do if this MAC size differs from the length of the output of HMAC
   for a particular hash function. Truncation is indicated by a MAC size
   less than the HMAC size as specified below.

3.1 Truncation Specification

   The specification for TSIG handling is changed as follows:

   1. If "MAC size" field is greater than HMAC output length:
         This case MUST NOT be generated and if received MUST cause the
      packet to be dropped and RCODE 1 (FORMERR) to be returned.

   2. If "MAC size" field equals HMAC output length:
         Operation is as described in [RFC 2845] with the entire output
      HMAC output present.

   3. "MAC size" field is less than HMAC output length but greater than
      that specified in case 4 below:
         This is sent when the signer has truncated the HMAC output to
      an allowable length, as described in RFC 2104, taking initial
      octets and discarding trailing octets. TSIG truncation can only be
      to an integral number of octets. On receipt of a packet with
      truncation thus indicated, the locally calculated MAC is similarly
      truncated and only the truncated values compared for
      authentication. The request MAC used when calculating the TSIG MAC
      for a reply is the truncated request MAC.

   4. "MAC size" field is less than the larger of 10 (octets) and half
      the length of the hash function in use:
         With the exception of certain TSIG error messages described in
      RFC 2845 section 3.2 where it is permitted that the MAC size be
      zero, this case MUST NOT be generated and if received MUST cause
      the packet to be dropped and RCODE 1 (FORMERR) to be returned. The
      size limit for this case can also, for the hash functions
      mentioned in this document, be stated as less than half the hash
      function length for hash functions other than MD5 and less than 10
      octets for MD5.

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 5]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

4. TSIG Truncation Policy and Error Provisions

   Use of TSIG is by mutual agreement between a resolver and server.
   Implicit in such "agreement" are criterion as to acceptable keys and
   algorithms and, with the extensions in this document, truncations.
   Note that it is common for implementations to bind the TSIG secret
   key or keys that may be in place at a resolver and server to
   particular algorithms. Thus such implementations only permit the use
   of an algorithm if there is an associated key in place. Receipt of an
   unknown, unimplemented, or disabled algorithm typically results in a
   BADKEY error.

      Local policies MAY require the rejection of TSIGs even though they
   use an algorithm for which implementation is mandatory.

      When a local policy permits acceptance of a TSIG with a particular
   algorithm and a particular non-zero amount of truncation it SHOULD
   also permit the use of that algorithm with lesser truncation (a
   longer MAC) up to the full HMAC output.

      Regardless of a lower acceptable truncated MAC length specified by
   local policy, a reply SHOULD be sent with a MAC at least as long as
   that in the corresponding request unless the request specified a MAC
   length longer than the HMAC output.

      Implementations permitting multiple acceptable algorithms and/or
   truncations SHOULD permit this list to be ordered by presumed
   strength and SHOULD allow different truncations for the same
   algorithm to be treated as separate entities in this list. When so
   implemented, policies SHOULD accept a presumed stronger algorithm and
   truncation than the minimum strength required by the policy.

      If a TSIG is received with truncation which is permitted under
   Section 3 above but the MAC is too short for the local policy in
   force, an RCODE of TBA [22 suggested](BADTRUNC) MUST be returned.

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 6]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

5. IANA Considerations

   This document, on approval for publication as a standards track RFC,
   (1) registers the new TSIG algorithm identifiers listed in Section 2
   with IANA and (2) allocates the BADTRUNC RCODE TBA [22 suggested] in
   Section 4. [RFC 2845]

6. Security Considerations

   For all of the message authentication code algorithms listed herein,
   those producing longer values are believed to be stronger; however,
   while there have been some arguments that mild truncation can
   strengthen a MAC by reducing the information available to an
   attacker, excessive truncation clearly weakens authentication by
   reducing the number of bits an attacker has to try to break the
   authentication by brute force [RFC 2104].

   Significant progress has been made recently in cryptanalysis of hash
   function of the type used herein, all of which ultimately derive from
   the design of MD4. While the results so far should not effect HMAC,
   the stronger SHA-1 and SHA-256 algorithms are being made mandatory
   due to caution.

   See the Security Considerations section of [RFC 2845].  See also the
   Security Considerations section of [RFC 2104] from which the limits
   on truncation in this RFC were taken.

7. Copyright and Disclaimer

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 7]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

8. Normative References

   [FIPS 180-2] - "Secure Hash Standard", (SHA-1/224/256/384/512) US
   Federal Information Processing Standard, with Change Notice 1,
   February 2004.

   [RFC 1321] - Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm ", RFC
   1321, April 1992.

   [RFC 2104] - Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
   Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.

   [RFC 2119] - Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
   Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC 2845] - Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
   Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)",
   RFC 2845, May 2000.

   [RFC 3174] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm
   1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.

   [RFC 3874] - R. Housely, "A 224-bit One-way Hash Function: SHA-224",
   September 2004,

   [SHA2draft] - Eastlake, D., T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
   (SHA)", draft-eastlake-sha2-*.txt, work in progress.

   [STD 13]
         Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", STD
         13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

         Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
         specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

9. Informative References.

   [RFC 2930] - Eastlake 3rd, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS
   (TKEY RR)", RFC 2930, September 2000.

   [RFC 2931] - Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction
   Signatures ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000.

   [RFC 3645] - Kwan, S., Garg, P., Gilroy, J., Esibov, L., Westhead,
   J., and R. Hall, "Generic Security Service Algorithm for Secret Key
   Transaction Authentication for DNS (GSS-TSIG)", RFC 3645, October

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 8]

INTERNET-DRAFT                                 HMAC-SHA TSIG Identifiers

Author's Address

   Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
   Motorola Laboratories
   155 Beaver Street
   Milford, MA 01757 USA

   Telephone:   +1-508-786-7554 (w)


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Expiration and File Name

   This draft expires in July 2006.

   Its file name is draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-sha-06.txt

D. Eastlake 3rd                                                 [Page 9]